

The creation of the postwar Austrian nation

Dissertation

to obtain the doctoral degree at the

**Institute of Political Studies
Polish Academy of Sciences**

University of Rostock

submitted by

mgr Piotr Andrzejewski

**Supervisors:
Prof. Piotr Madajczyk
Prof. Stefan Creuzberger
Supporting supervisor:
Dr Paweł Popieliński**

2019

year of submission: 2020
year of defense: 2020



Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer
Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International
Lizenz.

Author's declaration

I declare that this thesis was composed by the candidate, Piotr Andrzejewski, and has not been accepted in any previous application for a degree. The research for this thesis was undertaken by the candidate. All quotations have been distinguished by quotation marks or indentation and the sources of information used for my research have all been specifically acknowledged.

SIGNED..... DATE.....

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	5
1. Methods and theories	8
1.1 State of the art – the Austrian nation	8
1.2 Methodology	11
1.3 Basic terminology	13
1.4. Not so basic terminology - the significance of nation	19
1.5 Ride through history – the changing understanding of nation	23
1.6 Nation as a principle of organisation of society	38
1.6.1 How it is made? – Main narratives of the origins of nation	39
1.6.2 Organizing society	46
1.6.3 Nationalism as a way of organising society	62
1.7 Closing comments	74
2. History	76
2.1 The role of history in nation formation	76
2.2 A short construction of Austrian history	87
2.3 Austrian case of transitional justice	104
2.4 Historiography of the Austrian nation.....	117
2.4.1 <i>Austrian historiography before 1938 – lack of nation formation</i>	117
2.4.2 Legitimising the status quo - Austrian historiography after 1945.....	123
2.5. Closing comments	151
3. Politics	155
3.1 Political elites.....	155
3.2 The parties of Consensus – ÖVP and SPÖ	157
3.2.1 The polices of nation-making	168
3.2.2 Education policies of nation-building	176
3.2.3. Textbook analysis	181
3.3 Breaking the consensus. Failed opposition - FPÖ.....	204
3.4. Closing comments	215
4. Conclusions and closing comments.....	218
Bibliography.....	229
List of Abbreviations:.....	242

Introduction

The idea to create this thesis was born a long time ago in 2008 when I was an exchange student in Austria. Not only had I had the chance to witness the reaction of the Austrian society to the death of a controversial politician Jörg Haider, but also to experience the political influences of the populist right in the alpine republic. It was then that I noticed the fact that there are some bewildering issues with the national identity of the Austrians. Haider had rejected the mainstream vision of Austrians as an independent nation and claimed they were still part of the greater German nation. Through many discussions with my Austrian friends I was confronted with an identity that, at least in my opinion, was undefined and feeble, quite the opposite of the Polish national identity which for me was set in stone. When writing my master thesis about Haider and the radical right I delved into the topic even deeper. What I found fascinating that in fact there is a massive collection of literature regarding the Austrian national identity, much more in fact than in the Polish case. Of course there are monographs published about the character of the Polish nation, how it was perceived by various writers, politicians etc. But I have never found works that either tried to prove the existence of the Polish nation or on the other hand questioned its existence. The more I read about the Austrian case the more questions were raised.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the formation of the modern Austrian nation which is a process that started in 1945. Any researcher, be it a historian or a political-scientist, will immediately see how complex and difficult task it is. The studies regarding nations, nationalisms and national identity could come from fields like: history, political sciences, sociology, anthropology, psychology, linguistics, economics or even biology. Each provides a distinct methodology which makes it almost compulsory to make any nation research either interdisciplinary or highly focused on one aspect. Then issues with the understanding of basic terms come. Not only there is little consensus about what a nation really is but there is also little agreement among Austrians themselves. Those issues will be discussed in the following theoretical chapters. Anyone who wishes to investigate the Austrian case will be confronted not with the lack of sources but with the abundance thereof. And yet there was one thing lacking in all of the research. For example in the fundamental comparative study of Miroslav Hroch there was no mention of the Austrian case. He did not forget the Baltic nations (Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians) but omitted the Austrians. A similar omission was made by a Polish scholar Józef Chlebowczyk, who trying to find patterns in the development of small

nations. The only mentions of Austria were regarding the ill-fated Austro-Hungarian Empire and refer to the German speaking population of that country as German-Austrians¹. Somehow the inclusion of the Habsburg realm seemed to be sufficient and it is hard to blame anyone as the empire crumbled under the pressures of different national groups within and it provides more examples and stories that can be digested by scholars. And yet the complex history of the role of nations and nationalism in the fall of the Austrian Empire obscures the role that Austrian-Germans played, and in fact it is often overlooked. At the same time Austrian researchers tend to focus on proving the existence of the Austrian nation before the II World War and while they provide magnificent works the theory of nation building is often set aside. Paradoxically the Austrian example created one of the most ground-breaking works in regards of national identity: the discursive analysis². The Austrian case is interesting in the way it contrasts with other nations and nationalism in Europe (or even just in Central Europe). The nationalist movements and modern nation building did not occur as is in other cases in the XIX century it appeared in the second half of the XX and was compressed to the lifespan of barely two generations.

The goal of this thesis is to fill in the gap and to confront the findings about the formation of the Austrian nation with the theories of nation formation. Only in this way, I believe, the answer to the question, how the Austrian nation was made, could be provided. The theories will be validated or falsified by the Austrian case-study and in a reflexive way the Austrian nationhood will be validated (or not) by the theories. Secondary goals of this thesis focus on including the achievements of Polish scholarship and placing the Polish national theory within the global mainstream.

For the sake of clarity all of the quotations in this work that are coming from different languages (German and Polish) were translated by the author to English.

Structure of the thesis is as follows:

1. First chapter is devoted to methodology and theory
2. Second chapter focuses on the role of historians, history and its use in Austrian nation building
3. The third chapter focuses on the political aspects (parties and education) of nation building
4. The last chapter concludes the thesis.

¹ Chlebowczyk J., *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów*, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983. p 33.

² Wodak R., de Cillia R., Reisigl M., Liebhar K., Hofstätter K., Kargl M., *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität*, Frankfurt am Main 1998.

Special thanks need to be given to all that helped and contributed to the creation of this thesis. Most notably the two tutors: prof. Piotr Madajczyk and prof. Stefan Creuzberger. Prof. Ralph Schattkowsky's support towards the co-tutelle deal between the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the University of Rostock was indispensable. I would also like to thank dr Paweł Popieliński for his diligent reading of the draft. Other include my Austrian friends that helped me with accessing libraries in Vienna and Klagenfurt: Sai Pavan Veeranaki, Valentina Schaschee, Christine Kern. My stay in Vienna was not complete without discussions with the head of the Polish Academy of Sciences station in the capital of Austria – prof. Bogusław Dybaś. I would also like to thank Bogusław Kiernicki for allowing me to write the text in his calm office. Most of all I would like to thank my wife Katarzyna for enduring my long absences at home.

1. Methods and theories

1.1 State of the art – the Austrian nation

When trying to determine the amount of books that tackle the difficult topic of the Austrian nation one can be surprised by the sheer amount of them. The rather small alpine nation was and still is the object of a scholarly dispute that was not only limited to Austrians but attracted researchers from all over the world. For a Polish reader the sheer amount of literature about the Austrian nation and Austrian national identity is astounding. *There is no historical structure in Europe that is so strongly associated with identity problems of its members like Austria*³, as Friedrich Heer puts it. Perhaps it is this uncertainty of identity (such foreign a feeling to a Pole) that incites Austrian scholars and writes to deal with this issue again and again. Yet despite the amount of works there are scientific fields regarding the Austrian nation that seem to be untouched by scholars. I will list the shortcomings of the literature on the topic below.

While the discussion among historians was prevalent throughout the whole time since the foundation of the Second Austrian Republic in 1945 it were the late 70ties and 80ties that produced the most important works. Friedrich Heer's *Kampf um die Östereischicche Identität* and Ernst Bruckmüller *Nation Österreich*⁴. These two books are fundamental and form the backbone of the intellectual work covering the topic of the Austrian nation. There is however a problem with them, namely they barely if not at all touches the topic of the modern Austrian nation. Heer ends his narrative with the Anschluss and Bruckmüller devotes only a very short and superficial chapter to the modern Austrian national identity (called *Zugehörigkeitsidentität*), which he basically compares to the German *Verfassungspatriotismus*⁵. In this work I will try to prove that this is not entirely true in the Austrian case. But before these two pinnacles emerged several discussions were held in the journal *Forum* in the 50ties. The 60ties presented the readers with an edited by Albert Massiczek volume *Die Österreichische Nation: Zwischen zwei Nationalismen (1967)*. Then from an unexpected direction came an American contribution of William Bluhm *Building the Austrian nation*

³ Heer, *Kampf um die Österreichische Identität*, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar 1996, p. 6.

⁴ Heer's book was a clear reference to the work of Heinrich Friedjung's *Der Kampf um dies Vorherrschaft in Deutschland*, published in 1897, which described the downfall of Austria and the loss of Austrian influence in the German speaking realm.

⁵ Term coined by Jürgen Habermas that people are more attached and loyal to the ideas of a liberal constitution rather than nation. *Verfassungspatriotismus* corresponds mostly with the vision of a political nation rather than cultural or ethnic one.

(1973), which focused mainly on interviews with party members. It is an invaluable source for history of national consciousness among the elites. Sadly Bluhm's work omitted interviews members Freedom Party, who opposed the idea of the Austrian nation leaving scholars with other sources. This omission will be filled in by this thesis. Another American Peter Katzenstein in his book *Disjoined Partners: Austria and Germany* (1976) proposed the implementation of an abstract model of coexistence of two states with focus on systemic processes of integration and disintegration proving that it were not cultural development that led to the formation of Austrian nation but rather external and internal systemic differences. Another indispensable contributions are Felix Kreissler's *Der Österreicher und seine Nation: Ein Lernprozess mit Hindernissen* (1984)⁶ and two edited volumes *Nation und Nationalbewußtsein in Österreich* edited by Albert Reiterer (1998) and *Identität und Nationalstolz der Österreicher* edited by Max Haller (1996). The most important work is however the 2001 book by Peter Thaler *The ambivalence of Identity*, which has covered most of the work regarding intellectual and institutional nation formation. Thaler's work while being priceless for the topic has several lacks. While emphasising the role of historians Thaler does not investigate the issue of history schoolbooks. He also focused more on state institutions which lead to underrepresentation of the role played by political parties, which in the Austrian case is of utter significance⁷. Also the last chapter of Thaler's book which promised to confront the Austrian nation-formation with theories of nationhood does not deliver on the promise. One of the goals of this work is to fill in the gaps left by Thaler.

Outside of historical and political works there are also numerous and rather essayistic works by Anton Pelinka and interesting and well written essays of Robert Menasse that contribute to the discussion about the Austrian nation⁸. Another two essays written by a German historian Karl Dietrich Erdmann in a short book: *Die Spur Österreichs in der deutschen Geschichte. Drei Staaten - zwei Nationen - ein Volk?* (1989) created quite a fuss in the Austrian discourse. Erdmann proposed a vision of one people divided into three states:

⁶ In fact this book was firstly published in French as *La prise de conscience de la nation autrichienne*, Paris 1980. In 2006 an edited volume (band 6) of the *Emigration – Exil – Kontinuität. Schriften zur zeitgeschichtlichen Kultur- und Wissenschaftsforschung* was published in memoriam of Kreissler who died in 2005. The volume titled *Österreichische Nation - Kultur - Exil und Widerstand* contains considerations about his life and work but also about the Austrian nation.

⁷ In the 60ties there were more members of the SPÖ and ÖVP than in the German party counterparts. Austria has about the tenth of Germany's population. See: Fiedor K., *Historia polityczna Austrii*,

⁸ For the given topic the most important Pelinka A., *Zur österreichischen Identität : zwischen deutscher Vereinigung und Mitteleurop*, Vienna 1990. See also: Pelinka A., *Austria: out of the shadow of the past*, Oxford 1998. Menasse's work include: *Erklär mir Österreich. Essays zur österreichischen Geschichte*, Frankfurt am Main 2000, and *Das war Österreich. Gesammelte Essays zum Land ohne Eigenschaften*, Frankfurt am Main 2005.

West and East Germany and Austria. His essays were met with fierce rejection by the Austrians and created an interesting discussion⁹.

The list would not be complete without contributions made by historians like Georg Wagner whose edited volume *Österreich. Von der Staatsidee zum Nationalbewußtsein* (1982) preceded the massive *Österreich Zweite Republik* (1983-87)¹⁰. In both of these works Wagner sought the Austrian nation in the most ancient of times. The edited volume is a great source for understanding the mindset of most Austrian historians that tried to prove the continuity of the existence of the Austrian nation way in the medieval times (or even older). Wagner published his *opus magnum* to celebrate the thirty years of the existence of the Second Austrian Republic. His fellow countryman and historian Olivier Rathkolb followed the tradition and published the *Die paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 bis 2005* in 2005¹¹.

There are also several other works which deal with the topic of Austrian identity with *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität* edited by Ruth Wodak being the most significant one. The breaking work of several scholars introduced a new quality to nation-formation research with the focus on discourse. Wodak followed the constructivists, especially Benedict Anderson, who stressed the importance of communication in creating the imagined community of the nation. The analysis of discourse is multi-layered containing speeches, interviews and discussions. The Austrian national identity is understood as a cultural construct which creates a cultural nation. Wodak directly contradicts Brückmüller's proposal of political nation. The discursive construction of national identity serves as a great inspiration for this thesis although the focus will be shifted more to the discourses relevant in the past rather than in the present. Wodak tries to answer the question: what the Austrian nation is, rather how it was formed.

Additionally the yearly *Contemporary Austrian Studies* has to be mentioned. This annual is produced by the Centre Austria based in New Orleans in USA with the main editors being Günther Bischoff and Anton Pelinka. It is often the best source to get introduced to Austrian studies as it features texts from all prominent scholars dealing with the topic. Of all the 26 volumes that were published up to date several prove to be of value to the issue of

⁹ Most Austrians rejected Erdmann's ideas (among them the historians Gerhard Storzuh) but there were some who acknowledged some of the points made by Erdmann like Fritz Fellner. See: Storzuh G., *Vom Reich zur Republik*, Fellner F., *The problem of the Austrian Nation after 1945*, [in:] *The Journal of Modern History* 60 (1988).

¹⁰ Wagner G, *Österreich : von der Staatsidee zum Nationalbewusstsein*, Vienna 1982. Wagner G., *Österreich. Zweite Republik*, Vienna 1983,1987.

¹¹ Rathkolb O., *Die paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 bis 2005*. An English edition was published later.

Austrian nation formation, especially volume 5 that is specifically dedicated to this problem¹². Very often though the texts submitted are just abbreviated versions of books, monographs and articles that already were published in German in Austria.

In Poland, the issue of Austrian identity was briefly analysed by Adam Romejko¹³. The lonesome article of Romejko shows that there is a need for a Polish monograph to tackle the topic of the Austrian nation. There are however several works about the history of Austria. Albeit most of the focus on the Habsburg period like the fundamental works of Henryk Wereszycki *Pod berłem Habsburgów* (1975) and *Historia Austrii* (1972). Only a few historians managed to reach the time after 1945 like Karol Fiedor in his *Austria: zarys dziejów politycznych* (1996) but his book is rather superficial or Jerzy Kozeński in: *Austria dzieje społeczne i polityczne 1918-1968*¹⁴

1.2 Methodology

When researching nations one could apply a myriad of theories from different fields like history, political sciences, sociology, psychology etc. Each of these approaches would force the use of a different methodology. Since this thesis needs to balance between history and political sciences, I will employ methods coming from these two disciplines. Political sciences and history overlap with regard to many topics. In fact in many cases political sciences deal with the recent history (in Polish, *Zeitgeschichte*, *historia najnowsza*) that is usually dated since 1945. This work will use parts of political thought: theories of nation, nation-formation and nationalism. When talking about nation formation a systemic approach including the analysis of genetic, structural and functional aspects of this process are necessary. It is impossible to omit history as the legacy of the past plays a pivotal role in building nations.

There are many ways to write history and probably almost all historians would agree that the ideal is to write as objectively as possible, to write *sine ira et studio* – without any

¹² Bischof G., Pelinka A., *Contemporary Austrian Studies 5: Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity*. But other volumes contain texts relevant to the topic like volume 2 (The Kreisky Era in Austria), 3 (Austria in the nineteen fifties), 7 (The Vranitzky Era in Austria), 17 (New Perspectives on Austria and World War II), 19 (From Empire to Republic: Post World War I Austria), 25 (Austrian Studies Today)

¹³ Romejko A., *Przemiany austriackiej tożsamości narodowej*, [in]: *Procesy migracyjne w kontekście przemian kulturowo-cywilizacyjnych*, Polak E., J. Leska-Ślęzak J., (ed.), Pelplin 2007.

¹⁴ Wereszycki H., *Historia Austrii*, Wrocław 1972; Wereszycki H., *Pod berłem Habsburgów: zagadnienia narodowościowe*, Kraków 1975; Fiedor K., *Austria: zarys dziejów politycznych*, Łódź 1996, Kozeński J., *Austria 1918-1968: dzieje społeczne i polityczne*, Poznań 1970.

bias and emotions. This ideal however is never reached because of the shortcomings of the writers. Historians are always influenced by their background, their education, the time and place they live in or by the language they write in. Perhaps the best way to get as close as possible to the ideal would be to acknowledge those shortcomings, to be conscious of them when writing and help the reader to identify them. Jerzy Topolski, one of the founding fathers of the Poznań school of methodology thinks that all history is a construct¹⁵. That a historian is not recreating the past, in which case the struggle to get as close as possible to facts is justified and required. A historian creates a new story, creates a new past. The work of a historian is in fact a narrative construction. There is always a reason or a certain goal in front of each historian, which influences his or her work. The nationality of the writer and his or hers academic surroundings all contribute to the shape of the final product of the work of a historian. But probably the most important is always what the scholar wants to achieve with the work. *Every historian when constructing a narrative is always driven by more or less pronounced cohesive vision of the world and man*¹⁶. For me the special focus is the Austrian nation therefore all the history that will be used in this work will serve the purpose to fit in the narrative about the Austrian nation formation. This does not mean cherry-picking from Austrian history. A general outline of events and character from Austrian history needs to be prepared and presented, only that the focus will reframe the history to be seen through the lens of nation formation. Some events were of higher and some of lesser significance for the topic of the thesis. The role of the researcher is to explain and justify the choices that were made.

A bridge between history and political sciences lies in the historical method which serves the purpose of collecting a vast array of sources and using them in the analysis of the origins of political phenomena¹⁷. This is especially the genetic method that focuses on the fact that every process has its origin and creates results. The other bridge is of course the source analysis which in political sciences takes a more detailed form of text and discourse analysis. When talking about nations, which is a very broad topic it is impossible not to use a broad look of the systemic analysis – the general legal, institutional, economic and cultural framework in which the analysed process took place. On top of that the theoretical framework

¹⁵ Topolski J., *Metodologia historii*, Warszawa 1984, For more about the narrative structures of writing history see: Topolski J., *Jak się pisze i rozumie historię*, Warszawa 1998. Jerzy Topolski represents a postmarxist, constructivist approach to history and historiography. After the “linguistic turn” he was under the influence of Hayden White (White H., *Metahistory*. London 1973, White H., *Tropics of discourse*. Baltimore-London 1988)

¹⁶ Topolski J., *Wprowadzenie do historii*, Poznań 2009, p. 23.

¹⁷ Chodubski A., *Wstęp do badań politologicznych*, Gdańsk 2008, p. 127.

of Hroch, Hobsbawm, Anderson and others could be used both by historians and political researchers.

For the most part of the thesis however I will be using text analysis and the discourse analysis with the main focus on the historical and political discourse. More detailed explanations will be given in the chapters that require using them. As theoretical framework for nation-formation my inspiration comes mainly from the writings of Miroslav Hroch and Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska. I do not want to omit the constructivist approach of Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson, but the more balanced way of Hroch and Budyta-Budzyńska is more suited to the Austrian case. While nation is a construct it is not an artificial or arbitrary one and there are factors deeply rooted in history that contribute to the emergence of one nation and I do not want to make this omission in my thesis¹⁸.

1.3 Basic terminology

For every researcher that tries to vie with the notion of nation is confronted with several issues with framing the research. The first thing would be the choice of the subject of analysis and the paradigm of the ontological status of nations¹⁹. The nation could be seen in historical terms and treated as an existing entity. In that case it would not make sense to reduce the nation into the sum of its members. It would also be possible to attribute traits (or characteristics) to a nation. The nation could also be viewed as an unreal entity. The unreal paradigm can be divided further. The nation could be understood as an idea that has an axiological system based on culture, language and customs or it could be understood as an imagined, abstract community with invented traditions²⁰. The last but not the least unreal postmodernist paradigm would treat a nation as something in use. It would only emerge in discourse, communication between people or between institutions and people (in which case the discourse would be political²¹). For the sake of this work I will use the notion of the nation as a really existing entity even if the realness of their existence is based on discourse,

¹⁸ See more in Chapters 1.6 and 1.7.

¹⁹ Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010 p. 29-30.

²⁰ See: Hobsbawm, Anderson B., *Imagined communities*, London, New York 2006.

²¹ A myriad of postmodernist approaches towards nation was presented by Anthony Smith in the chapter *Beyond Modernism* p. 199 -220. A fundamental work for discussing the role of discourse as factor for nation emergence is Wodak R. (ed.), *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität, Frankfurt am Main 1998*. Perhaps the best description of this understanding is given by Roger Brubaker: *Nation is not a substance but an institutionalised form, it is not a collectivist but a practical category, it is not a being but a possible event. A nation is not a really existing group it is a conditioned construct, it is fluid, not necessary but it happens. It is fluidity, a relation, not an entity.* [in:] Brubaker R., *Nacjonalizm inaczej. Struktura narodowa i kwestie narodowe w nowej Europie, Warszawa-Karków 1998.* p. 22.

communication or culture. As in the famous joke made by the comedian Groucho Marx: “*He may look like an idiot and talk like an idiot but don't let that fool you. He really is an idiot.*” Similarly if a community thinks they are a nation, behave like a nation and are recognized by others as a nation they are a really existing nation. It does not matter if their realness is only proved in social interactions; they are a real product of those interactions. It is also impossible to speak of the nation without the notion of national identity which brings another word that needs clarification – identity. This is not a psychological or philosophical work so identity would only serve an auxiliary role. I am more interested in the mechanisms of identity creation with regards to the nation. But what is identity? Jan Assmann writes: identity is the knowledge of a person to be himself, to be unique and unmistakable²². Assmann leaves the question of identity into the realm of cognitive abilities of a person. Identity is subjective, fluid and multi-layered. It is a product of a dynamic process, with the result that an individual can also have multiple identities, each activated in different contexts and degrees. A person can at the same time have a class, professional, political, local, national or supranational identity. I am not writing in plural to indicate that all those identities can exist simultaneously, overlap and influence each other. In some cases identities can contradict each other which are a great inspiration for writers and filmmakers. This process creates an identity that is never solid; it is ever-changing with passing time and ageing of a person. The personal feeling of identity congruence and coherence that people possess is in fact an illusion. Identity also serves a teleological goal – it helps with social interactions with other people. If one can identify himself he or she will be able to identify others, it is a basic psychological and social mechanism when the “I” confronts “The other”.

Identity has to be divided into individual and collective (me and we). A collective identity can be shared among individuals and in order to do so ways of communicating social identities need to be developed²³. The individual identity is also a social construct it comes from exogenous influences coming from other individuals. In addition to physicality, practical and intellectual abilities, a key aspect of individual identity is also the social component: society contributes significantly to cognitive and emotional development. Max Haller in his research about Austrian national identity defines identity as *a socially constructed definition*

²² Assmann J., *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis*, Munich 1992. p. 130. For Assmann identity means *becoming reflexive of an unconscious self-image* so it remains on the level of one's consciousness. Also Antonina Kłoskowska follows the same pattern calling identity: a type of self-knowledge, a reflexive relation of the subject towards itself. Kłoskowska A., *Kultury narodowe u korzeni*, Warszawa 2005, p. 99.

²³ Hall S., *Kulturelle Identität und Globalisierung*, [in:] Hörnig K., Winter R., (ed.), *Widerspenstige Kulturen. Cultural Studies als Herausforderung*, Frankfurt am Main 1999, p. 369. For a more detailed analysis see: Du Gay P., Hall S., *Questions of Cultural Identity*, Los Angeles 2009.

of an individual that is, a social construction and *ties identity to the respective cultural patterns and rules of interaction*²⁴. Those rules of interaction that create a collective identity include symbols, rituals, celebrations and most importantly narratives that are constantly repeated and disseminated among a social group that wants to nurse a common identity.

My focus is not on the individual identity, not even on the collective identity, albeit it is more significant for this study, but rather on the ways that the collective identity is constructed. I do not want to focus on general rules of collective identity formation rather use a case study of a particular collective identity: the Austrian national identity. The national identity is a part of a broader civilizational and cultural identity. For Stuart Hall national cultures are among the main sources of cultural identity. *A national identity is not imprinted in our genes; nevertheless, it is thought to be part of our nature*²⁵. Even if national identity is a cultural construct it certainly feels primordial²⁶. A renowned Austrian political scientist and essayist Anton Pelinka is clear about the natural feeling of national identity. He proposes three types of understanding of this phenomenon:

1. National identity is not a phenomenon of nature, but of culture - that is dependent on social development. It is changeable and controllable, because only the political socialization makes a person a member of the nation.
2. National identity is only one of many identities existing simultaneously.
3. National identity is not only an ontological reality but also an indicator of a person's identity. Various conditions (biological, cultural etc). may change the intensity of expression of national identity.²⁷

For the needs of this thesis I would paraphrase the definition of Assman in regard of national identity. It is being reflexive of a national self-image. Kłoskowska expands this definition stating that a national identity of a national collectivity is their self-knowledge, self-

²⁴ Haller M (ed.), *Identität und Nationalstolz der Österreicher*, Wien-Köln-Weimar 1996, p. 38.

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 415.

²⁶ It is within the realm of possibility that the psychological effect of the naturalness of national identity is one of the reasons why primordialism was once the predominant narrative about nation-formation. More on the topic in chapter: Also there are new ramifications for identities with the onset of modernity which is argued in detail in: Giddens A., *Nowoczesność i tożsamość. Warszawa 2001*. Giddens argues that in the times of late modernity the functioning of identity changed to previous times and confronts the problems of existing in a post-modern reality.

²⁷ Pelinka A., *Nationale Identität*, [in:] *Nationale und kulturelle Identitäten Österreichs: Theorien, Methoden und Probleme der Forschung zu kollektiver Identität*, Wien 1995. The work is a result of a scientific project *Identitätswandel österreichs im veränderten Europa*.

identification²⁸. The national identity as being a collective one can only exist within a group of people that form a society. The identity is the validated, updated and used through means of communication which vary from everyday talk, through public discourse to the use of symbols. A symbol is an expression of a mixture of individual and collective sensations and experiences or an act that can be understood either unconsciously or as a deliberate attempt at implying a certain (or several) meaning. Symbols are omnipresent and seem to be obligatory for any kind of social life. In the case of national symbols they could include expression of tradition, archetypical stories and tales, documents, painting, sculptures and monuments, buildings or even certain people²⁹. Not all culture is national but national expression is cultural. For Stuart Hall a nation is a system of cultural representation and the culture itself is just a discourse³⁰. If we would logically follow the steps of Hall or Wodak it would lead us to the statement that a nation exists only in communication in a discourse. It is however important to make the distinction between national identity and a nation. The national identity is a subjective part of each individual's personal identity but it is also created and moulded outside of one's identity. It is a given of a habitus in which one socialises and grows up. It is reinforced or changed through interactions with other people or their cultural creations or ideology driven policies. No nation can exist without its personal expression of its members. In other words a nation is expressed through national identity but it is not just a national identity. Going further, the nation is an expression of identity through the means discourse but it is not the discourse itself³¹. Paul James distinguishes three methods of nation-formation that could also serve as an example for sustaining the nation in social interactions. It is the face-to-face integration (personal level); agency extended integration (institutional level) and disembodied integration (postmodern, multivoice and multisource)³².

The difference between identity and consciousness has to be brought up for the sake of clarity of further investigations. The terms national consciousness and national identity are sometimes used interchangeably. Consciousness has to be understood as a cognitive competence of a person. Without being conscious there would be no feeling of identity. With

²⁸ Kłoskowska A., *Kultury narodowe u korzeni*, Warszawa 2005 p.99 Kłoskowska mentions an issue with treating the national psyche as if it belonged to a single person. Nation is not a psychological unit with cognitive abilities. She is also critical of using national identity as an analytical category.

²⁹ Wodak R., de Cillia R., Reisigl M., Liebhar K., Hofstätter K., Kargl M., *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität*, Frankfurt am Main 1998, p. 37.

³⁰ Du Gay P., Hall S., *Questions of Cultural Identity*, Los Angeles 2009 200-201.

³¹ Very much like the narrative identity is created through discourse but the discourse is not the narrative identity. The theory of narrative identity postulates that individuals form an identity by integrating their life experiences into an internalized, evolving story of the self that provides the individual with a sense of meaning and integrity. See: Wodak, p. 55-56, 61-71.

³² James P., *Nation formation. Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*, 23-37, London 1996.

this understanding, you could BE conscious of your identity that you HAVE. So when writing about national consciousness it means writing about people who consciously identify as members of the nation. There is a semantic difference but for the general understanding of the national question it is not that important.

Another focal definition that needs to be addressed here is discourse. The term itself comes from Latin *discursus* which means a chat or a speech. Nowadays however the term is overused and abused to such extent that discourse can basically mean almost anything. Jerzy Szacki said: *the word discourse made a stunning career in modern humanities and it is harder and harder to be certain that it means anything at all. It is used in many various ways, and not seldom as a scientific term to name any longer statement or text*³³. At first discourse was used in linguistics to demarcate the whole process of communication or an organised oral statement. David Howarth traced the evolution of the ever expanding meaning of discourse³⁴. In short the term went from linguistics through structuralism, and (post)Marxist theories. Especially the Marxist influence is significant because the approach focusing on the mechanism of power and politics in discourse led to the creation of the so called critical discourse analysis (CAD) which according to some scholars should be regarded as a separate discipline in itself³⁵. It was Michail Bakhtin who first stressed the importance of context in the use of speech or text. But it was Michael Foucault that emphasised the role of power in the structure of discourse. The post-marxist approach includes also more specified ways of analysis like the importance of ideological context and outcome of discourse³⁶. This is a part of Antoni Gramsci's theory of hegemony. There is however no need to become so specific. As Anna Duszak says discourse is a text in context³⁷. The choice of context belongs to the researcher; it could be used in gender or postcolonial studies or in more general context like public, political or media discourse³⁸. Discourse can be analysed on different context levels as the following list prepared by Ruth Wodak is showing: :

³³ Szacki J., *Historia myśli socjologicznej*, Warszawa 2005, p. 905.

³⁴ Howarth D., *Dyskurs*, Warszawa 2005, p. 11-15.

³⁵ Duszak A., (red.): *Krytyczna analiza dyskursu*, Kraków 2008, p. 7. An identical definition is given by: van Dijk T., (ed.) *Dyskurs jako struktura i proces*, Warszawa 2001, p. 12.

³⁶ See Foucault M., *Porządek dyskursu*, Gdańsk 2002;

³⁷ *Ibidem* p. 7.

³⁸ For postcolonial use of discourse see Edward Said's *Orientalism*, a basic read in this field. Since Said other scholars replicated his achievement in different contexts for example: Thompson E., *Trubadurzy Imperium*, Kraków 2002, uses the discourse analysis to create a theory of Russian imperialism. Bill S., *Seeking the Authentic: Polish Culture and the Nature of Postcolonial Theory*, [in:] *Online Journal in the Humanities* 12, 2014, used the postcolonial framework to analyse the intricacies of Polish culture. Nevertheless it does not matter if the study regards the gender theory, or national theory or postcolonialism – they all are in fact limited to discourse analysis.

1. Language (text) level,
2. Intertextual, interdiscursive relation between discourses,
3. Sociological and institutional framework (mezocontext)
4. Broader social, political and historical context³⁹.

Depending on the source that will be analysed a different lever of inquiry will be required. For instance school textbooks need a deeper investigation into the linguistic level and whole works of historians need to be predominantly set in the historical and political context.

A typical CAD tries to check all the upcoming points:

1. make a diagnosis based on discourse analysis as to the state of knowledge, values, ideology of the authors
2. get an insight into the goals and assumptions that accompany communication - both explicit and those that the participants of the communication were not aware of
3. discover and describe the internal dynamics of power and subordination among the participants of communication;
4. reveal persuasive mechanisms and attempts to manipulate;
5. look for loopholes, inconsistencies, and communication errors⁴⁰

In my case I will limit myself to the historical (historiographical) and political discourses as they are the most relevant in the process of nation formation. The reason for this is that there already exists an extensive work prepared by a team of researchers under Ruth Wodak which deals with the topic of Austrian national identity⁴¹. Another reason is that it is almost impossible to recreate or replicate the work done by Wodak in regard to the past. The CAD is only true for the moment in which it was conducted. The only solution is an attempt to get as close as possible to the results of this kind of inquiry with more limited tools. More technical details on text and discourse analysis will appear in respective chapters of this thesis

39 Wodak R., *Dyskurs populistyczny: retoryka wykluczenia a gatunki języka pisanego*, [in:]. W: A. Duszak A., i N. Fairclough N., (ed.), *Krytyczna analiza dyskursu*. Kraków, p. 185–214.

40 Kopińska V., *Krytyczna analiza dyskursu – podstawowe założenia, implikacje, zastosowanie*, [in:] *Rocznik Andragogiczny* 26, 2016. p. 317-318.

⁴¹ Wodak R., de Cillia R., Reisigl M., Liebhar K., Hofstätter K., Kargl M., *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität*, Frankfurt am Main 1998.

as different sources require different apparatus⁴². There is a difference in approaching school textbooks, academic history books or interviews with politicians and each one of them requires a more specified analysis.

There are two vital terms that were not discussed yet. Nation and nationalism require however a much more detailed description which is elaborated below.

1.4. Not so basic terminology - the significance of nation

In the history of humanities and social sciences it is hard to find a more ambiguous term than the nation. Every person understands what nation means. The problem lies in the issue that everyone understands it in a different way and with highest probability will find it difficult to easily and quickly explain what it means. The nation is an essentially disputed concept the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes on the part of their users⁴³. The lack of common understanding is interwoven into the very fabric of the disputed idea. The problem deepens when one will take into account that people from different countries (or should I say nations?) do not mean the same thing when they say nation. As Marek Waldenberg puts it: *The definitions of nations always carry a very significant trait of the author's nationality*⁴⁴. A Frenchman means something different than a German when they say the word "nation", the Polish equivalent *naród* carries even more dissimilar meanings. The German word *das Volk* is not the same than the French *le peuple* or Polish *lud* and yet they all could be, in certain circumstances, used synonymously to describe a nation. The problem deepens even further with the fact that "nation" is also a historical term and its meaning have shifted and changed throughout the passing years, decades or even centuries.

Even within one national group it is hard to find a common base for understanding. The main reason for that situation is the fact that the term nation is quite politicized. Various political groups use it to achieve their goals or even in some cases their goal is to reframe the meaning of the nation itself.

The innate complexity of the term nation is exactly proportional to its importance. In the humorous words of E.J. Hobsbawm: "Suppose one day, after a nuclear war, an

⁴² See Chapter 3.2.3.

⁴³ Smith K., *Mutually Contested Concepts and Their Standard General Use*, *Journal of Classical Sociology*, Vol. 2, No.3, (1 November 2002), pp. 329–343.

⁴⁴ Waldenberg M., *Narody zależne i mniejszości narodowe w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej*, Warszawa 2000, p. 21.

intergalactic historian lands on a now dead planet in order to enquire into the cause of the remote little catastrophe which the sensors of his galaxy have recorded. He or she [...] consults the terrestrial libraries and archives which have been preserved, because the technology of mature nuclear weaponry has been designed to destroy people rather than property. Our observer, after some study, will conclude that the last two centuries of the human history of the planet Earth are incomprehensible without some understanding of the term nation and the vocabulary derived from it. This term appears to express something important in the human affairs. But what exactly? Here lies the mystery”⁴⁵. The mystery seems to be unresolved ever since Ernest Renan on 11th of March 1882 in the noble halls of Sorbonne in Paris asked his famous question: *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?* Despite the fact that hundreds if not thousands of works tried to answer it the question stands open still to this very day. I do not wish nor believe I would be able to answer it in a satisfactory manner. This work does not aim to create a new definition of nation or create a new theory of nation building. Miroslav Hroch has accurately named the problem that every researcher of nations and nationalism is facing. *Anyone who has been keeping up-to-date with the world of academic publications, even from a distance, knows that nation and nationalism belong among the most frequently studied matter and it is legitimate to question the point of adding another book on the topic. One’s scepticism would be all the more justified if the aim of this book were to present yet another new theory of nationalism. Any author who aspires to extend themselves beyond a mere description or narrative is by definition, making an attempt to be original. Admittedly, such originality for too often rests either on taking one aspect of the issue out of context and blowing it out of proportion*⁴⁶. To try and tailor a new theory of nation just to fit it to the Austrian example of this dissertation would be mere folly. Nevertheless it is important to establish a theoretical background and at least try to summarise the most vital narratives regarding the understanding “nation”. The proposed analysis, by no means, will be a comprehensive one. The sheer amount of works, books and articles is too overwhelming creates a situation when any attempt to delve into this topic will create only partial and imperfect results. That should never hold anyone back from trying though.

One of the very first things that a researcher can and should do is to investigate the etymology of the word that describes his or her research subject. Such linguistic inquiry not

⁴⁵Hobsbawm E.J., *Nations and nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge 1990, p. 1. It is both interesting and magnificent how Hobsbawm incorporates the common tropes and fears of the late Cold War period into his academic considerations.

⁴⁶ Hroch M., Preface of: *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015 p. I.

only helps to establish, at least, a basic meaning but also serves as a good introduction to the topic. It would make sense to do the same with “nation”.

In the Polish language the term *naród* stems from the verb *rodzić się* (to be born, a reflexive verb), even till the XVth century it was used to describe offspring⁴⁷. It is no surprise that the Latin root of the word nation – *nascor, nasci* means the same thing (to be born). Even the other Latin word used to describe nations: *gens*, comes from the verb *gigno, -ere* – to give birth. The majority of European languages use variations of the Latin root-word: *nation, nazione, nacion, nacija, nacja*⁴⁸. The connection of the term nation with birth or giving birth is a strong indicator of understanding nation as a family, a people of the common blood and of a common ancestor. The etymological analysis brings one of the understandings of nation – as a group of common ethnicity. The Greek word *ethne* bears the same meaning as the Latin *gens* and emphasises the bond of blood among a group of people. In a similar fashion the term for one’s land, one’s country: *patria, Vaterland, ojczyzna* also bring connotations to the family – in this case to the figure of the father (*pater, Vater, ojciec*). This genetic understanding of the nation is by far the most popular among historians. There are two other ways that identify the nation: functionalist and substantial. The functionalist approach, used by anthropologist and some sociologists puts its emphasis on the function that the nation serves. The substantial approach lists characteristics of the social entity that is the nation. All three schools create their own definitions. It is no mistake or coincidence that the title of this subchapter speaks about describing and not defining. It is very hard to define a nation. If we were to create a list of characteristics that constitute a nation it would quickly turn out that there are not so many nations that fit. A nation is too complex to simply put it into a definition, which in turn would be more exclusive rather than inclusive. Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska addresses this problem and states: Instead of speaking about the definition of the nation it is much better to talk about an idea, concept or an ideal type (in weberian sense) of the nation⁴⁹.

The ideal type of a nation is more inclusive and its biggest advantage is that the real entities that are in question do not need to fulfil all the requirements to become labelled as a nation. One can only compare them to the ideal type and establish whether they more or less

⁴⁷ Zientara B., *Świt narodów europejskich*, Warszawa 1996, s. 18.

⁴⁸ Benedict Zienara wrote an extensive analysis of all the words that describe nations in various European languages. He traces the meanings from the ancient Greek *ethnie* to the Germanic tribal expressions *thiuda* and *luit*, which evolved into *Deutsch* and *Leute*. Ibidem, p. 22-27.

⁴⁹ Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 22.

congruent. *Weber defined the ideal types as constructs introduced from the real world or historical reality. In order to create an ideal type, it is necessary to delve into the historical or social reality, and then generalize and enhance the traits or phenomena that really exist. The ideal type is not a model derived from a theory based on a hypothesis rather than an experiment (a priori), it is not a nominalist concept, it is an overdrawn generalisation of the existing reality*⁵⁰.

How to create an ideal type of a nation? Of course Budyta-Budzyńska presents the reader with her proposition. But before establishing it here it would be necessary to sum up the main threads of the discussion about the origins and the ontological status of nations and then pick up the most important features that would serve as a brick in the construction of the ideal type of the nation. Those main threads are: primordialism, historicism, naturalism and constructivism. The primordialists argue that nations have always existed and only their form had changed with the passing of time. The supporters of the historical approach say that nations appeared at some point of time. The origins of nations could be traced to the times of the fall of the West Roman Empire and the great migration period, to early medieval period and the formation of the Carolingian Empire, late medieval period or the renaissance and the emergence of various languages. Others argue that nations were formed only after the French Revolution in modern times. The second division is between the naturalists and constructivists. The naturalist approach states that nations have emerged in a primordial and natural way, the constructivists on the other hand argue that the nation is a casual phenomenon, and in its most radical version purely accidental. From the constructivist branch stem the ideas of nationalism as a tool that creates and shapes nation. By accepting this argument a nation would be something that could be brought to life but also dissolve and be replaced by a new nation or something else entirely.

The last or maybe the first issue that needs to be addressed is how nation was understood in the past and how its meaning has evolved over centuries. In order to create a coherent description of what a nation is and what it is not, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of certain terms. In that way this work would be liberated from unnecessary ambiguities. As Miroslav Hroch puts it: *Indeed, the sheer quantity of partial findings and sophisticated theories appear to have turned the issues of nation and nationalism into a very chaotic terrain, within which researchers often find it hard to orientate themselves.[...] a*

⁵⁰ Ibidem, p.22.

*mutual understanding is difficult, since only a minimal consensus has been reached about the terms, hence the need to offer a clarification of the basic terms and concepts*⁵¹. As it is with the case of Hroch I would like to limit this inquiry just to the Western world, namely Europe. The inclusion of non-European nations would create an even deeper terminological chaos. Other parts of the world adopted the European terms and tried to adapt their own unique situations to Western concepts.

1.5 Ride through history – the changing understanding of nation

As it is the case with almost all important European issues of historical importance the first meanings of the term nation come from antiquity. The Romans differentiated between two groups of people. One was the *populous Romanus* – the civilized people of the Roman Empire. On the other side of the *limes* lived *gentes* and *nationes* – various barbarians. The biggest divergence between those two terms is the understanding of communities. *Populus* was a nation (people) organized in a specific state. Cicero wrote: *The people (populus) is not in the least a gathering of people brought together by any mean, it is a huge group united by acknowledgment of the common law and the benefits of existing together*⁵². *Gentes* and *nationes* were united by common ancestry, usually coming from a legendary hero that gave the name to a certain nation-tribe. Interestingly *gens* (or more commonly used *gentes*) at first signified the noble families of the Roman patriciate. This meaning in the times of the Republic had shifted and was expanded to general ethnic groups. It makes sense that the familial origins of the word evolved into a description of a community united by ancestry. The use of *natio* for “uncivilized” peoples was not only a remark by a Polish historian Benedykt Zientara. Also an Australian researcher of social theory Paul James supports this understanding and quotes Sallust (*nationes ferae*), Cicero (*natio servituti nata*) and Hieronymus (*innumerabiles et ferocissimae nationes*)⁵³.

Those antique meanings were transferred to the early medieval period as the majority of the inhabitants of Europe used the surviving Latin texts as their source of information. Zientara emphasises the role of the writings of Isidore of Seville, as well as those of Boethius and Cassiodorus. The fall of the Roman Empire brought a change in the meaning in the use of

⁵¹ Hroch, M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015, p.2

⁵² Cicero, *De re publica*, as cited in Zientara B., *Świt narodów europejskich*, Warszawa 1996, p. 26.

⁵³ James P., *Nation formation. Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*, London 1996, p. 11.

See also: Greenfield L., *Nationalism. Five roads to modernity*, Cambridge, London 1992, p. 5.

By following the research of Guigo Zerrato Greenfield compares the Latin *nation* to Greek *ta ethne* or to Hebrew *ammamim*. The Greek root-word *ethne* evolved to signify something different than the Latin *nation*.

the word nation. *Closely linked with natus [birth] and natura [inborn characteristics], it vaguely indicated a larger context than gens or populus, but without there being any fixed distinction between the three terms. The Vulgate [that is, the authorised Latin version of the biblical scriptures prepared mainly by Hieronymus near the end of the fourth century] used gentes, populous, nationes interchangeably for the nations of the Old Testament, and that biblical usage determined the significance of nation for the time being. It indicated a fairly indefinite interrelationship of tribe, tongue and region, sometimes in a restricted sense, sometimes in a broader one. [Later in the Middle Ages] The Burgundians, the Bretons, the Bavarians, and the Swabians were called nations, but so were the French, the English, and the Germans. Unlike patria, nation did not have an administrative significance and initially not a political one either. But little by little the various relationships of dependence and community obtaining exerted an influence on the restriction and delimitation of the concept of nation⁵⁴. It is beyond discussion that the most important text of the early Middle Ages was the Bible and its Latin translation. Johan Huizinga was not entirely right in his assessment of the use of nation in the Vulgate. Saint Hieronymus did in fact use *populus* to distinguish the chosen nation of Israel from heathen nations – *gentes*. Even in the late Roman period St. Augustine used the term *populus* to indicate a community of the same faith⁵⁵. Interestingly Augustine also described the people of the old Greek and Roman faith as *gentes* – civilized people of a different faith. Nevertheless the contribution of the bishop of Hippo did not change the overall shift in meaning that created a division between the civilized Romans and the pagan barbarians. It has to be mentioned that *populus* had also a different meaning – a mass of people (similar in the meaning to the words: *peuople*, *Volk* or *lud*). When Isidore of Seville wrote his *Etymologiae* in the beginning of the VII century he used *populus* in the latter meaning. For all other early medieval communities he used the terms *gens* and *nationes* interchangeably and meant a gathering of people of common ancestry. He also analysed the issue of the language but it was of secondary importance. Many of the Germanic tribes that invaded and settled in the lands of the former Roman Empire used a similar language or dialect; they even had a similar ways of life. This did not prevent the tribes to create various independent political bodies. Yet there was little difference in meaning between for instance *gens Thuringorum* and *natio Picardorum*. In our times we would just call them tribes (or peoples) based on their shared ethnicity.*

⁵⁴ Huizinga J., *Men and Ideas*, New York 1959, p. 106-107.

⁵⁵ *De civitate Dei*, XIX, 24, as cited in Zientara B., *Świt narodów europejskich*, Warszawa 1996, p. 23.

The meaning of *gens* and *nationes* evolved over time thanks to the influence of the Catholic Church. According to Zientara the church used *natio* for communities that were much broader than *gens*, and had a territorial meaning rather than linguistic or ethnic. This statement is partially contradicted by Paul James who writes: *nation came later to refer to all aggregations, or classings, of people with a common ethnic background, including the most prestigious and civilized of associations the university corporations*⁵⁶. The university used *nation* is a fascinating construct. Universities were (as their name suggest) universalistic places where the working language was Latin and yet even there a specific type of particularism arouse. Students were grouped into corporate like nations⁵⁷. Those nations were grouped rather arbitrarily based on their general place of origin and their way of speech. For instance the University of Paris had four *nationes*: *France* for people speaking romance languages (including Spanish and Italian), *Picardie* for people from the Netherlands, *Normandie* for students from the North and East of Europe and *Germanie* for students from current Germany and England. The Polish *natio* at the University of Prague included people from: Poland, Lithuania, Ruthenia, Silesia as well as German speaking Saxony and Thuringia. The self-identification with those *nationes* was quite strong. There are historical recordings of riots, fights and even killings in the name of university nations. Such conflicts and divisions even led to secession from Oxford and creation of a new university in Stamford in 1333. Also the Church used nation in a similar fashion. The councils had divided the bishops into several *nations* regarding their geographical origin. This method was firstly used at the universal council in Lion in 1274. At the council of Vienne there were eight *nations*: French, Italian, Spanish, German, Danish, English, Scottish and Irish. Central European peoples were assigned to the German *nation* and the Scandinavian ones into the Danish one. The council in Konstanz that took place in the years 1414-1418 was witness to interesting developments. Various groups wanted to be acknowledged as a *nation*, especially the envoys from Portugal and Hungary. Even more interestingly the representatives of Savoy, Lorraine and Provence wanted to secede from the German nation because they spoke French. To sum up the term *natio* had evolved from its antique Roman roots to a word that encompasses a territorial or in the case of universities and church councils a more general geographic meaning. The late medieval period brought changes that continued into the next era.

⁵⁶ James P., *Nation formation. Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*, London 1996, p. 11.

⁵⁷ In the Polish language those university *natio* is called *nacja* instead of *naród*, which suggests that it has a different significance.

Another development comes with the turn of the ages and the coming of the Early Modern period. In France and the Holy Roman Empire the term was used to designate ruling classes as opposed to the common folk (named *peuple and Volk respectively*). The first use of nation that broke the distinction between the elites and the folk/plebs/people as Liah Greenfield argues happened in England. She believes that the change of meaning for a broader and more inclusive signifies the birth of the first modern nation.⁵⁸ Central Europe saw a different line of development where the nation remained to be used by the elite and the semantic change and understanding of what nation is happened within the ruling classes – the nobility. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as well as in Hungary the ruling classes distinguished themselves from the peasants and viewed themselves as the only legitimate members of the nation. The ethnic origins were not as important as belonging to the estate of nobles. It was quite common among the Polish noble (*szlachta*) to identify as *Natione Polonus, gente Ruthenus* or *Natione Polonus, gente Prussicus*; or even *Natione Polonus, gente Ruthenus, origine Judaeus*. The separation of the early medieval meanings between *nation and gens* had solidified and was clear even ten centuries later. What is more fascinating in this context is the political use of the term nation. To be part of the nation meant to have political right of which the lower classes were deprived. In Western Europe it was not until the turn of the seventeenth century when the English started to use *nation* to describe whole people of the country and this understanding began to spread. In 1650 Jan Amos Komensky a Czech philosopher wrote that a nation is *a community of people who occupy a common territory, have a common past and a common language, and are bound by a love for their common homeland*⁵⁹. Komensky's definition could still hold up to this day.

The early modern period saw a slow development of interchangeability between the terms *state* and *nation*. Various kingdoms and realms could be references as nations. In this way some ethnic groups were arbitrarily omitted. There is no surprise though, as the XVII and XVIII century are the time of absolutism. The absolute monarchies strived to create uniformed state by the means of bureaucracy. Ernst Brückmüller coined the term *Hofratsnation* – the nation of the royal bureaucrats⁶⁰. In his curious search for the Austrian nation in the times of the Habsburgs he argued that the creation of new administrative

⁵⁸ Greenfield L., *Nationalism. Five roads to modernity*, Cambridge, London 1992, p. 6. For more detail regarding the changing of meaning from elites, creation of new aristocracy see: Ibidem p. 27-88.

⁵⁹ Komensky J., *Gentis felicitas*, as cited by: Hroch M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015 p. 3.

⁶⁰ Brückmüller E., *Nation Österreich. Kulturelles Bewußtsein und gesellschaftlich-politische Prozesse*, Vienna 1996, p. 200-219.

apparatus of the empire was a social basis for national identity. Obviously this kind of nation was very scarce in numbers even if it grew with the development of bureaucracy after the reforms of the time of Enlightenment. And yet there is nothing really new in what Bruckmüller proposes. As stated before both in Germany and France there was a clear distinction between the nation and the people (*Volk, peuple*). In his anachronistic attempt to find the Austrian nation in history he just replicates the developments of different countries. The fact that he distinguished the *nation* of the elites at the very end of XIX century just shows that this development was clearly lagging behind other modern nations. But let us not get ahead of ourselves as this topic will be analysed in detail in later chapters. The Austrian example's purpose in this context serves just to prove the existence of a new social group that could also be included into a nation. The feudal society found its ultimate limits in the absolutist monarchies. The structure of those premodern societies organically and naturally favoured a limited understanding of nation that was limited to the higher strata – estates. With the slow development of capitalism nation changed its meaning, was transformed into a more egalitarian definition. It was then when the Latin word *status* started to describe not a social class but a state. In a similar fashion nations meant all the people living in one country. As Paul James notes the first usage of *nation* in that sense surfaced as early as the XVI century and gained momentum in the upcoming XVII and XVIII centuries⁶¹. At the same time another development occurred: the *status* - state started to become synonymous with nation. Coming from the late XVIII the equation *nation=state* made its way into becoming of the rule of international order after the I World War and the agenda of the US president Woodrow Wilson. The tradition of perceiving states and nations as one and not two strongly intertwined entities became the norm in Western Europe and the US. In Central and Eastern Europe the understanding of nation was different: there could be a nation without a state and in most cases even before a state came into existence. It was in this region that the dominating definitions emphasised the primal ethnic and cultural bonds.

The focus on the understanding of nation switched in the late XVIII century and took a more modern form. Adam Smith in his most known work *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* writes: ... *every separate community, society, nation, state or people (term which, as far as our subject is concerned may be considered synonymous... '62*. Eric Hobsbawm links this understanding with the coming of modernity, of which he

⁶¹ James P., *Nation formation. Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*, London 1996, p. 11

⁶² Smith A., *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* as quoted by: Hobsbawm E.J., *Nations and nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge 1990, p. 24.

distinguishes two major processes: economical and governmental development. He illustrates the rising importance of both economy and state institutions in defining what nation is by quoting the changing explanations of the word nation in The Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy. As Hobsbawm notes the Spanish dictionary does not operate with modern terminology before the year 1884. Nation meant *the aggregate of the inhabitants of a province, a country or a kingdom*. The year 1884 brought a pivotal change; the nation was from now on: *a state or political government, the territory constituted by that state and its individual inhabitants, considered as a whole*⁶³. The role of the public administration became crucial in the late XIX century Spanish definition. The focus on institutions also brings into attention the problem of territory. It is natural that what a government does is governing over a certain territory (or even over certain group of people living in that territory). Territory has become an important factor as early as 1795 and is evident in the French declaration of Rights: *Each people is independent and sovereign, whatever the number of individuals who compose it and the extent of territory it occupies*. The independence sovereignty has to be understood in this context as a possibility to organize one group with the same institutions and government, which could be formed by some representative of the given group. With this example it is easy to notice how slowly ideas could spread into neighboring countries like it is the case of France and Spain.

If one thing can be said about the new revolutionary nation is that it was not perceived in ethnic sense. The connecting bond, the fundament of a community was the common interest. It was not a problem for an American writer and radical Thomas Paine to become a member of the *Assemblée nationale*. He too could be part of the nation. In a similar fashion the American Revolution distinguished not between the Americans and the British but rather between the royalists and revolutionaries. This revolutionary concept of nation was truly idealistic. It was devoid of ethnic or linguistic limitations but that does not mean that those

⁶³ Ibidem, p. 14. It is worth noting that the first edition of The Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy was first published in 1726. The analysis of encyclopaedic can prove to be quite interesting. For instance Aleksandra Jasińska-Kania compared the definition of the nation in the Polish Encyclopedia in the 70ties and the 90ties. The first definition goes: *a nation is a persistent human community created on the basis of common fate, history, culture, language, territory and economic life that manifests itself in the consciousness of its members and the desire to possess and strengthen a state*. Twenty years later the definition changed: *a nation is a collectivity of people distinguished by common national identity. It is predominantly a community of ideas, so the first condition of its formation is the existence of one or more national (narodowy) idea, which goals are to mobilise as big parts of population to defend its interests*. Jasińska-Kania A., *Przekształcenia dylematów myśli socjologicznej*, [in:] Chałubiński M. (ed.), *Idee a urzędzeni świata społecznego*, Warszawa 1999, p. 153-154.

limitations would not appear in time, and as history proved, they did⁶⁴. Even if the French revolutionaries fought to omit the language as an important factor contributing to the inclusion in one nation they did not stop the ever growing power of central government that enforced standardized spoken French. France today is known for its struggle of retaining the „pure French language“⁶⁵. *A nation believes in its own language* as a Frenchman Marcel Mauss stated in 1969⁶⁶.

On the other side of the spectrum are the Germans, who because of their scattered geographical distribution in Central Europe were more inclined to lean towards a cultural understanding of the nation and the easiest and most basic indicator of belonging to that culture was the language. This point of view sometimes took interesting forms, for example in 1860 Richard Böckh, a Prussian statistician and mathematician argued that Jews who spoke Yiddish were a part of the German nation. And yet not all German speaking people would be included in this kind of community. Ernest Renan when deliberating on the phenomenon of the Swiss nation wrote: *Switzerland, so well made, since it was made with the consent of her different parts, numbers three or four languages. There is something in man which is superior to language, namely, the will*⁶⁷. The XIX century definitions of nation can become quite contradictory. What was functioning in one land was not popular in the other one time it is the territory or a government that is the vital part of understanding a nation, other times it is language, culture and will. Furthermore there are layers of meaning that contradict each other is the tension between the single person as an entity and the collective. Edwin Cannan in 1894 considered a nation to be just *a collection of individuals living in the territory of the state and considered whether the fact that in a hundred years' time all these people would be dead, made it impossible to speak of the nation as a continuously existing entity*⁶⁸. But a hundred years before him Edmund Burke already understood his national community as connection of generations after generations and in 1882 Ernest Renan had written the now famous words: *A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which, properly speaking, are really one*

⁶⁴ On a side note: the resurfacing of those limitations clearly shows that a nation is not just an imagined community, a construct but there are objective, primordial factors that contribute to the development of a modern nation.

⁶⁵ For instance: The Telegraph, Samuel H., France's *Académie française battles to protect language from English*, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8820304/Frances-Academie-francaise-battles-to-protect-language-from-English.html>

⁶⁶ Mauss M., *Oeuvres*, Paris 1969, p. 569., op.cit: Kłoskowska A., *Kultury narodowe u korzeni*, Warszawa 2005, p.47.

⁶⁷ Renan E., *La Suisse, si bien faite, puisqu'elle a été faite par l'assentiment de ses différentes parties, compte trois ou quatre langues. Il y a dans l'homme quelque chose de supérieur à la langue: c'est la volonté*. Op. cit. Vorländer H. (ed.), *Demokratie und Transzendenz: Die Begründung politischer Ordnungen* (2014), p. 135

⁶⁸ Hobsbawm E.J., *Nations and nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge 1990, p. 26.

*and the same constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past, the other is the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present consent, the desire to live together, the desire to continue to invest in the heritage that we have jointly received. Messieurs, man does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of efforts, sacrifices, and devotions. Of all cults, that of the ancestors is the most legitimate: our ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past with great men and glory (I mean true glory) is the social capital upon which the national idea rests. These are the essential conditions of being a people: having common glories in the past and a will to continue them in the present; having made great things together and wishing to make them again.*⁶⁹ For Otto Bauer the nation was a *relative community of character*, as he believed that each nation, very much like a living person, has a character that can change overtime⁷⁰. *The nation is not an absolute, but only a relative community of character, because the individual members of a nation, although they share the characteristics common to the whole nation, also have individual characteristics {and local, class, and professional characteristics that distinguish them from one another,* Bauer continued.

With that in mind, a prevailing feature of the XIX century understanding of the nation was that it had one generally (but not by all) accepted common denominator. It was primordialism, (also to some extent called perennialism). It is a belief that nations were a natural and very ancient phenomenon. Of course this type of thinking was not exclusive to the XIXth century. In fact it was as ancient as primordialism wanted nations to be. Ancient poems or the works of medieval and early-modern historians when describing tribes or peoples always searched for roots of the current communities even if those stories were not really factual. Many European nations traced their origins to the times of the fall of the Roman Empire or even further. Those with little evidence, like the Polish, tried to find “their ancient” ancestral tribe. In this case it were the Sarmatians, but putting an equation mark between Dacians and Romanians, Franks and the French, Visigoths and Vandals and the Spanish was a common practice. It cannot be a surprise that historians of the XIX century continued build upon and expanded these traditions

However, even with that common denominator of primordialism, it is clearly seen that XIX century created quite a mess when it comes to defining nations. It would be more precise

⁶⁹ Renan E., *What is a Nation?*, text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11th, 1882, in Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*, Paris, 1992.

⁷⁰ Bauer O., *The question of nationalities and social democracy*, Minneapolis 2000, p.22.

to actually speak of the understanding of the nation as a tree. It may come from the same roots and have the same trunk (with a hole or two) but as we get up the tree everything becomes complicated. There are thousands of branches some bigger, some smaller. Little branches growing from the strong and firm ones do so in all directions sometimes intersecting and intertwining with one another. But it is the XXth century that brings the multitude of meaning, definitions and new approaches that creates real chaos in the nomenclature, classification and identification. The XXth century theories would be the leaves of the tree. Some definitions would still cling to the bigger branches of the tree, as it is the case of Marxist way of perceiving nation. Neither Marx nor Engels did develop any coherent understanding of nation, as they thought of it as a thing of the past – the new communist society would transgress the local, geographical limitations of the nation and create a worldwide classless society. At the same time Austro-Marxists like Otto Bauer focused on character and culture, which was in line with the German understanding of nation. Stalin trying to piece it all together in 1913 in his work *Marxism and the National Question* enumerated the conditions of an existence of nation: *A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture*⁷¹. Stalin also emphasised the role of capitalism in forming modern nation. It seems that the Marxist theory does not bring much to the fray, but other social sciences that are derived from Marxism created interesting insights into the question of what is a nation. Sociologists like Durkheim or Weber included nations as a part of a broader and more general theory of social forms and constructs. Some focused on the ethic or even racial foundations of the nation, which created foundations for ideologies like Nazism. A change of focus on the nation was the result of the II World War and the concurrent ideologies that influenced it (Fascism and Nazism). Miroslav Hroch noted that: *The vast majority of researchers distanced themselves from the perception of a nation as a community of blood and decreasing interest was shown in the idea that a nation was a perennial category. There was general agreement about the fact that a nation could not be defined by ethnic features (language and culture) alone. A nation was now increasingly recognised as an independent community only if its members could be demonstrated to be aware of their belonging together, and to value it. This gave rise to a growing emphasis on the subjectivist characterisation of a nation over the following decades and nationalism being studied as a manifestation and even precondition for*

⁷¹ Stalin J., *Marxism and the national question*,
<https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm>
It has to be noted that the authorship of this text is somewhat disputed.

*the existence of a nation*⁷². Quite amusingly Hroch only listed those perceptions to try to challenge them with his comparative work. Nevertheless the subjectivist turn was a fact. Nation was now viewed from the lenses of different theories that each formed it in its image. The finest example would be Karl Deutsch and his idea of a community of complementary social communication. In this understanding the nation does not exist physically it is present in the very action of communication. It is not an ontological being it is a process. Psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, anthropologist and even biologists hopped on the bandwagon of national theory. A myriad of definitions and meanings was created. Postmarxists, constructivists and structuralists, like Ernst Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Paul James, Eric Hobsbawm, Zygmunt Bauman and others shed a new light on the nation formation process but without trying to exactly define what nation really is or offering very vague definitions⁷³. For instance Gellner does not define nation but what it means to have or belong to a nation. He proposes a cultural and voluntaristic explanation. In the first case two people belong to the same nation when they use the same culture to communicate in the second when they believe they belong to the same nation⁷⁴. This is a rather simplified utilitarian approach as it mixes personal identity and group identity without even investigating the valence (the process of using national group identification as a personal trait)⁷⁵.

Most of the mentioned scholars identify nations as a European phenomenon but a Benedict Anderson has shown, some national movements appeared outside of Europe at the end of the XVIII century, which is earlier than the process occurred in several European nations. His idea of creole pioneers directly contradicts the writings of Gellner as not all Latin American colonies entered the industrial phase remaining feudal or post-feudal societies when the national movements came to life in that region. For Anderson a nation is a political community - imagined to be inevitably limited and sovereign. Even so Anderson treats nation as a cultural phenomenon that replaced religious and dynastic communities. Despite the differences in finding the origins of nations, Anderson quite similarly to Gellner chooses the voluntaristic definition as a single person needs to believe he is a part of a national community.

⁷² Hroch M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015, p. 7-8.

⁷³ By the term Postmarxist I wanted to indicate that while many of the mentioned researchers use methodologies influenced by Marxism they are not necessarily Marxists themselves. As is the case of Gellner he was politically opposed to Marxism.

⁷⁴ Gellner E., *Narody i nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 2009, p. 82-83.

⁷⁵ Kłoskowska A., *Kultury narodowe u korzeni*, Warszawa 2005, p. 103.

That does not mean that there were no new attempts to define a nation. Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska for example states that *a real nation are always a conglomerate of demos, ethnos and Kulturnation, and they only differ with each other with the emphasis put on one of those features*⁷⁶. *Ethnos* may be understood in several ways: as an ethnically bonded nation, as an ethnic group or an ethnicity. This multitude of meanings does not help with understanding what nation is according to Budyta-Budzyńska. Nevertheless *ethnos* plays an important role in nation theory. *Ethnos* usually is in the focus of anthropologists and sometimes of sociologists and historians. Scholars like Bronisław Malinowski research tribes in order to find the meaning behind the social interactions, its functions in the construction of society and trying to define what culture is. The insight of ethnologists and anthropologists are important to comprehend the issue of social structures (one of which could be a nation) and how they were made. At the same time *ethnos* is useful when deliberating about ethnic minorities that inhabit states with a different dominant culture. In many cases the ethnic minorities strive to gain their own state or independence of other states. This struggle can be connected with the effort to establish oneself as an independent nation, as is the case with the Kurds or Basques. Ethnic groups are important for historians as well as they provide a basis to compare with folk or peasant cultures of Europe⁷⁷.

Demos has to be understood in this context as the political nation, which is one of the most common ideas of nation description of the XX century. Ernst Gellner, Liah Greenfield, Eric Hobsbawm and Charles Tilly focus on the “modern” political nations. The emphasis on the *demos* is laid on the issue of sovereignty and citizenship. While Tilly seeks the beginning of the political nation in the early-modern period Hobsbawm wants to limit this process to the XIX and XX century. Despite those temporal differences there seems to be an agreement that it is not the ethnical bond that creates a nation, it is a process led by state institutions and a very specific segment of culture which Gellner identifies as *nationalism*. Other thing that brings the aforementioned scholars together is the idea that citizenship is crucial for belonging to a nation. It is a matter of recognition by existing states, not only the one that grants the citizenship but also the recognition of other states that honour this declaration of belonging. The nation is either *state driven* or *state seeking*. When the goal of having an own sovereign state the nation becomes state driven. A similar way of thinking is present in the writings of Józef Chlebowczyk. For the Polish historian it does not matter if a certain social group starts

⁷⁶ Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu I konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 56.

⁷⁷ For a comprehensive study about the relations between the ethnicity and nations see: Eriksen T., *Etniczność I nacjonalizm*, Kraków 2013.

as an ethnic, cultural or political community. In a Hegelian fashion he shows a one way development scheme which always ends in achieving a sovereign state. A language/cultural/ethnic group develops into a nationality. Nationality develops into a nation (or a national minority). Then the nation or the minority tries to achieve both internal and external sovereignty⁷⁸. He distinguishes two phases of nation formation: the language-cultural phase and the second one the political phase. For Chlebowczyk a true nation in its most developed form is the political one.

The *Kulturnation* is easy to explain and as seen before this definition is used by many scholars like Gellner. The nation is bound by common culture not by territory, state or government. The cultural understanding of nation was more spread in central Europe which geographically consists of many language and ethnic groups mixed on a relatively small area. The idea of *Kulturnation* was most prominent in societies striving to unite themselves in one sovereign state. Miroslav Hroch names this process *unification nationalism* and names Germans, Poles and Italians as examples. Thomas Eriksen also uses the cultural meaning attributing to anthropology. “*Nation*” was used imprecisely as a grand category of people or societies with a more-less uniform culture⁷⁹.

Type of a nation	Origins	Relation to state	Base	Traits	Level of inclusiveness
DEMOS	Social contract theory, individualism, Nation created by the will of its members	State = nation	Ius soli	Voluntarism, subjective	High
ETHNOS	Herder, traditionalism, romanticism	Distinction between state	Ius snagunis	Determinism, objective	Low - closed

⁷⁸ Chlebowczyk J., *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów*, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983, p. 56.

⁷⁹ Eriksen T., *Etniczność i nacjonalizm*, Kraków 2013. p 149.

	Belief in primeval and natural origins	and nation			
<i>Kulturnation</i>	Herder, German romanticism, Evolutionary character of a nation, it is not created	Difference between cultural and political community	Common culture and language	Cultural and objective	Low but open

Another Polish sociologist Anna Kłoskowska delivers a rather vague definition that has to be understood as *Kulturnation: nation is a collectivity connected with a certain community of culture that helps and enables reciprocal understanding and a certain unity of its members*⁸⁰. Anthony Giddens on the other hand understands nation in a completely different way, it is *a collectively existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary [and uniform] administration, reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states*⁸¹. There are problems with the definitions provided by Deutsch, Budyta-Budzyńska and Giddens as they are at the same time enriching the debate about the meaning of nation. The problem is that those definitions cannot be used as stand-alone ones and each is fragile in its own way. Most certainly the nation is not just a process, with the definition provided by Budyta-Budzyńska one would need to firstly define the three ingredients of her definition. With the case of Giddens shows the problem with the Anglo-Saxon tradition of focusing on the state as a key factor in the existence of nation. The definition of Kłoskowska on the other hand is in line with Gellner and focuses on the cultural totally omitting the ethnic and political. Other scholars do not even think of the nation as an existing entity, it is thought of as a process of communication, a narrative or just a political product of certain actors of public life (elites). Hroch mentions a point of view in which there is no nation just nationalism⁸². Budyta-Budzyńska, while providing a definition on her own, decided to shy away from using definitions and proposes using more fluid terms like idea,

⁸⁰ Kłoskowska A., *Kultury narodowe u korzeni*, Warszawa 2005, p.8.

⁸¹ Giddens A., *The Nation-State and Violence*, Cambridge 1985, p.116.

⁸² Hroch M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015 p. 13.

concept, variation or an ideal type. For her definitions always tend to be imperfect because they exclude certain groups that clearly are nations but do not fit the description⁸³. Problems like too big emphasis on the role of state, focusing on territorial cohesion or ethnicity or language might work in defining one nation but do not work with another. The perfect example would be a rather broad definition made by Stalin but even with its multi-layered inclusivity it would not name Jews as a nation, which they clearly are. To avoid such problems Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska instead of trying to define what nation is, proposed a model of an ideal type of a nation which consists of objective and subjective traits. A nation has:

1. *A name (own or given by others but accepted by the community).*
2. *Language, which is treated as a mother tongue*
3. *Territory (also called motherland), which is inhabited by at least a part of the nation*
4. *A belief in common ancestry*
5. *Own history*
6. *Own culture in which a significant part of the community participates and identifies with*
7. *Own state or a desire to poses a sovereign state organization*
8. *A feeling of emotional bond*
9. *A feeling of otherness towards other communities and the feeling of worth*⁸⁴

By framing the national question into the form of an ideal type a lot of problems are solved. Not all of the points of the list have to be checked to identify a group as a nation. Also the division into subjective and objective traits allows shifting focus from one to another. For instance the assessment of physical existence of territory or the existence of culture, state and languages would be different from the subjective ones like: identity or consciousness. With that different types of scholars could focus on different aspects and each contribute to the understanding of one nation. Also the list presented above could serve as test if a certain community is a nation. For example the Polish nation would check all from the list above but the Swiss would omit point 2 (language) and point 4 (a belief in common ancestry). The

⁸³ Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu I konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 55.

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, p 30-31.

Kurds would serve as another example. They are an ethnic group, speaking at least two different languages, living in four different countries (Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran). Depending on which country they live in their relations are more tribal than national and not all of those groups desire to have their own state while others do which leads to lack of cooperation between divided Kurds. They share common ancestry but their histories are different. There is no consensus if in theoretical terms the Kurds should be treated as nation. Depending on the theoretical framework they could be treated as such or the results can be entirely dissimilar.

There is also one more issue with defining nation. With the exception of Karl Deutsch whose thinking was precursory to the modernist turn in XX century philosophy; other definitions are renditions of previous existing terms. In other words the snake started to eat its own tail. The issue of nation became so complicated that with highest probability I could say that it is impossible to define it with just one explanation and a mixture of many are required to reach an understanding. In the conclusion of his work Anthony Smith lists several problems that are also encountered in this work, and which conveniently could be used to summing up the discussion above:

1. *The failure to reach a consensus on the delimitation of the field; in particular, the disagreement between those who wish to treat problems of nations and nationalism as quite separate and distinct from issues of ethnicity, and those who regard ethnic and national phenomena as comprising different aspects of a single theoretical and empirical field, a distinction that corresponds to that between the modernist and the perennialist (and primordialist) paradigms.*

2. *The notorious terminological difficulties in the field, and the failure to reach even a preliminary agreement on the definitions of key concepts. It is also clear that scholars have quite different approaches to the question of definitions, and in particular whether the concept of the _nation' can only apply where a majority of the designated population is included (and participates) in the nation.*

3. *The problems of definitions arise, in part, from the deep divisions between basic paradigms and methodological approaches in the field. Once again, there is no agreement about the fundamental theoretical objectives, let alone substantive elements, of explanations, for example: whether explanations should be causal, whether they ought to be framed in purely individualistic terms, how far they should be reductionist, and so on.*

4. *From these broad differences spring the many divergent research programmes and interests in the field. Coupled with the swiftly evolving politics of ethnicity and nationalism, it is hardly surprising if research should be carried out on a wide range of topics and problems within the vast terrain of ethnic and national phenomena; and that it is often quite difficult to relate various research concerns to each other to form a more composite picture of progress in the field.*

5. *Finally, there is the problem of different value-orientations to issues of ethnicity and nationalism. From these spring often quite opposed ideological positions vis-à-vis ethnic and national phenomena, which in turn help to determine different research problems and interests—as, for example, with the current interests in civic nationalism, hybridised identity and globalisation⁸⁵.*

The age of the definite is over over and the age of late modernity or postmodernity was born. As Zygmunt Bauman writes, the times of late modernity or postmodernity are rejecting the modernist order and delve into the territory of relativism⁸⁶. Trying to define the term nation was like trying to name the ineffable and it no longer became a possibility. Nation became an essentially contested concept. It means that this contested concept *gives a name to a problematic situation that many people recognize: that in certain kinds of talk there is a variety of meanings employed for key terms in an argument, and there is a feeling that dogmatism ("My answer is right and all others are wrong"), skepticism ("All answers are equally true (or false); everyone has a right to his own truth"), and eclecticism ("Each meaning gives a partial view so the more meanings the better") are none of them the appropriate attitude towards that variety of meanings⁸⁷*. In my understanding every new entry and research tries to shed a new light on what nation is and does not necessarily exclude the validity of other works and this is the basis on which I will conduct my research.

1.6 Nation as a principle of organisation of society

Nowadays in most states there are only two primary ways of becoming a citizen of a country, (which might also mean becoming a part of a nation): either through *ius sanguinis* (the law of blood) or *ius soli* (law of land). The first law draws attention to the natural bonds of blood and family and echoes the ethnic understanding of a national community. The law of

⁸⁵ Smith D.A., *Nationalism and modernism*, New York 1998 p 221.

⁸⁶ Bauman Z., *Ponowoczesność jako źródło cierpień*, Warszawa 2000.

⁸⁷ Graver E., *Rethoric and essentially contested arguments* [in:] *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 11 (3), p. 168.

land is connected to the territorial aspect of citizenship. It would be required only to be born in a certain land to become a citizen. Both types of recognition require the existence of states and their institutions to validate the citizenship which has to be recognized internally and externally. In a perfect world all existing countries would legally acknowledge the existence of others, which is sadly not the case now. There are also secondary ways of becoming a citizen but in most cases they concern people who already got their first citizenship in the aforementioned two ways. *Ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* are prime examples of practical ways of basic society organization and have to be understood as a necessity. They are the most simplified essence of the problem of belonging to a polity and to a society but do not cover the myriad possibilities when it comes to identity: ethnic, national, regional etc. Such is the role that law plays in creating fundamental roles for societies. In the case of belonging it focuses on blood and land. Perhaps it is no coincidence that Nazi propaganda used *Blut und Boden* as tool in nation formation directed towards the peasant masses⁸⁸.

Ius soli and *ius sanguinis* carry a huge historical baggage of the ways in which nations and their nation-states were formed. In this subchapter I would like to focus on the theories of nation-formation and try to answer not only how nations came to life but also why (the answer to the latter is somewhat spoiled in the title of this chapter). As with trying to define what nation is one finds a similar problem with trying to find an answer on how nations came to life. Luckily this time the major narratives and ideas can be brought together in to distinct groups.

1.6.1 How it is made? – Main narratives of the origins of nation

The first big difference between scholars and researchers lies in the concept of when nations emerged or appeared in this world. Anthony D. Smith names five groups with the two most prominent ones being primordialists and modernists. It would serve best to quote Smiths definitions⁸⁹:

Primordialists attempt to understand the passion and self-sacrifice characteristic of nations and nationalism by deriving them from *‘primordial’* attributes of basic social and cultural

⁸⁸ For more information on national and social engineering in Nazi Germany look in: Madajczyk P., *Marzenie o narodzie doskonałym. Między biopolityką a etnopolityką*, Warszawa 2017.

⁸⁹ It has to be underlined that Smith uses the word paradigm for his five distinguished groups which I find unjustifiable. Not only some of his “paradigms” are too similar too each other but in general when used separately they omit important parts of other theories. It would make more sense to call them narratives or approaches.

phenomena like language, religion, territory, and especially kinship. Primordialist approaches, whether of the cultural or the sociobiological varieties, have sensitised us to the intimate links between ethnicity and kinship, and ethnicity and territory, and have revealed the ways in which they can generate powerful sentiments of collective belonging. This is evident, not only in the work of van den Berghe and Geertz, but also in Grosby's research on ancient Israel.

***Perennialism** views nations over the *longue durée* and attempts to grasp their role as long-term components of historical development—whether they are seen as temporally continuous or recurrent in history. Perennialists tend to derive modern nations from fundamental ethnic ties, rather than from the processes of modernisation. Perennialist approaches, like those of Fishman, Armstrong, Seton-Watson and, in respect of ethnicity, Connor and Horowitz, have contributed greatly to our understanding of the functions of language and ethnic ties, and the power of myths of origin and familial metaphors, in rousing popular support for nationalism. Here they serve as valuable correctives to the more extreme modernist interpretations and remind us of continuities and recurrences of ethnic phenomena⁹⁰.*

It is hard to actually justify the distinction between primordialists and perennialists. Both of these groups view the issue of nation formation with the *longue durée* in sight. Both emphasise the importance of ethnicity, language and other objectively existing factors that contribute to making a nation. *Powerful sentiments* from primordialists carry basically the same meaning as the perennial *power of myths of origin*. Perhaps Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska, who takes a different approach and omits perennialists entirely, could shed more light. The difference that Smith is seeking lies in the way that scholars distinguish the origins of nations. One group is naturalists and other is constructivists. Naturalists claim that nations are primeval, that came to life in a natural and organic way. They are neither created nor brought to life. Nations have always existed only they did not have the awareness of their own existence. The only historical process involved is the rising tide of national self-consciousness. These beliefs were often held by writers of the romantic period as well as nationalist ideologues. On the other side of the spectrum are the constructivists who claim that nations are something accidental and unnecessary. They were created by various and yet specific agents through the means of ideology, nationalism, the work of elites etc.

⁹⁰ Smith D.A., *Nationalism and modernism*, New York 1998 p 223-225.

Interestingly though, nations had to be formed around certain ideas or myths like language, culture or fatherland which may sound primordial but could as well be invented or imagined traditions. For Budyta-Budzyńska the primordialist approach usually is naturalist: nations existed for a long time only their form changed. But the naturalists could reject the romanticized primordial idea and lean to the historical approach⁹¹. The historical approach says that nations appeared in a specific moment of time, but to find that point of time is no easy task. Historians who focus on a certain period of time usually tend to favor the subject of their research as the moment of origins of nations. There is little consensus when exactly that happened. The starting point could be placed in the dark ages that followed the Great Migrations of barbarian tribe from IVth to the VIth century A.D. Going further in time historians like Christopher Dawson emphasize the era of Charlemagne or like Mark Bloch the times of the Crusades. More on the constructivist side some scholars focus on the role played by the institutions of states and the birth of printing press and capitalism. Charles Tilly argues that state centralization forced uniformity. The same argument was repeated by Ernst Gellner only that he described the same process that happened 300 years later in the XIXth century. Gellner also frames the process of industrialization. The invention of the printing press and capitalism seem to be of utter importance for Benedict Anderson but also the sociologist Antonina Kłoskowska who traces the roots of national cultures to the early modern period. In this group also Liah Greenfield has to be included. Although she focuses on the development of civic nations she still places the English example in the early modern era. Józef Chlebowczyk, writing under the Marxist influence, attributes the nation development process with the end of feudalism and eve of capitalism (which could happen in different periods of time in different countries). And last but not the least are researchers that view nation formation as a typically modern phenomenon dating from the American Revolutionary War and the French Revolution (eg. Hobsbawm). There are also historians and sociologists that try to bring those various opinions together and create a coherent narrative like Miroslav Hroch who tries to marry the perennial-naturalism with modernization theory.

Since modernity and modernization have been evoked, this probably is the best place to return to the definitions of Anthony Smith:

Modernists seek to derive both nations and nationalism from the novel processes of modernisation, and to show how states, nations and nationalisms, and notably their elites,

⁹¹ Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 23-25

have mobilised and united populations in novel ways to cope with modern conditions and modern political imperatives. Modernist approaches like those of Anderson and Hobsbawm have been particularly illuminating in uncovering the role of discursive networks of communication and of ritualised activities and symbolism in forging national communities. Scholars such as Mann, Breuilly, Tilly and Giddens have done much to demonstrate the formative role of the state, warfare and bureaucracy, while the often decisive role of political elites and their strategies has been explored by scholars like Brass and Hechter. This is paralleled by the work on the intelligentsia's seminal role by Hroch, Nairn and others, who have developed the powerful insights and wide-ranging analyses of Gellner and Kedourie⁹².

For Budyta Budzyńska the modernism as exemplified by Smith would be put into the historical-constructivist end of the axis. But Smith makes the issue more complicated by trying to find a middle-ground between perennial and modernist approach and proposes a new idea of ethno-symbolism.

***Ethno-symbolism** aims to uncover the symbolic legacy of ethnic identities for particular nations, and to show how modern nationalisms and nations rediscover and reinterpret the symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions of their ethno-histories, as they face the problems of modernity. Here too the attempts by Armstrong, Hutchinson and myself to trace the role of myths, symbols, values and memories in generating ethnic and national attachments and forging cultural and social networks, have added to our appreciation of the subjective and historical dimensions of nations and nationalism. This is matched by a parallel concern with investigating the ways in which nationalists have rediscovered and used the ethno-symbolic repertoire for national ends, in particular the myths and memories of ethnic election, sacred territory, collective destiny and the golden age.*

In this way Smith tries to mix the pre modern roots of the nation. The idea is that Gellner and Hobsbawm and other modernists are wrong in the assumption that there were no nations before modern times. It is not hard to think of examples like the Jews, Armenians or Persians whose national roots could be traced not to medieval times but to antiquity. What to do with the example of ancient Roman citizens? Were they a nation in a modern sense? The other issue is the continuity of communities that formed in medieval ages in Europe and only changed overtime. Zientara, a historical perennialist (in Smithian terms), does see the difference between modern nations and their predecessors are only quantitative and not

⁹² Smith D.A., *Nationalism and modernism*, New York 1998 p 224.

qualitative⁹³. In other words, nations existed and over time more and more parts of society were included in the participation in the national community. Kłoskowska also follows this logic by quoting sources from the early-modern period⁹⁴. Trying to find a compromise Smith argues of the perennial origins but modern ways of nation building. Probably a most poetic example for Smiths views would be the one used by Peter Alter⁹⁵. He compared the forming of European nations to the construction process of a gothic cathedral. With foundations laid in medieval times the cathedrals stood unfinished during the early modern period only to find their towers built in the XIXth century. A very interesting remark, in this regard, comes from Ernst Gellner as he compares the traditional agrarian society to a natural species and the industrial society to an artificially generated one⁹⁶. If a continuity between medieval ethnic communities and certain modern nations could be traced then the ethno-symbolical approach would be validated (and the constructivist model of Gellner would be contradicted). Paul James on the other hand leans towards Smiths ethno-symbolical approach with a new touch of the theory of abstract communities. For him abstract communities existed since the medieval ages and he sees continuity in the change of those communities. Each new age brought a development and broadening of the abstraction and in most cases (at least in Europe) it was a continuous process. Medieval *nationes* created an abstract sense of place, the early modern state apparatus played a dominant role but it managed to bring a broader abstraction that led to politicization of the concept of the nation⁹⁷. Then came the nationalist movements of the XIX century that looked for a mass community that had to be abstract because no one would be able to meet that amount of people in person. The mass mobilization created the public sphere with abstract ideas of public sovereignty and national citizenship⁹⁸. The nation state when finally formed was an amalgamation of abstract community and an abstract state apparatus. Then came the post-modern nation of the late XX century with neo-nationalism

⁹³ Zientara B., ... p 18.

⁹⁴ Kłoskowska p. 52-75. The reason behind Kłoskowska going so back to the past is the fact that in the given chapter she analyses the correlation between the fatherland (*patria*) and the national identity. In most cases fatherland means the same as a state and state driven nation can occur before the modernisation period of the XIX century. That is the result of using the cultural understanding of the nation and focusing on identity which is highly subjective.

⁹⁵ Alter P., *Nationalism*, London 1991.

⁹⁶ Gellner E., *Narody i nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 2009, p. 138.

⁹⁷ The idea of the Two bodies of the king is a great example of this abstraction. The term was coined by a German historian from Poznań – Ernst Kantorowicz. For more information see: Sowa J., *Fantomowe ciało króla*,

⁹⁸ Not dissimilar to Hroch's theory of phase A-B-C. Only for Hroch the model was predominantly used for non-state nations. This model is described in the following chapter of the thesis.

and globalization. For Paul James there are continuities within the social form of abstract community from medieval to postmodern times⁹⁹.

The upcoming postmodern definition serves as a gateway to the future, to show where current trends are taking the idea of nation. The insight of postmodernist focuses on identity and could contribute to the development of understanding of nation by adding analyses of other parts of a person's identity (like gender) that could overlap with the national identity.

Postmodern analyses have revealed the fragmentation of contemporary national identities, and suggest the advent of a new 'post-national' order of identity politics and global culture. Analyses of such postmodern themes as fragmentation, feminism and globalisation can be seen as continuations of components of the modernist paradigm. Some of them, notably those of Bhabha, Chatterjee and Yuval-Davis, have embraced a 'postmodernist' deconstructionism, whereas others—for example, those of Mosse, Schlesinger, Kandiyoti, Brubaker and Billig—are intent on exploring novel postmodern dimensions. Though they may eschew a more general theory of nationalism, they embody significant advances in our understanding of the dynamics of identity in plural Western societies¹⁰⁰.

Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska takes a different approach and speaks of primordial - historical and natural – constructivist dichotomous approaches¹⁰¹. She dismisses both the perennial category and merges it with the primordial, as there are not enough differences that would justify such an act. She also does not distinguish ethno-symbolism as a viable paradigm. That treatment of proposals forwarded by Smith has some footing. It is hard to say that both primordialism and perennialism are paradigms when they are hardly distinguishable. The same goes for the newly proposed ethno-symbolism, which seems to be a bridge between the primordial and the modern. If we were to combine both frameworks proposed by Smith and Budyta-Budzyńska and organize the paradigms on the axis of approaches the results would look like the ones presented in **Table 1**.

⁹⁹ James P., *Nation formation. Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*, London 1996, p. 191.

¹⁰⁰ Smith D.A., *Nationalism and modernism*, New York 1998 p. 225. Quite paradoxically many of the postmodern approaches do not differ that much from Renan's remark of national identity being a constant plebiscite, the difference lies in the much more developed theoretical and methodological apparatus but the assumption of how national identity works traces back to the XIXth century. Perhaps it is a good example on how little the foundations of what constitutes the nation in the eyes of researchers and scholars had changed over the passing centuries.

¹⁰¹ Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p.23-28.





Table 1

By applying the paradigms proposed by Smith on a graph based on Budyta-Budzyńska proposal of approaches we can easily observe the fluidity of several categories and the uneven distribution of the so called paradigms. The perennial paradigm occupies two fields as it employs parts of both primordial and historical approaches, as well as constructivist and historical. It has built upon the primordial theory but has not reached the constructivist end of modernism. That is the main reason why I would argue against naming it a paradigm as the overlapping with different paradigms is too big to justify that distinction. Ethno-symbolism is in fact just another version of modernist constructivism that heavily looks into the past and uses primordial (or perennial) categories in a modern way. There are other problems at hand. For example some modernists consider ethnicity as one of the building blocks of a modern nation and the post-modernism focuses much on the present and partial identities that are only emergent. The graphic representation in **Table 1** shows the uneven distribution of theories as most of them lean towards the historical and constructivist approaches. In any research regarding nation it would make sense to shift the focus on historical and constructivist approaches as with the exception of primordial theories all of them linger in one area. Given the fact that primordialism was mostly a historical ideology used in nation formation during

the romantic period and by XIX century national movements it almost excludes it from modern research¹⁰².



1.6.2 Organizing society

Human beings are social animals. That statement of Aristotle has been true for the most part of the last 2500 years. People organize or are organized into groups and form communities: from families, clans, tribes, through ethnic groups to modern nations. All those communities also function in the framework of institutions that they create or are forced upon by other communities. Despite the major differences between the theories of nation formation they do exhibit a common process of community formation led by agents and actors like the social elites or institutions. The Pareto principle or the iron law of oligarchy tells that in each

¹⁰² There are however notable exceptions like Clifford Geertz who was an anthropologist researching old societies in Asia and Africa. More importantly Geertz does not even use the term primordialism, as he was an anthropologist not a historian. This term was bestowed upon him by Anthony Smith. Nevertheless most of Geertz remarks about the importance of self-evident “givens” like kinship, same religious beliefs or using the same dialect show how communities form and with the passage of time they can evolve into organisations of higher level (nationhood or nation). See: Geertz C., *Old Societies and New States*, New York 1973.

society or social group elite will form¹⁰³. The elites working within the framework of an ethnic group, a national group or within a state are the driving force in organizing society into nations¹⁰⁴. Even if the nation formation process¹⁰⁴ was a grassroots movement of the peasants it always were the elites (sometimes foreign) that stood behind nation formation such as was the case with the Latvians¹⁰⁵. The other great actor in nation formation is the state and its institutions. Contrary to most Western scholars I am listing the state on the secondary position after the elites. For Paul James the nation-state is the predominant form his abstract communities¹⁰⁶. The last part of nation-formation that needs to be mentioned is the economy and technological progress. The three foundations for (modern) nation-formation: actors (elites), state institutions and economical and technological progress must not be viewed separately. In fact it is the elites that use the existing structure of a state to form a nation (France) or in a different case the elites rally and organize themselves against state institutions to form a nation (Poland). The economic and technological advancements could not take place without an active role played by both the elites and the state¹⁰⁷. The state funded or bought from new factories, which created new elites, brought economic progress and hardships for the local populations that were undergoing social changes. It was the state that created a net of uniformed educational system but it were the elites that provided the teachers and the material to teach. All those three elements are highly reciprocal each influencing the other two. In that way I propose to bind together the differences between scholars who tend to focus on any of the three elements of nation formation. At the same time another conciliatory

¹⁰³ The term Iron law of oligarchy was coined by a German sociologist Robert Michels and was limited only to research devoted to political parties. Nevertheless his law was proven to be true in almost all forms of society and therefore could be used as a general rule of thumb. The same goes for the Pareto principle which primarily focused on the distribution of wealth but was developed into the theory of elite circulation. See: Michels R., *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, 1915. For more modern use of this theory see: *Mouzelis N., Organisation and bureaucracy: an analysis of modern theories*, New Brunswick 2009. Pareto V., *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, New Brunswick 1991. Also look into: Bottomore, T.B., *Elites and society*, London 1964. Bottomore describes the process of change of the ruling class into the power elites which serves as a good illustration of the development of nations. The elites do not need to be limited to economic power but their position also includes education, knowledge, cultural capital and prestige.

¹⁰⁴ Take note that this statement generally contradicts the point of view which states that nation development was a modern phenomenon. In fact similar processes could be observed earlier only they included a much smaller group of people (nobility, clerks, intelligentsia etc.) What modernity brought was the change from limited reach to mass movements.

¹⁰⁵ It goes without saying that also peasants as a social group developed their own elites. For the Latvian case see: Użule-Fons S., *Między Rosją a Niemcami. Proces uświadomienia narodowego i politycznego Łotyszy w XIX wieku*, Poznań 2004. This Ph.D thesis is available in the library of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań.

¹⁰⁶ James P., *Nation formation. Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*, London 1996, p. 151.

¹⁰⁷ Giddens analyses the role of militarization and war that drove industrial advancements in Europe. These changes forced the social structure to adjust to modernization processes. The same can be said about the growth of capitalism. See Giddens A., *Nation-States and Violence*, p.170. and *Power, Property, State*, 1981, p. 186.

ground needs to be found in the case of the great strife between primordial and modernist approaches. It does not matter if the nation had existed for a long time and dates back into antiquity as even primordialists and perennialist accept the fact social changes happened in the XIX century that transformed the way nations look. The modernists would argue that it were those modern developments that created the nations from scratch. Either way the result is the same: if we start with an ethnic group (*ethnie*) that shows preconditions for formation of a nationality and then a modern nation or if we take a class-estate society that *en masse* has no national identity but through the influence of modern nation building, capitalism etc. becomes a modern nation.

Since it was established that the state and its institutions play one of the crucial roles in nation formation a clear distinction has to be made at the very beginning: there were nations that formed within the framework of state institutions and ones that developed without state institutions or even against them. When it comes to the example of Europe this division is also a geographic one with Western Europe presenting examples of the first kind and Central and Eastern Europe delivering examples for the second one. Józef Chlebowczyk presents the differences between nation formation processes in the following way:

Western Europe:

State community -> Community of language -> national community (nation-state)

Central and Eastern Europe:

Cultural community (community of language) -> national community -> state community (nation-state)¹⁰⁸

To go into more detail in Chlebowczyk's reasoning we have understand that at the very base of his modern nation-formation theory is the Marxist vision of progress of society. The progress is viewed as unilinear, which means that all societies follow the same path¹⁰⁹. It is irreversible, and evolutionary. It may be viewed through a progressive lens (the progress is always beneficiary to societies in the higher levels). For Marx and his acolytes the linear development of societal organisation started with the tribal communities, evolved into slave states (ancient Babylon or Rome), then morphed into feudalism, which in turn developed into

¹⁰⁸ Chlebowczyk J., *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów*, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983 p. 23.

¹⁰⁹ Sztompka P., *Socjologia zmian społecznych*. Kraków, 2005, s. 130-141. The view presented by Sztompka is hardly universal. For instance Arnold Toynbee argues that development of societies is a cyclical phenomenon.

capitalism. It goes without saying that the progress would end with the downfall of capitalism and the final triumph of socialism. For this thesis the focal point lies in the moment when feudalism broke down and was replaced by capitalism. For Chlebowczyk the beginning of the modern, national identity is connected with the development of capitalist means of production which he dates on the second half of the XVIII century¹¹⁰. Capitalism has brought more mobility both territorial and social. Traditional societies that existed throughout the last centuries like settlements, villages, *folwarks*, guilds, and estates (social classes) are being uprooted. More and more elements of the economic system become interconnected which creates a vast change in comparison with the highly fragmented and scattered feudal structures. At the same time the economic change forces a social change and the creation of new social bonds. The more capitalism develops the more active and socially (nationally) aware people become. With the social change comes the desire to organise a more egalitarian society in form of democracy that is confined within a national state. For Chlebowczyk, who is highly influenced by Marx the modern social identity had two layers: national and class and he devotes a significant proportion of his writing to emphasise the tension between the two. The class identity helped to create horizontal bonds and the national identity vertical bonds. Chlebowczyk continues then to distinguish those developments into two categories regarding the place where they happened: national and multinational states¹¹¹. Centralised administrations of certain Western European states created an opportunity for the nation forming processes, mostly through the unification of language. The process, writes Chlebowczyk, was firstly limited to the ruling class and the *enlightened part of society*¹¹². In Central and Eastern Europe the limitations of the political nation to the elites lead to the nonexistence of classless social bonds. Only when the ruling class stopped being limited to just the first estate, the aristocracy and was replaced by the bourgeoisie (or intelligentsia) the nation formation process could fully develop in the realm of Central and Eastern Europe. The third estate, the people when elevated to a higher level of development acquires the mentality and identity of either the nation-state or the mentality of the pre-existing late feudal political nation. In Western Europe the nation forming process was based in the matrix of state institutions and this forced smaller ethnic group like Bretons, Basques, Frisians, Welsh etc.) to

¹¹⁰ Chlebowczyk J., *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów*, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983 p. 10. This point of view is nothing new. Similar statements were issued in the past by scholars like Otto Bauer or Karl Deutsch. For reference see: Bauer O., *The question of nationalities and social democracy*, Minneapolis 2000, p. 80-87. Deutsch K., Folz W., (ed.) *Nation-building*, New York 1966, p.38.

¹¹¹ This is a paradox in the writings of Chlebowczyk, he already uses the term national state in regard of entities that were just forming. It would be more precise to speak of multi-ethnic or multicultural states. This exemplifies the strength of thinking in national terms even in researchers in the topic.

¹¹² Chlebowczyk J., *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów*, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983

be forced by the state to be a part of a modern nation. The two most important mechanisms of social engineering implemented by the state were: language use in schools and public administration and the general military service. Interestingly Chlebowczyk basically leaves Western European countries in that point claiming that further vertical national movements developed unconditionally through historical events like wars¹¹³. This flaw in his reasoning is the result of applying Marxist optics. Instead of focusing on national development the interest shifts to the socio-economical as if the nation was already formed. At the same time he includes the *fourth estate* the proletariat into the equation stating that the development of class consciousness among the proletariat was mirrored by the development of the national consciousness. In other words only when workers movements arise they are included into the fight for power in the nation-state (this is the horizontal inclusion). Only then the workers become the leading force in a nation. It would be a disservice for Chlebowczyk to present him as a mere Marxist historian, but he struggles to conform his findings about the nation to the Marxist theory. The moment of the inclusion of the masses to the national community is crucial. Firstly not only the peasant and workers become “nationalized” but the elites which use to exclusively regard themselves as the only members of a nation become open to the inclusion of the lower classes. The replacement of estate society with a national community based on the consciousness of ethno-linguistical community, common history and traditions and cultures and customs create a habitus for a classless, national solidarity¹¹⁴. This is especially true for societies of Central and Eastern Europe who needed to cooperate against the institutions of the state which was not their sovereign nation-state. Nevertheless the driving force behind social change was still capitalism. The economic progress forces the traditional societies to widen their contact which leads to the discovery of speaking a similar vernacular tongue. Small and isolated communities are merging with other similar communities. If there is a state that imposes a “high” version of the language the vernacular is being replaced or mixed with the high language. If the state uses a different language the local dialects expand and are elevated to the “high” status in the community that uses it. The groups that use a similar language enter a phase of inclusive integration and start forming nationalities – the first step in becoming a nation. The language also becomes the first

¹¹³ Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p.

¹¹⁴ Chlebowczyk J., *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów*, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983, p. 50. Of course one could argue that only when nations are formed in capitalist environment only then the workers could see their class interest and start cooperation on an international level. Nevertheless the formation of nations seems to contradict the theory of class struggle, at least to some extent. Chlebowczyk also views the nation formation process as a linear mechanism that once started will always go in the same direction. See. Chlebowczyk J., *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów*, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983 p. 43.

political demand – the ethnic-linguistic group fights for the right of linguistic self-determination. As Chlebowczyk continues the process of standardization of language was a practical one and enabled better communication between local societies. In a parallel fashion the process of development of feeling of sameness occurs. It was a feeling of participation in a larger than local group.

The second phase of nation formation moves to the political territory. After establishing the ethno-linguistic connections the inevitable next step in development is the emergence of historical consciousness. Historians (usually members of the elite) devote their time to justify the existence of a nation by presenting the civilizational output of one people. It does not matter if this narrative is factual or highly romanticised or even serves as a myth¹¹⁵. In most cases the rise of historical consciousness played also a formative role¹¹⁶. The shared belief of common ancestry when looked at through the historical lenses took form of stories of heroes, battles, glory and hardships. As stated before the stories could be mythical like the Finnish *Kalevala*. Chlebowczyk continues in his analysis and mentions the qualitative change of the bond that is created through the belief of common history. Sharing a language was just a technical matter and in the case of sharing same history it is already ideological. While the historian is supposed to write history *sine ira et studio* there is always an agenda behind the writer. History is not just a recalling of the past it serves as a story that evokes emotions¹¹⁷. History either legitimises the existence of a nation-state or is used as justification for the struggle to achieve a sovereign and independent nation state. Through this process the unification of ethno-linguistic groups and nationalities a nation is formed (or a national minority in other cases). The political expression of the desire of having a nation-state is the pinnacle of nation formation, as a nation can function without a state.

Chlebowczyk also nuances the second, political phase of nation formation by adding two stages (“a” and “b”) to that phase. The right to self-determination could be understood internally (culturally) and externally (territorially) and the development of those corresponds with the “a” and “b” stages. The internal right of self-determination has to be understood as the possibility to develop one’s culture autonomously on the basis of native resources which in turn will be a part of general, world-wide cultural development. It is the right to live, grow

¹¹⁵ A prime example is the story of Wilhelm Tell.

¹¹⁶ Maybe with the exception of Latvians and Estonians.

¹¹⁷ More on that in Conclusions of this thesis.

and create in an emancipated national society that is in possession of its own value system¹¹⁸. The second phase is quite simply focusing on the highest level of nation-formation: achieving a nation-state, which means governing over a certain limited territory and demarcating the geographical reach of one nation by borders. By this the nation-formation process did not only change the social structures of societies but the geo-political structures across the globe leading to the downfall of international empires. Józef Chlebowczyk prepared and proposed a model for nation-formation that he applied to “small” nations of Central Europe, mostly the nations of the Habsburg Empire. When summed up the process can be presented in a simplified form:

	Focus	Main process	Social development	Political expression
Phase I	Language and culture	Standardization of language	Ethnic-linguistic group -> nationality	The right for linguistic self-determination
Phase II	Political	Development of historical consciousness	Nationality-> a)nation b)national minority	Right for national self-determination

Phase II	Stage “a”	Internal sovereignty	The right for national self-determination
	Stage “b”	External sovereignty (borders)	The right of a nation for self-determination

Miroslav Hroch further specifies the nation-formation phases with regard of the non-state nations (the second category of Chlebowczyk) into three phases:

¹¹⁸ Ibidem. 51.

Phase A: Elite phase: Actors (players, activists, elites) strive to lay the foundation for a national identity. They research the cultural, linguistic, social and sometimes historical attributes of a non- dominant group in order to raise awareness of the common traits. This is the moment of creation of a national language based on dialects, creating national culture from folklore and creation of national history. Social bonds are understood in ethnic and linguistic terms.

Phase B: Phase of mass mobilisation: elites try to rally the masses. More and more social groups hop on the national bandwagon. Sovereignty and territorial aspects of possessing or wanting to have a nation-state appear in this phase. Possible movements towards democratization. Social bonds are understood in territorial terms but a nation is also a community of destiny.

Phase C: Political phase: the mass movement divides into conservative, clerical, liberal, social democratic factions¹¹⁹. The political agitation reaches a mass scale. Social bonds start to become ideological and work within a national framework.

Hroch's model of phases is simpler and easier to use but Chlebowczyk's is more nuanced. However, the biggest issue with the writings of Chlebowczyk is the fact that he tries to balance the findings of his comparative study with Marxist theory. He admits that capitalism brought mobility and chances of social advance but then immediately criticizes it from Marxist position. Another recurring problem is the role of the proletariat in nation formation – this social class was supposed not only to develop national identity but also an international class identity. History of the I World War showed brutally that the national particularism was the dominant ideology among the masses and that the international sentiment even if always present did not achieve its dominant status. However nationalism can be seen as something different as just a natural result of introduction of capitalist organisation of society. Ernst Gellner rejected the idea that nationalism was a class ideology that only benefited the bourgeoisie. For Gellner it was not the ideological force of nationalism that created nations but rather its systemic role, its function in the times of modernity¹²⁰.

¹¹⁹ Hroch M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015, p. 125-127. Another subdivision could be made here regarding from where the elites originated. They could recruit from aristocracy turned bourgeoisie (Poland), directly from bourgeoisie (Germany), urban lower-middle class (Czech), intelligentsia of peasant origins (Estonia, Latvia).

¹²⁰ Breully J., Introduction to: Gellner E., *Naród i nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 2009, p. 25. In order to assume Gellners point of view it is necessary to identify what modernity is and what social change it brings within.

Gellner's functionalism stresses the importance of language and culture in nation formation but the mere existence of language and culture does not guarantee that a nation will form. It is the function that they play in organising society that makes them useful in nation formation. For instance in agrarian societies of medieval Europe culture and language served to isolate the ruling classes from the majority of the peasant population¹²¹. Each class (clergy, soldiers, merchants, and peasants) lives in a different and separated community. Moreover the system of social organisation thwarts mobility and creates cultural and linguistic differences. Agrarian communities are local and remote and create in a natural fashion their own sociolects or even dialects. Same goes for local customs and histories that are told, all is confined to a limited geographical space. Those segmented societies were mostly autarchic when it comes to both food production and the passing of knowledge of doing so. Even if a part of the elite (like catholic clergy) transgressed the geographical limitation their own group was even more isolated by the sophisticated culture and language (like Latin). In the most radical form the very ability to read and write already is enough to create such distinctions. In the case of elites the culture serves to distinguish them from the rest of the population and other elites as well. In the centre of Gellner's work lies the idea that it was the eve of industrial society that created nations¹²². Tribal and feudal organisations reinforced local particularisms and remoteness. When the technological advancements achieved the level of industrial age everything changed. Indeed it was constant change that is the core characteristic of the industrialisation. Before, in feudal societies change was a problem to overcome now the change became the norm of social order and had to be embraced. The traditional structure of society was incompatible with the needs of industrial economy. Industrialisation forced mobility from villages to cities and between cities and with mobility comes equality¹²³. An industrial society will eventually have to confront the existence of estate or class barrier because they are hampering the process of modernisation. Of course there will be inequality but the social distances between groups would grow smaller and smaller¹²⁴. An industrial society has to be mobile because otherwise the lack would halt the development and competition not only between industries but also between states. A country that lagged behind in development would be easily overrun by a technologically more advanced opponent. So it does not matter if industrialisation was market or state driven. The emergence of a first

¹²¹ Gellner E., *Narody i nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 2009 p.87.

¹²² Gellner's model is verified positively by the case studies conducted by Liah Greenfield . English nation was first. But at the same time there are contradicting examples like the Latvians.

¹²³ Gellner E., *Narody i nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 2009, 105.

¹²⁴ Gellner contradicts the Marxist theory here

industrial state pushed other to follow. That is why state institutions had to introduce a way to create a more uniform society through the means of education¹²⁵. Very much like in an army, every member of society should undergo at least a basic training equal for everybody. Also the commands taught during army drills share resemblance to the uniform language that started to emerge in the industrial age. Higher mobility and requirements for new types of workforce out of sheer necessity need a common tongue. Language, speech and written text need to be simplified, standardised and taught. It goes without saying that such changes have a profound impact on the culture. Providing participation in culture and creating the feeling of belonging to one's culture became now the dominant role of the state. Socialization of new generations happened not only in the local community but predominantly in state run schools. Such culture, argues Gellner, had to be "high" not based on the limited local and traditional communities. It had to be not only adapted from the elites but transformed to be more inclusive and fostered in the general population¹²⁶. The accumulation of technology and science lead to creating homogenous societies. This process can be observed not only on a national level but in the age of globalisation at a global scale, as it creates convergence of lifestyles. The industrial age creates many processes of convergence: explosion of population numbers, rapid urbanisation, migrations, economic and political intrusion of local communities by global economics and centralized states. For Gellner it is the economic change that forced social change that in turn created nations through the ideological and cultural means of nationalism. This would not be far from Marxist understanding of development of history. There is the economic basis and the cultural superstructure that stems from the basis. But Gellner does not see the end of history, the appearance of nations is purely incidental and shall the circumstances change so will the rules governing the order of society. In other words there is no historical determinism in Gellner's work, nations just happened to be but history could have developed in a different way. This thinking is not entirely correct. Humans are social animals and form societies which need to be organised in a certain way. So if there is a breakdown of one system of societal organisation (feudalism) and a new one emerges it has to bring a new way of organising society. With the coming of capitalism new means of communication and industrialisation reshaped the social tissue that took the form of a nation. The cultural and ideological face of this societal change is expressed by nationalism. Gellner is aware that his proposal of the model of social change is not universal. He himself

¹²⁵ Prussia – is an example of a modern school system appearing before and during the early stages of industrialisation.

¹²⁶ High culture could also be derived from low cultures.

states that for one existing real nationalism, there were about nine that are potential but never resurfaced¹²⁷. This brings us to the question whether it was industrialisation that created nations or this process had more steps like: industrialisation->nationalism->modern nations. For Gellner nationalism was a necessity to homogenise a society linguistically and culturally. Gellner's work has to be only understood as an ideal type of societal change and nation-formation. Hroch criticizes Gellner that the coincidence of modern nation-building occurring with the establishment of capitalist economies and industrialisation does not necessarily mean causation. As stated before this is clearly a Marxist point of view that completely disregards the fact that capitalism as an economical system tends to promote free trade without borders and creates international (rather than national) ties.¹²⁸ A possible answer to these two contradiction points of view would be to assume that capitalism and industrialisation creates new models for social interaction which in turn leads to the creation of new culture (and nationalism as an ideology) which then creates a modern nation. But then a new problem arises – there are examples of nation-formation without industrialisation. Even the two models of Gellner the famous ideal types of non-existing states of the Empire of Megalomania and Ruritania do not provide an answer. They serve as functional, tempting and thought provoking generalisations. There are however examples of nationalism appearing before industrialisation and there are examples of industrial centres that did not show any national movements¹²⁹. Then comes also the question of uneven development, not all regions in one state or empire had the same rates of industrialisation. History also shows examples of social homogenisation, especially linguistic homogenisation way before the industrial era. It was the institutions of states that started the homogenising processes. This is especially true for absolutist monarchies, the process was not limited to just them it was just the strongest there. One could argue that it was the birth of capitalism that influenced homogenisation. In that regard Chlebowczyk and Marxist theorists like Otto Bauer and Eric Hobsbawm would be closer to the truth. Perhaps it is best to say that homogenisation and social change started in the early-modern period but entered a quantitative change with the onset of industrialisation. Even Hobsbawm who himself places the nation-formation processes in the XIX century

¹²⁷ Gellner p. 130. This estimate is not based on any research it is mere speculation. Hroch argues that for a successful nationalist movement to emerge a population of at least 0.5 million people is necessary. Nevertheless both estimates are arbitrary.

¹²⁸ Hroch M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015 p. 95.

¹²⁹ Examples of regions where nationalism emerged from different than economic factors are: the Balkans, Catalonia, Basque Country, Finland, and the Baltic States. One example of an industrial centre that did not create nationalism was Odessa in the Russian Empire.

writes about popular proto-nationalism¹³⁰. The proto-nationalism could explain why Komensky, who was not coming from England, the most developed part of Europe, could write his quite modern definition of a nation in the XVII century, long before any modern nation had formed. This only proves that there are primordial (or perennial) elements in the writing of modernists and constructivist they are just disguised in grass-roots movements or in the form of proto-nationalism.

What Gellner proposed was a turning point in the scientific discourse about nation formation and he needs to be credited for making a breakthrough shift to constructivism. Nevertheless his model that focuses heavily on modernity and industrialisation is not without its flaws. There are many problems with Gellners vision of nationalism as the driving force in nation-formation. There are examples of multi-ethnic, multi-cultural even multi-national states that have modernised themselves without the need of national homogeneity. Also nationalism appeared in agrarian societies without the influence of industrialisation.

Probably the most comprehensive and broad theoretical model that lists modernisation as only one of many objective factors contributing to nation formation comes from Miroslav Hroch and I will not hide the fact that his ideas are closest to my understanding of nation formation process. Hroch listed not only modern phenomena as objective factors in nation making but also extended his list of preconditions with primordial aspects:

1. History
2. Language and ethnicity
3. Modernisation
4. Conflict of interest
5. Emotions and identity

History of each nation plays a pivotal role in nation-formation. There are always important events, institutions or people which came before the times of modern nations which are tied to the present. As Hobsbawm famously stated: *Historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to the heroin-addicts: we supply the essential raw material for the market. Nations without a past are contradictions in terms. What makes a nation is the past, what justifies one nation against others is the past, and historians are the people who*

¹³⁰ Hobsbawm E.J., *Nations and nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge 1990 p. 47-59. He mentions language, religion and state traditions as preconditions of proto-nationalism.

*produce it. So my profession, which has always been mixed up in politics, becomes an essential component of nationalism*¹³¹. History also has a psychological aspect. History, or more precisely historiography or the use of history is one of the major sources of personal memories. Memory is an essential part of one's identity and the ways of remembering, the ways of collective memory influence the personal memory in a reflexive way¹³².

Language and ethnicity: the feeling of belonging to ethnically distinct group and language as a necessary *sine qua non* mean of communication are probably the most primordial aspects of nation-formation. At the same time for several modern-nations neither language nor same ethnic roots were a unifying factor. Despite this fact both ethnicity and language played a role in nation-formation even it was just secondary. Ethnic ties in modern nation could be transformed into the myth of common ancestry. Language is a natural way of distinguishing between the "we" and "the others" and could be even treated as the central element of the experience of ethnicity¹³³. In the times before modernity language unified certain estates (aristocracy that spoke Latin or French or clergy that used Latin). With the coming of modernity languages became a correlate for nationality. In fact in first modern population censuses it was the language that was a base for attributing nationality¹³⁴. Language plays a twofold role as a primordial way of identifying others and a modern tool of nation formation. There is continuity in the way that language forms identity so it has to be attached to a primordial factor. But as Gellner points out the need for homogenisation was universal for modernity. In the newly born United States German was used as an official language in several states but because of the need for unification was soon rooted out in favour of the dominant English. The French decreed the standardised French as the language of freedom and barred local dialects of Catalan from official use (*the nation believes in its language*). The Polish independence movement fought for the use of Polish in schools and administration in three partitions. There is little surprise that Hroch places language and ethnicity together as language was often treated as an indicator of nationality as was the case

¹³¹ Hobsbawm, E. , *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today*, [in:] *Anthropology Today* 8(1), 1992 p. 3-8. Also Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska includes a nation's own history (or at least the belief in having one) in one of the parts of the ideal type of a nation.

¹³² Kłoskowska A., *Kultury narodowe u korzeni*, Warszawa 2005, 131-132.

¹³³ Ibidem, p.48.

¹³⁴ Hobsbawm relates the example of the Russian census of 1873 that used language as a primary source of information about nationalities inhabiting the empire. Language plays a twofold role as a primordial way of identifying others and a modern tool of nation formation. There is continuity in the way that language forms identity so it has to be attached to a primordial factor. Hobsbawm continues with elaborating examples of

with censuses, the Serbian national movement or even Hitler's claim for the unification of *Sudetendeutsche* with Germany¹³⁵.

Modernisation is essential because there would be no modern nations without it. The introduction of school systems, mass communication, mass draft to the army, social changes like emancipation, democratization were processes that happened parallel to nation-formation and in many ways they have overlapped. Within modernisation Hroch includes processes like equalization of society or the emergence of civic society and social and political emancipation. Hroch creates a typology of nation formation with regards to modernisation processes. There are two variables: transformations within the national movement and transformations of the modernisation processes.

Transformation within national movements:

1. Beginning of national agitation (phase A-B)
2. Transition from national agitation to mass movement (phase B-C)
3. Adoption and presentation of political programmes (PP)
4. Establishment of statehood or autonomy (NS)

Transformation within modernisation:

5. Arrival of democratisation and constitutionality (BR)
6. Industrial revolution (IR)

Hroch's examples are:

Germans and Italians (unifying movements) :

AB-PP-IR-BC-NS/BR

Norwegians, Hungarians, Finns (integrating movements)

AB-PP/BR-BC-IR-NS

Slovenians, Lithuanians (delayed national movements)

¹³⁵ Hobsbawm E.J., *Nations and nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge 1990, p. 81-100, Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 77-83.

AB-IR-BR-BC-PP-NS

Serbians and Greeks (insurgent movements)

AB.PP-NS-BC-Br-IR

Catalans, Flemish, Basques (disintegrated movements)

BR-IR-AB-PP-BC

Poles (delayed mass mobilisation?)

AB-BC/IR-PP-NS/BR

Austrians (delayed simultaneous national movement without transformation)

PP - IR/BR/AB/BC - NS¹³⁶

Conflict of interest is a factor brought by very few researchers. Hroch identifies the conflict in general terms like struggles for power or economic goods, between the elites and the masses, the centre and the periphery. Budyta-Budzyńska and Charles Tilly take a more limited approach by limiting general conflicts to more specific wars and other traumatic experiences. In medieval times war induced organisation and state-building. Taxes needed to be collected to maintain a military force. War made states and states made war. Military conflicts confronted societies with hostile *others* and was a source of the feeling of common destiny. In more modern times war served as a tool for social engineering and mass mobilisation¹³⁷. War was a great source for stories, myths, heroes and symbols. For instance the 1389 battle of Kosovo plays a major role in Serbian nation building, the Revolutionary War for Americans, the battle of Valmy for the French, Napoleonic wars for the French, Spanish Polish etc. As Budyta-Budzyńska states it is not only war but also major traumatic events that are important for nation building. The genocide of Armenians or Jews consolidated them as nations; World War II ended the formation of the Polish nation and started the formation of the Austrian one. The nation forming process was usually not a

¹³⁶ Hroch M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015, p. 111-112. The Polish and Austrian examples were not included in Hroch's analysis they are the addition of the author of this thesis. The Austrian example will be explained in more detail in the later chapters. See: Chapter 4.

¹³⁷ Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 83-84.

peaceful transition from one type society to another. The more traumatic the experience of war and hardships, the more consolidated the nation¹³⁸.

Emotions and identity after the modernisation processes tend to be almost only indicators of the existence of nations. The spread of national identity reached a mass scale but is dependent on individuals reaction to the national symbols that evoke the feeling of belonging to a nation. This category selected by Hroch seems to include elements of other ones (history is used to evoke emotions and solidify identity, not to mention conflicts). But the sociological approach towards the issue of nation and national identity validates Hrochs choice. Even within the psychological aspect Hroch finds primordial aspects in the natural instincts and human biology. Ethno-national behaviour is determined by biology and resembles the instinctive behaviour of certain animal species. The bio-chemical processes are independent of cultural circumstances and true for all human beings¹³⁹. Another example would be the existence of stereotypes which serve a cognitive function of simplifying and categorizing information.

There are also other factors that can contribute to nation-formation like religion. For modernists it was the national identity that replaced the role religion played in medieval and early-modern societies. At the same time religion could play an important role in national identity formation during the modernisation processes. Budyta- Budzyńska names religion among the nation formative factors among the existence of state and its traditions, myth of common ancestry, language, war and trauma and institutionalisation of a social group. It is hard to omit the influence of Orthodox Christianity in the formation of the Russian national mind-set, or Hussite movement in Bohemia and Moravia or Reformation in Germany and England, Catholicism for Austria and Poland etc. Religious wars consolidated states like France.

With most of the nation formation factors enumerated above there is still one left that needs to be examined in detail and in fact it is hard to imagine this process without it. This factor is nationalism.

¹³⁸ Ibidem, p. 84.

¹³⁹ Ardrey R., *The territorial imperative*. New York 1966., Hamilton W., *The genetical evolution of social behaviour*, Journal of Theoretical biology 7 (1964).

1.6.3 Nationalism as a way of organising society

Nationalism fortunately does not have a semantic history that is as long as with the case of the nation. It was firstly used in 1798¹⁴⁰. Not dissimilar with the term nation it also changed its meaning through the passage of time. It also has different meanings depending on the language used. In Polish nationalism has pejorative connotations and it's not synonymous with patriotism. The Polish case is peculiar because it distinguishes between the national idea (*idea narodowa*) and nationalism (*nacjonalizm*)¹⁴¹. Nationalism is viewed in Poland as militant and aggressive and the *narodowy* attitude is closer to patriotism. This not a new development and this semantic difference exists in the Polish political discourse for over a century now. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition nationalism is understood more neutrally as an idea promoting a sovereign statehood for a certain nation. Similarly patriotism understood in Poland as the love of one's country (*patria*) in the Anglo-Saxon context is interchangeable with national pride. The French tradition nationalism was almost exchangeable with the word patriotism and was attributed with the Jacobins and the fight against anti-french forces. As Chlebowczyk points out the French used nationalism to indicate both the love for the country and nation but also as a manifest of destiny (*la grande Nation*). It was only in the second half of XIX century when nationalism changed its perspective from a left-wing to more right wing attachment to tradition. However the feeling of national exceptionality (*sacro egoismo* of Mazzini) remained despite the left to right shift¹⁴².

There was little theoretical discussion about nationalism in the XIX century as it was regarded as a part of history of nations. There were some exceptions like the two Austrian social-democrats Otto Bauer and Karl Renner who witnessed raging nationalisms that ravaged the Austro-Hungarian Empire they happened to inhabit. However their work was not only analytical but more ideological as it served to propose a political solution to the problems of social-democracy in a multi-national Empire. Bauer wanted to organize nations not in territorial bodies but in association of persons disjoining the nation from the territory and

¹⁴⁰ Budyta-Budzyńska on p. 188 gives the information that nationalism was first used in 1836 but the Merriam-Webster dictionary contradicts this information and traces the first ever use of the word nationalism to 1798 and claims it was used in the sense: *loyalty and devotion to a nation; especially: a sense of national consciousness*. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalism>

¹⁴¹ This is the result of the existence of the political movement of National-Democracy in the late XIX and first half of XX centuries that created this semantic discrepancy. Also a person who identifies with the national idea is a: *narodowiec* not a *nationalist*. The meaning is almost the same though.

¹⁴² Chlebowczyk J., *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów*, Warszawa-Kraków 1983, p. 226.

understanding it as an interterritorial association of persons¹⁴³. The Austrian branch of Marxism (also called Austro-Marxism) differed from more orthodox Marxists who believed nations to be a false expression of class identity. For Austro-Marxists nations were an existing reality. Nevertheless nationalism as a subject of analysis became more prominent in the 20ties and 20ties of the XX century, quite possibly because of the more urging situation in Europe and the rise of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. It was Carlton Hayes, an American historian who looked into nationalism in his fundamental work *The Historical Evolution of Nationalism*¹⁴⁴. Hayes saw nationalism as the same process as tribalism that appeared already in antiquity – it was a *small state nationalism*, a feeling of loyalty. It is surprising how little the scientific discourse about nationalism changed since Hayes. Of course there are the breath-through works of Gellner, Hobsbawm and Anderson and they contributed to a significant shift towards constructivism. But now after the passage of time one can witness the changes in the scientific discourse and the criticism of the modernist-constructivist approach become more and more frequent. Paul James found similarities between premodern societies and modern nations in his abstract communities model. Thomas Eriksen on the other hand focuses on the role of ethnicity (a primordial factor). For Eriksen anthropological research on ethnic groups leads to a conclusion that ethnic identities create nationalist movements given the circumstances (like a crisis/war etc). The constructivist ideas of nation-formation are almost a mirrored image of anthropological theories of ethnies and ethnicities. Ethnic nationalism as well as modern nationalism creates the same feeling of belonging and a same type of identity. Nationalism creates a metaphorical kinship as opposed by real kinship of tribes. The result however is the same identity of belonging.¹⁴⁵ The modern nationalism that he witnessed was an ideology – the driving force for almost all recent events. Nationalism not only led to the fall of empires, it unified Germany and Italy and led to the independence of Greece, Poland, and Norway etc. For Hayes nationalism reshaped all other –isms to its liking.

¹⁴³ Bauer O., *The question of nationalities and social democracy*, Minneapolis 2000, p. 222-224. Interestingly Karl Renner, being a Marxist, presented a typical primordial approach. *Once a certain degree of European development has been reached, the linguistic and cultural communities of peoples, having silently matured throughout the centuries. Emerge from the world of passive existence as peoples. They become conscious of themselves as a force with a historical destiny. They demand control over the state, as the highest available instrument of power, and strive for their political self-determination. The birthday of the political idea of the nation and the birth-year of this new consciousness, is 1798, the year of the French Revolution.* Renner K., *Staat und nation, Vienna 1899*. p 89.

¹⁴⁴ Hayes C., *The historical evolution of modern Nationalism*, New York 1931. The whole text is in public domain and can be downloaded from <https://ia801603.us.archive.org/4/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.13165/2015.13165.The-Historical-Evolution-Of-Modern-Nationalism.pdf>, Access, 05.01.2019.

¹⁴⁵ See: Eriksen T., *Etniczność i nacjonalizm*, Kraków 2013, p 151-163. Also Karl Popper believed nationalism to be somewhat similar to tribalism. See: Popper K., *Spółeczeństwo otwarte i jego wrogowie. T.2*, Warszawa 2006 p. 63.

The industrial revolution was “nationalised”, used to promote the ideology despite its cosmopolitan premises. Nationalism transformed political ideologies like liberalism, Marxism or philosophies of Comte or Nietzsche and distorted them for nationalist purposes¹⁴⁶. Another contribution to understanding of nationalism was the work of the Prague-born American philosopher and historian Hans Kohn and his work *Idea of Nationalism*¹⁴⁷. While Hayes was rather critical of nationalism for Kohn was more balanced in his opinions. Firstly for Kohn nationalism was a state of mind strongly related to the nation state. He distinguished two types of nationalisms: Western, liberal, democratic and Eastern, irrational, mythological and authoritarian¹⁴⁸. What is more important is the fact that he claimed that nations were the result of nationalism. Kohn also placed the source of nationalism in the times of Reformation (the early-modern period). Hobsbawm would reject such claims but still give the processes of the time a name of proto-nationalism. In other words, they were similar but not modern enough.

John Breuilly in his extensive introduction to Gellner’s *Nations and nationalism* indicates that after the war nationalism became somewhat forgotten. It was the result of the naturalisation of the concept of nation, which in its meaning equalled society. Indeed the focus of anthropologists and sociologists shifted towards processes within societies (nations) not nations themselves. Only historians and political scientists working on diplomatic relations were interested in nationalisms. One example of this period would be Elie Kedourie who defined nationalism as a doctrine invented in Europe in the beginning of the XX century¹⁴⁹. It was Ernst Gellner that revolutionised the scholarship dealing with nationalism. In Gellner’s opinion it was the transformation from the agrarian society to the industrial society that replaced traditional cultures with their modern counterparts. The industrial revolution changed society and that society started to organise itself along the lines of a new idea of nationalism. For Gellner nationalism is *primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent*¹⁵⁰. The publication of Gellner’s work was the first sign of new times to come. Even the new wave of scholars like Hobsbawm still uses the very same meaning of nationalism that Gellner proposed¹⁵¹. However Gellner also identified nationalism with a sentiment and a movement that stemmed from this sentiment. Therefore

¹⁴⁶ Ibidem, p. 288-289.

¹⁴⁷ Kohn H., *Idea of Nationalism*, New York 1946, p. 18-24. The whole text is in public domain and can be downloaded from <https://ia801900.us.archive.org/3/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.190501/2015.190501.The-Idea-Of-Nationalism.pdf>

¹⁴⁸ Kohn used Germany. As the predominant example of Eastern nationalism.

¹⁴⁹ Kedourie E., *Nationalism*, Oxford 1993, p.1.

¹⁵⁰ Gellner E., *Narody i nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 2009, p. 75.

¹⁵¹ Hobsbawm E., *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge 1990, p. 9.

nationalism could not only be treated as an ideology. Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska specified the short remark made by Gellner. Nationalism encompasses entities such as: a movement that is a part of nation-formation process, radical parties and movements, psychic stances (sentiments)¹⁵². Nationalism as a part of nation-building process fits into the Hroch's distinction of phases. It can be cultural, political and ideological. Since then research on nationalism, nations and national identity became so numerous that they are almost incomprehensible by a single person. Because of the huge impact of the II World War the discussion about nationalism is tainted with a bias and nationalism was treated as a solely negative ideology and moral judgement obscured the scientific approach¹⁵³. While Karl Deutsch already tried to present nationalism as a neutral process it was Gellner who spearheaded neutrality as a basis for research about nationalism. Another way of dealing with the problem of moral judgement was acknowledging that nationalism is "Janus-faced" and has a good and bad side at the same time. This approach was used by Hans Kohn and still is popular in use¹⁵⁴.

The history of nationalism, if we assume that the protonationalist period of Hobsbawm or the general point of view of Hayes will not be included, naturally frames it as a modern phenomenon. It started in the late XVIII century with two revolutions: American and French. For the first half of the XIX century nationalism was an inclusive and liberal doctrine. A nationalist of that time was a revolutionary who connected the devotion to ones fatherland with the suppression of various national groups in multinational empires. Nationalism was strongly connected with the idea of sovereignty and democracy. Romantic poets and leaders such as Byron, Mazzini, Michelet or Mickiewicz praised the international struggle for freedom "yours and ours". Paradoxically the liberal nationalists were very international in their activities. Nationalism was also a modernising force and it does not matter if it was stemming from the industrial revolution and had to be a part of modernisation (Gellner) or used industrialisation as a tool of nation-building (Hayes)¹⁵⁵.

¹⁵² Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 194.

Probably the most interesting case is when a nationalist party or movement are the basis for nation-formation and do create a nation. Then the symbols and aesthetics of the movement become national or even state symbols.

¹⁵³ This approach tends to be popular among Marxist and post-marxist scholars like Hobsbawm.

¹⁵⁴ Examples include: Thomas Eriksen and Tom Nairn. Nairn T., *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited*, 1997., Eriksen T., p. *Etniczność I nacjonalizm*, Kraków 2013, p. 180.

¹⁵⁵ Also internationalist ideologies like communism put industrialisation into a central place. Industry was to create the new driving force in social change – the proletariat. For nationalists it was a tool in modernising their national societies. For more about the relation of modernisation and state-driven policies see: Leszczyński A., *Skok w nowoczesność: polityka wzrostu w krajach peryferyjnych 1943-1980*, Warszawa 2013.

All of this changed in the second half of the XIX century. The transformation of nationalism made it a less liberal idea and more connected with *Machtpolitik*, the politics of strength. Nationalist ideas became intertwined with social Darwinism and national expansion¹⁵⁶. Nationalism was more and more becoming synonymous with chauvinism¹⁵⁷. The imperial politics of the III French Republic and Bismarck's Prussia and then unified Germany set an example. Much to the dismay of Hobsbawm even socialist movements of central Europe focused on fighting for national states¹⁵⁸. The transformation of nationalism was partially caused by its innate characteristics. But also as the nationalist movements across Europe started to reach the Hroch's Phase C of mass mobilisation their inclusivity reached its limits. Now all of those nationalisms started to clash with each other and fighting for each scrap of land containing even a small group of people believed to be part of the nation. This mechanism became apparent after the end of the Great War and the establishment of several nation-states in Central Europe. Border wars such as the ones between Poland and Germany or Slovenia and Austria serve as good example¹⁵⁹. Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska names the transition from liberal nationalism to integral nationalism, which most important trait in comparison with the older version is the focus on authority rather than democracy¹⁶⁰. Budyta-Budzyńska only generalises the earlier typology of Kohn who distinguished the democratic/civic/Western (liberal) type of nationalism and the ethnic/Eastern (integral) type of nationalism. The problem with Kohn's dichotomy is its simplicity, for instance there are examples of ethnic nationalism in the West (Basques). Instead of the East-West divide the ethnic type of nationalism could be a function of replacement of institutions. If state institutions are present and available for the nationalist movement, then nationalism leans towards the civic type, if not, it leans towards the ethnic type.

¹⁵⁶ The general agreement is that nationalism even from its liberal beginnings had the expansionist gene. Examples include the exceptionality of the French nation, the *sacro egoismo* of Mazzini and other. Almost each nation thought of itself as the chosen one and destined to play a certain role in the general history of mankind. Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska recalls the term nationalism being used in 1836 in a theological sense – for a nation to be chosen by God. Budyta-Budzyńska, p. 188. Other problems arise with the concept of historical and non-historical nations. For instance Otto Bauer uses such a distinction and the liberal Mazzini differentiated nations worthy of having a nation state and limited their number to 11.

¹⁵⁷ Chlebowczyk, *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów*, Warszawa-Kraków 1983, p. 226. For more information about the processes of transformation of nationalism in specific nations see: Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge 1990, p.101-130.

¹⁵⁸ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge 1990, p. 125. A prime example of this process is the socialist movement of Poland. In Finland for instance the Socialist Party became de facto a national party.

¹⁵⁹ Poles and Germans were fighting for the region of Greater Poland and Silesia. The Austrian Slovenes wanted to join as much of Carinthia as possible to the southern Slav state.

¹⁶⁰ Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 192. The term integral nationalism was coined by Charles Maurras, a French philosopher and supporter of authoritarian rather than democratic rule.

In the already used by Chlebowczyk case of French nationalism transformation the integral nationalism manifested in the support of monarchy as the best form of government for the nation. Usually this type of nationalism surfaced in the situation when a nation-state was already formed and democratic governments struggled with solving social problems.

There is no one type of nationalism. The distinction between liberal and integral nationalism is just one example of many of different typologies. Gellner himself proposed a typology regarding the possession of power and availability of education (or lack thereof). But there cannot be a better pronounced dichotomy of nationalisms than the tale of the Empire of Megalomania and Ruritania that Gellner provided¹⁶¹. The nationalism of the Empire is a typical nationalism of the centre: led by the elites and state institutions and directed at national minorities. Examples of such nationalism include the English XIX century imperial nationalism or the nationalism in the Bismarck-united Germany. On the other end lies the nationalism of the periphery, which is usually connected with the of secession, irredentism and independence movements. Furthermore nationalism could be divided further into the nationalism of the majority and nationalism of the minority¹⁶². Nationalism of the majority usually concentrates on defending the *status quo* and privileges. It is against social change and blocks the cultural and political emancipation of minority groups, it favours assimilation of minorities¹⁶³. On the other hand nationalism of the minority focuses on fighting everything that the nationalism of the dominant group stands for. It strives for sovereignty, emancipation and social change. It is also fervently against assimilation with the dominant group. Those two types may seem like contradiction but in fact they may transform one into another depending on the political situation of each of the groups. Once liberated the minority may become a majority in their own state and thus reorient its goals to the nationalism of the dominant group. The dominant group when losing its position may refer to the ways of the nationalism of minor groups with its focus on culture and history. Nationalism of the centre/periphery usually overlaps with the nationalism of the majority/minority but this rule is not universal. The dominant group may inhabit the periphery and be set against the ruling minority. Gellner goes even further in creating his typology and adds three variables: the

¹⁶¹ Gellner E., *Narody i nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 2009, p. 147-153.

¹⁶² Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 197. Chlebowczyk, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, p.33-35, 56-101. See also the chapter about the peripheries of dominant culture in: Kłoskowska A., *Kultura narodowa u korzeni*, Warszawa 2005, p. 183-296

¹⁶³ Chlebowczyk divides the concept even further by creating phases of assimilation: from linguistic to cultural (civilisational), p. 60. To read more about the intricacies of assimilative processes see Chlebowczyk, *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów*, Warszawa-Kraków 1983 p. 56-101.

divide between the ruling and the ruled, the availability of mass education and cultural differentiation¹⁶⁴. The availability of mass education has to be understood as the capacity to participate and create higher culture. Also for model purposes Gellner limited the cultural differentiation to the existence of just two separate cultures. Interestingly the crucial discrepancy is the cultural differentiation, without it nationalism would not emerge¹⁶⁵. The same situation occurs when there is no higher culture in written form, which Gellner identifies with premodern times. Within this typology only three scenarios guarantee the appearance of nationalism. The first one is when the ruling class has access to education and the ruled is deprived of it (“Habsburg” nationalism), the second is when the ruled are educated and the ruling class is not (diaspora nationalism eg. Jews, Greeks, Armenians). The third one when all of the society has access to power and education (typical western nationalism).

There are many other ways to differentiate types of nationalism which are not that relevant to the topic of this thesis but nevertheless they should be mentioned. For instance Hroch focuses only on nationalism as a European phenomenon but Anderson and Hobsbawm add colonial and post-colonial nationalism into the fray. Nationalism could be leftist, rightist, liberal, communist or postcommunist etc¹⁶⁶. Hayes for instance, proposed five types of nationalism: humanitarian, jacobinic, traditional, liberal and integral¹⁶⁷. There is however one characteristic that must not be omitted and that is treating nationalism as an ideology. For instance Anderson believed that nationalism did not constitute a legitimate ideology. There is some truth in this statement as nationalism does not encompass many issues like the form of government, type of economy and its doctrine is prone to changes, there are little solid

¹⁶⁴ Gellner E., *Narody i nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 2009, p. 191.

¹⁶⁵ The divergence in power possession could lead to social revolts but never (at least according to Gellner) within the framework of nationalism. Here lies possibly the biggest difference between Gellner and Marxists. For Marx and his followers just social tensions would create nations and at the same time ethnic tensions should create social tensions which will lead to the socialist revolution. Never has a social revolt within a culturally homogenous society created a revolution and never an ethnic revolt took the Marxist form of revolution. Hobsbawm mentioned the problem of socialist movements becoming de facto nationalist movements.

¹⁶⁶ For more information about the relations of communism and nationalism see: Zaremba M., *Komunizm, legitymacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej w Polsce*, Warszawa 2001. In short Zaremba shows how Marxist and socialist legitimacy of communists in Poland was replaced by nationalism. Even the communist rulers of GDR tried to form a separate German nation from the West Germans. When communism fell in Central and Eastern Europe the symbolic space that was usually occupied by communist ideology was quickly overtaken by nationalisms. Sometimes, as was the case of Yugoslavia the cultural differentiation was “frozen” for the time of communist dominance only to erupt when the structures of power disappeared.

¹⁶⁷ Hayes C., *The historical evolution of modern Nationalism*, New York 1931. The whole text is in public domain and can be downloaded from <https://ia801603.us.archive.org/4/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.13165/2015.13165.The-Historical-Evolution-Of-Modern-Nationalism.pdf>, Access 05.01.2019. Importantly for Hayes these versions of nationalism were placed in chronological order. So while those types of nationalism can coexist they are historically proven stages of development of nationalism.

foundations for nationalism. Also nationalism never produced any great thinker and has no canon of scriptures and books. Anderson believes that nationalism should be placed among phenomena like religion and not the ones like fascism or communism¹⁶⁸. Quite paradoxically the underdevelopment of nationalism may be one of the sources of its universal success. Perhaps it was its particular nature and huge variability (every nation had its own nationalism) that contributed to the universal success.

For these considerations it does not matter if nationalism will be treated as “partial-ideology” or a “full-ideology” because it functions as an ideology. Once again I will refer to the invaluable work of Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska, who merged the most common parts of nationalist doctrine trying to create an ideal-type. Not all of the elements of the doctrine need to appear in a certain nationalist ideology but it did appear in enough nationalisms that it is included on the list.

Ideal type of the doctrine of nationalism:

1. Nation is the greatest good
2. A nation-state should be the international norm
3. *Sacro egoismo* – national good is more important than personal good
4. A person can only fully develop within the framework of a nation
5. Nation is natural not a construct, worth more than the sum of its parts
6. Nation is sovereign, the source of political power
7. Belonging to a nation is a matter of birth not will
8. Social reality can be divided into “our” and “other”
9. A nation is unique
10. National interest should be realised with all necessary means
11. Nation is homogenous
12. There is a hierarchy of nations
13. Relations between nations are based on force not on brotherhood¹⁶⁹

One thing lacking in the list of the doctrine is the placement of nationalism on the so called political compass. It does not make sense to label nationalism left-wing or right-wing.

¹⁶⁸ Anderson B., *Imagined Communities*, p. 5. Thomas Luckmann believes that nationalism is an „invisible religion” because it does not create new institutions but with great success uses the existing ones like schools, media, the military etc. See: Luckmann T., *Invisible religion. The Problem of Religion in Modern Society*. London 1970.


¹⁶⁹ Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 201-205.

As stated before by Hobsbawm nationalism transformed the socialist movements in its image. Similar thing happened to conservatism. As an ideology conservatism is looking into the past and tries to preserve the best of it. At first glance nationalism seems to be a conservative ideology but one could not be more wrong. Because of the modernising potential of nationalism it is actually oriented towards the future. While it uses the past it is often I myths. In the most radical scenario nationalism actually destroys the premodern cultures and societies in order to create a mythical version of them. Nationalist ideology suffers from false consciousness – while defending folk culture and the traditional values, continuity and diversity it fabricates a new higher culture, helps to create mass and anonymous society. Nationalism as an ideology could then form its own contradiction¹⁷⁰. Dead languages are resurrected; folk dialects are appropriated to be used as high language by the elites. Nationalism creates cultural avatars¹⁷¹. It cannot be treated as a version of conservatism either. That leaves out liberalism. It seems that liberalism and nationalism are quite contradictory: one is individualist and one is collectivist. Nationalism promotes solidarity between its members and tries to soothe class divisions, some of which were created by modernisation processes. Nationalist liberalism is a political ideology that actually came to life in Germany and in Austria. I have already analysed all the programs of the Austrian national-liberals and found a pattern. Liberal nationalism (or national liberalism) is a paradoxical idea that is contradictory and either liberal or national elements will overtake one another. On political plain it means tensions, divisions and break ups of parties and movements, which is exactly what happened in the Austrian case. Eventually it was nationalist collectivism and solidarity that overtook liberal aspect of the national-liberal party¹⁷². The innate collectivism of nationalism also creates a tendency of nationalism to lean towards statist and protectionist policies towards economy. That does not mean central-planned economies of the former communist states but generally the role of state in economy and promotion of economical autarky are high among nationalist goals in economy.

¹⁷⁰ Gellner E., *Narody i nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 2009, p. 144-147.

¹⁷¹ Those passages from Gellner basically encompass Andersons idea of imagined communities. But unlike Anderson, Gellner points out that while the culture created by nationalism is somewhat artificial it is never arbitrary and always stems from existing preconditions.

¹⁷² Andrzejewski P., *Paradoks narodowego liberalizmu, Historia i idee Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki 2014 nr 22. See more in the Chapter 3.3.



If nationalism could be placed on the political compass it generally would be positioned somewhere on the top left quarter of the compass. That does not mean that there are no nationalist libertarians but rather that nationalism as a system of values has a tendency to shift towards authoritarian left¹⁷⁴.

There is undeniable connection between nationalism and modernisation. It does not matter if modernisation was the source of nationalism or quite otherwise that nationalism was the source of modernisation. History provides examples of both and I would rather see the relationship between the two as the ancient Chinese symbol of yin and yang, they cannot exist without one another and each half contains a part of the other. The question is similar to the famous which was first the hen or the egg dilemma. Nationalism however differs from modernisation in one important aspect: it had a changing political agenda. As an ideology it influenced the social order on various levels: from the economical to the political one. The first phase of liberal nationalism introduced the idea of sovereignty of nations and promoted equality and democratisation. It also proposed the demarcation between nations with ethnic, linguistic and religious borders. Different types of nationalism, depending on the

¹⁷³ The Political Compass by no means is a scientific tool. It was created by a political journalist and uses 61 questions to identify the subject's political views that are then projected on the economic left-right and axiological authoritarian and libertarian axis. The widespread success of the political compass shows its utilitarian application that could be used as a basic reference point for more sophisticated models. In my opinion it is sufficient for the attempt to place nationalism somewhere in the vast spectrum of left-right distinction.

¹⁷⁴ There are many examples of nationalist policies that favour strengthening state institutions and their influence over economy like recent Donald Trump's tariff wars, or the statist policies of the Polish Law and Justice party. The list however is older and longer: from first mercantilist policies of the British and French Empires, through industrialisation efforts of postcolonial states, or the Meiji period of modernisation in XIX century Japan. Socialist states also employed certain policies straight out of nationalist playbook. For example Adam Leszczyński points out that there are continuities between Polish nationalists of the pre-war period and communists after 1945. See: Leszczyński A., *Skok w nowoczesność: polityka wzrostu w krajach peryferyjnych 1943-1980*, Warszawa 2013.,

circumstances of its appearance reshaped the social order by promoting agrarian or industrial policies. Nationalism was against old feudal estate society and leaned towards social solidarity and corporate organisation of society among the lines of types of employment and jobs rather than class. The goal of creating a nation state also led to tensions in mixed regions and radicalisation of minorities which in turn developed their own nationalist movements. Nationalism reshaped the structures of power – members of a nation (which may but not necessarily is be equal with citizens) are ruled directly by the institutions of the nation state. The legitimacy of power comes directly from the nation and not from metaphysical divine roots. Nationalism also elevated the importance of ethnicity and language to new levels, which in the most radical form the bond between national identity and ethnicity formed racism. After the first inclusive phase nationalism became exclusive. The exclusivity could take the positive form of patriotism but also the negative of xenophobia and chauvinism. As an ideology nationalism was also a great fuel for war justification. Yet despite all its flaws and all of its shortcomings as an ideology nationalism is quite possible the most successful idea in the history of mankind. Benedict Anderson named it the *anomaly of nationalism*. To other ideologies that lord Acton named as the biggest competition for nationalism (Mazzini): equality (Rousseau), communism (Babeuf), Anderson adds liberalism¹⁷⁵. Anderson is surprised that in post-enlightenment liberal times that evoke individualism the vast proliferation of nationalist ideas based on tribalism, primordial loyalty and common ancestry should already be rooted out in favour of a modern society. Hroch adds the idea that liberal, capitalist economy should promote this individualisation of society¹⁷⁶. Marxist socialism and communism were faced by the anomaly of nationalism that prevailed the prophesised coming of the communist end of history¹⁷⁷. Nationalism has shown endurance that allowed it to dominate over other ideologies. It is so widespread that is taken as something natural, a regular occurrence. Nationalism has become banal. This ideology shapes the ways of thinking

¹⁷⁵ Acton, *There are three principal theories of this kind, impugning the present distribution of power, of property, and of territory, and attacking respectively the aristocracy, the middle class, and the sovereignty. They are the theories of equality, communism, and nationality. Though sprung from a common origin, opposing cognate evils, and connected by many links, they did not appear simultaneously. Rousseau proclaimed the first, Babeuf the second, Mazzini the third; and the third is the most recent in its appearance, the most attractive at the present time, and the richest in promise of future power.*

See: *Nationality*, [in:] *The Home and Foreign Review*, London 1862. The whole text of the essay is available online: <https://archive.org/stream/ra634742501londuoft#page/n9/mode/2up>

¹⁷⁶ Hroch M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015 95. For the weakness of liberalism when faced with nationalist ideas see also Andrzejewski P., *Paradoks narodowego liberalism, Historia i idee Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki 2014 nr 22. See more in the Chapter 3.3

¹⁷⁷ Anderson B., *Imagined communities*, London, New York 2006, p. 3-5. Cambridge 1990, p 125. Interestingly Hobsbawms remarks of nationalism hijacking socialist movements did not obstruct Anderson from claiming that the age of nationalism is soon coming to an end (because it is so widespread in the world).

about the world, international affairs and civic relations. Its constantly reminding people of its existence through insignificant everyday symbols used in currencies, flags, sports etc. It emanates from encyclopaedias, schoolbooks and almanacs. Nationalism is hidden in plain sight in news reports, even those about the weather. Banal habits of everyday life reinforce nationalism which in turn also became banal¹⁷⁸. Its banality is the most significant sign of success? So why did nationalism become so widespread, why did it become an obvious part of reality and most importantly why did it triumph over other ideologies of the XIX century and become the last ideology standing on the ring after the fall of other Grand Narratives¹⁷⁹? As Lord Acton wrote: *There is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehensive, more subversive, or more arbitrary than this. [...] Although, therefore, the theory of nationality is more absurd and more criminal than the theory of socialism, it has an important mission in the world, and marks the final conflict, and therefore the end, of two forces which are the worst enemies of civil freedom, - the absolute monarchy and the revolution*¹⁸⁰. In a sense Lord Acton was right on the battlefield of ideologies or doctrines it was nationalism that emerged victorious trumping over both the monarchical regimes as well as socialism. Perhaps Józef Chlebowski is right in asserting that it is the existence of capitalism is crucial for nationalism. Capitalism is about competition and there is no safer haven from the hardships of free market economy than the nation, which corresponds with the natural aristoteleic need of a human being to be a social animal. Nationalism in the long term proved to be a solid warranty for the existence of democratic nation-states that are “natural” points of reference in a globalised world. Nationalism was the remedy to limit the alienation (Marx) or social entropy (Gellner) caused by modernisation processes. The apogee of nationalism, the nation state, proved to be both the guardian of civil liberties and at the same time the protection against the distortions of capitalism. That is a feature that was not achieved by socialism and liberalism as they focused only on one of the aspects. That is not to say that nationalism was without its problems and shortcomings, being the cause of conflicts, wars and horrid crimes like genocide. Yet despite those atrocities nationalism became a banal part of everyday life.

¹⁷⁸ Billig M., *Banal nationalism*, London 2004, p. 6-9.

¹⁷⁹ Sierakowski S., *The five lessons of populist rule*, Project Syndicate, January 2 2017, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/lesson-of-populist-rule-in-poland-by-slawomir-sierakowski-2017-01?barrier=accesspaylog>

¹⁸⁰ Acton J., *Nationality*, [in:] *The Home and Foreign Review*, London 1862. The whole text of the essay is available online: <https://archive.org/stream/ra634742501londuoft#page/n9/mode/2up>. For the Polish reader the insights of Lord Acton about the role played by the Partitions of Poland in the emergence of nationalism can prove to be of utmost interest.

1.7 Closing comments

The great success of the works of Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm seemed to end the discussion about what nation is and how it was formed. The constructivist and modernist approach became so popular that it even proliferated to mass media. For instance in early 2018 New York Times prepared an informative YouTube video *How nations make up national identities* that popularised the very arguments made by the constructivists¹⁸¹. The daily argued that nations are in fact a myth. The four factors the editors enumerated were: mass mobility and language uniformisation, mass communication, modernisation of warfare and the decline of religion. Yet the developments of nation-formation theory showed that the constructivist turn was not so permanent, although I have to admit, it has an admirable charm. When studying the constructivist a little bit deeper one can find elements that contradict the idea that it was modernity that created modern nations (which is a tautology). Gellner admitted that the formation of nations was not an arbitrary process, which implies that there had to be certain pre-modern conditions that determined the outcome of universal modernisation processes. Hobsbawm needed to elaborate on proto-nationalism in the premodern era and Anderson was surprised by the vitality of nations. Anthony Smith, when he summarised the most important narratives concerning nations and their formation, chose to side with ethno-symbolism that was somewhat a conciliatory position between the primordial and modernist approach. Thomas Eriksen and Paul James with completely different approaches found enough similarities and continuities by examining either ethnic groups and the functioning of ethnicity as well as group formation in their abstraction. The culturalist approach of Antonina Kłoskowska shows that national cultures existed before modernisation and Miroslav Hroch had elaborated in great detail about the sources of nation formation of which only one was modernisation and the other two were premodern legacies of the past and ethnic ties. Perhaps Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska is right that all of the above approaches are not actually contradictory but complementary, just their focus is laid elsewhere. European nations were formed or formed themselves in different ways and there is no one set way to make a nation. Both Hroch and Józef Chlebowczyk presented intricate models that put nation-formation in formal categories and models. In Western Europe it were capitalism and the centralised bureaucracies of the state that played the major role in nation formation. In Central and Eastern Europe it was not capitalism nor the state institutions that formed nations, it were

¹⁸¹ *How nations make up national identities*, New York Times, 28 February 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9qF6FvwrHI>

culture and language. While secularisation was a part of nation-formation in the West in the East religion was used as one of the fundamentals of national culture etc. However one factor was similar for all models of nation formation: it were always the elites that spearheaded the process. For my purpose the results comparative approach of Hroch, Chlebowczyk and Budyta-Budzyńska is the only one that can bring a significant result. The process of Austrian nation formation in constructivist sense was already conducted by Peter Thaler so one of the things left is to confront that process with models on more meta-level, especially that all of the authors mentioned above conveniently abstained from analysing the Austrian case.

2. History

2.1 The role of history in nation formation

Paraphrasing the famous quote of Eric Hobsbawm: *Historians are to nation-formation what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to the heroin-addicts: we supply the essential raw material for the market. Nations without a past are contradictions in terms. What makes a nation is the past, what justifies one nation against others is the past, and historians are the people who produce it*¹⁸². The role of history was so crucial that at one point of the time one of the basic distinctions of nations was the opinion whether they were historical or non-historical nations. Hegel wrote: *In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve itself as such. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation), has, strictly speaking, no history – like the nations which existed before the rise of states and others which still exist in a condition of savagery*¹⁸³. Otto Bauer extended this view with the insight to the social structure. For him a historical nation had already developed social structure at the eve of the coming of capitalism¹⁸⁴. Bauer saw peasant populations as non-historical nations. This view was connected with the Marxist understanding of nation as a bourgeois phenomenon; the class situation determined the development of nations. The idea of non-historic nations may seem silly now, as it is quite clear that even the peasant masses had their own history and practiced their own forms of memory. The folk cultures and vernaculars were elevated to the status of national high-culture thus proving the Marxist branch of nation theory wrong.

The influence of history on nation formation could be understood twofold:

1. The influence of the factual past on nation-formation
2. The influence of historiography on nation-formation

Constructivists such as Anderson or Gellner tend to focus only on the second understanding of the influence of history. It is to be understood as the result of the work of historians – in the terms of Jerzy Topolski – a construct, a narrative an invention. In this sense

¹⁸² Hobsbawm, E. , *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today*, [in:] *Anthropology Today* 8(1), 1992 p. 3-8. Also Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska includes a nations own history (or at least the belief in having one) in one of the parts of the ideal type of a nation.

¹⁸³ Hegel F., *Philosophy of mind*, Oxford 2001, p. 60. The whole text of the Philosophy of mind is available online: <http://hegel.net/en/pdf/Hegel-Enc3.pdf>, The idea of non-historical nations was transferred to Marx and Engels. Especially Engels was receptive and he even deemed some nations unworthy of existence.

¹⁸⁴ Bauer O., *The question of nationalities and social democracy*, Minneapolis 2000, p. 190-193,

history would just be a source of national mythology and a mean to achieve national mobilisation and prove legitimacy. But as Hroch points out this point of view is severely limited, as people do not come in contact with history just through text or the constructs of historians¹⁸⁵. There is a whole other dimension of oral history passed in families through generation as well as the material remains of history (buildings, places of importance, battlefields etc). While I can agree with Hobsbawm famous statement that nations invent traditions it is really hard to invent actual history. Of course some elements of history will be emphasized, underlined and all the lights will be directed at them but the same time it is hard to omit the real events that happened. In some most radical examples major historical events can be overlooked, forgotten or sent to the unconscious – such as according to Andrzej Leder happened to the drastic change of the Polish society during the time of the II World War. He called it the “dreamt revolution” because the Polish, figuratively speaking, seemed to sleep through that change and remember only the horrors of occupation and the heroism of resistance¹⁸⁶. While the general society is unaware of the process it does not mean that it did not happen, and in fact some scholars believe that it was the II World War that ended the process of formation of the modern Polish nation. Presumably the most important element of existing historical heritage is the state and its institutions. To some extent also religious institutions buildings could play a similar role as monuments of the past and signs of continuity. This is an obvious call back to the idea of historical nations which was validated by the existence of state. Nations like the French, Spanish, English, Dutch or Portuguese always had centralised institutions that formed the backbone of the state. Obviously there are differences between the aforementioned examples, like the role of (semi)autonomous regions but overall it was the state that was the source of identity. Great Britain composing of not only English but also Scots, Welsh and other minor groups created a distinct British national identity as opposed to centralised France that incorporated the populace of different French dialects into one nation. There are also the examples of Germany and Italy, which were fragmented into a myriad of state institutions but were driven together by culture. A special case of this was Poland which also exemplified what Hroch calls the *unification nationalism*, but when it comes to the role of history Poland would need to be assigned to a different category: a state that was lost. The state, when destroyed like in the case of Hungary or Poland left constant reminders of its existence. The history of a sovereign state, while many

¹⁸⁵ Hroch M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015 p. 39.

¹⁸⁶ Leder A., *Prześlona rewolucja*, Warszawa 2014. See also: Wapiński R., *Polska i małe ojczyzny Polaków: z dziejów kształtowania się świadomości narodowej w XIX i XX wieku*, Wrocław 1994; Wapiński R., *Polska na styku kultur I narodów: w kręgu przeobrażeń narodowościowych i cywilizacyjnych*, Gdańsk 2002.

times turned into myth by poets and historians of the romantic period usually left a material heritage in form of local institutions or administrative borders. Sometimes it was just one thing that was left was the name of a kingdom, such was the example of Norway or Bulgaria which called back upon the memory of states that ceased to exist in 1397 and 1018 respectively. Yet, despite the long lack of independent statehood they have re-emerged as modern nations. It is surprising how many medieval kingships, dukedoms and principalities even if integrated into bigger organisms reappeared again during the modernisation process of the XIX and XX century. Perhaps this process did not stop yet and there are still groups in Europe that use the history of even partial sovereignty to legitimise their nationalist movements. Good example of this is the Breton nationalist movement that traces its historical heritage to the Duchy of Brittany that was integrated with the Kingdom of France in 1532. Another sound example is the Catalan nationalism that calls back the times of regional sovereignty from the IX to the XI century as well the autonomy in the Kingdom of Aragon¹⁸⁷. Belarus is an interesting example of appropriating (and not without merit) the partial sovereignty of a multicultural and multi-ethnic Grand Duchy of Lithuania as its own state tradition. There are however several nations like Finns or Latvians that had no state to refer to in which case the nationalist movements recalled folk customs, architecture and the natural beauty of the land¹⁸⁸.

Whether the state survived or not determined the shape of historiography and as Hroch points out it also shaped the territoriality of written history¹⁸⁹. In the case of state institutional continuity national history was the history of the state and the shape of the state determined what was considered to be national territory. This type of historiography had two important characteristics: the lack of a master narrative and it forced the inclusion of other ethnic groups into national history (Finns into Swedish, Lithuanians into Polish, Catalan into Spanish history etc.). The lack of the master narrative was fertile growth for politicised history and the usage of history by dominant competing political movements. When there was no remaining state and the traditions were discontinued history was used to legitimise the reconstruction of the fallen country. The best example of this situation was the Polish historiography in relation to the lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita*). Several other nationalities inhabited the Commonwealth such as Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and

¹⁸⁷ The list of potential new nation-states in Europe is growing and almost in all cases there is a tradition of some form of statehood or independence. Examples are: Scotland, Wales, Flanders, Basque region, Galicia, Andalusia, Sardinia, Bavaria or Silesia.

¹⁸⁸ Hroch M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015 p. 48.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibidem* p.177-178.

other. They all had laid claim to their own statehood thus complicating the national situation in the former lands of the Commonwealth. Lithuanians and Ukrainians do not refer to Rzeczpospolita as their state of origin but Belarusians do. The third case includes states, which institutions disappeared in the medieval era. In that case historiography could not easily refer to borders of an old state – the new desired sovereign country had to be imagined through appropriation of myths¹⁹⁰. One such example is the Slovaks who not having much institutional history on their own recalled the Great Moravia of IX century. The last case leaves national movements that had no state and even no myths to fall back to. Historical argument was the weakest in those groups which tend to project their territory among ethnic lines. Legitimacy of a nation state could come from just the fact of struggle under foreign rule.

The second understanding of history's influence over nation-formation is the role of historiography. Paradoxically also historiography could be regarded as a material remainder of the past. Medieval and early modern chronicles and other literary works about the deeds of the past exist as an actual object – a set of scrolls or a book and serves just by its existence as a legacy of the past. The narratives of those early chronicles served as a basis but also a limitation for nation-formation. While the historical tradition was later used for nationalist adaptations of history they did provide a set of narratives that were limited in scope. The chronicles usually concentrated on the story of monarchs and kingdoms but they also touched upon topics as: common origin and struggle with foreign invaders. With the passage of time the chronicles started to depict communities that were defined either ethnically or politically or both¹⁹¹. This evolution opened historiography to history of states, privileged classes and in some rare cases the story of the lower classes as well. The pre-modern history writings need to be treated as part of material heritage because they put the up-to-date rituals and customs in context. Perhaps it is this provision of context that is the most significant contribution of history in nation formation. This is especially true for the case when the continuity of the state was interrupted and history provided information about, but also preserved traditions.

Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska among the factors that contribute to nation formation listed also the myth of common ancestry¹⁹². It is important to mention this because the content of the pre-modern historiography in many cases could be dividing into two categories: historiographical and mythological narratives. Some scholars even put the pre-modern

¹⁹⁰ Budyta Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 74-76.

¹⁹¹ Hroch M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015, p. 53.

¹⁹² Budyta Budzyńska p. *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p.74-76.

historiography straight to the myth category¹⁹³. A fine example of this dichotomy is the *Historia Polonica* written by the bishop of Kraków Wincenty Kadłubek in the beginning of the XIII century. Kadłubek presented history of the ruling Piast dynasty but also mixed mythical stories trying to tie Poland with antiquity. A legendary king of Kraków – named Krak, was according to him a polonised version of the Latin Gracchus etc. In the premodern era Polish nobility applied the ideology of *sarmatism* which traced their origin from the ancient nomad people of Sarmatians. The Swedes believed that they came from the Goths and the French from Gauls. The last example had also a class undertone: the people were supposed to be descendants of Gauls but the hated aristocracy from a different tribe – the Franks. Germans related themselves to the ancient *Germanii* etc. The myth of common ancestry does not need to be true; it evokes emotions and a sense of “natural” or primordial belonging. Budyta-Budzyńska frames the myth as something universal for each nation but the truth is that depending on the situation in relation to the existence of state institutions nations could refer either to real, well established events in history rather than in myths. Some parts of national history are forgotten or chosen not to be remembered. Forgetting could also be a part of the process of mythologisation. To the myth of common ancestry Budyta-Budzyńska adds the myth of common destiny as the most important. The vision of the communist society or the myth of the Third Reich, which would last for a thousand years, is the most radical examples. To these types of myths Jerzy Topolski adds other categories: the historiographical and fundamental myths¹⁹⁴. While the myth of ancestry and destiny could be treated as subjects of scientific investigation (for example the myth of the Revolution in French historiography) the other influence the way historiography is constructed and its narratives are written. The historiographical myths are divided into factual and theoretical and they appear in two ways. Firstly myths appear in the case where the historical narrative fills in the gaps left by the lack of sources or amplifies source-based information. Second case appears when a historian (or any other scholar for that matter) does not falsify his or her findings. The fundamental myths could also be called metamyths as they reach the level of paradigms in which people think that are embedded into consciousness. They are the structures of thinking and Topolski names seven of them: the myth of evolution (or progress), revolution, sublimation, coherence, causality, activism and determinism. The myth of progress is a trademark of Enlightenment and the work of Condorcet *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human*

¹⁹³ Assman J., *Kultureles Gädachtnis*, Munich 1992, p. 78.

¹⁹⁴ Topolski Jerzy, *Jak się pisze i rozumie historię*, Warszawa 1998, p. 208.

*Mind*¹⁹⁵. The myth of evolution creates the problem of ahistorical evaluation of uneven development of different parts of the world and usually point at a goal of the evolution. One of these points could be the nation-forming process. The myth of revolution creates the categorisation of what was before and after the revolution often using the revolutionary moment as a point of reference. In the “revolutionary” thinking the timeline is divided by the revolutionary moments and they organise the main narratives. The myth of sublime is the feeling of awe that contact with history and historiography creates in opposition to the “now” that can be experienced through senses. The past is a matter of imagination and is distorted because of the lack of sensory experiences. The French revolution or the British industrial revolution or Napoleonic wars were subjects to the sublime myth – instead of focusing on the factual process it was their significance that was stressed out. Another aspect of the sublime myth is ahistorical modernisation of terms – the nation is probably the best example. We know that the nation was not the same thing now and 400 years ago but it did not stop generations of historians from writing national histories like it was a fact. The myth of coherence is a tendency of historians to create coherent narratives. Perhaps it was Hayden White who described the influence of coherence on the historiographical narratives¹⁹⁶. The myth of causality forces historians to look for the causes of every historical process thus making every historical event a factor that contributes to change of lack thereof. Causality tends to focus on universal rights of history rather than human action. It was predominant in the positivist era of historiography¹⁹⁷. The opposite of causality is activism that attributes all the historical developments to human action. Paweł Jasienica, a renowned Polish historian explained Polish history with the focus on the leaders (kings) and their character and decisions and is a model example of applying the activist fundament of historical narrative¹⁹⁸. The myth of determinism is basically a simplified version of the evolution myth and Topolski does not provide any reason for distinguishing therefore it will also be omitted here.

¹⁹⁵ Some comment on progress – Herder etc.

¹⁹⁶ White H, *Metahistory*. For White history writing resembled four universal narratives: tragedy, romance (epic) comedy and satire. The tragic story tells a tale of self-identification that could only be acquired through suffering. On the contrary the romantic (epic) narrative allows self-identification through triumph (usually of good over evil). The comedy stresses out the inability of self-identification and settles with the acceptance of existence. In satire paradoxically the self-identification comes not through triumph or pain but through conscious acceptance of the inability of self-identification. Hayden White connected historians and philosophers with his ideal types of narratives. For tragedy it were Tocqueville and Marx, for romance it were Michelet and Nietzsche, for comedy Ranke and Hegel, for satire Burckhard and Croce. Whites work is considered the introduction of the postmodern linguistic turn to historiography.

¹⁹⁷ Topolski J., *Jak się pisze i rozumie historię*, Warszawa 1998, p. 215.

¹⁹⁸ Paweł Jasienica published several books on Polish history from the early medieval period till 1795: *Polska piastów* (1960), *Polska jagiellonów* (1963), *Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów* (three volumes 1967-1972). His books are still a popular read in Poland and were republished in 2007. Perhaps his popularity was boosted by a feature movie *Różyczka* from 2010 which was based loosely on Jasienica's life.

The process of mythologisation of national historiography could be attributed to the psychology of historians, their ideological influence, a tendency (conscious and subconscious) to manipulate or censorship¹⁹⁹. However one of the most important factor is assuming the primordial paradigm (approach). The search for roots that are as old as possible was strongly connected with a primordial understanding of nations in pre-modern historiography. This trait was then carried on to the early historical writings of the XIXth century, especially of the romantic period. But it would be wrong to assert that with the coming of positivism and more scientific scrutiny regarding historiography this would change. Because of high ideological implications of history it was used and abused in the age of nationalisms and the primordial myths prevailed in the narratives. The older times the nation could trace its own history and it does not matter whether it was true or mythologised, the more legitimate were the claims made by nationalist movements. The most basic level of legitimations was the sole existence of the nation which was sanctified by history. Other levels of legitimation included territorial claims or claims of inclusion of certain social and ethnic groups into the nation or state.

There were four stages of development of national history: pre-modern, romantic, positivist, revisionist (critical) historiography. The topic of premodern history writing was touched upon above. The constant professionalization of methodology and development of other supporting sciences like archaeology were contributing to the level of detail in historiography. The scientific developments did not however stop the instrumentalization of historiography. Because of growing scientific scrutiny it is hard to speak of historiography as an invention or myth creation. Creating fables and inventing stories and fictional heroes is generally rejected by historians²⁰⁰. Historians because of the limitations of their discipline could not invent history and did not truly “invent” traditions in the Hobsbawm sense. Nationalism may have used only selected parts of historiography with a bigger or smaller national bias but it did not create the historical facts out of thin air. Despite all of dynamics between history and nation-formation the connection of historiography and (pre)national-myths seem inseparable since the foundation of medieval European historiography. As stated before primordiality was a constant factor in history writing and this had several consequences. Most importantly if assuming that a nation had “always” existed it allowed the

¹⁹⁹ Topolski J., *Jak się pisze i rozumie historię*, Warszawa 1998, p. 269.

²⁰⁰ This statement does not mean that historiography was free of forgeries and fabrications. In the Polish case the infamous *Kronika Prokosza* from the late XVIII presented an alternative history of the Slavic and Sarmatian tribes in pre-polish territory. In 2016 it served as a main source for publishing a book about the so-called *Turbo-slavs* despite the fact that *Kronika Prokosza* was already dissected and declared a forgery by notable XIX century historian Joachim Lelewel. While influential the pseudo-historical myth does not undermine the main narratives of public discourse on national history.

incorporation of ancient history and ancient myths into the national cultural repertoire. In quite a contradictory way the myth, while based on history allowed nations to transgress history. If a nation existed always that it gave it a sense of almost godlike permanence. Through the passing of generations, culture and customs and in some cases also the development of state and its institutions nation seemed to reach immortality. In that sense nationalism, backed by history, filled in the role that religion used to play in creating a feeling of belonging to a community. Perhaps because of the dominance of primordial historiography the existence of (national) myths is already a consistent pattern, a part of *longue duree*. A myth plays a symbolical role and evokes basic emotions. Despite being refuted by science (critical historiography) historical myths prevail. They can be disproven by science but not even then their influence could be suppressed. A myth could be only combated and replaced by another myth²⁰¹. Jerzy Topolski presents a different approach. For the Polish historian the myth could either be contradicted by scientific findings but it also could be a part of science (at least until proven false)²⁰². Science is always confronted with an unending process of mythologisation of itself, both on the factographic and theoretical levels.

Many myths that entered the national imagination and heroes that entered the national pantheon did happen, only their interpretation became mythologised. Decisive battles that broke the continuity of state existence like the battle of Kosovo in 1389 or battle of Mohi of 1525 that put Serbia and Hungary under foreign rule of the Ottomans or Habsburgs. Other myths included revolts and movements that were interpreted as conducted in the name of the nation. Some of the best example include the Hussite wars of the early XV century the proclamation of the Polish Constitution of the 3rd May in 1791 and of course the French Revolution. The other side of myth includes heroic figures, usually military leaders the likes of Frederic Barbarossa for Germans, Gustav Vasa for the Swedes, Jan Sobieski for the Poles. The “Austrian” case of Eugene of Savoy who was not a national hero but rather the hero of the Habsburg dynasty is an exception and a symbol of failed nation-making. Heroes usually play the role of “integrators” – they are set as examples for whole communities²⁰³. Perhaps it is why Eugene of Savoy whose role was the servant of the Habsburgs contributed only to the strengthening positive feelings towards the ruling dynasty and not to the nation.

²⁰¹ Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 75. The distinction between *mythos* and *logos* is a matter of debate. One could accept the intertwined relation between the two, analyse it or even try to fight myths and purify logos from them. Some believe that it is impossible to separate the two and only *mythisotry* is the only possibility. See: Heehs P., *History and Theory*, 1994, p 1-20.

²⁰² Topolski J, *Jak się pisze i rozumie historię*, Warszawa 1998, p. 206.

²⁰³ *Ibidem*, p. 315.

To proceed further I would like to present Hroch's introduction to creating a typology of national history. No one has yet been created but Miroslav Hroch created a detailed set of questions that when applied in a comparative study would create such typology.

Hroch's "questionnaire" for national history:

1. *Definition of the nations –own" history:*

a) *Territorially, the national borders were defined by:*

- *A pre-existing state – historical borders*
- *The ethnicity of the inhabitants*
- *Older regional units*

b) *The internal structure of the national territory was perceived as:*

- *National centre versus the provinces*
- *Different historical and geographical regions*

c) *Chronological dimensions*

- *When did the nation start to exist*
- *Where were its origins placed in time?*
- *Where did its members come from?*
- *Was there continuity or discontinuity of national history?*
- *What were the moments of national integration and*

disintegration?

d) *The system of national values:*

- *Why were some periods and events seen as the times of glory and others as times of decline?*
- *Among the heroes who were representative of national values, which ones were regarded as positive and which ones as negative?*
- *Was there a stable system of positive and negative values, seen as intrinsic in the nation 's –own" history?*

- *Unity and diversity within the concept of national history:*
 - Master narratives*
 - Alternatives and competing concepts*

2. *National history in the European context:*

a) *we and Europe:*

- *How strong was the interest in non-national European history?*
- *Did historical thinking encompass the idea of the general development of the entire continent? Of the whole of humanity?*
- *What historical hetero-stereotypes of the other nations were there?*
- *What was considered the most common type of mutual relationship with neighbours (war, trade, culture) in national history?*
- *Which aspect of the nation's own history was seen as specific, and how frequently was it contrasted with the history of others?*

b) *Reflections on uneven development:*

- *Were comparisons drawn between national history and the general situation across the rest of the continent, or the history of certain nations?*
- *Were certain countries (including the nation's own) perceived as either more or less developed (underdeveloped), and were there attempts to understand and explain it?*

3. *Social factors:*

- *Who were the most influential authors of master-narratives?*
- *What were their social background, profession, education, and political and cultural engagement?*
- *Who were the addressees of national history?*
- *How was information about national history spreading among the population?*

4. General problems and interdependencies:

a) myth and reality in understanding national history:

- *What was the relevance of scientific argument in the search for the purpose of national history?*
- *What was the status of historical truth as final criterion?*

b) National history and the process of nation forming:

- *National history as political and national argument*
- *Increasing interdependence between politics and national history*²⁰⁴

To give some short and simplified examples of application of the first point of Hroch's questionnaire: in the Polish case the national borders were defined by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This idea was later challenged by the national movement, which preferred ethnic lines as demarcation of the state borders. In the case of Italy reconstruction of the Roman Empire was used as legitimacy for colonial invasions of Africa in order to reconstruct the concept of *Mare nostrum*. Also because of the geographical reach of the old Venice Republic the united Italy of the second half of the XIX century laid claim to Dalmatia, which is now a part of Croatia. In a similar way for some time the reach of the Roman Empire in Britain determined the limits of what was English history. This later changed to encompass the whole island and overseas regions etc. The Czech "father of the nation" historian Frantisek Palacky claimed the medieval lands of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia as Czech. Palacky is probably the most pronounced example of a single historians influence on the nation-formation process. In the Polish case it was the Polish Crownlands (*Korona*) which were considered the backbone of the national territory. The Germans with the divided structure of the Holy Roman Empire struggled to find the central region. The final conflict was resolved between Austria (*Grossdeutsche Lösung*) and Prussia (*Kleindeutsche Lösung*). On the other hand Finland was considered a periphery of the Swedish and then Russian centres. The chronological dimension varied depending in which stage of historiography development (romantic, positivist, critical) it was written. The ideological goal was always to go as far in history as possible. If any continuity was found like with the ancient *Germanii* and modern Germans then it was used. Even broken continuity could serve as source of

²⁰⁴ Hroch M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015, p. 180-181.

legitimacy as was with the Greek claim of Constantinople as the Greeks regarded the Byzantine Empire as their own etc.

2.2 A short construction of Austrian history

The goal of this subchapter is not to write a cohesive and comprehensible history of Austria as this would be a futile attempt. Instead I would like to propose a short narrative that will encompass processes and events that, the way I see it, are relevant to the Austrian nation-formation or to me more precise, relevant to the Austrian historians. This endeavour creates some problems from the very beginning because one fundamental thing needs to be established, namely: what is Austria? Should the history of Austria limit itself just to the confines of the current borders of the II Republic or instead focus on the people that inhabit it? Austria for a long time of its history was a part of the Holy Roman Empire and this fact cannot be neglected. Is the history of Austria a part of German history or should it be treated separately? Should a history of Austria include the history of other nations that were part of the Habsburg Empire? To limit the scope of the historical narrative I will only address the Austrian issues of being interconnected with other states and nations when it will be necessary for Austiran nation building or was important for Austrian historians. Only a short recollection of basic facts could achieve this goal. A geographical limitation to the regions regarded as Austrian would contribute to clarity, other regions or states will be mentioned only when it is relevant to the main topic. I will focus on the ethnic composition of the peoples that inhabited the lands that constitute Austria today as well as on the events that led to the persistent duration of the regional and state borders²⁰⁵.

The lands that form Austria nowadays saw human settlement in the Old Stone Age of the Lower Paleolithic Period. One of the oldest surviving remains of a human being were found on the Austrian-Italian border in 1991. The mummy, dating back as far as 5300 years (3300 B.C) was named Ötzi refering to the place of his discovery in Ötztal Alps. In 2013 a vast genetic research of more than 3700 men proved that Ötzi had 137 confirmed relatives living in South Tirol²⁰⁶. The mummy serves as one of the greatest sources for the knowledge of living conditions of the Bronze Age. Austria is also home to the city of Hallstatt, which gave tha name to one of the most known archeological cultures of the Iron Age. The proto-

²⁰⁵ To create this narrative and recall the basic facts of Austrian history I will be using Fiedor and Wereszycki, *Historia Austrii*, and the *Encyclopedia Britannica* to validate some of the dates. When stating not the obvious historical developments further sources will be given in the footnotes.

²⁰⁶ He also showed some genetical resemblance to the people native to the islands of Sardinia and Corsica. The ethnicity of Ötzi cannot be determined because of the lack of data.

European tribes inhabiting the area were known as Illyrians (*Illyrioi* in Greek) and were overrun by the Celts, which are generally connected to the Hallstatt culture. However the Eastern Hallstatt culture is also attributed to the Ilirians. The presence of the Hallstatt is dated from around the XII century to Vth century B.C. At the beginning of the IV century B.C. the first name of the region appears in the Latin name of *Noricum*, which was first used to address a Celtic kingdom or tribal federation. *Noricum* became the name of the province of the Roman Empire in the year 16 B.C. Firstly it had semi-autonomy to be later incorporated straight to the Roman Empire. Other provinces that partially overlapped with current Austrian territory were Raetia and Pannonia. The Danube provided a natural border from Germanic tribes of Marcomanni and Quadi. On that border a Roman fortification *Castrum Vindobona* was erected in the II century A.D, which was the foundation for the current Austrian capital – Vienna. Other important settlement from that period is Iuvavum, which later became Salzburg. In the late III century constant invasions from the Germanic tribe of Alemanni ravaged the province which loosened its connection to Rome. It was one of the first provinces to part from the Roman Empire when the invasion of the Huns and the period of Great Migration started. The political vacuum was filled in by various tribes who fought over the dominance of the region. The Langobardi were forced out to Italy in late VI century by invading Bavarians and Slavic tribes. Remains of Alemanni held to the westmost part of Austria. The Bavarians were dependent on the Franks and the Slavs were dependent on the Avars but both groups managed to become independent by the end of the VII century. A Slavic tribe of Karantani formed a principality in Eastern Alps, possibly giving the name to the later land of Carinthia²⁰⁷. While there were some remains of Christianity from the antique times the VII century saw missions sent by the Bavarian dukes, which led to establishment of the church in Salzburg. Because of the Avar threat the Slavs placed themselves under the protection of Bavarians, which led to the spread of Bavarian missionaries. This political configuration did not last long as at the end of the VIII century Charlemagne firstly destroyed the independent rule of Bavarian dukes only to follow with the destruction of remains of Avars in 796 A.D. Under the Karolingian influence the territory was named the Avar March later renamed the Pannonian March and then the Southern March (*marchia Austriae* in Latin). The time was marked by increased Frankish and Barbarian settlement, especially in the territories of Styria and Carinthia. The successful Magyar invasions were stopped by the decisive battle of Lechfeld in 955. In 976 Leopold Babenberg became the ruler (margrave) in

²⁰⁷ Another theory traces the name back to the Roman Carnutum.

the lands reclaimed from the Magyars and expanded the possessions to Carniola (modern day Slovenia) and Styria. The same year Carinthia became an independent duchy within the Holy Roman Empire.

In 996 in a letter from the Emperor Otto III to the Bishop of Freising the first ever recorded German name of Austria was written. [The *regione vulgari vocabulo Ostarrichi* (region called *Ostarrichi* in the common tongue) meant only a small part of land of what is now Lower Austria. There is some confusion because the Latin name Austria comes from the name of the southern direction and the German words come from the name of the eastern direction, nevertheless both terms Österreich and Austria are used till this day despite their etymological contradictions.

The wars between the two dominant families of Welfs and Hohenstaufen saw the Babenbergs on the side of the latter. In 1156 the emperor Frederick I Barbarossa in the treaty of Regensburg divided the lands to achieve peace. Bavaria was given to the Henry III of the Welfs but the Babenbergs, as a matter of compromise, became sovereign rulers in Austria (here meaning Lower Austria) and their duties towards the Empire were reduced. The lands became a fief of the Babenbergs and were elevated to the status of duchy. All of the privileges were confirmed in the imperial document called *Privilegium Minus*. The Babenbergs continued their expansion with the inclusion of Styria in 1192 and some gains in Carniola. The consolidation of the lands through development of infrastructure and intense settlement was put to halt when the last Babenberg Frederic the Warlike was killed in a battle with the Hungarians in 1246 leaving no male heirs²⁰⁸. The fight for the Babenberg domain first saw victories of the king of Bohemia Otokar II of the house of Premysl. His advances were halted in the decisive battle of Dürnkrut in 1278 where he was killed by the army of his most prominent opponent Rudolf I Habsburg. Rudolf himself was coming from Swabia but through Austria the new Habsburg dynasty became one of the most influential not only in the Holy Roman Empire but in all of Europe. The Empire was *transformed into a quasi-hereditary monarchy under Habsburg leadership. Although the emperor was elected and not determined by hereditary succession, the Habsburgs ruled the empire all but continuously between 1438 and 1806. Austria changed from periphery to core; Vienna turned into the imperial residence and a preeminent center of German cultural and political life. The*

²⁰⁸ It was also the Babenberg court that had the famous *Nibelunglied* written by an anonymous Austrian-German author.

*intellectual and administrative elite from many German territories flocked to Vienna in the service of the emperor and his cours: Austria had become the leading German state*²⁰⁹.

The Habsburgs expanded their territory in 1335 Carinthia and Carniola as well as Tirol in 1363. During the reign of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles IV who chose to develop Prague the duke of Austria Rudolf IV the Founder started the construction of a gothic cathedral of St. Stephen and founded the University of Vienna in 1365. It was Rudolf who forged a fake document called *Privilegium Maius* that was supposed to elevate Austria from duchy to Archduchy. While the document was regarded as fake by Charles the IV it took a hundred years for the *Privilegium Maius* to be used as claim for the Habsburgs to be elevated to the title of Archduke. It was Frederic III who became the Holy Roman Emperor and used his position to strengthen the Habsburg family both within the Austrian hereditary lands and in the Empire itself. It was also Frederic who had claims to the Hungarian lands which later allowed the Habsburgs to inherit the lands. Later territorial acquisitions included the city of Trieste and parts of Arlberg. In 1395 the Austrian lands were divided into three sections: of Niederösterreich (modern Lower and Upper Austria), Innerösterreich (Steiermark, Kärnten, Carniola) and Oberösterreich (Tirol and Arlberg). Maximilian Habsburg was another ruler to extend the influence of the Habsburgs through tactical marriages that gave the family hereditary rights in Spain. The saying *Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube* – 'Let others wage war: thou, happy Austria, marry came into full fruition in the XVI century²¹⁰. The sudden deaths of the Jagiellon rulers of Hungary and the Czech lands, as well as the end of the male line in Spain allowed the famous Emperor Charles the V to inherit lands that created a true empire on which the sun never sets. Through the geographic discoveries of the new world the Habsburgs gained control of Central Europe, Spain, south Italy, the Netherlands and huge parts of South and Central Americas. The Habsburg dynasty was later divided into the Spanish and Austrian lines. Through the dynastic expansion, the Germanic inhabitants of Eastern Alps became not only a vital part of the Holy Roman Empire but also a part of a new multi-ethnic and multi-lingual empire (or even a multi-national empire if one chooses to place the existence of nations in the XVI century). In a paradoxical way the strength of the Austrian-German population in this situation came from the connection to the Holy Roman Empire, and the strength of the Austrian dynasty in the Holy Roman Empire came from their gains in non-germanic lands like Bohemia and parts of Hungary.

²⁰⁹ Thaler P., *The Ambivalence of Identity*, West Lafayette 2000, p. 55.

²¹⁰ The origins of this saying are controversial; some appoint Emperor Rudolf IV, some Emperor Mathias. Least be said that this unofficial motto of Habsburg policy is an anachronism.

It was through this expansion that put Austria in direct contact with the expanding Ottoman Empire of the Turks. In 1529 the Ottoman army besieged Vienna, albeit without success. In 1527 new central organs of the ruling dynasty's court were created – the *Hofkanzlei* (chancellery) *Hofkammer* (treasury) the *Hofrat* (council) leading to a step-by step centralisation of the state administration. The other conflict that defined the times was a religious one. The onset of Protestantism saw the growing influence of Lutherans, Calvinists and Anabaptists in the Austrian lands but it turned out that the Habsburgs became the champions of counter-reformation and managed to recatholicize a majority of Austrian lands. Not without a cost. The Czech lands were devastated by the Thirty-Years War and the religious conflict gave rise to a northern protestant German state – Prussia. The devastation of the Czech lands created a vacuum that was filled in by politics of spreading Catholicism, a first attempt of creating a unifying culture which resulted in the creation of a myriad of baroque architectural masterpieces across the domain of the Habsburgs. At the same time the aftermath of the Thirty Years War – the peace of Westphalia changed the Holy Roman Empire into a loose association of states, which gained more sovereignty within the Empire.

The last great Ottoman push into the European territory ended with the siege of Vienna in 1683, where the Turkish army was soundly defeated by a coalition army led by the Polish king John III Sobieski. The formation of the Holy League two years later started the Habsburg expansion into the Balkans. Austria became one of the great European powers and was drawn into a series of conflicts like the war of the Spanish, Austrian and Polish succession in the XVIII century. Another set of conflicts known as the three Silesian wars saw Austria defeated three times by the Prussian king Frederic the Great. The Silesian wars were the first signs of a growing Austro-Prussian conflict that was to be resolved only a hundred years later. By the acquisition of Silesia, a wealthy province, Prussia became one of the European great powers and extended its influence over the whole German states. Another geopolitical development of the Silesian wars was the fact that now it was Prussia that was more geographically connected to other German lands and Austria's focal points started to move outside of the German speaking realm.

The second half of the XVIII century brought important reforms to the construction and functioning of the Austrian state. The two reformist rulers were Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II. The incessant warring of the Habsburgs on many fronts left the treasury in poor condition. This was especially true after the Seven Year's War. The reforms created a customs union consisting of the majority of Habsburg lands in order to promote the

development of trade. The traditional social estate structures were undermined by limiting the serfdom duties of the peasant population towards the landowners. But probably the most important improvement of Maria Theresa's reforms was the creation of a new school system that was compulsory and included the peasants. The creation of a codified legal system in the form of *Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana* of the year 1768 also deserves a mention. The reforms were continued by Maria Theresa's son Joseph II who further limited the serfdom of the peasants. He is mostly known for the expansion of state control over religious institutions, liquidation of monasteries and using the acquired church funds to expand the state school system. The religious reforms were also followed by the Patent of Toleration that allowed Protestants and Jews to be treated equally by law as the Catholics. In 1784 an important and yet overlooked change took place – German replaced Latin as the formal language of the institutions of the Habsburg domain. That included also lands that did not have a German speaking population.

The XIX century was the scene of a slow downfall of the Austrian status from a subject to object of history. The flames of the French revolution spread ideas of national revival that had a very minor response from the Austrians but a very strong one from Germans²¹¹. In 1804 Francis II Habsburg named himself the Emperor of Austria under the name Francis I. This decision was the answer to the ever growing threat of Napoleonic France, and in fact Francis' move predicted the fall of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 that was dissolved by Napoleon. Francis II got stripped of his imperial title and had to settle only with the smaller Austrian empire. Austria during that time was almost constantly at war and lost almost all of them, which led to the diminishing of the country's importance as well as was tied to territorial losses. The turmoil of the Napoleonic wars brought not only destruction of old political entities but also new ideas of nations and sovereignty. Even Austria was not free from the romantic wave of patriotic feelings. It was at that time that the patriotic hymn *Österreich über Alles* was written by Henrich Collin in 1809. A year before that the historian Josef Freiherr von Hormayr founded a journal that was to promote patriotic feelings. The problem was that Hormayr focused on the triumphs and heroes of the Empire and the dynasty. That was not enough to spark a national feeling. Despite the famous call of the diplomat Count Johann Philipp Stadion – *Wir haben us als Nation konstituiert!* (We have made ourselves into a nation), there was little to none response. In 1813 Emperor Francis made sure

²¹¹ Bruckmüller E., *Nation Österreich. Kulturelles Bewußtsein und gesellschaftlich-politische Prozesse*, p. 336.

to replace the words nation and fatherland with emperor from the military oath²¹². The Austrian idea was limited solely to the dynasty and national allegiance could only mean one thing – allegiance to the Habsburgs.

The eventual downfall of Napoleon, the Emperor of the French only further halted those new “national” developments. The Congress of Vienna was still held by the representatives of the *ancient regime* and not it were the dynastic powers of Europe making all the political choices. In one of the Congresses’ decisions was the replacement of the deceased Holy Roman Empire by the loosely formed German Confederation in which it was Austria that had the leading role. Both Prussia and Austria were states that had territories with non-German populations that were not part of the Confederation. In 1834 Prussia formed a trade union of the German lands (*Zollverein*) that excluded Austria. The fact is that Austria’s disinterest in the *Zollverein* was enhanced by the existence of Austria’s own trade union and by some industry protection laws. It was a great example of institutional factors that pulled Austria away from the unification of Germany.

Another limitation showed itself during the Spring of Nations. The Frankfurt Parliament of 1848 discussed the issue of a national unification of Germany that was based on ethnic borders. The Austrians did not want to have their lands divided into a German and non-German parts. At the same time deputies of other German states were in favour of creating a German national state without the inclusion of other ethnic, linguistic and national groups. The Frankfurt Parliament turned to Prussia. Even if the events of the March Revolution did not produce any significant political outcomes – it was a symbol of Austria’s slow demise in the German speaking realm. In fact it was Prussia that unified Germany. The tensions between the two states erupted in open war in 1866. After a swift defeat at Königgrätz, the short seven-week conflict led to the establishment of unified Germany under Prussia and the rejection of Austria. Those events eventually broke the Austrian connection to the German speaking lands it had with the Holy Roman Empire and the German Confederation. The German speaking population of the Habsburg Empire became the most privileged minority in the state, but a minority nonetheless. By 1914 the Austrian-Germans were overrepresented in the administration of the western part of the Empire. They numbered only around 30% of the population, but 76% of civil servants, 56% in the ministries that coordinated the Dual Monarchy, 81% in the Finance ministry and 65% in the Foreign Ministry, which was

²¹² Bluhm W., *Building an Austrian nation*, New Haven, London 1973, p. 14.

supposed to be more open to people of different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds²¹³. Austro-Germans also had a privileged economic situation and held to at least 67% of capital²¹⁴. The privileged situation was also clear in the way electoral system was devised. For instance in the 1907 elections the German-speaking parties needed statistically 9575 votes to get one mandate in the parliament while the Poles 11082 votes and the Ruthenians 22785 votes etc²¹⁵.

The wound inflicted to Austria in 1866 proved to be fatal, as with the weakening of the Austrian state and its German elites – other national groups wanted more rights for themselves which led to the creation of the dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy. A lost war should have provoked an anti-Prussian sentiment but because of the exceptionally good conduct of the Prussian troops that occupied Vienna for two months won favour with the Austrian middle and lower classes. In fact before 1866 anti-Prussian sentiment was prevalent in the Austrian society and after it turned into a favour. This was especially true during the Prusso-French war of 1870 when Austrian-Germans were cheering for Prussian victory²¹⁶.

The Habsburg monarchy needed more funds because of war expenditures which led to liberalisation of social life and democratisation. After the brief formation of the *Reichstag* in 1848 and 1849 the Imperial Council (*Reichsrat*) was founded in 1861 and served as parliament with the House of Lords (*Herrenhaus*) and House of Deputies (*Abgeordnetenhaus*). While the deputies' constituencies were rooted in traditional divisions of lands the practice showed national (ethno-linguistic) divisions and factions in the Parliament. The Germans usually occupied one third of the seats²¹⁷. Obviously there were also political divisions in the parliament along the left-right dichotomy²¹⁸. The Socialist party was founded in 1889, then named *Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs* – SDAPÖ. In 1934 it changed the name to *Sozialistische Partei Österreichs* – SPÖ and in 1991 to *Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich*. The socialists usually held a pan-German belief and

²¹³ Katzenstein P., *Disjoined Partners*, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1976, p. 111-113.

²¹⁴ A substantial part of this statistic is attributed to the industrial circles of Bohemian German speaking population, parts of which could be also considered Czech.

²¹⁵ Pelinka A., *Zur österreichischen Identität*, Vienna 1990, p. 28.

²¹⁶ Katzenstein P., *Disjoined Partners*, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1976, p. 93.

²¹⁷ Since 1867 the Hungarian part of the monarchy had its own parliament. This boosted the influence of the German speaking population in the Austrian part of the dual monarchy.

²¹⁸ The ideological divisions between the conservatives and socialists were less important than ethnic differences. For instance in 1882 the Christian Socialists stopped caucusing with their counterparts of Slavic origin. The socialists were more international but eventually in 1911 the party split along ethnic ties as there was an overrepresentation of Austrian-Germans in the leadership of the parties. In 1897 all parties formed a German-front that was supposed to advocate the special status of Austrian-Germans within the Empire. Austria in their vision was supposed to be a German state. See more: Mommsen Hans, *Die Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage im Habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat*, Vienna 1963.

advocated unification with Germany. In 1891 the conservatives created a party called the *Christlichsoziale Partei*, which existed till 1934 and which was the precursor of the 1945 *Österreichische Volkspartei* (ÖVP). The conservatives were the group that spurred Austrian nationalism. However the idea was flawed as they did not consider Austrians to be a separate nation and they also advocated for unification with Germany. The only difference with the socialists was the idea that Austria should become a quasi-sovereign federal state of Germany and Austrians should retain their privileges, which they had in the Empire²¹⁹. Those two political movements are one of the oldest and despite the persecution in the years 1938-1945 one of the longest, continuously functioning parties in Europe.

After the creation of Germany the leftover German population of Austria became prone to strong German nationalism. One of the vital points of that movement was further unification with the newly established Germany. This was true for both the monarchical period and prevailed to the establishment of the First Austrian Republic in 1918. It is important to point out that it were the 210 German deputies to the Reichsrat who assembled on the 21st of October 1918 and laid claim to create a new state of German-Austria (*Republik Deutschösterreich*), which was supposed to include all German-speaking lands of the former Empire like the Sudeten (which became part of Czechoslovakia). The abdication of the last Habsburg Charles I on the 11th of November paved the way to the country declaring a Republic the next day, with Karl Renner as a provisional chancellor in charge²²⁰. The beginning of the provisional constitution of the short-lived Republic stated:

Article 1

German-Austria is a democratic republic. All public authority is derived from the people.

Article 2

German-Austria is a constituent part of the German Republic. Particular statutes determine the participation of German-Austria with the legislature and the administration of the German Republic as well as the extension of German laws and institutions into German-

²¹⁹ Wodak R., *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität*, Frankfurt am Main 1998, p. 114.

*Austria*²²¹.

Despite the fact that Austria and Germany could not be unified, either because of the existence of two different dynasties (Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs) or by the decision of the Allied Powers after World War I, Karl Renner in 1920 still decided to write the anthem of the already non-existent German-Austrian Republic. The melody was created by Renner's acquaintance Wilhelm Kienzl.

*1. Deutschösterreich, du herrliches Land, wir lieben dich!
Hoch von der Alm unterm Gletscherdom
Stürzen die Wasser zum Donaustrom,
Tränken im Hochland Hirten und Lämmer,
Treiben am Absturz Mühlen und Hämmer,
Grüßen viel Dörfer, viel Städte und ziehn
Jauchzend zum Ziel, unserm einzigen Wien!
Du herrliches Land, unser Heimatland,
Wir lieben dich, wir schirmen dich.*

*2. Deutschösterreich, du tüchtiges Volk, wir lieben dich!
Hart ist dein Boden und karg dein Brot,
Stark doch macht dich und klug die Not.
Seelen, die gleich wie Berge beständig,
Sinne, die gleich wie Wasser lebendig,
Herzen so sonnig, mitteilbarer Gunst,
Schaffen sich selber ihr Glück, ihre Kunst.
Du tüchtiges Volk, unser Muttervolk,
Wir lieben dich, wir schirmen dich.*

*3. Deutschösterreich, du treusinnig Volk, wir lieben dich!
Dienende Treu schuf dir Not und Reu,
Sei uns in Freiheit dir selber treu!
Gibt es ein Schlachtfeld rings in den Reichen,
Wo deiner Söhne Knochen nicht bleichen?
Endlich brachst du die Ketten entzwei,
Diene dir selber, sei dein! Sei frei!
Du treusinnig Volk, unser Duldervolk,
Wir lieben dich, wir schirmen dich.*

4. Deutschösterreich, du

*1. German-Austria, thou art wonderful, we love thee!
High from the Alps' dome-like glaciers
Waters rush to the Danube
Where they water lambs and shepherds in the highlands,
Drive mills and hammers at hillslopes and
Greet many villages and towns, and run
Joyously towards their destiny, our unique Vienna!
Thou'rt a wonderful land, our native land,
We love and protect thee.*

*2. German-Austria, thy people is brave, we love thee!
Thy soil is hard and meagre thy bread,
But hardship makes thee strong and bright.
Souls that are firm like mountains,
Minds that are agile like water,
Hearts so radiant, full of benevolence
Create their own happiness and art.
Thou brave people, our native people,
We love and protect thee.*

*3. German-Austria, thy people is faithful, we love thee!
Thy serving loyalty has brought you misery and remorse,
Be now, in freedom, loyal to thyself!
Is there a battlefield in our neighbouring countries
Where the bones of thy sons do not bleach?
Finally, thou hast broken thy chains,
Serve thyself, only thyself! Be free!
Thou faithful people, our bearing people,
We love and protect thee.*

4. German-Austria, federation of

²²¹ The full text of the 11 short articles of the constitution are available online in the legal section of the Austrian National library: <http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=sgb&datum=1918&page=26&size=45>.

*Bergländerbund, wir lieben dich!
 Frei durch die Tat und vereint durch Wahl,
 Eins durch Geschick und durch Blut zumal.
 Einig auf ewig, Ostalpenlande!
 Treu unserm Volkstum, treu dem Verbande!
 Friede dem Freund, doch dem Feinde, der
 droht,
 Wehrhaften Trotz in Kampf und Not!
 Du Bergländerbund, unser Ostalpenbund,
 Wir lieben dich, wir schirmen dich.*

*alpine lands, we love thee!
 Free through deed, united through election,
 One through fate and above all through
 blood.
 Forever united, countries in the eastern Alps!
 Loyal to our nation and loyal to the union!
 Peace to our friends but to all foes who
 menace us
 Defensive persistence in battle and misery!
 Federation of alpine lands, union of the
 eastern Alps,
 We love and protect thee²²².*

The anthem never became validated officially it was used for official occasions. The first time it accompanied the ceremony of swearing in new army troops on July 15 1920 in Vienna. A possible explanation for this is the fact that the Allied powers forbade Austria not only to join Germany but to use the name German-Austria. Nevertheless the song was used on numerous state occasions and was in use at least till 1929²²³. Different compositions were discussed, including traditional melody of Haydn that later became the German national anthem but was rejected on the ground of being too grounded with the times of the monarchy. The new text stressed the importance of freedom and elections as well as the federal structure of the First Austrian Republic. The tensions between the conservatives and socialists prevented any melody and song to be chosen as a *de iure* anthem. That problem was resolved only in the 30'ties with the ascent to power of the Christian democrats who reinstated the melody of Haydn with lyrics by Ottokar Kernstock. Because the melody was the same as the *Deutschlandlied* the public singing of the Austrian anthem always lead to confusion as people were singing different lyrics at the same time depending on their political views. The Kernstock anthem was valid during the Austro-fascist period till the Anschluss in 1938. Only after 1945 a new anthem was devised and a melody by Mozart replaced the old one composed by Haydn.

²²² To read more about the national symbols of German-Austria movements see: Hochman E., *Imagining a Greater Germany. Republican Nationalism and the idea of Anschluss*, London, 2016, p. 70-87.

²²³ *Ibidem* p. 72.

The dream of joining Germany was prevalent in the I Austrian Republic – the state that nobody wanted²²⁴. Every political party with the small exception of Habsburg royalists and communists had unification in Germany in its programmes. Even till 1921 local plebiscites were held and in all cases the population spoke in favour of unifying with Germany. Nothing exemplifies the need for unification with Germany than the existence of a Greater Germany People's Party (*Großdeutsche Volkspartei*) which amassed as much as 17% of the votes and being a part of right-winged governments within the coalition with the Christian-Democrats. Perhaps the best description of the popular mood of the time comes from the British Intelligence Department: *We cannot exterminate the Austrian Germans; we cannot make them cease to feel Germans. They are bound to be somewhere. Nothing would be gained by compelling them to lead an existence separate from that of Germany. Such enforced separation would merely stimulate German nationalism, but could not prevent cooperation between the two branches nor their final reunion. Lastly, the inclusion of German Austria in Germany is not altogether disadvantageous from our point of view; it would restore the balance between the Catholic south and the Protestant north, and help to check Prussianism in Germany, even if both parties concerned wish it, has therefore be dismissed both on grounds of principle and expediency*²²⁵. The thoughtfulness of this insight is surprising even for today's standards. Despite the British assessment, the French were very reluctant in strengthening Germany in any way and fiercely opposed the idea of unification.

The I Austrian Republic suffered economically. Before 1918 the lands were interconnected with other parts of the Empire and after the end of the Great War they were Austria became a trunk of a tree with all its branches cut off. The country was sustained through substantial crediting from England and France but the coming of the Great Depression in 1929 only deepened Austria's economic problems. Aside from the internal problems and a growing conflict between conservatives and socialists a new destabilising factor appeared in 1933 in the form of the establishment of the Nazi Third Reich. Adolf Hitler pressured Austria politically and the Nazi party in Austria was gaining popularity, as well as the idea of the unification. At the same time the first signs of rejection of unification started to appear in the political elites of Austria. The socialists rejected the idea on the basis of animosity towards National-Socialism. In 1933 they wrote: *If we want Austria to preserve its*

²²⁴ Wodak, *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität*, Frankfurt am Main 1998, p. 112. The term was coined by an Austrian journalist Hellmut Andics in 1962. For more see: Andics H., *50 Jahre unseres Lebens. Österreichs Schicksal seit 1918*, Vienna 1968.

²²⁵ Cartsen, F., *The first Austrian Republic 1918-1938*, Aldershot 1986, p. 6.

*independence from a fascist Germany, we do not desire this for the purpose of turning Austria lastingly from or against Germany, but for the purpose of letting Austria fulfil its mission for the whole German people. We want German-Austria to be a haven of refuge for German liberty, for German democracy, for the free development of German culture and literature, and especially for the German labour movement and German socialism, until the whole of Germany will be free again*²²⁶. The socialist did not reject their traditional pan-germanist stance; they only did not want to be a part of a fascist state. Soon they saw themselves in one. The ruling Christian social party under Engelbert Dollfuss was forced by the Western Powers to reject joining the German customs union 1932 under the threat of the not receiving further loans. Finding himself more and more isolated Dollfuss turned to the Italian fascist dictator Benito Mussolini. Italy was to be the warrant of Austrian's independence and Austria in turn adopted the fascist model of the state. The Austro-fascist regime was introduced after a short four-day civil war that was won decisively by Dollfuss and his followers. The Corporate State of Austria (*Ständestaat*) was the last resort of defending Austria's limited sovereignty. The alliance with Mussolini proved to be farfetched and Dollfuss was assassinated in 1934. Yet even the conservatives at the time felt that Austrian's were part of the German *Kulturnation*, they only tried to preserve their power within the framework of the Austrian state²²⁷. So despite the popular support for unification not everyone was happy when in March 1938 German soldiers entered Austria. The annexation of Austria known under the German name *Anschluss* was accepted by the international community and was later legitimised by a plebiscite in which 99% of votes were cast in favour of unification. The region was renamed *Ostmark*, recalling one of the historical terms from the medieval times. The Austrian dream of unification would prove to become a nightmare soon enough. Or did it? Many Austrian-Germans benefited from the Anschluss and made careers in the administration of the Third Reich. The Austrians also proved to be loyal soldiers and had the smallest desertion rates among all groups incorporated to the German army²²⁸. Austrians were also overrepresented in the higher positions of the Third Reich, especially the SS. Yet a substantial part of the

²²⁶ *Österreichs staatliche Zukunft und die Sozialdemokratie, Arbeiter Zeitung, 13.05.1933*, op.cit: Thaler P., *The Ambivalence of Identity*, West Lafayette 2000 p.71.

²²⁷ Wodak R., p. 114. The ideology of the Corporate state was somewhat inconsequential. On the one hand the difference between catholic Austria and protestant Germany (or pagan Nazi Germany) was emphasised on the other hand regarded Austrians as cultural Germans. This paradoxical and ambivalent identity gave birth to the idea of Austria as better Germany. The term *Österreich, das bessere Deutschland* was later used in economic terms indicating higher standards of living in Austria in comparison to Germany. See also: Heiss G., *Pan-Germans, better Germans, Austrians: Austrian historian on national identity from the First to the Second Republic*, [in:] *German Studies Review* 16, 1993, p. 421-422.


²²⁸ Thaler P., *The Ambivalence of Identity*, West Lafayette 2000, p. 86-89.

Austrian population found itself on the rough edge of history. Aside from the Jewish population the groups targeted by the Nazi regime were the socialists, the Austro-fascists, and Catholics. The support for the war was high among the population but there was some meagre yet noticeable resistance. After the Anschluss around 200.000 former Austrian citizens emigrated and another 200.000 became victimised by the regime of which half was killed. Of 100.000 Austrian Jews more than 65.000 perished in the Holocaust. Austria also suffered war losses totalling 250.000 killed in action and around 24.000 died due to the Allied bombings. The total number of deaths through terror policies and war is estimated at around 370.000. This number constitutes 5.56% of the prewar Austrian population (the Jewish casualties constitute around 30% of the population before the Anschluss). After the end of the II World War, Austria was re-established as a republic under joint occupation of USA, USSR, France and UK. The Allies remained in Austria till on 15th of May 1955 the so called State Treaty or the Treaty of Austrian Independence was signed. In fact the neutrality was stated later by the Austrian parliament on the 26th October 1955 when all the foreign troops left Austria. Austria became a neutral state and all Allied troops withdrew from its borders. 26th October was chosen as a national celebration day and holiday for the II Austrian Republic. Austria managed to build a stable economic and political system in the following years with two major parties the Socialists (SPÖ) and the conservative People's Party (ÖVP) ruling either in the grand coalition or separately. In 1986 a scandal connected with the newly elected president Kurt Waldheim, who hid information about his service in the SS in the Balkans during the II World War, changed the discourse about the role of Austria in the war²²⁹. The alpine republic joined the European Union in 1995, forty years after becoming independent.

The economic developments of Austria also need to be mentioned. The success of the Second Austrian Republic in the economic and social department is one of the reasons for the success of nation-building processes. In 1951 George Hoffman named economic development of Austria as the basic prerequisite for the survival of the independence of the country. Analysing the viability of the state through aspects like food supply, forest products, industries, raw material production, transportation and tourism are all factors that can contribute to the independence of Austria. He projects that Austria would be economically viable without US support in 1952. Hofmann also mentions one interesting fact: that the industrial output of

²²⁹ See more: Born H., *Für die Richtigkeit Kurt Waldheim*, Munich 1987, see also: Herzstein R., *Waldhheim. The missing years*, New York 1988.

Austria after the war was bigger than the output in 1937, even after the destruction caused by bombings and other military operations²³⁰. This is important because of the impact that industrialisation has on social structures and nation making. Austro-Hungary was fourth or fifth industrialised state in the world. The issue was that the majority of the industry was placed in the Czech lands or in the port areas of Trieste and Dalmatia. Only Styria as the only core Austrian land had seen some industrial activity. When the Empire fell almost all of the industry became part of different states. Only the investment in big industrial works during the Nazi era and the help from the Marshall Fund allowed the Austrian core lands to become modern and industrialised. The graph below shows the GDP growth in Austria. The growth of economy in the Second Austrian Republic was unprecedented and became one of the vital parts of the Austrian national identity – the growth, and the social policies that accompanied it became tools for national integration.



Source: World Economics Data²³¹

The political history of the Second Austrian Republic will be discussed in more detail in subchapter 2.3 as well as chapter 3 of this dissertation. Nevertheless a basic outline of the political history is necessary. Austrian democratic system was mandated by the Allied occupying forces, which allowed or did not allow certain parties to run in elections. With the

²³⁰ Hoffman G., *The Survival of an Independent Austria*, [in:] *Geographical Review*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Oct., 1951), p. 606-621.

²³¹ <https://www.worlddeconomics.com/GrossDomesticProduct/Austria.gdp>, Accessed: 01.10.2019.

failure of the Communist Party of Austria to secure any substantial vote the political system was established between two major parties: the conservative People's Party of Austria (Österreichische Volkspartei - ÖVP), the socialists (and later social-democrats) the socialist Party of Austria (Sozialistische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ). These two main parties dominated the political scene governing either in the so called grand coalition or separately. They were accompanied by the national-liberal „Third Camp” firstly the Union of Independents (Verband der Unabhängigen, VdU) which later transformed into the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheit Partei Österreichs, FPÖ). It was not until the late 90ties when the liberal cam started to employ populist politics and break the duopoly of the two main actors on the Austrian political scene. The Austrian political system was based on consensus – which was most exemplified by the *Proporzsystem* – the system of proportionality. When one party was governing the positions in the administration were always distributed to include the other party as well. If one department in a ministry had a director from ÖVP than his or her vice-director hat to be from SPÖ etc²³². This system encouraged political participation and the party membership was unusually high in Austria. In the 60ties Austrian Parties had more members than its German counterparts. The table below presents the election results and turnout after 1945.

Election year	SPÖ	KPÖ	ÖVP	VdU	FPÖ	Gre	LiF	BZÖ	Turnout
1945	44.6	5.4	49.8	-	-	-	-	-	94.0
1949	38.7	5.1	44.0	11.7	-	-	-	-	96.8
1953	42.1	5.3	41.3	11.0	-	-	-	-	95.8
1956	43.0	4.4	46.0	-	6.5	-	-	-	95.3
1959	44.8	3.3	44.2	-	7.7	-	-	-	94.2
1962	44.0	3.0	45.4	-	7.0	-	-	-	93.8
1966	42.6	0.4	48.3	-	5.4	-	-	-	93.8

²³² This was most evident in the state controlled media where always two journalists from different parties or opposing views had to be present.

<u>1970</u>	48.4	1.0	44.7	-	5.5	-	-	-	91.8
<u>1971</u>	50.0	1.4	43.1	-	5.5	-	-	-	92.4
<u>1975</u>	50.4	1.2	42.9	-	5.4	-	-	-	92.9
<u>1979</u>	51.0	1.0	41.9	-	6.1	-	-	-	92.2
<u>1983</u>	47.6	0.7	43.2	-	5.0	-	-	-	92.6
<u>1986</u>	43.1	0.7	41.3	-	9.7	4.8	-	-	90.5
<u>1990</u>	42.8	0.5	32.1	-	16.6	4.8	-	-	86.1
<u>1994</u>	34.9	0.3	27.7	-	22.5	7.3	6.0	-	81.9
<u>1995</u>	38.1	0.3	28.3	-	21.9	4.8	5.5	-	86.0
<u>1999</u>	33.2	0.5	26.9	-	26.9	7.4	3.6	-	80.4
<u>2002</u>	36.5	0.6	42.3	-	10.0	9.5	1.0	-	84.3
<u>2006</u>	35.3	1.0	34.3	-	11.0	11.1	-	4.1	78.5
<u>2008</u>	29.3	0.8	26.0	-	17.5	10.4	2.1	10.7	78.8
<u>2013</u>	26.8	1.0	24.0	-	20.5	12.4	-	3.5	74.9
<u>2017</u>	26.9	0.8	31.5	-	26.0	3.9	-	-	80.0

Source: Bundesministerium, Inneres²³³

The political history of the Second Austrian Republic will be discussed in more detail in subchapter 2.3 as well as chapter 3 of this dissertation. Nevertheless a basic outline of the political history is necessary. Austrian democratic system was mandated by the Allied occupying forces, which allowed or did not allow certain parties to run in elections. With the failure of the Communist Party of Austria to secure any substantial vote the political system was established between two major parties: the conservative People's Party of Austria (Österreichische Volkspartei - ÖVP), the socialists (and later social-democrats) the socialist Party of Austria (Sozialistische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ). These two main parties dominated

²³³ All election results are available on the webpage of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior: https://bmi.gv.at/412/Nationalratswahlen/Historischer_Rueckblick.aspx, Accessed on 01.10.2019.

the political scene governing either in the so called grand coalition or separately. They were accompanied by the national-liberal „Third Camp” firstly the Union of Independents (Verband der Unabhängigen, VdU) which later transformed into the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheit Partei Österreichs, FPÖ). It was not until the late 90ties when the liberal cam started to employ populist politics and break the duopoly of the two main actors on the Austrian political scene. The Austrian political system was based on consensus – which was most exemplified by the *Proporzsystem* – the system of proportionality. When one party was governing the positions in the administration were always distributed to include the other party as well. If one department in a ministry had a director from ÖVP than his or her vice-director hat to be from SPÖ etc²³⁴. This system encouraged political participation and the party membership was unusually high in Austria. In the 60ties Austrian Parties had more members than its German counterparts.

Before examining the historiography of the German nation the era since 1945 has to be examined in greater detail with the special focus on the idea of Austria as the first victim of Germany as well as the transitional justice processes that happened in the II Austrian Republic.

2.3 Austrian case of transitional justice

The downfall of the Third Reich created a new situation in the world. The national socialists responsible for barbaric atrocities were put to trial in Nurnberg and were accused of crimes against humanity such as genocide on the basis of legal terms that did not exist prior to those events. The Nurnberg trials and the policy pursued by the Allied forces in Germany set an example the first case of implementing what would later be known as transitional justice. Since then a number of countries that transitioned from an authoritarian system or dictatorship implemented to a various degree a policy of transitional justice. As Juan Mendez puts it: *the pursuit of retrospective justice is an urgent task of democratization, as it highlights the fundamental character of the new order to be established, an order based on the rule of law and on respect for the dignity and worth of each human person. Yet it is also one of the hardest choices that any democracy has to make, if only because the effort to restore truth and justice where denial and impunity have reigned is frequently attacked as destabilizing*

²³⁴ This was most evident in the state controlled media where always two journalists from different parties or opposing views had to be present.

*and vindictive*²³⁵. In this short passage Mendez points out several issues that arise when spoken about transitional justice. The first one would be the fact that this term is used almost exclusively to describe the process of democratization and establishment of the rule of law.

One could argue that each regime change comes with a specific transitional justice. Obviously when speaking about a transition from democracy to an autocratic system it is hard to state that the establishment of a new justice system would have anything in common with justice. Nevertheless some mechanisms of transition could be similar. Since the focus of researchers²³⁵ lies solely on the transitions to democratic systems it would be an interesting inquiry to launch a comparative study and broaden the young discipline of transitional justice research.

The second issue raised by Mendez is the idea that transitional justice that happens as a result of a transformation into democracy has to be based on the rule of law and respect for human dignity and worth. This description however presents an ideal type of transitional justice and many processes that are included in it do not seem to do enough of justice. How so? Democracy is a political system that is formed by compromise and it is relatively inclusive, especially when compared with other regimes. Moreover it claims moral superiority over the past and presents itself as progress, as something better. Therefore the transitional justice implemented in a newly formed democratic regime serves as a founding myth of the establishment of the rule of law. At least in theory that is how it's supposed to be. In this chapter I would like to investigate the case of transitional justice in Austria which shows how the democratic system actually prevents justice from being carried out in favour of democratic inclusion.

The biggest problem with transitional justice in democratic systems is that democracy needs to be inclusive. Victims need to live among their former perpetrators and the democratic logic treats them the same: as citizens who have equal rights. While this is an obvious groundwork of democracy it does infringe a common sense of justice. Poland saw two historical democracies: the nobles' democracy (*demokracja szlachecka*) and people's democracy (*demokracja ludowa*) in both cases the adjectives conveniently placed before the term democracy indicated that those systems were not in fact true democracies. In the first case of *demokracja szlachecka* it was only the nobility that possessed rights, in the second one it was a communist dictatorship. The so called "adjective democracy" is now a term to describe a democracy at a fault, an imperfect system. One could argue the same about

²³⁵ Mendez J, *Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies*, London 1997, p. 1-23.

justice. Transitional justice is actually an “adjective justice”. While aiming to do justice in times of transition it is quite the opposite: a compromise between the common need for integrity, law and punishment of crimes and between the democratic need to create a homogenous group of citizens. If the transitional justice would be too harsh on the perpetrator group their opposition could be too strong and therefore this process would prevent them from being included into the newly forming democratic regime. A good example of this would be the tough negotiations between the government of Columbia and the communist guerrilla FARC. Only after a broad amnesty was promised, FARC laid their arms in 2017. If the transitional justice would be too soft then it would cause resentment in the victims, as well as, the general public, which would find the new regime as flawed and would not be as loyal to the new state. Here I would provide the example of Poland where the politics of the “thick line” and a very soft approach towards former communist perpetrators caused a rise of radical right-winged movements²³⁶. Transitional justice emerged with the fall of the Third Reich or as it is called Nazi Germany. But Germany was not the only Nazi state. The case of the smaller German counterpart Austria is very often overlooked. More interestingly all the processes of transitional justice while being structurally similar to the bigger German example were not exactly the same and created different results. In order to fully describe the Austrian case it is necessary first to establish how implementation and execution of transitional justice looks like and then describe the historical process of transitional justice appliance in Austria.

The International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) names four most important ways or variations of transitional justice:

- Criminal prosecutions for at least the most responsible for the most serious crimes
- “Truth-seeking” (or fact-finding) processes into human rights violations by non-judicial bodies. These can be varied but often look not only at events, but their causes and impacts.
- Reparations for human rights violations taking a variety of forms: individual, collective, material and symbolic

²³⁶ Of course this was not the only reason of the rise of radical right in Poland. Some of those factors were economical. Nevertheless the right-winged extremists in Poland remain radically anti-communist. Similarly the new generation of post-war Germans radically rejected their parents’ Nazi legacy in the revolutions of the year 1968.

- Reform of laws and institutions including the police, judiciary, military and military intelligence²³⁷

I will use the framework of ICTJ in order to describe the Austrian case but in reverse order so the first topic addressed would be the reform. Before that however some historical background needs to be emphasised. The major difference between the post-war treatment of Austria and Germany was the fact that the major Allied forces in 1943 in Moscow declared Austria as the first victim of the Hitlerite aggression. The Moscow Declaration goes as follows:

*"The governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Nazi aggression, shall be liberated from German domination. They regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighbouring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace. Austria is reminded, however that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation."*²³⁸

The declaration is crucial to understanding the politics in Austria in the years 1945-1955. It is a contradictory document in itself. On the first hand it seems to be balanced and reasonable. It states that Austria is the first victim of Nazi Germany but does not forget the crimes committed by Austrians in the machinery of the Third Reich. But politically its focus is placed rather on the victimhood than being the perpetration which had a significant impact on the processes of transitional justice in Austria.

Similarly to Germany Austria was divided into four occupation zones: Soviet, American, British and French. The capital city of Vienna suffered a similar fate with its immediate centre being used as an international zone for all Allied forces. Austria however did not suffer the fate of divide Germany though thanks to its geopolitical location. Unlike its

²³⁷ *What is Transitional Justice?*, <https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice>, Access: 16.05.2019.

²³⁸ The full text of the Moscow Declaration can be found here: Moscow Declaration, October 1943, <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html>, Access: 16.05.2019.

Germany, the geography of Austria and Vienna prevented a partition in the German fashion. The situation of two German states did not replicate itself in the Austrian case. This situation developed in such a way as a result of the uncertain strategic planning of the Allied forces. Although the Moscow Declaration allowed Austria to form an independent state, the Allies behind the scenes held significant doubts about the viability of Austria as a separate entity. Austria's seeming inability to resist Hitler in 1938 validated the opinion that the post-Versailles Treaty Austrian state was too small to keep out aggressors, but whose strategic location invited other powers to interfere in Austrian politics. Before the Yalta agreement Soviet and British/American influences were negotiated unofficially the list of countries did not contain Austria that received special treatment through the Moscow Declaration. It is clear that the Soviet foreign policy with regards to Austria was to keep their options open in the post-war order; the British on the other hand still occupied the mental state of the "Great game" and prepared various solutions for Austria. One of those was an attempt to re-establish something to fill in the void that appeared after the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The British plans named it a Danubian confederacy. Another plan proposed a political union with Bavaria. Such development would strengthen Austria, weaken Germany and prevent a resurgence of Prussian militarism. The problem of German strength happened to be solved in a different manner: a division of the country in two uneven halves. The reality of the Cold war undermined the ambitious British plans. Not to mention the fact that the Soviets would never agree on giving up their influence in Central Europe for a stronger Austria. . The Soviet press denounced a confederation as a resurrection of the Habsburgs and one that unjustly rewarded Austria at the expense of the other victims of Nazi aggression. That does not mean that a scenario of divided Austria was also not discussed. Surprisingly the ones who proposed it were the Americans. The first years of the occupation made Austria into one of the important sites for the early Cold War, the Truman administration considered and proposed an East-West division of Austria in 1947, but it fell in disfavour with the Soviets. This situation was a result of the electoral failures of the Austrian Communist Party. Not to mention the rather unfavourable attitude of the general Austrian population towards the Soviet occupying force. The Soviet army when liberating Austria from the Nazis committed numerous rapes and the looting of industry and infrastructure went beyond any reasonable limits in the Soviet occupation zone. The fear in Moscow was that settling the Austrian question on terms proposed by the West would only benefit the West and undercut Soviet security. The result was a stalemate in Austria until the negotiations for the State Treaty began after Stalin's death. The passing of the communist dictator was a game changer in the USSR, in the *Ostblock* and

also in Austria. The alpine republic was to be used as a bargaining chip in order to achieve détente with the West. Renegotiation of the occupation was a huge opportunity to steer the USSR into a new direction in the Soviet relationship in Europe. Death of Stalin opened new diplomatic possibilities one of them being a complete neutralisation of Germany. For the Soviets such move would be beneficial. Not only they would gain a buffer zone between them and the West but also demilitarize a significant part of Europe. Austria had a potential to serve as a model for the bigger German solution. Moreover ending the occupation in Austria had other positive results for the Soviets. First of all they would get rid of cumbersome costs of the occupation. When the time of looting, which was limited to the immediate post-war time, finished then the USSR had to devote more and more resources to the occupation of Austria. At the same time Austria becoming neutral created geopolitical advantages. Not only would the NATO's forces retreat behind the easily defensible line of the Alps but creating a neutral Austria would disrupt transportation lines between two big NATO states: Germany and Italy. In case of open conflict retaking Vienna would be rather easy. The distance between the Austrian capital and Bratislava is a mere 40 kilometres of flatlands. The West would have to force their troops through the inaccessible Alps. As negotiations for the Austrian State Treaty began, the Soviets staked out a basic position that Austria was to not seek a military alliance with an outside power and explicitly forbid any unification with Germany. The geopolitics of central Europe created a diplomatic win-win situation for everybody including Austria and created the only scenario when the Soviet army retreated from once occupied territory.

In 1955 the Allied forces and Austria signed the so called State Treaty. Austria became a neutral state and all of the occupying armies retreated. This move was a gamble for both East and West. It has to be said that Austrian diplomacy really managed to achieve as much as possible in that peculiar situation. What is most important for these considerations is the last moment of negotiation of the State Treaty. The Austrian gamble is best described by the journalist Hella Pick: *On 14th of May 1955, the four Foreign Ministers, Dulles, Molotov, Pinay and Macmillan assembled in Vienna. Not since the Potsdam Conference in 1945 had the four wartime Allies found themselves in complete agreement over a major issue. They were unanimous in approving the Treaty text. By the end of October all their forces would have gone from Austrian soil. Only then would the Austrian parliament declare Austria's permanent neutrality. The four ministers beamed politely and nodded: next morning they would sign the Austrian State Treaty. Then it was the turn of the Austrian Foreign Minister, Leopold Figl, to drop a potentially wrecking bombshell. He had one more request, that the*

*preamble to the Treaty repeated the 1943 Moscow Declaration's formula that Austria was Hitler's first victim, but had to bear its share of responsibility for its participation in the war on Hitler's side. Austria wanted this clause removed from the State Treaty. Figl argued that it would be unfair to burden Austria with guilt about past behaviour at the very moment of its relaunch as an independent nation. Austria's internal and external development would be handicapped by such a moral slur. With little pause for reflection, all four ministers agreed to Austria's request*²³⁹. Of course the Austrians assumed that the most difficult partner to convince would be the Soviet representative – Molotov. USSR has always used the aforementioned part of the Moscow Declaration as leverage, a mean to extract economic tributes from Austria. At the time however bigger things were at stake. The State Treaty was to be presented by all sides as a great achievement of détente. Everything was already prepared including the text of the Treaty. The timing of the Austrian diplomacy was perfect. No one would squabble over one short passage in one short paragraph when such a big success was at stake. In this way Austria managed to avoid its responsibility for war atrocities for three decades. It is essential that this was allowed by the Allies and that they allowed this situation to happen. Firstly In the Moscow Declaration leaving an open door for Austria, and secondly during the State Treaty negotiations which were the moment to use the passage out of responsibilities. This created a nationwide amnesia that was supposed to last for thirty years till the so called “horrid year 1986”. In that fatal year two important political events happened in the alpine republic. The first, less significant, one was the rise of Jörg Haider, who took the leader position in the far right-winged party FPÖ. This development happened to be a turning point for the radical right in Austria which rose from a mere 5% in popularity to almost 30%. The second event was of much bigger importance and changed the political memory of Austrians. The Waldheim affair marked a turning point in the Second Republic. In 1986, the former General Secretary to the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, ran as a candidate for the office of the President of the Austrian Federal Republic. Shortly after winning the election information came out that he was a part of a unit that committed crimes against humanity in the Greek city of Saloniki by deporting the entire Jewish population. He was also involved in war crimes in the Balkans. The diplomatic response was strong and Waldheim became persona non grata in almost every country in the world. Austria had to confront its past and abandon the role of being solely a victim. This development had also an impact on

²³⁹ Pick H., *Guilty victim. Austria from the Holocaust to Haider*, London, New York 2000, p. 31.

acknowledging at least some basic responsibility for the atrocities committed during World War II.

The rule of law was quickly re-established as the country had a whole legal system of the 1st Republic with the famous constitution written by Hans Kelsen and enacted in 1920 (with some minor amendments in 1929). The legal systems that were used in Austria during the fascist regime of Dolfuß and Schuschnigg as well as the Nazi legislation were completely revoked. After 1945 some interesting legislative changes were introduced and they were an answer to the unprecedented crimes committed by the Nazis during the II World War. This brings us directly to the topic of criminal prosecutions and the denazification of Austria.

The issue of the crimes committed by the Nazi regime are well known. The world's response to them was the creation of a new term: genocide and some the perpetrators were retroactively prosecuted in the Nurnberg Trials. Interestingly the denazification courts in Austria started to operate even sooner than the court in Nurnberg. The defendants were accused on the basis of two legal acts: The War Crimes Act (Constitutional Law of June 26, 1945) that *introduced a number of offenses that were either formerly non-existent in the Austrian judicial code (such as the violation of human dignity or denunciation) or had to be f*(Constitutional Law of February 17, 1947). According to this act former National Socialists were divided into two groups, namely: those who were involved in war crimes (and other related illegal activities) and those who were required to atone for their actions and make reparations (i.e. incriminated and lesser offenders)²⁴⁰. How did these courts work in practice? Prof. Winfried Garscha has described them in detail: *The People's Courts were presided over by two professional judges and three lay assessors. [...] After the liberation of Austria in May 1945 People's Trials were held only in the Soviet occupied zone. The first such trial took place in August in 1945 – three months before the Nuremberg Trials. The accused were former stormtroopers suspected shooting Hungarian Jews in Engerau, a village near Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia. The Western Allies in their respective occupation zones did not allow the establishment of People's Courts before March–April 1946. Thereafter four People's Courts existed in Austria – Vienna for the Soviet zone, Graz for the British zone, Linz for the American zone and Innsbruck for the French zone*²⁴¹. There were 536,660 people

²⁴⁰All the findings are available on the official governmental webpage of the denazification process <http://www.entnazifizierung.at/denazification-in-austria/>, Access, 10.01.2019, <http://www.nachkriegsjustiz.at/prozesse/volksg/index.php>, Acces 10.01.2019.

²⁴¹ This information is held on the governmental portal for the archive of resistance in Austria during https://www.doew.at/cms/download/40g3m/en_second%20republic.pdf, p. 5, Access, 10.01.2019.

registered in Austria as Nazis. 18.3% of these individuals were “illegal party-goers,” or people who had belonged to the NSDAP even before the “Anschluss” in 1938, a time when the party was prohibited in Austria²⁴². *The Austrian People’s Courts launched preliminary proceedings against almost 137,000 individuals suspected of crimes that fell under the Nazi Prohibition Law or the War Crimes Law, 108,000 out of them by early 1948. More than 28,000 people were brought to trial, 23,000 got a verdict, 13,607 individuals were sentenced. 30 death sentences were actually executed out of 43, two of the criminals sentenced to die committed suicide before they could be hanged. 27 criminals were sentenced to life imprisonment. Sentences in the upper range (that is maximum penalty or imprisonment of more than ten years) were imposed on 350 defendants*²⁴³. This list does not contain all of the Nazi criminals prosecuted after the war. Some perpetrators were tried in Nurnberg and a small number of them were extradited to other European countries to be tried in the places where they have committed their crimes.

Unfortunately a sentence in the People’s Courts did not mean that the perpetrators were properly punished. Out of the 350 criminals with upper range sentences only seven were still imprisoned in 1955. Most of them were pardoned. The second problem to be found here is the small number of convictions in regard with the number of people put to trial. In many cases politicians, ministers or even members of the clergy intervened in order to lower the sentences or in favour of abandonment of prosecution. The most important factor in the clemency of the Austrian state towards former Nazis was the fact that their civic rights were revoked only until 1949. After that they could vote and run for offices which in the democratic reality meant that they were an important pool of voters that every party wanted to scoop from. In 1955 in the year of Austria regaining independence at a cost of neutrality the People’s Courts were shut down. 4.700 cases were still pending at the time and were transferred to regular courts. This however was not the end of the story of the prosecution of Nazis in Austria. A special police department for Nazi crimes was established. This department added about 1000 cases to the previous 4.700 pending ones. The results of the work of this department were less than meagre. Only 39 people were put to trial and of those less than a half – 18 were sentenced.

After the prosecution of perpetrators the truth-seeking is one of the most important parts of transitional justice. While the prosecution serves to punish the perpetrators and serve

²⁴² Stiefel D., *Entnazifizierung in Österreich*, Vienna 1981, p. 98, 116, 119.

²⁴³ https://www.doew.at/cms/download/40g3m/en_second%20republic.pdf p. 5

at least a flimsy feeling of justice the truth-seeking is a process that goes much deeper. It is a slow and meticulous process often conducted by scholars of the highest level. The goal of truth-seeking is to enumerate all of the crimes committed and through acknowledgement empower the victims symbolically and in some cases propose a restitution and compensation based on the findings of the truth-seeking commissions. In the Austrian case it was the *Historikerkommission* (Historical Commission) was created in 1998 and it was set up to examine Austria's role in the expropriation of Jewish assets during the period of *Ostmark*. It worked over the span of five years and concluded in 2003 and more than 150 researchers took part in the investigations in the archives. Those scholars had to look in depth into the status of property of more than 200.000 Austrian Jews and around 10.000 Roma and Sinti. As one of the members of the *Historikerkommission* Robert Knight wrote: *The precise permit given by the government in 1998 was to investigate 'the expropriation of property in the period of Nazi rule (1938-1945), restitution and compensation in the Second Austrian republic and attendant welfare issues'. This may seem narrow in its focus on property issues, but in fact it affected nearly all aspects of Nazi rule and Austrian society. Last but not least, it was also concerned with the image and legitimacy of post-war Austria itself, as a collective victim of a foreign (German-Nazi) occupation*²⁴⁴. Robert Knight points out the broader importance of the *Historikerkommission*. *What seems to be missing from the point of Austrian interest were the Austrian victims of Nazism. Why were they omitted by the government who set the Historikerkommission up? To answer this question one must look back at the Austrian postwar history yet again. Because of the idea of Austria as the first victim of German aggression it was the Austrian victims that received the most attention. Number of persecuted Austrians was established at around 200.000*²⁴⁵. *Among those 200.000 were conservative and socialist politicians, priests and members of resistance. Not only the Austrian suffering was emphasized but also intensively commemorated. One example would be an inclusion of letters of Austrian Konzentrationslager inmates or resistance fighters memoirs in the schoolbooks for history classes. Needless to say the Jewish victims were not included in this official state narrative. It was only the Waldheim affair of the year 1986 that proved to be a breaking point. The depiction of the victims of the Holocaust in history textbooks became a standard in*

²⁴⁴ Knight R., *Austria and Nazism: Owning up the past*,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/genocide/austria_nazism_01.shtml, Access, 10.01.2019. For more see Ö Knight R., *Wortprotokolle der österreichischen Bundesregierung von 1945-1952 über die Entschädigung der Juden*, Frankfurt am Main 1988.

²⁴⁵ The exact numbers are hard to establish. Austria had used a similar mechanism as Poland in the same period to more-less equal the number of Polish and Jewish victims. In Poland the number of victims was said to be 6 million with 3 million for both Jewish and Polish victims. The Austrian calculations similarly stated that there were around 400.000 victims of the Second World War divided into two halves: the Austrian and the Jewish one.

a similar fashion to the German counterpart. The difference was that the Austrian acknowledgement of its Jewish victims came 30 years later than in Germany.

On international level *Austria was either too small - in international terms - to matter, or it was seen as an enclave of tranquillity and good order (and 'permanent neutrality' between east and west), which ought to be cultivated*²⁴⁶. It would not be an overstatement to say that the Waldheim Affair was more significant for Austria externally than internally. The eyes of the whole world were pointed at the Alpine Republic. The international context also shifted and time was ripe for the creation of a truth-seeking commission. *The international climate was also changing through the 1980s and 90s, as a new 'politics of sensibility' developed. A number of disputes over paintings (such as those by Gustav Klimt) revealed their dubious provenance, and thus brought the issue of the expropriation of the property of Jews to a wider public, and the war record of neighbouring Switzerland also came under scrutiny. In response - after some inept initial reactions - the Swiss set up the independent Bergier Commission to investigate their own country's approach to the Third Reich. And last but not least, 'class actions' on behalf of holocaust victims and forced labourers were started in the US, with the aim of getting compensation and wage payments.* Apparently it was the pressure from the USA that was crucial in forming the *Historikerkommission in 1998*. In an interesting turn of events politics have overtaken the slow research process. Even before the commission presented the vast results of its work and agreement was reached between the governments of Austria and the USA in January 2001. The result of this settlement two issues were resolved: compensation for forced labourers and Jewish victims. Most importantly the settlement included a redress for the loss of rental property (59,000 Vienna flats) that was supposed to be paid out of the Austrian National Fund. A General Settlement Fund was established to provide compensation in ten different categories of losses:

- Liquidated businesses including licenses and other business assets
- Real estate, insofar as it was not restituted on grounds of Part 2 of the General Settlement Fund Law
- Bank accounts
- Stocks
- Bonds
- Mortgages

²⁴⁶ Ibidem.

- Movable assets, insofar as property losses of this description had not already been compensated by the National Fund
- Insurance policies
- Occupational and educational losses
- Other losses and damages²⁴⁷

It was ironic that the deadline for applications for reparations from the General Settlement Fund was set to early 2003. This was the exact moment when the *Historikerkommission* published the results of its work. One could argue that it was not a coincidence and that the findings of the commission that could be used as a base of restitution now were published too late to serve any other purpose than just truth-seeking. In a sense the commission failed to achieve one of its goals and did not allow any victims or the legal successors of the victims to receive redress. Despite those limitations and problems a total of 20.702 applications were filed and The General Settlement Fund had to process and evaluate around 160,000 individual claims in the different categories. The greatest number of claims was asserted in the categories "liquidated businesses" and "occupational and educational losses", which had previously not been dealt with by any sufficient restitution measures. In total, 210 million US Dollar was available for these payments²⁴⁸.

As for the commission of historians it would once again make sense to refer to Robert Knight to summarise the results of the work of the *Historikerkommission*: *The commission's findings run to 14,000 pages, including 53 individual reports and one volume of conclusions. This amount of research cannot be easily summarised. But broadly speaking it shows the involvement of Austrian individuals, groups and institutions in all facets of expropriation of assets from the Jewish community in the Nazi years; from daylight robbery to more subtle forms of expropriation in the name of economic rationality. It also shows how numerous individual Austrians and institutions - from Vienna's Dorotheum auction house to the state (federal, regional and local) - gained as a result of these activities. The commission described how a machinery was established in Austria in the first post war decade, to provide restitution to the economic victims of the Nazis. And how some survivors had had some*

²⁴⁷ All information about the Austrian General Settlement Fund can be found on the official webpage: <https://www.entschaedigungsfonds.org/monetary-compensation.html>

²⁴⁸ *The proceedings before Claims Committee*, <https://www.entschaedigungsfonds.org/proceedings-before-the-claims-committee.html>, Access: 16.05.2019.

*success in getting it. For example the owners of businesses that had not been liquidated (these were in the minority, and were generally the larger firms) had quite a good chance. It also helped if the claim involved real estate. Most moveable property simply disappeared and - apart from identifiable works of art - will presumably never be found*²⁴⁹

Every case of implementation of transitional justice is exceptional as the situation of particular countries is different. Even though the example of Austria shares close resemblances to Germany it is a completely different story. Very much like Germany Austria was forced to reform its state system by the victorious Allies. However Unlike Germany Austria returned to its own prewar constitution. Also in comparison to other non-european countries Austria had a very long tradition of parliamentarism and democracy which influenced the reconstruction of the alpine republic. The reform was also the easiest part for Austria to implement during the transitional justice period.

Things were not so easy when it came to persecutions of the perpetrators. While some of the most prominent Nazis were put to trial in Nurnberg they were included there as Germans. At the same time Austria received a much lighter treatment from the Allies than Germany. It was perceived as the first victim of the Nazi aggression and later the Austrian diplomacy made huge efforts to avoid being held responsible for the wartime crimes. Only a very small number of perpetrators were sentenced – in a rather symbolic manner. While some of the former Nazis faced troubles in the II Austrian Republic (like the prohibition of work in certain places) these limitations were soon lifted. All in all it is possible to say without much exaggeration that the prosecution of former Nazis in Austria was not successful and that Austria used the opportunities given by the Allies to shield them. Especially after 1949 when the former Nazis were allowed to vote again and proved to be a substantial part of the electorate. This situation was a seed that grew and in time became more and more problematic for Austria.

The truth seeking process came very late to be of any significance to the remaining living Jewish victims. While the findings of the highly professional *Historikerkommission* are very detailed and show an in-depth research the impact of those findings is very limited. Because of the political deals that were quickly made before the *Historikerkommission* work

²⁴⁹ Knight R., *Wortprotokolle der österreichischen Bundesregierung von 1945-1952 über die Entschädigung der Juden*, Frankfurt am Main 1988.

could have any influence the reparation process was rather hampered. While Austria eventually did pay some reparations it was done so late, more than 50 years after the end of the II World War, to have any real impact.

In general it could be said that Austria had implemented transitional justice only because of pressure from abroad and to uphold its positive image that was given to this country by chance by the Allies. As in many cases transitional justice proved to be of limited importance and held a symbolical dimension. The transitional justice processes were not substantial for the new nation making of the II Austrian republic where the focus was put on the Austrian and not Jewish victims of the war and Nazi crimes. As the comparative study of implementation of transitional justice in various countries around the globe edited by James McAdams shows this is a case more often than not. Transitional justice leaves a deep feeling of injustice among the victims but at the same time serves as a feeble but necessary base for reunification of society during a system change. The Austrian case proves that despite its flaws transitional justice is necessary even if it is too little and too late.

2.4 Historiography of the Austrian nation

2.4.1 Austrian historiography before 1938 – lack of nation formation

The Austrian pre-modern historiography does not really exist. Austria was considered a part of German territories which is shown for example in the richly illustrated Hartman Schedel's *Nurnberg Chronicle* also called as *Weltchronik*²⁵⁰. The work was famous for its cityscapes. The view of Vienna is using the old Latin name of Pannonia. Similarly the *Lexicon* of Johann Hübner of 1709 also includes the Austrian lands into the broader *Germania*²⁵¹. Both German and foreign world chronicles or world histories have always included Austria to the realm of Germany and Vienna was named as the biggest and most important German city. The first use of the term Austrian nation comes with the medieval *natio* at the universities. The university was created in 1365 and included a geographical Austrian nation, which extended also to what is now Italy. Other Germans were divided into Rheinisch and Saxon *nationes*²⁵². The German self-identification is one of the persistent

²⁵⁰ The whole chronicle is well described, translated and scanned for the viewers' comfort by the Beloit College in Wisconsin: <https://www.beloit.edu/nuremberg/inside/about/tour.htm>

²⁵¹ Please take note that at the time there was no state called Germany. The term Germania is solely used as a geographical-cultural one.

²⁵² Heer F., *Kampf um die Östereischicche Identität*, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar 1996, p. 42.

factors of the German-speaking population of Austria. The XIX century saw a brief rise of some form of Austrian consciousness but within the German nation. Neither the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, the failed revolutions of 1848, nor even the defeat in 1866 stopped the German population of Austria from rejecting their German identification. In fact XIX century only saw the rise of German and not Austrian nationalism. There were some attempts made by historians like Josef Freiherr von Hormayr or Josef Alexander Freiherr von Helfert who both wanted to see the Austrian nation as a political one. The attempts of transferring Western ideas of the nation to the Austrian reality were doomed and gave little fruit²⁵³. Instead of creating a historiography that inspired patriotic feelings and emphasising Austrian history the historians firstly focused on the development and perfecting the methodology and then they turned to the German-Austrian or the *Grossdeutsch* point of view.

In 1913 Richard Kralik published *Österreichische Geschichte* he was one of the precursors of the historiography that marked the I Austrian Republic. Kralik decided to shift the focus of German historiography to Austria and put it in the centre of the narrative. Of course the successful unification of Germany by Prussia led to the creation of Prussia-centric historical narratives. This situation also left the Austrian-German historians with the feeling of rejection which they tried to cope with especially after the fall of the Empire²⁵⁴.

After 1918 the pan-German spirit was still prevalent, especially among scholars working on universities. For instance the historian Ernst Winter had problems with obtaining his habilitation because he was considered not Germanist enough in his writings²⁵⁵. Most narratives of historians focused not on facilitating on nation-formation but rather on the importance of (Austrian) Germans and their mission in central Europe within the Habsburg Empire²⁵⁶. The Austrian mission in the East was a permutation of German identity. A catholic monk and historian Hugo Hantsch wrote: *We would have to turn the whole history of the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburgs on its head if we were to deny the community that unites us with the whole German people. Austria is, even in the narrow and diminished state in which it was preserved by the Treaty of St. Germain, shield and core of the Reich, if we think about*

²⁵³ Hormayr published his *Österreich und Deutschland* in 1814 and Helfert his *Über die Nationalgeschichte und den gegenwärtigen Stand ihrer Pflege in Österreich in 1853*.

²⁵⁴ Kralik R., *Österreichische Geschichte*, Vienna 1913, p. 5-6.

²⁵⁵ Winter was a strong opponent of Nationalsocialists and had to emigrate from Austria in 1938. In an interesting twist of events a stark Germanist historian Heinrich von Srbik was denied work as a teacher after 1945 on the condition that he did not renounce his views. More on the nationalist faith of German-Austrian professors see: Heer, *Kampf um die Österreichische Identität*, Vienna, Cologne 2001, p. 377.

²⁵⁶ Dachs H., *Österreichische Geschichtswissenschaft und Anschluß 1918-1930*, Vienna, Salzburg 1974, p. 1.

*cultural riches and tasks in Central Europe*²⁵⁷. Peter Thaler frames this approach as Austro-Germanist (putting Austria within the broader German framework). Most historians of the inter war period fall into this category. Hantsch, because of his strong affiliation to Catholicism stressed the importance of this faith to Austrian history. The Habsburg Empire only prospered when they fought of either the Turks or the Protestant armies. Despite his anti-Nazi point of view and a strong sentiment towards the Habsburg Empire Hantsch was in fact, a typical Austro-Germanist. He was an advocate for the sovereignty for Austria because only in that the Catholic heritage could be preserved. It goes without saying that this view was similar if not equal to that of the Austro-fascist regime which also leaned heavily on Catholicism. In his work Hantsch wanted to present the Austrian contributions to the overall German civilisation. Despite the international character of the Habsburg Empire Hantsch saw it as a mean to spread the German culture to the east. In ethnic terms he wrote: *Much foreign blood flows in the veins of the people in Austria but the population of small towns remains what it always was, and the large mass of native peasantry stays free of any racial mixing. German blood is stronger than foreign blood and, within a short time, is able to assimilate the foreign elements .The country remains German and the German way soon flows more widely throughout the whole of the Danube-Vltava territory*²⁵⁸. While presenting the German character of Austria Hantsch's main goal was to emphasise the importance of Austria for Germany. Despite being rejected from the unified state of 1871 Austria still had a Germanic civilizational role to play and should not be rejected from the German „family”. Yes the role of Austria was different than Germany's but it was just a variation, a different aspect of Germanness (*Deutschtum*) that could be seen in the history of Austria. In other words the main goal of the narrative was to boost the importance of Austria in German history. While being on its geographical periphery Austria was supposed to be the core of German civilisation²⁵⁹.

The most prominent Austrian historian of the period Heinrich von Srbik presented a similar, albeit slightly magnified, view on the role of Austria in German history. Srbik was a supporter of the Anschluss and joined the NSDAP. He was also the head of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (named Academy of Sciences in Vienna during the times of *Ostmark*). In his own words that he delivered in a lecture in Berlin in 1936 Srbik spoke: *I have directed you toward the goal that I had staked out form myself. Austria in German history; this was*

²⁵⁷ Hantsch H, *Österreich: Eine Deutung seiner Geschichte und Kultur*, Innsbruck 1934, p. 101. Quote translated by Thaler P., *The Ambivalence of Identity*, West Lafayette 2000, p. 76.

²⁵⁸ Hantsch H., *Österreich: Eine Deutung seiner Geschichte und Kultur*, Innsbruck 1934, p. 68.

²⁵⁹ See also: Hantsch H., *Österreichs Schicksalweg*, Innsbruck 1934.

not meant to be mere self-praise of the Austro-Germans, albeit my words may at times involuntarily have sounded that way. A wider and more rewarding concept stood before my eyes, however incomplete its realization might have been: a presentation of the Austrian share in universal German history and an attempt to promote the historic affiliation between the south-eastern Germans and the Germans in Germany in this historiographical manner²⁶⁰.

In his monumental work *Deutsche Einheit* (German Unity) Srbik wanted not only emphasise the role of Austria in German history but to show that Austria was the leader of all German states. This was an intellectual protest against the exclusion of Austria in German historiography after 1866 – the so called *kleindeutsch* historiography. In his pangermanic writings he tried to convince that there is a common German history and that Austria is a part of it, because there is only one German nation that lived in various states²⁶¹. With that understanding comes the problem of the non-germanic inhabitants of the Habsburg Empire Srbik tries to convince that for the most of Austrian history its population was de facto German, at least till the reign of Maximilian I. All of Austrian culture showed its deep connection to *Deutschtum*. Examples include for instance the germanisation policy conducted by Joseph II. The biggest tragedy for the German nation was the fighting between Austria and Prussia. While Srbik believed Frederic the Great and Maria Teresa were great German leaders, their wars only led to the loss of German blood and created divisions in the one German nation (*Volk*). Only the Great War brought Germany and Austria together in common struggle²⁶².

Other historians followed Srbiks narrations or expanded it in several aspects. Some of them contributed their texts to an edited volume by Srbik and Josef Nadler. Heinrich Kretschmayr and Wilhelm Bauer argued that despite the eastern location Austria played a pivotal role in the development of Germannes. The Habsburg marital expansion into the East served the interest of all Germans, especially because it united the isolated pockets of German settlers living in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Because of the borderline character of Austria, the German identity was stronger than in the geographical core of the Holy Roman Empire²⁶³. It is important to stress out that Josef Nadler himself a literary historian argued that

²⁶⁰ Srbik von H., *Österreich in der deutschen Geschichte*, Munich 1936, p. 77. This is a collection of three lectures that Srbik delivered in Germany. Quote translated by Thaler P., *The Ambivalence of Identity*, West Lafayette 2000p. 76.

²⁶¹ Ibidem, p. 7.

²⁶² Ibidem, p. 33-37, 49-50, 76.

²⁶³ All texts come from an edited volume: Srbik von H., Nadler J., *Österreich. Erbe und Sendung in Deutschen Raum*, Salzburg, Leipzig 1934, p. 88-87, 369. The titles of the essays are: Kretschmayr H., *Der Aufstieg des Hauses Österreich*; Bauer O., *Das Deutschtum der Deutsch-Österreicher*. The argument about the borderline strengtening the German identity is validated by the example of Carinthia that saw tensions between the German

despite the Catholic influence of Austrian culture the reforms of the time of enlightenment of Maria Teresa and Josef II led to re-germanisation of Austrian culture and marked the return to cultural roots. In fact for Nadler Austria and its capital Vienna presented the most influential centre of German culture, especially in regard to music and literature. Nadler was also eager to point out the ethnic roots of Austrians coming from the Bavarian tribes. Any contact with other races (Slav, Hungarian, etc) was too limited to influence the German character of Austrians ethnicity²⁶⁴.

At the end of the historiographical spectrum laid the clear Germanist approach represented by Heinrich Friedjung in his work *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland*. His book was a love letter to Bismarck's policy of German unification²⁶⁵. While the Austrianist authors tried to balance the importance of Austrian and Prussian politicians Friedjung joined the mainstream German historiography.

As seen by all the examples above the intellectual contribution of Austrian historians prior to the Anschluss did not create a solid footing for the process of nation formation. The main focus of their work was to emphasise the role of Austria in German history. This was caused by the trauma of rejection after 1866 and 1871 from the unified German state as well as by the trauma of the fall of the Habsburg Empire. The disappearance of the dynastic realm historians tried to find a substitute and resolved to fill the emptiness with pan-german ideas. Austrian historians did not want their country and rejected the way that the region was organised after the Great War. It did not matter if they were opposed to the Nazi regime or supported it²⁶⁶. As the examples of Hantsch and Srbik showed they both shared an idea of unification with Germany – only dissimilarities to be found in the details. In a paradoxical way the Austrian identity of that time meant being a part of Germany. Only in unity with the whole nation could Austria present its unique civilizational contributions to the world. For sure the Austrian history had to be treated as a part of a broader German history and its only distinction was in the point of view of the narrative. Austrian-German historians wanted to write the history of Germany seen through the lenses of the Austrian state.

The historiography of the I Austrian Republic was highly prone to mythologization. Events were interpreted in such a way that they would fit the pangerman metanarrative. The

speaking population and the Slovenian minority. The year 1920 saw a small scale border conflict between the Yugoslav state and Austria. It was resolved on the 10th October 1920 with a plebiscite (*Volksabstimmung*) that left the region in Austria. This date is celebrated as a regional holiday in Carinthia. This region is also the bastion of pan-German movements and the right winged populist who foster the German sentiment.

²⁶⁴ Nadler J., *Das stammhaft Gefüge des Deutschen Volkes*, Munich 1934, p. 51.

²⁶⁵ Friedjung F., *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland 1859-1866*, Stuttgart 1897-98.

²⁶⁶ Dachs H., *Österreichische Geschichtswissenschaft und Anschluß 1918-1930*, Vienna, Salzburg 1974, p.2-3, 16, 30-38, 54.

ideological influence of the time is evident. Nation was defined by the historical borders of the Holy Roman Empire and traces of continuity of the premodern understanding of *Germania*, as exemplified in the late medieval and early modern lexicons and descriptions of the world, were prevalent and have to be treated as a persistent factor. The ethnicity of the inhabitants of Austria was proven to be German, especially by Srbik who pointed out that in the Austrian provinces there was little or close to none mixing of ethnicities. The main struggle in the Austrian-German historiography is in fact showing the biggest emphasis on the point 1. e) of Hrochs “questionnaire”: the struggle between the centre and the provinces. Austria claimed to be the civilizational centre of *Germania* despite its peripheral geo-political location. It was the change of the centre to Prussia that sparked the intellectual reaction of Austrian historians. There was an agreement that Austrians were ethnically German coming from the Bavarian tribes and if there were any other racial mixtures (Slavic or Hungarian influences) they were downplayed. The history of Germans was continuous albeit tragically divided by the fighting within one nation but of two states: Prussia and Austria. The unification of Germany was not completed in Austrian eyes. But even the Silesian wars were sometimes interpreted as a way of coming of the nation together as it created room for Austrian reforms and modernisation also meant Germanisation. As for national heroes: Austrian historians had a whole share of Habsburg rulers and politicians. Metternich was seen as someone who slowed down the unification process. An interesting trait of the Austrian-German historiography is trying to equal the admiration to Prussian kings and politicians with their Austrian counterparts. The only competing concepts regarded only the level of underlining Austrian uniqueness within German civilizational realm. The European influence of the Austrian Empire was seen as an extension of German civilizational mission to humanity. Austrian historical narratives, while being conducted with high scientific standards did not put those standards as a mean in itself. The main focus was put on trying to convince the German counterparts of the value of Austrian contributions to German history. In fact it seems that the targeted audience of Austrian historiography were not really the citizens of the Austrian Republic but rather German historians. The trauma of separation caused the creation of the myth of Austria as better Germany²⁶⁷. That is why Heinrich von Srbik presented his work in Berlin in a series of lectures. While the historiography might have supported the argument of the Austro-fascist regime for the *raison de etre* of the Austrian state, the example

²⁶⁷ Stourz G., *Erschütterung und Konsolidierung des Österreichbewusstseins- vom Zusammenbruch der Monarchie zur Zweiten Republik*, [in:] Plaschka R., Stourzh G., Niederkorn J., (ed.), *Was heisst Österreich? Inhalt und Umfang des Österreichbegriffs vom 10. Jahrhundert bis heute*, Vienna 1995.

of Srbik shows that he was eager to work under the Nazi regime as well. His successor in the University of Vienna Hantsch was not really far ideologically but only resisted the Nazis on the basis of his Catholic faith. It was not the historical argument that proved to be essential but the political activism of historians that determined their future positions and careers. In short, the historians and historiography of the I Austrian Republic did not provide sufficient intellectual resources that are needed to creation of a nation. Paraphrasing the words of Ernst Hanisch: After 1918 what did the Austrians think, what identity did they have? The history books showed only empty pages to their question²⁶⁸. And yet history changed. The history books written after 1945 had a perfectly tailored answer to that question.

2.4.2 Legitimising the status quo - Austrian historiography after 1945

In 1945 Austrian historiography found itself very much in the moment of a new beginning. While politically it was the second *year-zero* (*Jahr-null*) in the last 30 years, for the historians 1945 was truly the moment of reset. The historiography of the First Republic shows developed connections to what came before them but the postwar Austrian historiography is an entirely different story. This was the time when political action preceded the intellectual work necessary for nation-formation. In fact it would take three decades for major monographs and narratives about the Austrian nation to be written. It seems that in the regard of the Second Austrian Republic history was too late and did not catch up with the present. Because it was the political world that delivered the new interpretations of history it is no surprise that history was very much distorted. Anton Pelinka calls it falsification of reality²⁶⁹. For Pelinka the founding fathers of the Second Republic were straight up lying and creating self-deception on a national level. The politicization of history was so strong that politicians *recounted, written, recorded and made* history. It is no surprise then that contributions to the history of Austrian nation actually came from abroad and not only from Austrians like Felix Kreissler (though writing in French!) but also coming from other nations like William Bluhm.

The small group of Austrian historians were almost all representatives of the Austrian-German or even only German approaches to Austrian history till 1945 but they followed the

²⁶⁸ Hanisch E., *Der lange Schatten des Staates. Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert.*, Vienna 1994, p. 158.

²⁶⁹ Pelinka A., *Taboos and Seld-Deception: The Second Republic's Reconstruction of History*, [in:] Bischof G., Pelinka A., *Contemporary Austrian Studies 5. Austrian historical memory and national identity*, New Brunswick 1997, p. 96.

political leaders. At the beginning historians took the role of journalist and held their discussion in the press. In November 1945 *Akademische Rundschau* was established and promoted Austrian autonomy and stressed the importance of nationhood²⁷⁰. A month before another periodical *Turm: Monatschrift für österreichische Kultur* advocated the departure from *kleindeutsch* Prussian Treitschke historiography.²⁷¹ The most heated discussions were carried in the press of political parties though. Despite the turn towards Austrianism there still were strong remnants of older Germanist approaches. Taras Borodajkewycz, an avid Nazi, worked as a historian on the University of Vienna until a scandal forced him into retirement in 1971. In 1955 Borodajkewycz wrote that without Germany Austrian history remains incoherent and meaningless²⁷². In response Adam Wandruszka in 1956 wrote that there is no need to write about the Austrian-German relations because *everything had already been said about this and that the close bonds of Austrian with German history are just as securely established as is the unique development of Austria, especially since 1866*²⁷³.

The 60ties brought a qualitative change with the publishing of more scientific monographs and edited volumes. They were highly ideological and tried to project the Austrian nation back in time for about 1000 years – to the symbolical beginning of Austrian history. In the book of Genesis Adam gives names to the creatures he encounters thus creating the beginning of the bond between humans and animals. When a child is born one of the first actions to take is to name it. So the obvious date for the symbolical birth of the Austrian nation was 996 – when the name *Ostarrichi* was used. The symbolical strength of a name is hard to overlook. Even decades later an academic workbook for students of German language prepared in the Wrocław University by Lucjan Puchalski opens with the German translation of the Latin document that mentioned *Ostarrichi*²⁷⁴. Despite the fact that the Austrian nation was just beginning to take shape, historians proposed a very primordial understanding of the nation. Alexander Novotny wrote: *For millions of years the Earth was circling the Sun – and on one knew! For centuries an Austrian nation has existed; first dormant and finally-particularly after 1945 – the Austrians realised that they are a nation*²⁷⁵. Despite Austrians forming a political community and perhaps a political nation it was anachronistically and

²⁷⁰ Fellner F., *The problem of the Austrian nation after 1945*, [in:] *The Journal of modern history* vol.60 no.2, Chicago 1988, p. 274.

²⁷¹ Ibidem, p. 275.

²⁷² Ibidem, p. 280. For more see: Borodajkewycz T., *Wegmarken der geschichte Österreichs*, Vienna 1972.

²⁷³ Ibidem, 280.

²⁷⁴ Puchalski L., *Ausgewählte Quellen im Diskursfeld Identitäten. Österreich*, Wrocław 2009, p. 11-12. There is also a similar set of sources published for Germany.

²⁷⁵ Novotny A., *Bewahrung des österreichischen Nationalcharakters in den Wirren, Sieden und Niederlagen des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, [in:] *Die österreichische Nation* 27, Vienna 1975.

retroactively put into a perspective of the thousand years. As Fellner jokingly said instead of projecting a thousand year Reich to the future, Austrian historians projected the Austrian nations a thousand years into the past²⁷⁶. In this spirit Albert Massiczek wanted to create historical foundations for Austrian state consciousness. He tried another trick by projecting the term “Austrian nation” to the past. Massiczek wrote: *Incidentally, it should be observed that the concept of an Austrian nation: is no mere invention of the Second Republic, but can be documented as early as 1368 at the University of Vienna for students from the Habsburg domains*²⁷⁷. The term nation did mean something completely different in the medieval ages, as did the term Austria. The sole existence of the name proved the existence of the Austrian nation ages before 1945. In this sense the first wave of Austrian historiography resembles the search for mythical origins of other European nations only that in the Austrian case the origins are historical facts but are subject to mythologisation.

The early 70ties bring the introduction of foreign or partially foreign authors to the fray. Felix Kreissler and Karl Stadler were Austrian emigrants escaping the Nazi regime. On the other hand William Bluhm and Peter Katzenstein represent American scholars. Karl Stadler, a member of the Austrian Communist Party who emigrated to the UK in 1938, contributed to the Oxford series *Nations of the modern world* with a tome about Austria. He presented a history of the Austrian First and Second Republic and introduced the topic of national identity²⁷⁸. Because of his negative experiences in Austria he was critical of both fascist and Nazi regimes and focused on the persecution of Socialists and the functioning of Nazi courts in Ostmark. However it was not Stadler but another emigrant Kreissler who was even more hostile towards Germany. Interestingly, while Stadler’s book was in English, Kreissler’s work was first published in French *La prise de conscience de la nation Autrichienne, 1938-1945-1978* as he was working at the University of Rouen at the time. Kreissler, who escaped to France, had been caught by the Gestapo because of his involvement in the French resistance. Eventually he was transferred to the Buchenwald concentration camp under false identity. His work had a clear goal: to radically destroy *the legend of the German-Austrian or even of the Austrian as the “better” German, and the portrayal of the growth and consolidation of the Austrian nation. This process requires the final eradication of pan-*

²⁷⁶ Fellner F., *The problem of the Austrian nation after 1945*, [in:] *The Journal of modern history* vol.60 no.2, Chicago 1988, p. 284

²⁷⁷ Massiczek A., *Die österreichische Nation: Zwischen zwei Nationalismen*, Vienna 1967, p. 192. Both this quote and the one from Alexander Novotny were translated by Peter Thaler, *The Ambivalence of Identity*, West Lafayette 2000, p. 65.

²⁷⁸ Stadler K., *Austria*, London 1971. See also: *Stadler K., Sozialistenprozesse : polit. Justiz in Österreich 1870 – 1936*, Vienna 1986.

*German ideology*²⁷⁹. Both Stadler and Kreissler saw their personal resistance against the Nazi regime as opposition to a more generally understood Germandom (*Detuschtum*). The existence of the Austrian nation was a measure against the re-emergence of German Nazism. Kreissler's book focuses solely on this experience and its timeframe is also limited – from February 1938 till the *Aktualität* of the 1980's. Before the Anschluss the nation was sleeping or hiding in a national subconscious. Only the brightest of spirits – poets and writers could see through the veil and conceptualise an Austrian nation²⁸⁰. In Kreissler's view the nation was woken up by the shock of the *Anschluss*²⁸¹. His focus is on the groups of opposition against the German Nazis, most notably the conservatives and communists. Kreissler is also the proponent of the *Konzentrationslager* experience – where leaders of different ideological camps had time to not only discuss the future of an independent and democratic Austria but also develop a genuine feeling of brotherhood²⁸². The high point of Kreissler's narrative is the "liberation" of 1945 – when a wave of spontaneous Austrian patriotism took the streets. The book is centered on three chapters from 1938 till September 1939, the time of the Second World War (1939-1945) and the time of the Austrian nation – 1945 till the chancellorship of Bruno Kreisky. In a survey conducted among politicians of major Austrian parties Kreissler finds that they believe that most of Austrians were against the *Anschluss* in 1938 and that Hitler was sure that during the plebiscite from 60-80% of Austrians would choose independence²⁸³. Not only is such survey was conducted only on a group of 80 people and is not representative at all, its findings are treated as obvious and with little commentary. They serve as arguments. With the annexation of Austria by the Third Reich came the first disappointments in Austria. The pan-German dream was slowly turning

²⁷⁹ Kreissler F., *Der Österreicher und seine Nation ein Lernprozess mit Hindernissen*, Vienna 1984, p. 13.

²⁸⁰ Ibidem, p. 15.

²⁸¹ In a later edition of his book Kreissler added an annex at the end where he mentions that the process of the formation of the Austrian nation started much earlier in 1804 when the Kaiser Franz I became the Kaiser of Austria. The modern Austrian nation could not appear before other nations and the processes of modernisation, social and political development as well as the fall of feudalism all marked the timeline of the Austrian nation formation and also marked the delay in comparison to other nations. The problems of the Austrian nation lie in: the multinationality of the Empire, the privileged German-speaking class wanted to maintain its position as long as possible, the Herder idea of *Kulturnation* and *Sprachnation* led to the popularity of pan-Germanism. The Austrian formation of nation could only occur in conflict with the German speaking united Germany – it was the only way to abandon pan-Germanism and the concept of a thousand years of common history. Prussia played a negative role in Austria's history – it bullied Austria to join the I World War against the West with tragic consequences. In 1918 the nation formation entered its last phase. It was already there but was not aware of its own existence. What really strengthened the coming out of the subconscious were the *Anschluss* and the diversity of Austrian resistance. The other factor that contributed to the nation formation was the emigrants forced out of Austria in 1938. Kreissler then concludes that the Austrian nation became a living reality. See: ibidem, p.537-544.

²⁸² Ibidem, p. 16.

²⁸³ Ibidem, p. 87.

into a nightmare. Firstly the Austrian administration was destroyed and replaced by Nazi officials and then came the terror²⁸⁴. The result was the appearance of the first reflexions about the Austrian nation. The most important role was played by the Christian-socialists, former Austrofascists, Catholics and emigrants to the West²⁸⁵. The first anti-German reflex had an anti-Prussian face. He treats Prussia as the opposite of Austria. Prussia was a made-up country with little natural beauty, Austria was a grown up, historical state with magnificent natural scenery. The social tissue of Prussia was not developed and had shown little cultural life, Prussian elites were homogenous, the Austrian were heterogeneous. The masses in Prussia were a disciplined and prone to limitless authority (of the army and social democracy!), the Austrian masses were independent and prone to limitless individuality. The Prussian individual used to be liberal but because of the lack of roots he turned “bismarckian” with little thought about the past. The Austrian is of traditional attitude that was solid and stable throughout the ages. The Prussian man is strict, the Austrian is ironic. The Prussian man is direct; the Austrian is an actor etc... etc²⁸⁶. Kreissler continues to enumerate the disappointments of Austrians under the German rule. Even some Austrian National-Socialists were expressing disappointed²⁸⁷. Austrian culture was devastated by the Nazi politics of repression, many writers were murdered or sent to concentration camps, the traditional Austrian intelligentsia, was specially targeted which led to the decay of Austrian culture during the years of 1938-1945. Both the Opera and the music schools were subject to ideology and their quality dropped immediately. All of this led to the growing rejection of the Nazi-rule: the elites discussed the concept of an independent Austrian nation more and more, and the masses showed some passive resistance, especially towards the war effort. This is summarised by a short poem from 1941:

*Wir wollen keinen Krieg,
Wir brauchen keinen Sieg,
Wir wollen unser freies Österreich
und freuen uns auf die Hitlerleiche*²⁸⁸.

²⁸⁴ Ibidem, p. 92.

²⁸⁵ Ibidem, p. 107.

²⁸⁶ Ibidem, p. 119-120. Kreissler uses the text written by Hugo von Hofmannsthal from 1917 to show the continuities and persistence of the anti-Prussian attitude of the Austrians.

²⁸⁷ Ibidem, p. 149.

²⁸⁸ Ibidem, p. 214. The poem was found in the documents of the justice system of Ostmark, as someone was charged for the use of these words.

The longer the war lasted the bigger the opposition grew in Austria. Even the traditionally reluctant towards the idea of the Austrian nation the Socialists also hopped on the bandwagon. The Moscow declaration of 1943 was a major factor to strengthen the Austrianist ideas among the elites. The Austrian Freedom's Front was established in October of 1942 and this enhanced the rather meagre acts of sabotage. The nearing of the wars end brought deeper conceptualisation of the Austrian nation – images of *Himi Vindobonensis* or *Homo Alpinus* of mixed German (more precisely Bajuwar) and Slovenian ethnicity. The German language of Austrians was rejected and named only a *lingua franca* that had nothing to do with the German nationalism²⁸⁹. The last chapter shows the history of the birth of the second Republic, the formation of first party programmes and solutions of everyday problems of the postwar years which is then followed by the description of discussion of Austrian intellectuals about the Austrian nation formation. The discourse of that time was a forge for the formation of the concept of Austrian nation – what was its role and destiny in the world? Some voices emphasised the legacy of the Habsburg Empire – with Vienna becoming an open city and the centre of European spirituality²⁹⁰. Other liberal legacies of the Empire should be the acceptance of the racial mixture in Austria as well as acceptance of the idea of a multilingual nation (with special attention to minorities like the Slovenes etc.). The results of the discussion could be summarised as goes: there is no „mother nation” for the Austrian nation; it is neither German nor other. There is no Austrian nation without democracy, its own culture and without economic unity. There is no Austrian nation without the equality of its citizens, especially the minorities. There is no Austrian nation where racism, chauvinism, anti-Semitism, and false historical identity could flourish. Finally there is no Austrian nation without the state independence, sovereignty and active neutrality²⁹¹. Alongside these concepts several myths and concepts marched right into the Austrian national *imaginarium*. Any attempt at calling Austria German is the first step to loose independence. The Austrian nation appeared later than the most of European nations and this process is not yet finished, but the formation of the Austrian nation must not happen through the means of nationalism, as history had shown it leads to suffering. The Austrian patriotism has to be humanistic in its core and spirit. With this comes the rejection of war and protection of neutrality. And last but not the least – without the contributions of the Austrian resistance fighters there would be no creation of the Second Republic after the liberation by the Allies; they should be treated as martyrs for

²⁸⁹ Ibidem, p. 353.

²⁹⁰ Ibidem, p. 484.

²⁹¹ Ibidem, p. 492.

the Austrian cause²⁹². With positive images came also concepts that needed to be rejected and these are: the ideology of the race of masters, the expansion of nations, the authoritarian leadership, violence against political opponents, militarisation of the youth, the weakening of parliamentary democracy, positive attitude towards military goals of Germany during the II World War, romantic visions of Germany and finally anti-Semitism and the idea of Anschluss²⁹³.

The late 70ties were witness to the publishing of first concise Austrian histories that included the times of the Austrian Republic. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik published the limited: *Österreich: Die Zweite Republik in 1972*²⁹⁴. Erich Zöllner's *Geschichte Österreichs* was published in 1979. Zöllner's concept is interesting because it projects the existence of Austria into the times where it was not possible as if the sole existence of the geographical land already marked the existence of Austria. He starts his history with the Illirian and Celtic settlement but then follows with the chapter *Austria in the times of the Romans*²⁹⁵. His whole history is based on the premise of geographical limits of the Austrian Republic that are projected back in time, even in his foreword Zöllner emphasises the importance of geography, thus giving him an excuse for the limitations of his Austrian history. All historical processes lead to the formation of Austrian lands, especially the years 976-1246 when the bulk of the Austrian lands was shaped through dynastic policies and conquests. There is no mention of German history it is only a story of one county – Austria. Another history of the Austrian Republic, an edited volume by Heinrich Benedikt was published in 1977²⁹⁶. What is valuable in this book is not the history of the First and Second Austrian Republic and the political developments that occurred then and there but the very last chapter named: *The historical continuities of the Austrian states and their European function*. The first thesis that appears in this chapter is the continuous (*ununterbrochen*) existence of the Austrian state (sic!)²⁹⁷. Austria is supposed to play a solid and unchangeable role in European history – as the heart of Europe. The start of the Austrian statehood is the year 803 – the creation of the Awar Mark.

²⁹² Ibidem, p. 495-496.

²⁹³ Ibidem, p. 499. Sadly social studies conducted in 1976 show that 39% of Austrians still believed in the ideology of the master race or master nation. 21% were for militarising the youth.

²⁹⁴ Weinzierl E., Skalnik K., *Österreich: Die Zweite Republik*, Graz 1972.

²⁹⁵ Zöllner, E., *Geschichte Österreichs*, Wien, 1979, p. 25. The same framework is applied in *Die Chronik Österreichs* by Walter Kleindl – there are Romans in Austria and Austria was already she shield against the east since the years 401 AD. Also there is Austrian history under Nazi rule. No history of Germany is mentioned. The tendency to appropriate German history by Austria seems to be the rule rather than exception. For the richly illustrated chronicle see: Kleindl W., *Die Chronik Österreichs*, Dortmund 1984, p. 5, 17, 23, 518.

²⁹⁶ Benedict H., *Geschichte der Republik Österreich*, Munich 1977.

²⁹⁷ Ibidem., p. 575.

Because of the special position of Austria it always played a role of the divisor as well as bridge builder. The anomaly of 1938 only showed the necessity of Austrian existence for the European order²⁹⁸. Austria was not willingly annexed in 1938 but occupied (*besetzt*). The thousand year Austrian nation still has its historical mission to fulfil – to maintain European peace and freedom²⁹⁹. This concept of thousand year old Austria was repeated in the three volumes of *Tausend Jahre Österreich* edited by Walter Pollak³⁰⁰. The history of Austria starts on the 21 of July 976, writes Pollak.

The American authors Bluhm and Katzenstein presented something completely different. Their point of view was based outside the Austrian discussion and they both have contributed with substantial works that expanded the discussion. Both of them start their narratives relatively late. They do not seek the beginning of the Austrian nation in the early medieval period and are not interested in mythmaking. Bluhm starts his narrative during the Napoleonic wars in 1808 and Katzenstein starts with the aftermath of the said conflicts in 1815. Despite not being influenced by constructivism in historiography they both quote Karl Deutsch as their theoretical inspiration. Bluhm also mentions Kohn, and his idea of eastern backward nationalism. The prehistory of the Austrian nation is limited to the XIX century. Bluhm enumerates the rare instances of Austrian national identity shining through history. The starting point 1808 is the date of Hormayrs mentioning of the Austrian nation. In 1809 a military hymn is devised by Heinrich Collin – *Österreich über alles*³⁰¹. It is clear that Bluhm wanted to write an intellectual history, or the history of mentality. His conclusions are that the attempts made to facilitate the national feeling among Austrians were ill devised or found no soil to grow on. The examples from the time of the Empire were described in the previous subchapter. Even in the First Republic the attempts were doomed to fail. Bluhm mentions the case of the poet Anton Wildgans who devised the ideal type of the „Austrian man” (*Der österreichische Mensch*). The Austrian man was supposed to be a true heir of the fallen Empire, a well-spoken gentleman, who knows many languages, a polyglot that builds bridges between nations³⁰². This concept not only was flawed because it tried to lean on a non-

²⁹⁸ Ibidem, p. 576.

²⁹⁹ Ibidem, p. 610. The European destiny of Austria is also highlighted by Zöllner although he emphasised the importance of Austrian cultural heritage, music and architecture. See: Zöllner E., *Geschichte Österreichs*, Wien, 1979, p. 582. Also Kleindl frames Austria as the mirror and model for Europa. See: *Die Chronik Österreichs*, Dortmund 1984, p. 545.

³⁰⁰ Pollak W., *Tausend Jahre Österreich, Vienna 1975*.

³⁰¹ This title was a callback to the war motto of 1684 made by Philipp von Hornigk: Austria above all, if only she wills it! (*österreich über alles wann es nur will!*)

³⁰² Wildgans actually gave a speech in court in Stockholm which was later transmitted by the Austrian radio. The problem with Wildgans is the same as all Austrianist concepts that were born between 1918-1938. Being

existing polity of the Habsburg Empire but also treated being Austrian as a version of being a (better) German. Bluhm names all those failures as the time of the politics of disintegration and contrasts them with the politics of integration of the Second Austrian Republic. In fact the short period of the 25 years between 1945 and 1970 constitute the core of the narrative. Bluhm shows the opportunism but also rational policy making of the Austrian political elite that slowly trickles down to the general public and leads to the establishment of the Austrian nation. It was the first time that the existence of the Austrian nation was framed as a completely modern phenomenon which happened only after 1945. William Bluhm does not engage the Austrianist historiography; he focuses almost solely on the role of political elites and not historians. He could not be blamed for this omission and the most engaging intellectual work conducted by historians were not yet finished and published. Nevertheless his book challenges the primordial Austrianist historiography from constructivist positions and comes to completely different conclusions.

Peter Katzenstein uncovers new perspectives by applying a very peculiar point of view. His interest is the unification and fragmentation of states. Examples include Germany and Italy as well as the break ups of Sweden-Norway and England-Ireland. For Katzenstein Austria and Germany serve solely as a fascinating case study. While Switzerland was a part of the Holy Roman Empire for some time its division predated the modern times and required an analysis of a too long time span. The case of East and West Germany was on the other hand too short and not established well enough³⁰³. Katzenstein embarked on a mission to find systemic pressures and counter-pressures to state integration and disintegration. The Austrian political autonomy is for the American scholar a persistent factor of Austrian history. He traces the factors contributing to this state in the behaviour of elites and their relation to the economy. For instance the Austrian-German elites had no incentive to be unified with Germany, while their Prussian counterparts were limited by functioning just in the Prussian state. Austrian-German elites had many options of social-mobility and economic development within the realm of the Habsburg empire. To achieve such status the Prussian elites pushed towards creating a bigger state. The disproportion of economic interests of both elites had a huge impact on development. Austrians were imperial and not industrial because they did not

Austrian was just another permutation of being German. In fact the Austrian man – was in fact the best German – *less simple, less brittle more conciliatory and more cosmopolitan* than the *Reichsdeutsche*. Nevertheless the Austrian man became later a symbol and a subject of analysis. See: Wodak, p. 409 – 419. The Austrian man was also a failed project because of the connection to aristocracy. This type of identity created the likes of Coudenhove-Kalergi – with a cosmopolitan, European identity or led to the creation of Musil’s “men without properties”.

³⁰³ Katzenstein P., *Disjoned partners*, Berkeley 1976, p. 4.

need industry to uphold their status, the Prussians on the other hand were industrial but not imperial, for them industrialisation brought more economic and social rewards³⁰⁴. The political and economic rewards of integration or disintegration are what drives the elites of states towards unification or autonomy. Only a state of crisis could force the elites (or counterelites) for integration with another state and equally the wellbeing of the elite strengthens the drive for autonomy and remaining disjoined. By using this approach Katzenstein rejects cultural arguments. Two states could be culturally homogenous but without the rewards of integration – it will not happen³⁰⁵. The author then follows with presenting metaphorical “patterns” of integration and disintegration in chronological order. The *aristocratic pattern (1815-1848)* was the time of political cooperation of Austrian and German elites in suppressing liberal movements but in other spheres there was isolation. The movement of the masses was small but the time witnessed migration of elites from “Germany” to Austria. The *conflict pattern (1834-1870)* was the opposite of the previous one. There was a developing economic and social interdependence (especially concerning the emigration of Austrian masses to Germany) yet the politics of elites who were warring over the domination of the German realm prevented any unification. The following *hierarchical pattern (1870-1918)* led to the growing dependence of one subject (Austria) to the other (Germany). The dependence weakened Austria internally and sparked international conflicts as well. This was the moment when integration was halted by the elites but was desired by the masses whose economic and symbolical positions were inversely proportional to their confinement within the Austrian state. The apogee of this process was the *voluntaristic pattern (1918-1938)* where both the elites and masses desired integration both in Germany and Austria. The *structural pattern (1938-1945)* showed in fact that the Austrian elites managed to obtain privileged positions within the unified polity of the Third Reich. Only the quest for European dominance and the defeat in the Second World War stopped full integration. The result was the formation of the *pluralistic pattern (1945-1970)* where despite cultural ties the elites had neither political nor economic incentives for integration³⁰⁶. The detailed study conducted by Katzenstein shows that the counterpressures and political autonomy were more often the result than copressures to political integration. The way Austria as a polity was shaped made the elites rewarded more by the autonomy of their country. Even during the crisis years that led to the Anschluss the elites only resorted to that

³⁰⁴ Ibidem., p 27.

³⁰⁵ The case of contemporary Romania and Moldova exemplifies this hypothesis pretty well.

³⁰⁶ One could argue that joining of the European Union by Austria in 1995 only strengthened this pattern. See: Bischoff G., Pelinka A., *Contemporary Austrian Studies vol. 5: Austria in the European Union*,

strategy because it was the only way to secure their internal position³⁰⁷. Katzenstein sees the disintegration or fragmentation as the dominant trend which is not limited to the case of Austria and Germany. In fact it is the dominant trend as seen by the history of culturally homogenous areas like Scandinavia or the Anglo-Saxon realm (UK, USA, Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand). There are deep historical and structural patterns that create resistance to integration or political unification. Katzenstein even lists the project of European unification as doomed because of the patterns he described – the partners will remain disjoined.

The 80tie saw the apogee of the discussion about the Austrian nation. In 1981 the massive work of Friedrich Heer *Der Kampf um die österreichische Identität* was published. The work is a fascinating read and an intellectual delight, Full of personal stories and richly ornamented with quotes the books is a deep excavation of mental or psychological history. While Heer writes about identity he uses the term because of its flexibility, he still interchanges the existence of national identity with the existence of the nation³⁰⁸. In that way Heer is the continuator of the work of his Austrian predecessors in the II Austrian Republic. Heer makes it clear that he rejects the German understanding of Austria in the very first pages of his book. He deliberates on the ethnic composition of the lands of the *Bundesrepublik Österreich* and equates them with the same lands in prehistoric times. Calling back on the Illiryian and Celtic herithage Heer concludes that the Roman province of Noricum had to be Celtic because the Romans could not distinguish between different tribes very well, especially between German and Celtic ones³⁰⁹. Pushing it even further Heer equates the name Noricum with Österreich. *Noir* (nor) in Celtic languages was supposed to mean East and *rig* equates with *Reich* (realm), Noricum equals *Ostreich*³¹⁰. Even during the Roman period the Celtic kings were allowed to rule for some time as governors – thus laying ground for autonomy. Both the Celts and Romans left a heritage of appreciation of culture and poetry – a trait of the Austrians till this day. The first “German” tribes appeared in the V-VI century in the form of *Franken* and *Bajuwaren*. The Ostmark of Charlemagne could not be German because the king himself was not German. Heer continues to combat the perception of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation as a myth. Even Vienna the undisputed capital of the Austrian lands

³⁰⁷ Katzenstein P., *Disjoined partners*, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1976, p.220.

³⁰⁸ Heer F., *Kampf um die Österreichische Identität*, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar 1996, p. 17-22.

³⁰⁹ Heer, *Kampf um die Österreichische Identität*, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar 1996, p. 24. See also: Görlich E., *The Celtic background of Austria*, [in:] *Celtic Yearbook* 1970, Dublin 1970.

³¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 23. Heer quotes a work of Karl von Czoernig from 1857 as proof.

was not entirely German but a place of mixture of ethnicities. Jews, Czechs, Hungarians were invited to study in the Vienna University. In the conflict between the Slavic Premysl II Ottokar and Rudolf Habsburg (*ein Schwabe*) the Austrian elites were in favour of Premysl and were coldhearted towards the German new coming dynasty³¹¹. But it was under the Habsburgs that the genuine Austrian identity was born during the reign of Rudolf IV the Founder (*der Stifter*) in the years 1358-1365. Not only did he include Tirol into his realm of power, but started the reconstruction of the symbolic cathedral of St. Stephen and founded dozens of new cities across the land and the Vienna University (hence the nickname). Heer defends the infamous false document *Privilegium Maius*, which despite being fake and compares it to another known forgery the so called donation of Constantine. The process of the birth of the Austrian identity was finished with the formation of a special type of dialect: *Österreichisch-Deutsch* (since 1340)³¹². The “German German” language is a thing of the reformation and Protestantism and not of the Catholic Austria.

The history of the formation of Austrian identity is a story of many tragedies. Friedrich Heer believes that of all of them, the biggest one is the “great tragedy of Protestantism”. Since the XVI century the lands of Austria were home to at least two (sometimes three or four) political religions, to two nations and two (three or four) cultures. The Austrian identity lived in constant crisis for the last several hundreds of years. Heer identifies the Austrian (premodern) identity with the Catholic faith and its material manifestation in the baroque. The rest could be ascribed to the camp of the Austrian enemies. The list of enemies is long: Czech Protestantism, west European enlightenment and the German-Prussian spiritual culture. Austria in Heer’s vision is a citadel under constant siege. The other European nations despite their tragic histories and being torn apart by other countries like Poland or being under foreign rule for thousands of years like the Balkan nations retained their identities. For Heer Austria was “invaded” by different ideas that broke the structure of Austrian identity and all of them almost exclusively came from the outside³¹³.

The politicised religions in forms of reformation and counterreformation broke the Austrian lands apart into two cultures or two civilisations even. One believed in *the salvation through the German language, the language of Luther. Faith in the salvation through evangelical Germany, the liberator from the enslavement of Rome and the House of Austria.*

³¹¹ Ibidem p. 31. Songs were sung in the favour of the Bohemian king, writes Heer.

³¹² Ibidem p. 38.

³¹³ Ibidem, p 16.

*The other faith, the faith in the Austrian nation did not vocalize well: Catholic muteness, Catholic poverty of language and the peasant difficulty to express in written form, obscured the often overlooked state of affairs: there is an anonymous Austrian nationality, which only in the hardest of times was articulated with words*³¹⁴. This sentence is perhaps the best summary of Heer's work. His titanic work went into finding even the smallest glimpses of Austrian identity in history, from letters, through poems to speeches. At the same time Austria is the ultimate victim of foreign intrusions which draws parallels to the obvious Anschluss – the ultimate act of violation of Austria and the narrative end of Heer's book.

The birthplace of all those tragedies lies in Bohemia. This is where in the flames of the Hussitic wars not only Protestantism but also nationalism were born. Bohemia was the core of both Czech and German nationalism³¹⁵. A hate against Austria also stemmed from Bohemia – for instance Heinrich von Treitschke was the descendant of Czech Hussitic emigrants that left the country after the battle of White Mountain in 1620³¹⁶. The hate of the Czechs towards Habsburgs became a constant trend. The tragedy of the Austrian identity happened when Bohemia and Moravia became part of the Habsburg lands after 1526. There was on one but two nations within the state, not one but two religions, not one but two civilisations.

However the conflict between the two camps was won by the Habsburgs that managed to consolidate power and started to build a uniform culture based on Catholicism and baroque. The expression of Habsburg power became so strongly attributed these two elements that there is no surprise that the Czechs and Slovaks destroyed the column of Holy Mary in 1918 in Prague as a symbol of Austrian power and that the Austrian social democrats, who were sceptical about religion were so inclined to follow the pan-german ideology. Nevertheless the existence of the *Böhmische Konfession* broke the state into two and drew Austria into conflicts of not only local magnitude. It were the tensions in Bohemia that started the bloody Thirty-years' war of 1618-1648. Despite this conflict and the constant Ottoman threat the foundation of the Austrian identity were laid and were ready to carry a more sophisticated structure of the Austrian nation. None of that came to fruition because of the next tragedy that began to haunt Austria – enlightenment.

³¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 22. Heer names the wars with Turks, the Napoleonic wars, 1866, 1914 and 1938 as those hardest of times.

³¹⁵ Ibidem p. 117. It is noteworthy that Heer follows the idea of Ignaz Seipel, who was not only a historian but a Catholic priest.

³¹⁶ Ibidem 118.

Maria Theresa and Joseph II – two of the most revered rulers of Austria are for Heer no more than the biggest destroyers of Austria³¹⁷. While Joseph II had in mind to create an Austrian nation and to nullify what came before him. The new beginning meant an end to the only true expression of Austrian identity. The new beginning was supported by the German language and germanisation policies, by the ideas of Enlightenment which were hostile to the religious and Catholic heritage of Austria. *In extenso* they were also hostile to the Austrian national identity. Its development has been terminated by putting everything upside down. The emergent premodern nation became the victim of modernisation processes but this development does not stop Heer from finding more and more examples of Austrian identity that became more and more vocalised in the XIX century. Poets like Hormayr and politicians like Phillip Stadion are examples of propaganda of the Napoleonic wars. This might obscure the fact that it was no nation that wanted to have its own state but a state that wanted its own nation³¹⁸. This is highly misleading as the state institutions at the time propagated the idea of unity under the Habsburg dynasty rather than national ideas. In Germany this type of policy was viewed as anti-German³¹⁹. These processes became intensified with the development of the national movements of Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Italians etc. The fatal role of the minorities (especially the Czechs and Hungarians) was clear in the revolutions of 1848. The Hungarians were in open rebellion but in terms of identity the Germanised Czechs posed a bigger problem. For instance during the Frankfurter Parliament, a Anton Springer *a Czech and a Kulturdeutsche* proposed to create an Austrian state nation that would consist of Slavic races but in spirit it would be completely Germanised³²⁰. Nothing came out of these deliberations and the rivalry between Prussia and Austria for the leadership in the Germanic realm ended yet with another tragedy for Austria. The battle of Königgratz unified a state but destroyed a nation. From this battle stemmed the catastrophes of 1918, 1938 and 1945. The tragedy of the Austrian identity became the tragedy of the whole European continent. The clear demarcation from Germany came with the idea that Austrians should only identify themselves as Austrians not Germans but this proved impossible. The stronger the rejection from the Prusso-Germany, the stronger the pan-german sentiment in Austria. The social democrats of the time became the *apostles of the German faith*³²¹. The Austrian identity could be traced in certain groups of the traditional camps – conservatives (*blacks*) and Habsburgist

³¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 123.

³¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 175.

³¹⁹ Ibidem 206, the idea was proposed by German historian Johann Gustav Droysen.

³²⁰ Ibidem, 205.

³²¹ Ibidem, 341.

royalists (*black-yellows*). The second group lost its *raison de etre* with the fall of the dynasty in 1918 and transformation into the Republic. The tragedy was that it was a Republic without any republicans – the conservative camp was responsible for the destruction of the democratic system and introduction of the Austro-fascist regime which Heer calls the “new counterreformation”³²². The Nazi influence in the First Austrian Republic is attributed to the *Sudetendeutschen* or Germans from Bohemia – *they were not Austrians they were Germans of the borderlands*, writes Heer³²³. To support this idea the historian reminds the reader that the German Party that operated in Austria started in 1904 in the lands of Bohemia. Their members also recruited from the Austrian protestant population. The Austrian identity of the First Republic could be seen in the conservative camp of the Christian-social Party and later in the Austro-fascists *Fatherland Front*. But still this identity was anonymous with very little intellectual support and background. It did not know if it is better to rely on the “yellow-black” Habsburg and imperial traditions or to build a new “black” future. Even Catholicism which was one of the ideological backbones of the Austro-fascist regime was full of bishops that propagated unification with Germany.

The book ends with the comparison of two Austrian lives: of Adolf Hitler and Kurt Schuschnigg. He traces the expressions of Austrianness in their political career. For instance Heer mentions that an “old-Austrian” was reawakened in Hitler on several occasions – like the talks with Otto Skorzeny, or when plans for Balkan invasion were made which evoked the history of Austrian possession of those lands³²⁴. Heer’s idea is that even the destroyer of the Austrian statehood had shown some glimpsed of Austrian identity that proved the viability of that idea. Schuschnigg on the other hand was a subconscious heir of the Habsburgs. His words: *Firstly I am a German, then an Austrian and thirdly a legitimist*, were a paraphrase of a similar phrase spoken by Franz Josef in 1889: *above all we are German, then Austrian, and in the third line we are the Habsburgs...*³²⁵ With the Anschluss ended the chapter of old Austrian-catholic identity. At the same time Schuschnigg was too weak to defend Austria. Joseph Roth the famous writer and a colleague of Schuschnigg said: *this Alpine man, who does not understand nothing from Austria, will betray Austria, because he would not like Germans to shoot Germans*³²⁶.

³²² Hoor E., *Österreich 1918-1938 - Staat ohne Nation. Republik ohne Republikaner*, Vienna 1966.

³²³ Heer, *Kampf um die Österreichische Identität*, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar 1996, p. 383.

³²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 422.

³²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 429.

³²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 440.

The tale of the Second Republic is a new beginning and an era that Friedrich Heer avoided to describe leaving a gaping hole in his deliberations on Austrian identity. The narrative that Heer has created is the swansong of the Austrianist historiography. The struggle for the Austrian identity is a collection of all the important works by Austrian historians put together in an attractive and passionate story. The historical narrative is primordial to the core. Not only Heer tries to link the times of the antiquity (or before) to modern phenomena he believes that there is a more meta-level civilizational connection between the Ilirans and Celts. Heer often jumps between different centuries trying to show the connections and persistent factors in the history of the Austrian nation and Austrian identity. The history of the Austrian identity is framed in primordial terms but at the same time Heer believes that a nation is a cultural phenomenon which relies on the consciousness of its members – it is a type of political faith. In Heer's narrative the Austrian nation is supposed to appear in the early modern period but his development was suppressed by external influence as well as by internal actors who embraced the foreign influences. The main point of his narrative is also highly questionable. Casting Protestantism, enlightenment and Prussian aggression incorporated into the figure of Bismarck do not hold their ground when put under scientific scrutiny. First of all it is hard to believe that an Austrian nation existed in the XVI century and there is little to no evidence. Furthermore I would argue that the truth is actually the opposite of what Heer postulates. It was not the inheritance of Bohemia in 1526 that prevented the emergence of the Austrian nation but it is the factor that contributed mostly to its emergence. Without the Austrian imperial expansion, either dynastic or military into the non-German lands there would be no institutional framework, no institutional exoskeleton that would support the birth and development of a genuine Austrian identity and therefore the Austrian nation. The multiethnicity of the Habsburg lands prevented the unification with Germany and led to straight rejection in the Frankfurter Parliament in 1848. Also the fact that his book does not contain the description of the Austrian identity after 1945 is a huge flaw. Having written the book in the 1980'ties Heer had plenty social studies regarding the Austrian identity at hand. The fact that Heer was a devout catholic and an opponent of the National Socialism, being prosecuted and arrested on several occasions as well as fighting in resistance groups really shows in his book. The true Austrian identity in his opinion is limited to the catholic, Habsburgist Austria. On several occasions Heer mentions that Austria is a multi-voiced entity, but he does so only to confront it with the simple and barbaric Germany. *Germany would*

never understand us... as Rudolf Habsburg once said³²⁷. The religious influence is also traceable in the vocabulary and the way he frames certain issues. Political views are seen as confessions, one believes in the faith of the German-nation, or like Otto Bauer is the apostle of the German faith etc. Being a part of the nation, or having an identity is a matter of “national faith”. Protestantism in Heers view is the bane of civilisation it was the start of the doubtful progress *from humanity, through nationality, to bestiality*³²⁸. Austrian identity is cast as a permanent victim of historical developments, which had to correspond well with the idea of Austria as the first victim of the Nazi aggression. However things were to change soon. Friedrich Heer’s book has undeniable Austrian charm to it and marks the both the pinnacle of Austrianist historiography as well as its end. Only three years later in 1984 Ernst Brückmuller published the first edition of his constructivist analysis *Nation Österreich*³²⁹. The publishing of Brückmuller’s work heralded a new era for Austrian historiography in a similar way that the Waldheim Affair of 1986 changed the political discourse in Austria. In many ways *Nation Österreich* is a constructivist mirrored reflection of *Der Kampf um die österreichische Identität*. The influence of constructivists like Deutsch and Hobsbawm are clear in Brückmuller’s book as he structures his narrative around the nation-building. There is much more space devoted to the role of myths, stereotypes and historical phenomena that form nations. The crucial is the role of the state and Brückmuller highlights the history of the formation of the Austrian state and the inclusion of particular regions. The historical processes that transformed the ethnos into a nation are reformation, the development of new means of communication, enlightenment and secularisation. The rise of Protestantism is not a bane for Brückmuller, like it was for Heer, instead it is one of the boosters of nation formation. Reformation replaced traditional identity carriers – namely the Catholic Church and transfers those formative competences to the ruler or state. Brückmuller goes even as far as saying that the modern nation could only form firstly in the protestant countries³³⁰. Catholicism is a force that prevents modern nation formation. In catholic societies only secularisation would enable the creation of modern nations, as the example of France shows.

³²⁷ Ibidem, p. 245.

³²⁸ Ibidem, p. 345. The quote was coined by the Austrian writer Franz Grillparzer in 1849 as a critique of the ideas stemming from the enlightenment.

³²⁹ The book was published as: *Nation Österreich. Sozialhistorische Aspekte ihrer Entwicklung*, which was then expanded and republished in 1966 as *Nation Österreich. Kulturelles Bewußtsein und gesellschaftlich-politische Prozesse*.

³³⁰ Brückmuller E., *Nation Österreich. Kulturelles Bewußtsein und gesellschaftlich-politische Prozesse*, Vienna, Cologne, Graz 1996, p. 23. In fact Friedrich Heer would agree with the proposal, as he traces all the problems that Austrian identity had in history to the protestant revolution of the Hussites in Bohemia. But while reformation was a step towards modern nations it was a hindrance for the Austrian one.

Unlike his predecessors Brückmüller differentiates the meaning of nation, he does not dismiss the idea that there were nations already in existence before the XIX century; they only had a different meaning and ethnic or regional limitations. Aside for the sociological part of the book that deals with surveys among the population regarding their identity or relations to other nations as well as national symbols and heroes the historical narrative follows the “from ethnic to national” identity trope. The local identity is still relevant for modern Austrians and in some cases it could be understood as the variation of national identity. With the rejection of Germanism of 1945 one the gap in identity was filled in by a placeholder of regionalism. In that case regionalism needs to be regarded as an expression of a broader Austrian identity. For Brückmüller the regional identity is one of the most persistent characteristics of self-identification³³¹. The local identity has been the main identification pattern in Austria, which being a mountainous region. Only the development of state apparatus brought the separated localities on the path to modern nation and that is why the policies of the Habsburg rulers regarding state building are of as much importance as the nation formation processes. The amassing of power by the Habsburgs meant also state building³³². The declining influence of local barons and estates meant the monopolisation of security and protection as well as tax policies. The road to absolutist monarchy led to the creation of ever-growing central administration. The slow growth of capitalism since the XVI century also strengthened the role of the central administration. In the beginning of the XVIII century the central court (*Hof*) counted 2175 personnel³³³. It is the court that is perhaps the most thought provoking concept presented in *Nation Österreich*. Brückmüller proposes the idea of the existence of a premodern version of the Austrian nation in the form of the „court nation“ (*Hofratsnation*). The court nation consisted predominantly of the elites coming from clerical, military, aristocratic and eventually from burgers and city bourgeoisie³³⁴. It was not a homogenous group; it was only united in their function for the state and dynasty. Brückmüller only shows the expression of the existence of this nation in literature and poetry but does not put this concept in any theoretical point of reference. The *Hofratsnation* has to be categorised as a premodern political nation and could be compared to the aristocratic nation of the Polish Republic (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth). In both cases the nation was meant politically not ethnically and was built of people of different ethnicities. They used a common tongue

³³¹ Ibidem, p. 177.

³³² Ibidem, p. 202.

³³³ Ibidem, p. 207 op.cit. Ehalt H., *Ausdrucksformen absolutistischer Herrschaft. Der Wiener Hof im. 17. Und 18. Jarhundert*, Vienna 1979, p. 64.

³³⁴ Ibidem, p. 230.

(Latin or German). There was also clear class distinction, more in the Polish case than the Austrian. The elites were also more privileged but this factor was less and less important in Austro-Hungary, which saw some democratisation processes. The *Hofratsnation* was also slightly more modern than the aristocratic nation of the Commonwealth. It had to be understood as a society of clerks and soldiers, who all in all belonged to the *Kaiser*. In comparison to the Polish aristocratic nation, the *Hofratsnation* was open to some parts of burgher elite. The court nation was also not very numerous, it could count at maximum 200.000 people in an empire of 50 million people³³⁵. It was very limited by class and numbers and did not find any ways to become a mass movement. While there were examples of old Austrian patriotism of the members of *Hofratsnation* it did not develop into a mass phenomenon. There was no *k.u.k patriotismus* but a lot of more and more radical pan-German sentiment³³⁶.

Brückmuller blames the monarchy for not modernising the nation formation processes. Till the late XVIII century the state was modernising itself in a way that served proper nation formation but since then this stopped and the social mobility became limited despite a certain liberalisation of civic rights³³⁷. Looking from a different perspective Brückmuller actually confirms the thesis of Heer that it was the time of enlightenment that damaged the formation process of the Austrian nation but the reason is quite dissimilar if not the opposite. Heer believed it was enlightenment that undid the achievements of the dynasty in building a nation and Brückmuller highlights the lacks in modernisation. Because of the ossified social structures and overrepresentation of aristocracy on high positions (even aristocrats of different ethnicity than German, like the government led by Kazimierz Badeni of mixed Polish-Italian descent). The parliament (*Reichsrat*) had too few prerogatives to play a role in political integration. The politics of Austro-Hungarian imperialism contributed to national disintegration rather than integration and alienated all the national groups within the empire with the exception of Germans. Adding the relative slow modernisation of economy and social structures to the equation only brought the result of a fiasco in forming an Austrian nation. The only moment, during the Napoleonic period, that created some Austrian sentiment, so thoroughly, described by Heer, but the fire faded as quickly and it was ignited. Because of the mixed composition of the Austrian monarchy it was linguistic nationalism that

³³⁵ This is just an estimate not grounded in sources. It is important to mention though that Miroslav Hroch connects the viability of a nation with the number of its members. The number of 0.5 million people he mentions is arbitrary but backed by empirical and comparative data.

³³⁶ Ibidem, p. 374.

³³⁷ Ibidem, p. 269.

became the dominant form and obviously the German speaking population felt as a part of a bigger German speaking population. Brückmuller continues to show an abbreviated story of nation formation of Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Italians, Croats, Serbs, Slovenians, Slovaks, Romanians, Ruthenians and Jews. As for the Germans, Brückmuller frames their nation formation as a dual process – or in fact two separate German nation formation processes. While there were some Austro-patriots they were mostly members of the *Hofratsnation*, most of the German speaking population falls into the category of Austrian-Germans. The other formation process created the alternative of *Reichsdeutsche*. The distinction was so strong that many, including Heinrich von Treitsche or Theodor Mommsen were speaking against the integration of Austrian-Germans into the II German Reich³³⁸. Nevertheless, functioning in two different state organisms created two nation formation models for the Germans. Yet the formation in Austria was based on the same sources as in Germany. Austrian-Germans were still moulded by Weimar classics like Goethe, Herder and Schiller. The schools of Austria taught the history of the German Reich³³⁹.

Modernisation and development of capitalism only strengthened the pan-German longings of the Austrian-German bourgeoisie. The revolutionary streams of the XIX century steered the German speaking burghers towards integration with Germany as being a part of a bigger economic entity would benefit them and allow social mobilisation upwards – a trend that was limited in the Austrian(-Hungarian) monarchy. The growing national tensions in the Habsburg realm only reinforced the German national feeling and radicalised the German nationalism – this radicalisation became most evident after the fall of the Austrian Empire in the I Republic. The erosion of the pan-Germanism only came during the times of *Ostmark* and the II World War³⁴⁰. Brückmuller ends this part of narrative with the conclusion that despite an existence of a cultural affiliation towards Germanness in the Austrian population they do identify as Austrians and not Germans.

The narrative constructed by Brückmuller bears clear and significant influences of constructivism and Hobsbawm in particular. The role of the state institutions and the elites is paramount, as well as the influence of revolutions and mythbuilding. The Austrian case, he argues is specific because of the weakness and failures of aristocracy in the regions and their

³³⁸ Ibidem p. 291.

³³⁹ Ibidem, p. 373-374.

³⁴⁰ Ibidem p. 311. Brückmuller mentions the Austrian conservatives from 1942. The worse the war went for the Axis powers the bigger the dissent in Austrian elites. Had the war been won by Germany this development would not occur, or not as strongly as it did.

numerous deaths in the Thirty Years War, led Austria to the model of absolute monarchy and growth of central administration³⁴¹. These developments led to the formation of the *Hofratsnation*. The modern nation formation process in the XIX century was limited because of slow development of industrialisation as well as no revolutionary incentives. The romantic visions of national construction of the Napoleonic period represented by count Stadion were thwarted by the conservative era of Metternich. Also since 1848 the step by step liberalisation in the Habsburg Empire led to politicisation of conflict in the forms of political parties rather than to revolutionary movements. The long continuities of the Habsburg rule were not favourable of the creation of modern “invented traditions”. Austria did not have to invent its traditions till because there were real traditions in place and they were not really supporting the formation of the Austrian nation. The invention of traditions was also rather slow in the I Austrian Republic. Only after 1945 the state embarked on a mission to form new traditions, mostly because it had to.

All the “traditional” nation forming institutions like celebration days, army and schools revolved around the idea of the monarchy³⁴². The main celebration day till 1916 was the birthday of the Kaiser, the army was not fighting for the homeland or the nation but for the Kaiser and the schools did not teach about Austria but about monarchy and about German culture. It is clear that no Austrian nation formation process could appear in those circumstances and Brückmuller indeed uses the term Austrian Germans to describe the German speaking population of Austria. Nevertheless Brückmuller is not really free from the dreams of his Austrianist predecessors. Albeit from a new, constructivist and very modern perspective Brückmuller does also what Heer did before him. He is trying to find the Austrian identity in the literary works and events of the past and even surpasses Heer in this endeavour as he manages to find an Austrian nation before 1918! The so called “court nation” is indeed an interesting projection of primordialist dreams into the constructivist reality. Almost by no definition would the *Hofratsnation* be qualified as a nation. It might have been a community of common destiny, but had no common history, ethnic background or even a common language (despite using German in formal occasions). Just by looking on examples of non-German clerks of the empire like Kazimierz Badeni it is clear that his Polish identification

³⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 333, 337.

³⁴² Rauchensteiner M, *Österreichbewusstsein und österreichische Staatsidee im Zeitalter des aufgeklärten Absolutismus und Vormarz*, [in:] Zöllner E., *Volk Land uns Staat. Landesbewusstsein, Staatsidee und nationale Fragen in der Geschichte Österreichs*, Vienna, 1984, p. 42-53.

was stronger as the Austrian one³⁴³. Should the *Hofratsnation* be limited to just the ethnic Germans within the administration? The concept, while thought provoking, is an attempt to name a certain reality that appeared in the discourses of the time. But would the European clerks residing in Brussels be called a European nation? The idea is highly disputable if not refutable. There is also a significant lack of continuity of the *Hofratsnation* in the First Republic. There was no *Hof* anymore and this nation had to seek refuge in European cosmopolitanism (the vision of “postaristocratic” Austrian man), regionalism or pan-Germanism. Brückmüller’s narrative actually repeats the main idea of Friedrich Heer – there are many broken continuities in Austrian identity and nation formation that unabled the Austrian nation to actually form during the period of modernisation, during XIX and early XX centuries.

In 1984 a German historian Karl Dietrich Erdmann published his two essays: *The track of Austria in German history* and *Three States, Two Nations, One People?* In the first case Erdmann presents eleven points of intertwining of German and Austrian histories. The history of Austria starts with the German colonisation, the Celtic, Illyrian and Slavic populations of these terrains were overrun by the German settlers³⁴⁴. The court of the Babenbergs played an important role in German culture, here *Nibelungenlied* was written, it was also the place of the poet Walter von der Vogelwiede. Austria, as Erdmann understands it was the south-eastern part of the German realm. The *Privilegium Minus* did not in fact allow Austria to depart from the Holy Roman Empire – just changed its status within it. The religious strife that broke the German lands into two were in fact wars of princes and dukes and the peace of Augsburg of 1555 was a German achievement of human rights way before the French Revolution. Another religious war – against the Islamic Turks led to the creation of the legend of *Prinz Eugen*, a talented general of the time. Despite fighting in the Balkans on the “Austrian” southern front, he was regarded as a hero of all Germans. The songs of the Prince Eugene, the noble knight, were truly, Germanic folk (people’s) songs. His actions were regarded as the bulwark of Germany, not just Austria. In all Austrian wars many Germans from different regions served as the imperial army³⁴⁵. Also culturally the “unique” Austrian baroque was indeed a part of a broader cultural trend that, with regional differences, could have been observed in all of Germany. The wars of Silesia between Prussia and Germany did

³⁴³ More on the case of that prime minister of the Empire see: Łazuga W., —*Rzdy polskie" w Austrii. Gabinet Kazimierza hr Badeniiego (1895 - 1897)*, Poznań 1991.

³⁴⁴ Erdmann, K., *Die Spur Österreichs in der deutschen Geschichte*, Zurich 1989, p.45.

³⁴⁵ Ibidem., p. 55.

not stop the convergence of the two states – many reforms of the times of Enlightenment that were introduced in Austria, were inspired by their Prussian counterpart. Erdmann challenges the concept of Heer that the Enlightenment completely destroyed the “Austrian psyche”, which was embodied in the culture of baroque. In fact the time of reforms was a general tendency in the whole German realm and it replaced the previous sensual baroque with new trends. It was a development of culture and civilisation not a destruction of one. In fact the reforms of Maria Theresa and Josef II are regarded as a highlight of not only Austrian but German civilisation. Even after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire by Napoleon, the Habsburgs continued to use its symbols as coat of arms etc. The Napoleonic wars united the rivals – Prussia and Austria with a common enemy. *Our case is the case of Germany. With Austria Germany was independent and happy, only through Austrian’s help can Germany both of them* so spoke Archduke Charles Habsburg, Duke of Tetschen³⁴⁶. It is no coincidence that Erdmann quotes a member of the Habsburg dynasty. In fact he does this on several occasions. Kaiser Franz Joseph said: *I am above all an Austrian, but decidedly German*³⁴⁷. Erdmann does it to counter the quote of Rudolf Habsburg (*Germany would never understand us...*) so strongly emphasised in the works of Friedrich Heer. By doing so Erdmann counters the mirages of the young *Kronprinz Rudolf* and reminds the reader that most Habsburgs had also a German identity. The goal of Erdmann is to uncover the forgotten German legacy of the Habsburgs – the dynasty was not just solely and Austrian phenomenon. Not only the Habsburgs expressed their affiliation with Germany or German culture, the Austrian poets and writers like Grillparzer or Hugo von Hofmansthal could be used as examples. Erdmann continues to point out the clear desires of the population of the First Austrian Republic to be a part of Germany. The conflict between the Austrofascist Federal state and Nazi Germany has to be understood as a political one. The very fact that two similar developments occurred in 1933 and 1934 in Germany and Austria show their likeness rather than differences. Even Schuschnigg himself had a vision of Austria as federal state of Germany – with many traits of sovereignty but leaving the foreign and military affairs to the government in Berlin³⁴⁸. The affiliation to Germany does not end there, after the Anschluss there were more members of the NSDAP per capita coming from Austria than from Germany. Erdmann is also kind enough to remind the Austrian of the forgotten part of the Moscow Declaration that Austria had to share its burden for the crimes committed during the fight on the side of Nazi

³⁴⁶ Words of Generalissimus Erzherzog Karl von Österreich-Tetschen quoted by, Ibidem, p. 62.

³⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 73.

³⁴⁸ Ibidem, p. 79.

Germany. He then continues to ridicule the concept of the Austrian nation that appeared after 1945. *The appearance of nations in Europe carries positive memories about great, heroic deeds like regaining independence (Selbstbefreiung) from foreign powers, wars that were won, successful revolution; as well as perspectives for a dream of a common task for the future*³⁴⁹. Not only are Austrians identical to the citizens of West-Germany but they have also developed a similar state patriotism – *Verfassungspatriotismus* in case of Germany or the neutrality and State Treaty celebrations by the Second Austrian Republic. Both Austrians and Germans have a strong regional identity that often surpasses the national one. Even the elites of Austria – the likes of Bruno Kreisky do not think of the national identity of Austrians as something important (there again Kreisky was an Austrian socialist, coming from a party that reluctantly joined the “austrianist bandwagon”).

Erdmann concludes his argument by dissecting three arguments raised by Austrianist to justify the existence of the Austrian nation. Firstly the argument that Austrian history should be treated as the Swiss one and not be included into broader German history. Switzerland broke its state relations with the Holy Roman Empire the late medieval period and since then never sought any reintegration to the German realm. On the contrary Austria’s partition from the German realm was a result of a fight for the hegemony within it not an attempt from Austria to be separated. There was little German nationalism in Switzerland in the XIX century in comparison to Austria and later Austria and Germany shared similar fates during both World Wars. The second argument is a comparative one and tries to juxtapose Austria and the Anglo-Saxon nations. While stemming from the same root the Britons, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders constitute different nations – like supposedly Austrians and Germans. Erdmann argues that all those states form in fact the Commonwealth of Nations and still have the British queen as their titular sovereign. The third argument goes as follows: the existence of many German states is the historical norm, not the times of 1938-1945 when all the lands were united under one rule. Erdmann wrote his book before the unification of Germany so the three German states are the: Federal Republic of Germany, Democratic Republic of Germany and Austria. Even if Austria forms a separate state it still is a part of German history, very much how Saxon, Hessian or Prussian histories are a fraction of a bigger German whole. Austrian politicians and historians are hostile towards the idea of being part of Germany very much how the *kleindeutsch* historians like Treitschke used to be

³⁴⁹ Ibidem, p. 84. Erdmann downplays the importance of the Second World War. Other scholars like Małgorzata Budyta-Bydzyńska or Charles Tilly include traumatic experiences as important focal points that can start nation formation. Therefore Erdmann’s argument becomes more engaged and less scientific in the last chapters.

negatively addressing Austria. Erdmann concludes that perhaps there is no Austrian nation but only an Austrian state identity. If one has to speak about the *Kulturnation* than there is only one and it is German³⁵⁰. Austrians would not truly understand who they are if they do not look into the German history, as well as Germans could not understand themselves fully if they have omitted Austria.

Obviously the book that Erdmann presented problems for Austrian historians and its publishing led to a small *Historikerstreit* – an argument in-between historians. The outrage in Austria was immense and among the angered voices the strongest one belonged to Gerard Stourz. Other historians have to be mentioned as well: Georg Schmidt, Erika Weinzierl (the author of the first history of the II Austrian Republic) and Moritz Csaky. The reaction was deeply emotional and showed not only that the veil of Austrian identity was very thin and fragile but also that a scholarly dispute could touch the very identity of the historians. The discussion that followed was definitely not *sine ira et studio*. Eirka Weinzierl said that she *belongs to the group of Austrians, for whom, the year 1945, the liberation of Austria, was the most important and most positive political event of their lives. I dedicate myself to the Austrian nation*³⁵¹. The call to reintroduce Austrian history as a part of German history for the Austrianist authors recalled the times of German nationalism, Nazism and looked like an intellectual Anschluss. For her the moment when Austrian history ceased to be a component of German counterpart was 1866 and the expulsion of Austria from the German Confederation. She also called the military camaraderie of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 unholy³⁵². Moriz Csaky discredited the Germannes of Austria by downplaying the issue of language and elevating Slavic and Italian influences. *Language is by no means fundamental for people and a nation – so we were taught not only by modern linguistics and sociology, but also by the daily consciousness of the overwhelming part of the population in this country, whose representatives feel more at home in Trieste, Prague or Zagreb than in Kiel or Hamburg, precisely where German is spoken*³⁵³. Csaky's argument raises several topics at once. It evokes the old Habsburg legacy of a multi-ethnic empire and juxtaposes the „north” as a real of different civilisation. Csaky expresses what Anton Pelinka calls the fantasy or the

³⁵⁰ Ibidem, 94.

³⁵¹ Weinzierl E., *Österreichische nation und österreichisches Nationalbewusstsein*, [in:] *Zeitgeschichte 17*, Vienna 1989, p. 44.

³⁵² Ibidem, p. 48

³⁵³ Csaky M., *Wie deutsch ist Österreich – eine ewiggeistrige Frage?*, *Die Presse*, 21 December 1985.

dream of Austrian *Mitteleuropa*³⁵⁴. Pelinka was sceptical of Austria's role in the region both regarding the past as well as the present. Austria did not create a central European entity because it did not share the democratization processes equally among the non-german population of the Empire. And in the current times Austria has to be regarded more as a Western country rather than central-european. Gerard Stourzh argued that the idea of the three German states is rooted in the hitlerite vision of *Grossdeutschland* – it is the starting point and the three German states are just mere successor states (like with the division of Alexander the Great Empire into three Hellenistic successor states). The fact is that the unification under the Nazi boot did nothing but destroyed the unity within the nation and led to the separation of Austrians. Erdmann himself stated that the plurality of the German statehood was the norm and unity was the exception so his argument is a logical fallacy. Stourzh also points out that Erdmann uses the state and cultural nation terms and distinctions quite arbitrarily regarding the split of West and East Germany. He also points out that Erdmann never really challenged the idea of the existence of the Austrian nation³⁵⁵. The failure of the I Austrian Republic and the desire of joining with Germany have to be understood as a failure of the transformation from an Empire to a Republic. The fact that there is a distinct Austrian identity means that there had to be some foundations in history that served as reference points. Erdmann's concept of *dreigeteilte* Germany is a misappropriation³⁵⁶. Schmidt went even further and thought that the connection that Erdmann tried to establish was simply a way to make Austria responsible for the horrors of the II World War³⁵⁷. Austria was not a part of German community of fate.

There were also voices of support to Erdmann, most notably from Fritz Fellner who found Erdmann's contribution rather liberating and a return to German pluralism. German history was, in Fellner's opinion, limited to the German nation state formed in 1871 which hindered the development of other perspectives like the regional one or any comparative study

³⁵⁴ Pelinka A., *Zur österreichischen Identität*, Vienna 1990, p. 133-138. Austrian version of *Mitteleuropa* differs from the German one – it is a nostalgic vision. *Mitteleuropa* could only be understood as the periphery of the Greater German realm.

³⁵⁵ Stourzh G., *Vom Reich zur Republik*, Vienna 1990, p. 19-24. Stourzh G., *Vom Reich zur Republik*, Vienna 1990, p. 49. The book came as an extension of Stourzh essays in response to Erdmann. The discussion was later continued in an edited volume that also has a contribution from Stourzh: Botz G., Sprengnagel G., *Kontroversen um Österreichs Geschichte*, Frankfurt am Main 1994.

³⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 49.

³⁵⁷ Fellner F, Schmidt G. *Ende ohne Epoche der Deutschen Geschichte?* [in:] *Zeitgeschichte*, Vienna 1977, 168. Schmidt also was nagging about the fact that German historians reminded everyone with a passion that Hitler was an Austrian.

for that matter³⁵⁸. The fall of the Third Reich instead of being a liberating moment for historical science led Austria to the abuse of its autonomy and spurred Austrian close-mindedness and chauvinism. Erdmann opened up the discussion that could lead back to the more „federalised” history – pluralistic and diverse. Fellner did not have a problem with understanding Austrians as a part of a broader German identity – in fact only when compared with it Austria could show its uniqueness.

Another German contribution to the Austrian discussion came from the port city of Hamburg. In the years 1995-1999 the Institute for Social Research in Hamburg prepared an exhibition named *Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944* (The war of annihilation. Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941 to 1944). The exhibition’s goal was to show the fact that the army of the Third Reich did not just conduct regular military operations but it was also a part of the murderous machine that led to the deaths of millions of Jews, POWs and civilians³⁵⁹. The connection between military actions and genocide deconstructed the narrative of “unblemished” Wehrmacht. In many German and Austrian narratives the two topics were presented separately and the crimes were attributed to the SS. The exhibition showed the world of the perpetrators that was not limited to the leaders but included the masses of soldiers: a whole spectrum of German and Austrian society. *War of annihilation* was shown in twenty eight German and six Austrian cities between 1995 and 1999 and was seen by more than a million visitors Anna Wolff-Powęska noticed that the most important result of that exhibition was the confrontation with one’s self-image. It was like seeing a family portrait, a multi-generational experience³⁶⁰. The Austrian society was shocked much more than its German counterpart. All in all it were the Austrians who not only had an overrepresentation in the Waffen SS but also the Wehrmacht units that comprised of Austrian recruits had the lowest numbers of desertions³⁶¹. The reactions to the exhibition were wide from approval to fierce critique. The biggest dissonance was created by the stories told by the families to their children that differed from what was presented.

The political parties had different reactions to the Wehrmacht exhibition, ÖVP did not support it, SPÖ showed timid support, the Greens endorsed the idea and FPÖ openly criticised it. Jörg Haider spoke that the exhibition presents the generation of grandfathers and

³⁵⁸ Ibidem, p. 159-166.

³⁵⁹ Wolff-Powęska A., *Pamięć brzemię i uwolnienie*, Poznań 2011, s. 337. The outline of the exhibition is available online: http://www.verbrechen-der-wehrmacht.de/pdf/vdw_en.pdf

³⁶⁰ Ibidem. s.339

³⁶¹ Thaler P., *The ambivalence of identity*, West Lafayette 2001, p. 86-88.

grandmothers as criminals and he would become the champion of the Wehrmacht generation and support its good name³⁶². The media were positive about the exhibition but the letters sent to the editorial were not. Many wrote to defend members of their own families. There was a broad disavowal of guilt³⁶³. There was little place for arguments and the discussion was emotional. It used clichés with little to none empathy towards the victims of war of extermination. At the same time many people who served in Wehrmacht decided to write their memories down testifying about the crimes that this army has committed. It took 50 years since the end of the war to start coming to terms with the terrible legacy of the past in the Austrian population.

Both the *Historikerstreit* and the Wehrmacht exhibition did not make a giant contribution to the discussion about the Austrian nation it was mainly emotional and psychological. When the argument settled down and new tendency emerged and efforts were made to escape the ties of Austrianist historiography (it was never not totally free from its influences though). Scholars like Anton Pelinka continued to radically reject the narratives formed by historiography calling them opportunistic lies and deceptions³⁶⁴. Pelinka dissected the ideas of Austria being a part of Germany or being a part of Central Europe. Both he rejects and sees the process of the unification of Europe as a possibility for Austrians to finally come to terms with the problems of their past and their identity. In united Europe – the Austrian identity could become a synthesis of what once constituted the quarrel among historians³⁶⁵.

Younger generations even propose rejecting the 1000 year old Austrian history when speaking about the Austrian identity and nation. *Building of Austrian nation has almost automatically developed over these last five decades, I would suggest that we should not hinder its further growth by referring too often and too much to Austria's 1000 years of history, which for such a long time have failed to create a truly Austrian identity*³⁶⁶. The question of the Austrian national identity cannot be answered – because it always needs to be asked again and again it is in constant *statu nascendi*.

³⁶² Manoschek W., *Austrian Reaction to the Exhibition —Wir of Extermination. Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941 to 1944*, in Bischof G., Pelinka A., Karlhofer F. (ed.), *The Vranitzky Era in Austria*, New Brunswick 1999, p. 196-197.

³⁶³ Ibidem, p. 198.

³⁶⁴ Pelinka A., *Taboo and self-deception: The Second Republics Reconstruction of History* [in:] (ed.) Bischof G., Pelinka A., *Contemporary Austrian Studies 5: Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity*, New Brunswick 1997, p. 95-102.

³⁶⁵ Pelinka A., *Zur österreichischen Identität*, Vienna 1990, p. 139-145.

³⁶⁶ Mathis F., *1000 years of Austria and Austrian Identity: Founding Myths*, (ed.) Bischof G., Pelinka A., *Contemporary Austrian Studies 5: Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity*, New Brunswick 1997, p. 27.

2.5. Closing comments

The historiography of the Second Austrian Republic shows a radical change to what came before it. Historians took part in a heated debate that directly influenced the nation-formation processes. However it took three long decades for Austrian historians to start publishing books and monographs devoted to the history of the reborn country and newly born nation. The first history of the Second Republic was published in 1972³⁶⁷. Austrians got their point of reference to the Second Republic and not the already non-existent imperial Habsburg state. The change of perspective was immense. No longer were the Austrian historians looking at Germany as the framework for Austrian history. In fact it was the Austrian lands that served as the ultimate definition of territorial reach of Austrian history. History was no longer defined by the pre-existing empire but was written from the point of view of the small alpine republic. The ethnicity played a major role in the beginnings of historical narratives. Influences of Illyrians, Celts, Slavs, and Magyars were emphasised over the rather obvious Germanic ethnic dominance. History was written in a way that focused on the growing of sovereignty of Austria that was only fully achieved in the Second Republic – the embodiment of the thousand year’s long march towards an independent state. The story of unification of various Austrian lands under different dynasties served a similar purpose – to show the end effect. Austrian historiography became teleological to the core.

Austria stopped being viewed as the periphery of the German world and was looked upon as a centre of a new entity. Since it was the history of the land that came into focus the chronological dimension of Austrian historiography was expanded and reached more to the past. The pre-germanic tales of different tribes, and the Roman presence in the shape of the provinces of Noricum and Raetia was equally important as the later Germanic settlement. While the prehistory of Austria was of significance the signs of individuality only appeared after the Germanic tribes settled in the Alps – the historical *Ostarrichi* served as mythical claim to (independent) statehood. The approach towards nation for the most part was primordial – the formation of Austrian nation was believed to be influenced by the tribes of antiquity, which already assumes continuity. What once constituted a bulk of German history was purged of the German context and presented solely and exclusively from the Austrian

³⁶⁷ Weinzierl E., Skalník K., *Österreich: Die Zweite Republik*, Graz 1972. In 1983 a tome by the same authors targeted the First Republic was published. It was the first time when a comprehensive history of Austrian republics was published.

perspective. The wars with Turkey – were an Austrian and not German affair, same goes for the works of culture (music especially).

In this dominance of primordial narrative William Bluhm was the odd one out. While starting his narrative in 1808 he de facto points at 1945 as the starting point of conducting a policy of national integration (in comparison with the disintegration of society in previous eras). The works of Bluhm and Bruckmüller constitute a constructivist turn but not without its limitations. The bashing of the Austrianist historiography became the norm – both Anton Pelinka and later Peter Thaler rejected the primordialist visions and focused on modern nation making similarly to what Bluhm had done almost three decades before them. While the primordialists tried to emphasise continuity Heer delivered a paradox – Austria's continuity were its multiple discontinuities. It was a way in which the primordial point of view tried to tackle the issue of the non-emergence of the Austrian nation before 1945. The constructivist had no such problems – with the exception of Bruckmüller they stated that there was no Austrian nation before the II World War. The case of Ernst Bruckmüller is interesting because while using constructivist tools he still could not abandon the task of placing the Austrian nation as much in the past as his theoretical framework allowed him to. Nevertheless Bruckmüller sought for the symbolism and myths that were linked to past events of the medieval and early-modern period that formed the canon of Austrian imaginary. Interestingly though he himself quotes social surveys that always point to the alpine landscapes as the most prominent Austrian image³⁶⁸. Nature topples history. In many cases the material heritage of the past that carries symbolic or mythic potential could not be used in the Austrian case. First of all most of the heritage is connected with the times of the monarchy and the modern state is a Republic. For instance the crown of St. Stephen is a symbol of Hungarian continuity, the so called Crown of Chrobry, a Polish symbol was looted by the Prussians in 1795 and molten into coins. In 2003 a replica of that crown was made with the use of the gold from the coins, so it contains parts of the original crown. The royal insignia of the Holy Roman Emperors which are stored in Wien do not serve any of those purposes. Similarly for national heroes – Austrians usually point at musicians like Mozart or Strauss, the first ruler that comes to mind is Maria Theresa, because of her reforms³⁶⁹. She is followed by a modern politician – dr Karl Renner who is used as a symbolic figure of the “founding father” of the republic (he even has the privilege of being the father of not one but two republics). The focus on art and partially

³⁶⁸ Bruckmüller E., *Nation Österreich. Kulturelles Bewußtsein und gesellschaftlich-politische Prozesse*, Wien 1996, p p. 92-95.

³⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 107.

education shows the strong rejection of “Germani (Prussian)” values. Friedrich Heer praised the love of poetry of the “Celtic ancestors” of Austrians in comparison to militaristic Germans from the north. While Heer emphasised the times of the counterreformation and military success against the Ottomans and framed them as the “golden age” of Austrian history it is the liberal era of Franz Joseph that serves as an example against the primitive and barbaric German politics of the late XIX century. The historiography of the Second Republic also frames the period after 1955 as the new golden age – the most prosperous time for the inhabitants of Austria in the entirety of its history³⁷⁰.

The rejection of Germanes is probably the most important feature of Austrianist historiography. Friedrich Heer’s and Felix Kreissler’s works are perfect examples of complementary books that focus meticulously on finding as any expressions of Austrian identity as possible. Quite conveniently Heer’s books ends at the very moment when Kreissler’s starts its narrative (the year 1938). Only the second half of the 80’ties brought the discussion and allowed a small part of Austrian historians accept their affiliation to the broader German culture. While prevalent for the first forty years of the Second Republic, the rejection of Germanes became weaker and weaker as the time distance from the horrors of the II World War became larger and larger. Nevertheless the anti-German stance occurred during the vital moments of nation-formation and has to be regarded as one of the most important factors. Austrian historiography made a geographical demarcation from Germany and focused only on the history of the lands that form the Second Austrian Republic. The historiography is completely Austrian focused with a clear narrative of reaching the Second Republic as the pinnacle of Austrian fate and its ultimate goal. What used to be German is appropriated to be Austrian. While the mixed ethnic heritage is mentioned and became almost a ritual for the Austrianist historian there is little to none efforts to actually focus on the non-German history of Austrian lands. The Celtic, Slavic or Magyar population of Austria is absent from the narratives that focus on the rulers, and dynasties (most notably the Habsburgs). The historians’ objective was to emphasise the continuity of Austrian history and frame the Anschluss as an anomaly. Interestingly enough an Austrian historian Benedikt and the American Katzenstein and German Erdmann treat the Anschluss as an anomaly but on different grounds. Benedikt believes in the continuity of the Austrian statehood, Katzenstein

³⁷⁰ See: Rathkolb O., *The Paradoxical Republic. Austria 1945-2005*, New York, Oxford 2014, p. 54-92, 217-237. The Austrian model of the welfare state is one of the most discussed in the world and often compared to the Scandinavian examples. The economic success is echoed in international press with most notable example being the article *The Sound of Success* from the Economist, 22 November 2007, <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2007/11/22/the-sound-of-success>, Access 16.05.2019.

shows that being disjoined is a result of internal factors of Austrian society and economy and Erdmann treats Austria as another German state, having in mind that through most of German history it was always divided by a myriad of states.

Quite surprisingly the issue that combines most of the Austrian historians that completely disagree on other issues like Heer, Zöllner and Pelinka is the belief that the common destiny of Austrians lies in Europe – that Austria has some special civilizational mission or that Austrian identity will be expressed through a broader European identity. This however could be just a version of a postcolonial complex of the colonists for their Central-European „space of colonisation”. This idea has just been transformed into the Austrian burden of civilising Europe³⁷¹. The high level of emotion and ideology in Austrian historiography spurred radical reactions and critique, including the voices to abandon Austrian historiography entirely. When the generation of historians that were directly victims of the *Anschluss* and the Nazi regime gave way to the newer ones the focus on Austrian identity and Austrian nation weakened and became less and less relevant. The topic of Austrian identity became more prominent among political scientists and sociologists like Pelinka, Rathkolb or Wodak, and they focused more on the politics of the Second Republic and the present identity rather than historical.

While historians and historiography do play an important role in nation formation their influence is in fact limited. In the Austrian case it is the politics of the state and the state (political) elites that bear the palm. Historians play a vital role in creating national imaginary – such as pinpointing the geographical and temporal limits to the country and nation, without public policy though the influence of historians would be much weaker. Therefore it is crucial to investigate the state policies of nation making.

³⁷¹ More on the post-colonial theory in Central Europe see: Surman J., Kaps K., *Postcolonial or Post-colonial? Post(-)colonial Perspectives on Habsburg Galicia*, [in:] *Historyka. Studia metodologiczne* XLII 2012, p. 7-35, Andrzejewski P., *O zasadności stosowania teorii postkolonialnej w badaniach nad historią Europy Środkowej*, [w:] *Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki t.2, 2017, p.* See also the fundamental edited volume: Prutsch U., Feichtinger J., Scsaky M., (ed.) *Habsburg postcolonial: Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis*, Innsbruck 2003.

3. Politics

3.1 Political elites

*While a nation cannot exist without its members being aware of their nationality, the forming of the nation cannot take place without specific activities of groups and individuals*³⁷². In such way Hroch tries to dismiss the abstract influence of nationalism in nation making. It is always certain actors and groups that promote certain ideas and attitudes. As seen in the previous chapter historians are one such group that speaks in the name of the nation. Yet the influence of those scholars is limited and the focus must shift to the people (actors) in power. By that I do not mean the government perspective advocated by Hobsbawm. While in most cases of Western countries the nations were “state-nations” that were constructed in synergy with the institutions of the state it is not always the case. In the first chapter of this thesis I have pointed out that the understanding of the nation was limited to the elites, who more often than not were also the deponents of political power. From aristocracy of Germany speaking lands, Hungary and Poland to the gentry and bourgeoisie of England and France the elites were the driving force in nation-formation. The Austrian case is similar in many ways to the French one as it is an example of a state-nation. Yet the Austrian nation building took part in the times of lack of or limited sovereignty (1938-1955) only to reach the state nation level in later years. The transformation into modern nation has to be placed with the fall of the monarchy and establishment of the I Austrian Republic. The problem is of course that at the time even if the elites showed some degree of Austrian national consciousness they did not create substantial nation building processes. When the elites themselves doubted the viability of both Austria and the Austrian nation the Hroch’s phase B and C could not come into fruition. Almost all theoretical preconditions for the creation of a nation did not occur in the Austrian case before 1945. The prewar elites of the first Austrian Republic did not believe that they were Austrians. Almost all political parties wanted to reunite with Germany (with the exception of the Habsburg imperialists and the international communists). Historians like Heinrich von Srbik or Hugo Hantsch wrote about Austria as a German state³⁷³. Even the Austro-fascists like Dolfuss believed that they belonged to the German nation of culture. There was no Austrian national movement. Political activity focused either on Pangermanism or Paneuropeanism. The German language

³⁷² Hroch M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015, p. 117.

³⁷³ Hantsch H., *Geschichte Österreichs*, Graz 1953.

was treated as a cultural connection to Germany and the legacy of the Habsburg was treated as part of German history. The ethnic roots were understood as German. The Habsburg Empire has not created its own Austrian identity. The state administration was loyal to the dynasty and not to the state, not to mention the nation. There was no will to be Austrian. At the same time the mere existence of a state is already a prerequisite for nation formation. Despite the fact that the Austrian national consciousness had little popular support and the government did not prioritize nation-building policies the state did undertake some actions that could be classified as such. As Zygmunt Bauman wrote: *The state is eager to use the authority of the nation, in order to support the requirement of loyalty. At the same time nations tend to form themselves into states in order to use the state power of obligation to promote unity*³⁷⁴.

The other issue that has to be mentioned is the geographical location of Austria. The country is surrounded by states that in their majority applied the cultural model of nation-making (without the support of the state). The main reason for that is the fact they were part of multinational empires, with Austria being the prime example. This distorted the Austrian nation making process balancing it between the cultural and state models. In the I Austrian Republic there was a state but there was a nation, and both the general populace and the majority of the elites worked against the “natural state agenda of nation making” towards integration with Germany. Only after 1945 when the geopolitical factors and international policy formed and independent Austria that was viable the state-nation building process could come into fruition.

Without doubt that Austrian nation making even in the first Republic and even more so in the second was led by the members of the independent professional class. While there was some interdependency and interweaving with (former) aristocracy the political leaders recruited from upper-middle and middle classes. Quite interestingly the people who operated in the I Austrian Republic were also active in the II. The best example is dr Karl Renner who is considered the founding father of both Republics and a statesman of two eras. The First Republic was ridden with political conflict and high tensions, a short civil war included. The Second could not be different. The same people that were at each other throats before 1938 only several years later achieved an unprecedented and rarely found consensus.

³⁷⁴ Bauman Z., *Socjologia*, Poznań 1996, p. 176

3.2 The parties of Consensus – ÖVP and SPÖ

The politicians of ÖVP and SPÖ belong to political entities that count as one of the oldest in Europe. The conservative party can trace its roots from the *Christlichsoziale Partei Österreichs- CS* that was founded in 1893 and the Sozialdemokratische *Arbeiterpartei Österreichs – SDAPÖ* stated operating even earlier in 1889. To understand the genesis of the consensus one has to look at the turbulent times from 1934 to 1945. The first victims of the times were the socialists who were persecuted by the Austrofascist regime. In turn the Austrofascist who recruited mostly from the conservative camp found themselves on the rougher side after the Anschluss in 1938. During the time both the Austrian conservatives and social democrats were persecuted. While the political elites of the I Austrian Republic suffered the general population was expressing enthusiasm that was genuine and spontaneous³⁷⁵. The discontent among the masses started to grow only after the Stalingrad battle in 1943 and the defeat of the Axis forces. After the II World War the myth of Austria as a victim was created and the Anschluss was the primary act of aggression. The crimes and victims of the Austrofascist were forgotten or downplayed. The conservatives presented this regime as the last defence against the German aggression. While the socialist camp held different views on that matter it did not express major concerns as both fell victims to the Nazis. The so called “common concentration camp experience” was supposed to form the basis of consensus after the War. A text from the witness of history of the Dachau concentration camp Rudolf Kalmar recounts: *Now we stood in the square, tired, hungry and mocked in the striped uniforms, and felt for the first time the entire staggering ridiculousness of our onward appearance. Ministers and state secretaries next to Austrian workers, high military officers and bureaucrats of the administration next to young Communists, men of all world views, all professions and classes. In the following years of indescribable suffering, we put everything divisive aside and sought out the true source of unity: humanity: whether we were poor or rich, great names or unknown people, had this or that profession, were Catholics or atheists, middle class or Socialists, revolutionaries or conservatives, Austrians or Germans, Dutch or French, Italians or Belgians, Luxemburgers or Greeks*³⁷⁶. As many of his fellow inmates Kalmar was persistent in declaring Austrian nationality throughout his stay in the camp³⁷⁷. Kalmar’s memories are a perfect example of establishing a myth of unity that transgresses class, ancestry and political views – a typical example of abstract national unity

³⁷⁵ Bukey E., *Hitler’s Austria: Popular sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945*, Chapel Hill 2000, p. 33-34.

³⁷⁶ Op cit, Utgaard P., *Remembering and forgetting Nazism*, New York, Oxford, 2003, p. 78.

³⁷⁷ Ibidem, p. 102.

that appeared under harsh circumstances (to recall Budyta-Budzyńska framework of crisis as a catalyst for the creation of national identity).

The rebirth of Austria under the auspices of the Allied Powers was treated as *Stunde Null* - the zero hour, a new beginning when all the bad deeds of the past are forgotten. During the II World War both the socialists and the conservatives had various plans for the future of Austria, remaining a part of Germany was considered by both sides³⁷⁸. Karl Hans Sailer a socialist journalist of the *Arbeiter Zeitung* wrote in 1942: *There can be no doubt that Austria is German soil. Every attempt to magnify the difference between the Austrians and the other Germans to the point of talking of a separate Austrian nation has proven to be mere low grade agent's work*³⁷⁹. The traditional pan-Germanism of the Austrian socialists was still prevalent. Among the conservatives many scenarios were analysed including creating a separate South-German state comprising of Austria and Bavaria or creating a Danube-Confederation in the fashion of the fallen empire. This was all in vain as the decision was not to be made by Austrians but rather by the Allied Powers – who decided to create an independent Austria. That does not mean that Austrian political elites did not play a role in the establishment of the new state. Using his popularity and recognition as a symbolic figure Karl Renner managed, as a fellow socialist, to maintain positive relations with the Soviets. As the Red Army entered *Ostmark* Renner made a declaration of independence in the name of the nation. *In this declaration, as president of the last freely elected democratic government, and by virtue of the authority I had received thereby from the Austrian people itself, I wanted to call upon the country to declare its independence and to return to the democratic constitution of the republic*³⁸⁰. In Vienna the conservatives now operating under the sign of the People's Party, *Österreichische Volkspartei* (ÖVP) were included in the process of independence declaration and on 27th of April 1945 the socialists, conservatives and communists declared the *Anschluss null and void*. Unlike Korea or Germany, Austria was lucky to avoid being partitioned by the Western Allies and the Soviet Union and a provisional government was established. It claimed power (under supervision of the Allies) over the whole territory of Austria – the integrity of the state was maintained even if it was difficult to travel between various occupation zones.

³⁷⁸ Bluhm W., *Building an Austrian nation*, New Haven, London 1973, p. 49.

³⁷⁹ Op cit. Schärf A., *Österreichs Erneuerung 1945-1955*, Vienna 1960, p. 23.

³⁸⁰ Renner K., *Denkschrift über die Geschichte der Unabhängigkeitserklärung Österreichs*, Zurich 194, p. 15-16.

Another lucky coincidence was the fact that both in the socialist and conservative camps it were the moderates that took leadership. In the case of socialists Karl Renner and Adolf Schärf were considered the right-wing of the leftist party as well as Leopold Figl, Felix Hurdes and Lois Weinberger and Julius Raab were the left-wing of their right-winged party. This development made cooperation much easier. The rebranding of the conservative camp helped to disavow the Austrofascist past. The declaration of independence on behalf of the People's Party was signed by Leopold Kunschak, an experienced politician from the second row, but one of the few who opposed the dismantling of the state institutions by the Austrofascist regime in 1934. Even though it were the socialists who took the initiative in re-establishing the state it were the conservatives that proved to be crucial in Austrian nation-building. As mentioned before the socialist camp did not have many traditions and pan-German thinking was not exceptional even after 1945. The conservatives on the other hand stressed the continuities in Austrian history and treated it as a separate cultural entity. The very first program of the ÖVP emphasised the *heritage of those political groups which always stood on the ground of the Austrian tradition and independence*. It also regarded the *systemic cultivation of the Austrian spirit with sharpest emphasis on the autonomous Austrian cultural system, rooted in the Christian-occidental ideals which we have received from our forefathers*³⁸¹. The goal of the ÖVP was clear – to build an Austrian nation and the formation of a strong and proud Austrian political and cultural consciousness³⁸². The socialist party made no such claims only stressing the need to maintain sovereignty, interestingly though it were the socialists who first advocated the neutrality of Austria – one of the hallmarks of Austrian national identity.

In November 1945 it was the conservatives that won the first free elections with an absolute majority. Leopold Figl – the first chancellor of the II Austrian Republic invited the socialists to co-govern. It was a beautiful symbol of post-war unity and a stark contrast to the tensions of the years 1918-1938. This gesture was also the beginning of consensual politics and the beginning of a long story of the big „black-red” coalitions that lasted till 1966 and was renewed many times later. An informal system of party checks and balances was introduced (the so called *Proporz System*) and members of both parties were assigned jobs in state agendas in such a way that the members of one party were looking at the hands of their political competitors. The political integration was so successful that in 1965 there were more

³⁸¹ Berchtold K. (ed.), *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868-1966*, Oldenbourg 1967 p., 376-378

³⁸² *Ibidem*, p. 378.

members of political parties in Austria than in Germany³⁸³. While the socialists focused on economic policy of nationalisation of big industries (many of which were established by the Nazi regime during the times of the *Ostmark*) the conservatives took hold of education.

In order to present the sentiments among the members of the victorious People's Party it will prove useful to quote the article of Alfred Missonig, a Catholic journalist and one of the founders of the renewed ÖVP. He wrote for the conservative *Österreichische Monatshefte*: *In the first weeks and months after the liberation of our homeland from the German yoke, we experienced a wave of patriotic enthusiasm, as it could hardly have been recorded before in the eventful history of Austria. From the passionate protest against the German oppressor, who could now emerge elementary, grew a pure, clear and strong commitment to Austria, in which all sections of the population regardless of their partisan orientation participated. [...]* In this introduction Missonig creates the myth of common resistance against the Germans during the occupation. But why did the Austrians do this, were they not German themselves? Missonig continues: *Certainly it is correct that the Austrians adopted the Bavarian dialect of the German language, but over the centuries they have changed this language profoundly not inconsiderable and so only adapted to their nature. An internal necessity, for instance blood, of choosing the German language as the means of popular communication in no way existed; for, according to his blood composition, the Austrian people at that time was a very colourful mixture of Illyrian and Celtic, Roman, Slavic, Magyar and Germanic elements. [...]* Here Missonig highlights the ethnic difference between Austrians and Germans – as the primary source of dissimilarity. *The Austrian dialect of the German written language, which then emerged, deviated strongly from the Bavarian and has preserved this special feature to this day. [...]* *There should be no doubt about the existence of an Austrian national culture, which is much more than a copy of German culture. Its contents are: the Austrian literature, which does not allow a mingling with German literature at its peak; Austrian art, which in the Baroque as well as in the Romantic period represents something completely selfish, sharply differentiated from German art; Austrian music, which always had its own paths of development which only occasionally touched or crossed the paths of German music; and finally also the Austrian science, which, even where it allowed itself to be dragged into the wake of the Germans, as in philosophy, history, and natural science, still has peculiarities that can not be explained by "stunting nuances" alone. [...]* *Folk customs, lifestyle, sentiment,*

³⁸³ Around 716.000 socialist and more than 600.000 conservative party members in Austria compared to 690.000 Socialists and 385.000 Christian Democrats in Germany in 1965.

form of thinking and outward behaviour are also essential building blocks of a national culture. Not only the ethnic ties but also cultural set Germans and Austrians apart, from the elites to the common folk. How deep the differences between Austrians and Germans are, has forced us to cooperate with the "German brothers" in recent years drastically enough ad oculos demonstrated. The pacifistic spirit of the Austrian alone would be sufficient to recognize in him the representative of a nation alien to the Germans, even opposing [...] We Austrian is embellished with modesty; self-sufficiency. We work to live; the German lives to work. We respond to the adversity of life and our nearer environment with serenity, perhaps even with rants and grunts, which is not meant so seriously; the German strikes his fist on the table and tramples like the elephant in the china shop down everything that does not suit him or is incomprehensible. We know it always and everywhere that Austria is not the world, but that we are only one of the essential and irreplaceable pieces of the mosaic; the German does not see in the other nation its necessary complement, its salutary counterweight, but the enemy, whom the opponent Wodans has set into the world, so that the "German nature" takes offense at him and the sooner, the better, he makes. The satirical interpretation of the German national character: a German - a scholar, two Germans - an association, three Germans - a war, holds a most bitter truth, namely the truth that the German people is thoroughly a warrior people [...]. But who could say that the Austrian [...] thinks warlike and thinks of war? ³⁸⁴ Why to show such a lengthy quotation from Alfred Missong? Because he was the person mainly responsible for implementing these ideas into the party programmes of the ÖVP³⁸⁵. Even more radically Nadine Paulovic, a conservative member of the Austrian parliament wrote in the *Österreichische Monatshefte*: *We Austrians have been able to liberate ourselves in the last possible moment from the clutches of a crushing Prussian subhumanness (Untermenschentum, because we intrinsically rejected the pan-German error*³⁸⁶. A twisted echo of the pre-war ideology of Austria as better Germany surfaces here in the form of the Nazi terminology. The emotional reaction is clearly visible in the reactions and writings of a certain part of the conservative camp. A similar strongly emotionally biased point of view was represented by Felix Hurdes whose stark antipathy towards anything that is German is visible in his policy introduced in the Ministry of Education³⁸⁷. The chairman of ÖVP Leopold Figl in December 1945 declared that Austria never was a second German state and that Austrians

³⁸⁴ Missong A., *Die Österreichische Nation*, Vienna 1946, p. 1-8.

³⁸⁵ See: Kreissler F. , *Der Österreicher und seine Nation ein Lernprozess mit Hindernissen*, Vienna 1984, p. 369.

³⁸⁶ *Österreichische Monatshefte*, 1:12, 1946 p. 516.

³⁸⁷ See: Chapter 3.2.2

do not come or stem from Germans³⁸⁸. The radical approach of the first post-war years was watered down in later years. The 1952 program spoke only about the protection of the Austrian independence of the state, protection worthy was also the Austrian cultural heritage and mentality³⁸⁹. The disappearance of the Austrian nation as a concept from the party programs became a constant in the case of ÖVP. In 1958 there is no mention, in 1965 and 1972 programmes only the cultural exclusiveness and independence is mentioned³⁹⁰. The 1995 program the rich and complex cultural identity is the only remark. It is noteworthy that ÖVP at the eve of the accession to the European Union the importance of Heimat (not the motherland) is mentioned³⁹¹.

The socialists had a less straightforward approach towards the concept of the Austrian nation and the Austrian national consciousness. For instance in 1946 a socialist newspaper *Linzer Tagblatt* the Austrians as Germans of Austrian citizenship. The nation was to be treated as a political entity, but at the same time as a part of the entire German cultural nation. Interestingly this article provoked the reaction of the Allied occupying forces forced the editor of the *Tagblatt* to be dismissed³⁹². The fact that the symbolical figure of dr Karl Renner was stained by the support of the Anschluss in 1938 was not helping either. In the infamous interviews in *Neue Wiener Tageblatt* Renner spoke: Although not attained by the methods I support, the *Anschluss* is now a finished, historical act. I look at it with satisfaction after the humiliation of the 1918 and 1919, the treaties of Saint-Germain and Versailles. Renner was also a supporter of the annexation of the *Sudentenland* to Germany³⁹³. After the end of World War II Renner tried to distance himself from his past opinions. *When Hitler's methods of oppression, his final intentions, especially the war plans became apparent the overwhelming majority of the (Austrian) population rejected the idea of Anschluss with strong hate. Now they wish for nothing more than the restoration of the independent Republic of Austria*³⁹⁴. Nevertheless Renner never fully rejected his pan-German beliefs. On several occasions Renner called the Austrians as Germans of the Alpine countries, or when he spoke of the

³⁸⁸ Kriechbaumer R., *Von der Illegalität zur Legalität: die ÖVP im Jahr 1945 ; politische und geistesgeschichtliche Aspekte des Entstehens der Zweiten Republik*, Vienna 1985, p. 276.

³⁸⁹ Kadan A., Pelinka A., *Die Grundsatzprogramme der österreichischen Parteien. Dokumentation und Analyse*, St Pölten 1979, p. 212.

³⁹⁰ Ibidem, p. 139, 211.

³⁹¹ *Das Grundsatzprogramm der ÖVP*, 1995. The program is available online at: www.steirischeroeaab.at/wp.../Grundsatzprogramm-der-ÖVP.pdf, Access: 16.05.2019.

³⁹² Kreissler F., *Der Österreicher und seine Nation ein Lernprozess mit Hindernissen*, Vienna 1984, p. 412.

³⁹³ Ibidem, p. 377.

³⁹⁴ Renner K., *Denkschrift über die Geschichte der Unabhängigkeitserklärung Österreichs und die Einsetzung der provisorischen Regierung der Republik*, Vienna 1945, p.5.

ethnic composition of Austrians he mentioned the mixture of tribes: Bavarians, Swabians, Saxons, Franks and Hessians³⁹⁵ And yet Renner managed to find some understanding with the conservative camp on the basis of rejection of Nazism as an ideology that was a threat to socialists. For instance Friedrich Adler, the son of the founding father of the Austrian socialist movement - Victor Adler, did not want all the blame for the crimes of the war to go to the Germans. His anti-fascist views led him to the ascertainment that also Austrians were complicit in the crimes³⁹⁶. Adler was very vocal in his opinions: *The intention of creating an Austrian nation is, in my opinion, entirely utopian. But if this reactionary, as well as nauseous Utopia should ever be realised – should the Austrians, in fact be faced with the choice between the Austrian nation and the German nation (which situation I shall fortunately not live to see) I would be the one of those who would without hesitation, elect to remain with the nation, for which, for example, Goethe's Faust, Wagner's Ring of the Nibelungen, Freiligrath's poems of the revolution and Lassalle's speeches do not belong to a foreign culture. The Austrians are, however, far removed from having to take such decisions. Today it is a matter of not allowing oneself to be intimidated and of realising that one can be a good Austrian as well as a good member of the German cultural community*³⁹⁷. The ambivalence of socialist approach towards the Austrian national consciousness does not stem from Renner but he is a perfect example of how ideological traditions cause problems with Austrian nation-making. The SPÖ quickly learned (especially after interventions of the Allied occupation forces) that it is best not to mention the issue of Austrian nation. The programmes of 1947, 1952 and 1958 make no mention of the Austrian nation. Only the last one briefly touches upon the independence and neutrality of the Austrian state³⁹⁸. The trend continues in the 1978 program does not even hint at statements relevant to the issue of Austrian national consciousness. The silence is prevalent in the 1998 *Grundsatzprogramm* as well³⁹⁹. 32 as it does in the most recent policy.³³ For the SPÖ, the topic is no longer up-to-date, but approaches to interpretations of historical events are elsewhere.³⁴

³⁹⁵ Suppanz W., *Österreichische Geschichtsbilder*, Cologne 1998. p.24.

³⁹⁶ Adler chose not to live in Austria after 1945 and was more prone and free to express more in the traditional line of Austrian social democracy. Friedrich Adler wrote: *The question* Are we Austrian? Or Are we German? Is a typically scholastic one, if it suppose a general antithesis without stating in which relation it is to be considered. For whoever is called upon to think dialectically, even in a small way, will in the first instance argue from the thesis of course we are both Austrian and German. Op. cit: Braunthal J., *The tragedy of Austria*, London 1948, p. 147. Of course Adler could freely claim what he did because he was an emigrant.

³⁹⁷ Ibidem, 154.

³⁹⁸ Berchtold K., *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868-1966*, Vienna 1967, p. 286,

³⁹⁹ Kadan A., Pelinka A., *Die Grundsatzprogramme der österreichischen Parteien. Dokumentation und Analyse*, St Pölten 1979, p. 184. The program from 1998 is available at the website of the Socialdemocratic Party of Austria: <https://www.spoe.at/das-spoe-partieprogramm/>

In order to get a better glimpse of the elites' point of view the work of William Bluhm comes in handy as during his Fulbright scholarship stay in Austria in the years 1965-1966 he managed to conduct around 100 interviews with politicians and party members of different levels. The information collected by Bluhm is invaluable for the topic in question. There is of course the problem of such interviews as a politician is more inclined to say what is expected of him or her rather than to speak about personal thoughts. Nevertheless, knowing those limitations, the sources can be treated accordingly.

The (former at the time) Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus when asked about the Austrian nation described it as a state nation but at the same time did not believe in the separateness of Austrian culture. *German is my mothertongue, Austria is my fatherland* he said⁴⁰⁰. The reasons for the creation of the Austrian nation were the result of the German oppression after the Anschluss in the years 1938-1945. He also insisted that the national consciousness could not be decreed it is a result of good policy (both economic and social). In everyday life Austrians want to distinguish themselves from the Germans who come as tourists to Austria, because being different makes it more attractive from the tourism point of view⁴⁰¹. The former vice-chancellor Hermann Withalm was similarly avoiding talking about the national consciousness as it was a waste of time. Only in action and integration of the masses (especially the working class). He believed that the fact that 95% of the population were ardent Austrians was the success of the policy of the coalition parties. There was little talk about what really constitutes an Austrian and the Austrian nation, the approach of the political elite of the conservatives seems to be utterly pragmatic. The definition of Austrian nationality is better to be left alone and purposely ambiguous.

The second group interviewed by Bluhm were the national party functionaries. They were the people who connected the leadership with the local party groups and activists, they were also significantly younger than the leaders – mostly men in their thirties. An unnamed member (A) of the general secretariat believed Austria to be something older that did not start in 1918 as the socialists believe⁴⁰². The Austrian nation was still in the making and once the process would be finished it would be a good weapon to trump over the socialist opposition (on a side note, he could not be more wrong – the socialists won the next four consecutive elections). Another party clerk (B) rejected the idea of Austrian nation and believed it to be a

⁴⁰⁰ Bluhm W., *Building an Austrian Nation. The political integration of a Western state*, New Haven, London 1973, p. 179.

⁴⁰¹ Ibidem, p. 182. At the time Germans constituted around 70% of tourists to Austria. By far the largest group.

⁴⁰² Ibidem 184-185.

political problem that needn't be touched⁴⁰³. He thought that the idea of Austrian nation was a folly used as an immunization against the Anschluss idea and that in the times they were living it was no longer necessary. The negative approach was explained by the fact that the person connected it with nationalism and the horrors it caused in Europe. The community of Austrians is born through everyday problem solving not through ideology. This remark was probably the only one in line with the mentality of the ÖVP leadership. On the other hand another younger employee of the secretariat (C) was an energetic supporter of the Austrianist idea. His understanding of Austrian consciousness was more modern though. He saw it as merger of the „black and red” traditions with liberal Catholicism and integration of workers and farmers as equally important. As the hallmark of new identity the neutrality of the Austrian state was mentioned. As a conservative he saw the neutrality as continuity of the “heart of Europe” and bridge-builder between European nations. Bluhm categorises this new and above party lines Austrianism as consensualist⁴⁰⁴. Bluhm also quantified this approach as predominant in the younger party members (among them Erhard Busek the future Chancellor). The emotional attachment of this generation of politicians to Austria was relatively strong.

The last group of interviewees came from the local and provincial party structures of the ÖVP. More grounded to their electorate a conservative representative in Salzburg emphasised the problems of the identification with Austria among older generations. Only the economic success and state viability was the glue that held these people together with the country. It was the good situation on the job market that decreased social tensions⁴⁰⁵. The conservative governor of Tirol also emphasised his regional identity alongside the Austrian one. The Tyroleans were an ethnic mix of people from the north and south, east and west – therefore Tirol has a distinct identity⁴⁰⁶. The official from Salzburg defined Austria as a permanent borderland. *Nowhere in this country there is a place that is further than 100km from a border.* It is natural that regions like Salzburg tend to lean towards big economic centres outside of the country (Munich in this case).

The socialist politicians were more outspoken about the German heritage in Austria. The mayor of Linz and upper Austrian provincial party chairman Ernst Koref writes in his

⁴⁰³ Ibidem, 185.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibidem, 188.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibidem, 192-193.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibidem, 194.

memoirs that he feels affinity towards his Germanness⁴⁰⁷. Adofl Schärf said in 1964 that there will always be a place for German heritage in Austria⁴⁰⁸. Bruno Kreisky, presumably in an interesting remark for the Polish reader, mentions German lands that are divided into four parts: West and East Germany, the lands east of the Oder-Neisse line and Austria. At the same time for Kreisky Austria is not purely a German country as it has Slavic and other influences⁴⁰⁹

Luckily for us also William Bluhm had the chance to interview Kreisky before his ascent to power. In the interview Kreisky said that for the SPÖ *Austria means the Republic*. The nation is defined by the form of government. In fact Kreisky said similar things as his conservative counterparts. The Austrian national identity is the result of the Anschluss, and the successful politics of the black-red coalition. The issue of Austrian national consciousness was of little importance for Kreisky⁴¹⁰. Another interviewee was Karl Czernetz a member of the parliament and a prominent ideologue of the SPÖ gave a rather non-ideological answer. For Czernetz the Austrian nation was a political one despite the fact that in Central Europe nations traditionally were understood as cultural constructs. But most of the Austrian population surely did not think in those terms – therefore the issue was useless⁴¹¹.

A member of the lower level of socialist party apparatus (D) believed that Austrians were a state nation since 1945. The commitment to the state and to the constitutional rules of the republic preceded the development of a cultural consciousness. An Austrian cultural nation was still in the making and was based on the rejection of being German⁴¹². Another young party member (E) rejected the idea of language constituting a nation. He included Goethe as his heritage but on the same level as Dante, he mentions that Mozart was certainly Austrian and even Beethoven, despite being born in Bonn, became Austrian⁴¹³. On the other hand a young socialist ideologue (F) rejected the notion of Austrians as a cultural nation because of the issue of common language with Germans. In his mind there was no difference

⁴⁰⁷ Koref E., *Die Gezeiten meines Lebens*, Wien 1980. This opinion is stressed out throughout the memoirs.

⁴⁰⁸ Pfeifer H., *Werden und Wesen der Republik Österreich*, Wien 1967, p. 88

⁴⁰⁹ Üblagger R., *Die nationalen Traditionen der österreichische Sozialdemokratie* [in:] Mölzer A., (ed.) *Österreich und die deutsche Nation*, Graz 1985 p. 230.

⁴¹⁰ Bluhm W., *Building an Austrian Nation. The political integration of a Western state*, New Haven, London 1973, p. 180.

⁴¹¹ Ibidem, p. 180-181.

⁴¹² Ibidem, p. 188-189.

⁴¹³ Ibidem, p. 189.

between Austrian and German literature, and they should be treated as one. National consciousness is nevertheless of little importance and to be used as a political tool⁴¹⁴.

Going down on the regional level a socialist governor from Tirol spoke of ethnic similarities with Bavarians as they come from the same Bayuvar tribe (Bayuvarischer Stamm). *We have a common language with the Germans. But American are never thought of as English are they? Just so in Austria we are not German.* Continuing the Stamm topic: *All Austrians faw west as the Arlberg are Bayuvaren. The Voralbergers are Alemannen.* A press officer of the local government of Voralberg also named the people of this land as *Alemannen*⁴¹⁵. South Tyrol (which is a German-speaking part of Italy) was a purely German territory. After that remark the governor corrected himself and spoke of a purely Austrian-Tyrolean character of South Tyrol.

Bluhm mentions dozens of other interviews which mainly repeat what already has been written above but the most interesting remarks need to be addressed here. For instance a respondent from Burgenland (a land with mixed Slavic and Hungarian influences) was sceptical of an idea of an Austrian cultural nation and didn't need it⁴¹⁶. Dr Hans Huebmer, a press officer in Voralberg local government said that in his heart there are three loyalties: *Heimat Voralberg, Staat Österreich, Deutsche Kultur*⁴¹⁷. What was prevalent in the responses of the local officials was the emphasis on the locality and the differences between regions (Tirol vs east Austria etc.) At the same time some socialist local party members from Innsbruck were against the politics of strengthening local identities. *We are Austrians, we must build Austria, or we will be sucked up by the Germans. We require an Austrian consciousness in order not the be taken economically by the Germans.* It is hard to shun the impression that the socialists are only sceptical about the regional identity policies because it is the domain of conservatives and a way to gain influence in the regions⁴¹⁸.

The image produced both by the analysis of the party programmes as well as the interviews show a rather pragmatic if not cynical approach towards Austrian national identity. There is little space for ideology. Only in the first years after 1945 some part of the conservative camp presented a radical anti-German stance (likes of Missong or Hurdes) but

⁴¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 191-192.

⁴¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 193-194.

⁴¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 198.

⁴¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 198.

⁴¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 201. Interestingly the same person interviewed about the issue of the South Tirol almost called the inhabitants of this region Germans and corrected himself and said Austrians.

they had to give way to more consensual politicians in the beginning of the 50'ties. The party members tend to be proud of the economic, social and civic achievements of the II Austrian Republic regardless of party affiliation. In fact there is hardly any traceable difference between young generations of conservatives and socialists. The problem of Austrian national-identity is better to be avoided as it could cause problems. There is some eagerness to use the concept in political rivalry among the younger generations of politicians. For Bluhm this is the moment when the Austrian nation is complete. This would in fact correspond with Hrochs phase C of nation-making: the establishment of political divisions within a consensus of the national idea. The concept of Austria as a cultural nation does not find much footing in the local structures and is seen as divisive. The growing consensus in the 60ties in Austria was that the nation has to be treated as a state-nation, a political nation of the Western type. Such look the political elites that introduced nation-building policies in Austria. This would be the best place to present a selection of those policies.

3.2.1 The policies of nation-making

Now that the mentality and *Weltanschauung* has been presented the next step is to present how those political elites used the institutions of the Austrian state in order to construct the Austrian nation. Peter Thaler believes that the important precondition for the successful employment of the nation building processes was the centralisation of decision making in the hands of party elites⁴¹⁹. The two dominant parties governed the country mostly together in grand coalitions that represented more than 80% of the Austrian voters, and therefore had very strong democratic legitimacy. The fact that the Austrian state also nationalised many industries after 1945 only strengthened the importance of political elites and their spheres of influence. As seen in the examples above it was the conservative camp that led the identity politics in the II Austrian Republic. The socialists either had problems with their pan-German traditions or decided to remain silent on the matter. The fact that the communist politician Ernst Fischer adopted much of the conservative images only helped the conservatives. The KPÖ did not play a vital role and was soon marginalised politically; nevertheless it was a part of the meta-political consensus of the post-war decade before Austria became a neutral state. Among the institutional means of nation formation Thaler mentions three: judicial, educational and deligitimization⁴²⁰. To these I would also add the inventing of traditions in the

⁴¹⁹ Thaler P., *The Ambivalence of Identity*, West Lafayette 2000, p. 111.

⁴²⁰ Ibidem, p. 119, 124, 132.

spirit of Eric Hobsbawm. Of those four policies the most important is the education policy and therefore it needs to be examined in detail.

The Austrian invented tradition of the biggest prominence is 26th of October 1955 which commemorates the introduction of the neutrality. The Declaration of Neutrality was a declaration by the Austrian Parliament declaring the country permanently neutral as a constitutional act. The foreign troops of the Soviet Union, USA, UK and France left Austria on 25 October 1955. In legal terms the neutrality is both part of international as well as Austrian constitutional law. The holiday is simply called *Nationalfeiertag* – The National Celebration Day. Other state introduced holidays follow the Catholic calendar with Christmas and Easter. Also the international Workers Day is celebrated on the 1st of May. It is clear that the *Nationalfeiertag* is the only tradition that was invented and was a part of nation building. It also holds the word “nation” in it indicating who the celebration is addressing (the Austrian Republic in this case. Usually the day contain several official actions which include the Federal President and the Federal Minister for Defense attending a Mass on the Heldenplatz. Then the Federal President followed by the Federal Government lay wreaths at the tomb of the unknown soldier in the Crypt of the outer Burgtor (the city gate, also known as the Heldentor – the gate of heroes). Other official celebrations include a festive meeting of the Council of Ministers; the government also attends a concert of classical music in the State Opera. 26th of October is also the day when the new recruits to the Austrian army are sworn in. It is clear that the celebration of the National Day use actions of typical national repertoire. Especially the Gate of Heroes, which plays the role of a monument of the “Unknown soldier”. The gate saw heavy fighting during the siege of Vienna in 1683. The crypt located under the gate contains engravings commemorating soldiers of both World Wars. It says: *The heroes of the World Wars fell under the free sky, and under free sky they shall be honoured*. The crypt also commemorated the fallen members of the Nazi organisation SA but this was changed after 1945. In 1965 the Austrian government decided to honour the victims of the Nazi regime who resisted it – *in fight for Austrian freedom*. Next to the monument there is also a smaller one commemorating police officers and gendarmes on duty. The memorial also holds books with the names of fallen soldiers, which sparks controversy as some of them were found to be war criminals.

It is interesting that both in the collective memory and in state policy it was not 15th of May 1955 – the signing of the State Treaty, which granted Austrian sovereignty but the 26th of October which was the final act of regaining sovereignty. Until the year 1965 the

Nationalfeiertag was known as the Day of the Flag. On the decennary of the Declaration of Neutrality thus eliminating the Day of the Flag from the repertoire of national holidays, it was not moved to another day. In a survey asking since when is Austria free 87% respondents named the year 1955, and not the end of the II World War in 1945⁴²¹. The first decade after 1945 is seen as a prolonged occupation that started in 1938 with the Anschluss. As an Austrian historian Olivier Rathkolb recalls – until the early 60ties in was the departure of Allied troops that constituted the bulk of national celebrations. Only later the shift changed to the underlining of the Declaration of Neutrality. Neutrality was seen as an important and constructive element in the nation-building process with peaceful and calm patriotism as Chancellor Bruno Kreisky spoke in his last speech in the Austrian Parliament in 1983⁴²².

While thousands of people were in the streets to witness the important events of the year 1955 the anniversaries never attracted many. In 1965 the tenth anniversary of the signing of the State Treaty the new celebration day was established. The Ministry of Education prepared special events. The text of the State Treaty was distributed to pupils and students. The school radio system broadcasted speeches by Karl Renner and Julius Raab (the *Staatsvertragskanzler* – “Chancellor of the State Treaty”). The official narrative supported the idea of the long occupation of the years 1938 – 1955. Peter Utgaard quotes two speeches made by two teachers G. Rolletschek and E. Hubner. They are worth citing: ... *a small people, which unlike its great German neighbour – to whose credit has a genial sense for planning and order - has rather more of an understanding for affable nonchalance and comfortable routine, that this small people achieved the unbelievable and solved problems - which even most of the victorious powers had failed to solve after the First World War is remarkable. In an inconspicuous and more modest form we Austrians experienced something similar to the rebirth of the Old Egyptian Empire in the years before the State Treaty. When the people and the government avoided disintegration and chaos, when the parties, forgetting old feuds, worked together harmoniously in legislation and rebuilding. But the most beautiful fruit from these years full of privation was a newly awakened love of Heimat without pathos and conceit, a new openness of the soul for the magic of the landscape and for the innate, unmistakable uniqueness of Austrian art and culture*⁴²³.

⁴²¹ Rathkolb O., *The Paradoxical Republic*, New York, Oxford 2010, p. 8.

⁴²² Ibidem, p. 8.

⁴²³ Rolletschek G., *Festrede zur zehnjährigen Wiederkehr der Untersreibung des österreichischen Staatsvertrages*, op cit. Utgaard P., p. 150.

Another speech by Edeltraude Hubner stated: *the troops of the victorious powers, who in the fight against Hitler's Germany also had become the liberators of Austria, were – during the then years of hope and disappointment – seen more and more as bothersome strangers. Who does not still think of the many seized factories and agricultural enterprises, of the chicanery of the checkpoints, of the four in the jeep, or of the identification cards? In a solemn declaration by the Allies still during the war, the re-establishment of a fully free and independent Austria had been decreed. Based on its experiences, what could Austria, already free and sovereign in 1945, have accomplished for world peace. Now after the State Treaty our red-white-red flag no longer has to flutter modestly next to the flags of the great four; it can be the proud symbol of our national will. It can wave above a state whose will to freedom and consciousness of cultural mission are documented by the reopening of the State Opera on 5th of November 1955 with Fidelio*⁴²⁴.

This is especially evident in the celebrations prepared for the 50th anniversary of the State Treaty and Neutrality in 2005. It was also connected with the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the end of the II World War and the 10th anniversary of Austria joining the European Union. While the events prepared sparked interest of several hundred thousand people in the whole country (for a Vienna which has around 1.7 million inhabitants the result has to be seen as a moderate failure) the events were hijacked by the political elites⁴²⁵. Bischof writes that almost all commemorations of the year 2005 were state imposed. *The elites gathered solemnly and in exclusivity in Parliament, the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Upper Belvedere Palace in the age-old tradition of political institutions operating from the top down, indicating that the patronizing –Josephinism” is alive and well. Socialist President Heinz Fischer stressed the importance of Allied liberation in a Festakt in Parliament, where the founding of the Second Austrian Republic on April 27, 1945, was commemorated. The 60th anniversary of the liberation of the Mauthausen concentration camp in early May gave an opportunity to demonstrate a bipartisan awareness of war crimes committed by Austrians during World War II in their midst and the demonstration of a dutifully adequate holocaust memory. The culmination of the 60th anniversary of the State Treaty on May 15, 1955, when the crème de la*

⁴²⁴ Hubner E., *Festrede zum Nationalfeireteg am 25. Oktober 1965*, op cit. Utgaard P., p. 151.

⁴²⁵ Many more people went to museums for special exhibitions which included the original of the State Treaty. See: Bischof G., *The Politics of History in Austria*, it is a transcript of the lecture delivered by Bischof at the Harvard University on the 7th of April 2006. The whole text can be read online: <https://sites.fas.harvard.edu/~ces/conferences/Austria/Bischof.pdf>, Access: 16.05.2019.

crème of Austrian elites gathered by invitation only in the Belvedere [...] Americans love their Civil War battle reenactments, Austrians the restaging of grand diplomatic events. The traditional iconography of state treaty memorial events was closely adhered to. The historic scene on the Belvedere balcony was restaged, as had been done during most previous "found" State Treaty anniversary ever since 1965 with the visiting foreign ministers of the signatory powers. The governing elites hoped to attract the masses to the Belvedere gardens with an Austropop concert. Rather than tens of thousands of ecstatic Austrians showing up like on the historic May 15, 1955, only thousands came in 2005⁴²⁶. The fact that most people participated in cultural events and not in the main celebrations of the most important National Holiday speak volumes about either the weakness of the politic of memory conducted by the Austrian state and elites or about the total *desinteressement* in neutrality as a nation-building base. The Declaration of Neutrality lost its integrative role after the end of the Cold War and especially after Austria joined the European Union in 1995 – which is a direct breach of the principle of neutrality. It is one of the reasons why Switzerland does not agree to join the EU. With comparison to Polish state holidays the Austrian National Day seems pretty bleak. Poland celebrates the 3rd May Constitution and Independence Day on the 11th of November. While the first celebration day is turned mostly into a grilling holiday the second is treated solemnly and the participation in official events is usually very high. The Independence Day and the Declaration of Neutrality Day both adhere to sovereignty of a state and yet one creates much more emotional attachment than the other. Perhaps the very idea of neutrality lost its traction and response among the general Austrian population, neutrality itself is not a perquisite for sovereignty and its essence is void. The influence of politics of memory is limited and sparks little reaction.

Another state driven policy is the use of symbols. Aside for the flag and the coat of arms and the anthem – it is money that is one of the vital symbolic expressions of the state. Coins and banknotes are used on everyday basis and guarantee high exposure of symbols to the general public. In 1945, the Allies introduced notes in denominations of 50 groschen, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 25, 50, 100 and 1,000 schilling. The Austrian Nationalbank also introduced notes in 1945, in denominations of 10, 20, 100 and 1,000 schilling. With the banknote reform of 1947, new notes were issued in denominations of 5, 10, 20, 50, 100 and 1,000 schilling. Until 1957, the first 500 schilling banknote was issued and the 5 and 10 schilling notes were replaced by coins. However, although 20 schilling coins were issued from 1980, the 20 schilling note continued to be produced, with 5,000 schilling notes added in 1988. Austria adopted the euro

⁴²⁶ Ibidem. Bischof also highlights the fact that Austrian commemoration events are so strongly influenced by the state that there are cases of cherry picking historians that partake in discussions. Even if historians are not chosen they do know what they are supposed to say and what they should not.

as currency in the 1st of January 1999. The images on the groschen and schilling as well as euro coins show a certain pattern. Most groschen use the image of the Austrian coat of arms – a black eagle with a sickle and hammer in its claws. The schilling coins include images of the edelweiss mountain flower, a horse riding figure resembling Prinz Eugen statue from the Heldenplatz, a symbolic representation of nine Austrian provinces, and the Austrian eagle. Of those four policies the most important is the education policy and therefore it needs to be examined in detail. The banknotes focus on commemorating distinguished figures of art, culture, philosophy and sciences. The figures were accompanied by a corresponding building on the reverse of the banknote. On the 20 schilling note the painter Moriz Daffinger is paired with the Albertina museum that is the most prestigious painting gallery in Austria. The 50 schilling note is host to Sigmund Freud and the Josephinum – a medical Academy. 100 schilling shows the economist of the Austrian school Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, and the Austrian Academy of Sciences. 500 schilling note is a showcase of architecture with Otto Wagner and one of his architectural creations – the modernist Post Office Service Bank building. The 1000 note is reserved for Erwin Schrödinger, a Nobel Prize winner in physics and the University of Vienna. The highest value of the schilling – 5000 could not show anyone else as the composer Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and the Viennese State Opera. In 1997 new editions of the 500 and 1000 notes included a woman Rosa Mayreder – a feminist and painter and Karl Landsteiner a biologist responsible for distinguishing the blood types. The reverses of the banknotes showed the same persons. It is clear that the Austrian symbolism focuses on scientific achievements and culture. The euro coins show continuity with the groschen and schilling showing alpine flowers of edelweiss, gentian and primrose. The coins continue with Austrian architecture showcasing the landmarks of St. Stephen cathedral, Belvedere Palace and the Secession Hall. The only two people to be shown on the Austrian euro coins are Bertha von Suttner – a pacifist and (of course) Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. Bertha von Suttner is on the 2 euro coin emphasising the importance of peace in Austrian European policy. What is striking in the images used on coins and banknotes is their ideological emptiness. Aside for the two female figures that represent feminism and emancipation of women as well as pacifism there is hardly any political statement included in the state money. Perhaps the lack of ideology is a statement in itself. The distancing and reluctance in making any sharp ideological decisions regarding national symbols resembles the mentality of the political elites. Austria was to be the land of culture and scientific achievements – the imperial symbols were gone. No freedom fighters and resistance members or victims of the Nazi persecution were included in the coins, no generals or national heroes

like Andreas Hofer were chosen to be a part of Austrian coins and banknotes. The Polish złoty hosts a set of rulers: dukes and kings highlighting the continuity of the Polish statehood, there is no such message in the Austrian case. The deliberate refusal to use national heroes was a pragmatic choice in order to avoid any controversies. On the one hand such selection limits the effects of creating national symbols but at the same time shifts the focus on nature, art and sciences – a softer version of nation building.

For Peter Thaler the most important state-driven policies of nation construction are the judicial instruments of nation making. He mentions them even before education (to which I would give the precedence in that matter). Even despite the fact that Thaler eventually believes that judicial instruments have an indirect influence – because they prevent certain actions solely because of fear of being persecuted or simply because of administrative problems that one can have when trying to break existing laws. There wrote that because *Austrian nation-building lay in opposition to an already existing modern national identity, which was to be substituted with a new sense of self [...] the state and its institutional capabilities provided crucial support for a nation-building process that confronted an alternative concept of identity*⁴²⁷. The first trace of legal anti-Germanness was imposed by the Allied occupation forces. Because of their insistence the State Treaty included the following passages:

Article 4. Prohibition of Anschluss

1. The Allied and Associated Powers declare that political or economic union between Austria and Germany is prohibited. Austria fully recognizes its responsibilities in this matter and shall not enter into political or economic union with Germany in any form whatsoever.

2. In order to prevent such union Austria shall not conclude any agreement with Germany, nor do any act, nor take any measures likely, directly or indirectly, to promote political or economic union with Germany, or to impair its territorial integrity or political or economic independence. Austria further undertakes to prevent within its territory any act likely, directly or indirectly, to promote such union and shall prevent the existence, resurgence and activities of

⁴²⁷ Thaler P., *The Ambivalence of Identity*, West Lafayette 2000, p. 119.

*any organisations having as their aim political or economic union with Germany, and pan-German propaganda in favour of union with Germany*⁴²⁸.

The separation from Germany was introduced on many levels. All people that possessed the citizenship of Germany were to leave Austria under Allied supervision. This included the Sudetendeutsche, who were previously part of the Habsburg Empire. The policy of expulsion was then preceded by internal Austrian legislation that interdicted the usage of the name “German” in any association or club. At the same time any organisation that even implied that there is a German ethnicity in Austria or that there are ethnic connection between Austria and West Germany were banned from operating⁴²⁹. The courts in Austria when confronted with organisations that tried to register themselves or re-establish themselves after the war prevented these actions on the premise that such action would be a violation of the State Treaty. The attempt to register an association of German *Burgenländers* met with the judicial response that the *national populace of the independent Republic of Austrian consists of Austria*⁴³⁰. It has to be mentioned that only Germans could not register their organisation in the aforementioned fashion – other ethnic groups and minorities like Croats, Slovenes, and Hungarians had no problems. It was just the fact that the sole existence of German ethnicity in Austria could threaten the integrity of the new nation, as the majority of the population could identify with German (or mixed German) ethnicity. So one could not call himself a German Carinthian but Slovenian Carinthians were accepted by the state⁴³¹. Ethnicity was considered and equated with ideology and as a concept it was supposed to be rooted out.

There is one more minor and yet interesting tool of nation making. During its accession to the European Union, Austria secured 23 term in Austrian German that were to be legally used in all EU official documents. The accession protocol included the clause: *The specific Austrian terms of the German language contained in the Austrian legal order and listed in the Annex to this Protocol shall have the same status and may be used with the same legal effect as the corresponding terms used in Germany listed in that Annex.* The Annex

⁴²⁸ The whole text of the *STATE TREATY FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC AUSTRIA. SIGNED AT VIENNA, ON 15 MAY 1955* can be read online: <https://www.dipublico.org/100823/state-treaty-with-annexes-and-maps-for-the-re-establish%C2%ADment-of-an-independent-and-democratic-austria-signed-at-vienna-on-15-may-1955/>

⁴²⁹ Thaler P., *The Ambivalence of Identity*, West Lafayette 2000 p. 121.

⁴³⁰ Ibidem, 122.

⁴³¹ The court ruling on such case was passed on 21st of April 1988. See Ibidem p. 122-123. However at that point of time it was possible to register an association of German-speaking Carinthians, only the appeal to German ethnicity was still forbidden.

contains 23 terms. Austrian German is the only pluricentric language that is recognised not only by the EU but also International Law⁴³².

Another issue that will not be discussed here in detail are other means of state nation building. One significant aspect is represented by sports. In the Austrian case it were the winter-sports, especially ski related (like ski-jumping) that helped to create positive images and a community feeling at the same time a clear demarcation from the biggest rival of Austria – Germany. Austria devoted substantial resources in order to create a solid support for winter sports and brand them as typical Austrian territory⁴³³. The assessment of how influential sport was in nation making is impossible. With certainty one could say that it did contribute to some extent. The generous spending of the Austrian state only supports that theory. The neo-tribal integrative role of sports is a tool of nation making and Austria was no exception.

3.2.2 Education policies of nation-building

Who controls the past, controls also the future – that cynical quote from the George Orwell's *Year 1984* is a fine example of how twisted the understanding of the role of historiography in the XX century had become. History and its scribes were drawn into the vortex of various ideologies, which served as glasses through which the past was seen. The ideologies or strong ideas dictated the content of history books. Nationalisms, fascism or communism created their own versions and interpretations of history. Some heroes and events were elevated and revered and some were cast aside. The selective treatment of history is however not the domain of totalitarian systems. Even democracies are not free from these accusations. Any system or political regime has its agenda that is found also in history books, and especially in schoolbooks.

⁴³² For the text of the Accession Treaty of the Republic of Austria to the European Union see: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:1994:241:TOC>, Access: 16.05.2019.

For a linguistic analysis of the 23 legal terms see: Markhardt H., *Das Österreicherische Deutsch im Rahmen der EU*, Frankfurt am Main, Wien 2005.

Another example of a pluricentric language is Serbo-Croatian but it is not recognised as such by law. Perhaps after the accession of Serbia to the EU it will be another example.

⁴³³ More on the topic see: Hack Ch., *Alpiner Skisport und die Erfindung der Österreichischen Nation 1945 – 1964*, Doctor thesis defended at the Karl-Franzes University of Graz, 2013.

In 1945 one of the biggest conflicts in world history was just fading and the scale of the Second World War was unprecedented. At this very time Austria found itself in a very peculiar position. Defeated and occupied by allied forces it was also regarded as the first victim of German aggression and the alpine republic was recreated as an independent state. The Austrian elites, very much like after the end of the Great War, were only passive actors of the changes. However they did not have to construct the state from scratch, and they already had some experience in the reconstruction of state institutions. Between the years 1918 and 1945 Austria changed its forms of government several times: from a hereditary monarchy it transformed into the First Republic, which in turn was overthrown by a fascist regime of Engelbert Dolfuss. The Austrofascist regime had to give way to the strength of the Wehrmacht, which took over Austria without a shot and incorporated Austria as *Ostmark* directly into the Third Reich. Eight years later this time under the occupation and supervision of the victorious allies Austria became a republic once more. The Second Austrian Republic was built by the very same people who remembered the times of Franz Joseph and its administration. While the systems changed the elites remained the same. The new goals for the reborn republic were set and one of the most prominent of all was to convince the general public that they constitute an Austrian nation. This might come as quite a surprise as the provisional government had to tackle issues and problems like the shortages of food, medicine and apartments. Yet, as Peter Utgaard ascertains, for the survival of the state it was essential for the survival of the new state to create a new political, social and cultural identity that would be clearly distinguishable from the German one. In that way a basis for negotiations with the Allies would be solidified and in the long run the longevity of the state would be secured.⁴³⁴ The Allies were also interested in the formation of such national identity, which was just putting to motion the texts of the Moscow Declaration of 1943 as well as the Proclamation of the 27th of April 1945 which nullified the Anschluss. The Austrian political elites set on the course of nation building. Because the socialists were rather reluctant and distanced towards the idea of an Austrian nation it was the conservatives that played the dominant role. The socialists focused mainly on economic issues and left education in the hands of the conservatives. Already during the Dolfuss and Schuschnigg regime the conservatives started to implement elements of Austrian identity to the schoolbooks. The problem was that the Austrian identity was defined as a part of a broader German one.

434 Utgaard P., *Remembering and forgetting Nazism. Education, national identity and the victim myth in postwar Austria*, New York 2003 p. 25.

*Whoever is a good Austrian is also a good German*⁴³⁵ .. The sentence from a children's book is a perfect exemplification of the weak attempts to form an Austrian identity before 1945, nevertheless it was an attempt and has to be noted. The children's book was unintentionally inciting German patriotism and Austria was presented on a comparable level with Saxony or Bavaria (as a German region). Yet the *Ständestaat* propaganda emphasised the importance of locality and values connected to the little motherlands, the natural beauty of the regions: the true Austrian Heimat. Quite possibly it was the weakness of the Austro-fascist propaganda in schools and the wide spread acceptance of the German idea that enabled the Nazis to make an easy take over the schooling system in Austria after the Anschluss. Of course the racist and Nazi propaganda elements were added to the school curriculum but the history of Austria did not need to be rewritten completely. The schooling system quickly was equated with the one functioning in the Third Reich. The Nazis that were persecuted during the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg regimes were given positions in the *Ostmark* administration. Not many clerks were needed to come from Germany to Austria as the numbers of Austrian Nazis were sufficient the *Gleichschaltung* was an easy task.

Shortly after the II World War the main goal was to reverse the effects of the *Gleichschaltung*. Thanks to a pragmatic approach and the pressure from the occupying Allied forces the Austrian elites were quick to reach an agreement. It has to be mentioned that Austria had limited sovereignty at the time and officials from the public administration as well as the system of education was under Allied supervision. Thanks to a surprising unity of thought between the Austrian conservatives and the communist politician Ernst Fischer, the socialists had no other choice as to succumb to the ideas that were not so popular among them.

Schools were organised in the same fashion as in the time of the I Republic (which in turn were based on the old imperial system). The Allies also supported the reestablishment of the school system in Austria. The main goals of the Allied powers were: denazification and upbringing of the youth in the spirit of democratic values⁴³⁶. The denazification process was treated by the Allies rather personally – people involved in the Nazi movement and party were banned from teaching in the first years of the II Republic. This caused some problems as around 50-60% of teachers were either members of the NSDAP or in one way or another involved in the Nazi regime. This situation only weakened the denazification process in schools. Another problem was caused by the lack of coordination between the Allies in

435 *Mein Vaterland, mein Österreich*, Vienna 1935, p. 5.

436 Engelbrecht H., *Geschichte des österreichischen Bildungswesens. Band 5*, Vienna 1988, p. 399.

various occupation zones. One thing however was universally agreed upon: to get rid of the Nazi-era school books. Already in 1948 first makeshift schoolbooks were published. They focused on democratic values and emphasised the independence of Austrian culture⁴³⁷. In the same year the Allied censorship of Nazi schoolbooks was partially lifted: with the exception of geography and history. In chaotic actions books from the US were brought and translated into German. It were the Americans who most of pressured for the creation of a new, positive identity that would be rooted in democratic values. It were the Americans who proposed to get rid of all mentions of Germannes from the teaching programmes and pushed to replace it with Austriannes⁴³⁸. It was no easy task and problems were plenty. There was a shortage of teaching material, the numbers of former Nazis in the school system were too high, there as a need for a swift creation of a new teaching programme and re-education of the people schooled in the years 1938-1945. The person who was responsible for those changes was Ernst Fischer – a communist activist. In the provisional government of Karl Renner it was Fischer who supervised the Ministry of Information. Fischer quickly accepted the conservative viewpoints on Austrianist exceptionalism. He spoke: *we are a nation of unique history and culture. I am aware that not all in our past and present is praiseworthy, but we can still present our contributions to the world culture. It is worth highlighting. I do not deny that we are proud of Haydn and Mozart, Schubert and Bruckner, Grillparzer, Raimund and Nestroy. We are proud of our magnificent architects, who created the Cathedral of St.Stephen, the Karlskirche or the Belvedere. We are proud of our peasant leader and our Viennese, we are proud of the battles and achievements of the Austrian working class*⁴³⁹. In this very inclusive message the thing that is string the most is how little is mentioned about both peasants and the working class. Fischer spoke as if he were a conservative focusing on artists from the imperial times. In the background of this scenery the idea of Austrians as a *Kulturnation* is eminent. It is here that the national myth of Austrians as a nation of high culture is born. It is exactly history and culture that is the main focus of the communist Fischer. The politics of consensus reached a high point at that moment. Thanks to Fischer the dominant narratives of the conservative camp made through to the school system.

Ernst Fischer was not occupying the position of the minister of education for long. With the electoral failure of the Austrian Communist Party, he was replaced by the

437 Ibidem, p. 404.

438 Utgaard P., *Remembering and forgetting Nazism. Education, national identity and the victim myth in postwar Austria*, New York 2003 p. 33.

439 Op cit. Utgaard P., *Remembering and forgetting Nazism. Education, national identity and the victim myth in postwar Austria*, New York 2003.p. 33.

representative of the triumphant conservatives – Felix Hurdes. It was Hurdes who had the biggest influence in shaping the teaching programme. His personal beliefs and experiences created the basis for the idea of the new Austrian nation. Hurdes was a prisoner of the Dachau and Mauthausen concentration camps and managed to survive the times of the II World War. His experience developed a staunch anti-German sentiment. He was not only an enemy of Germany as a state but *Gemrmannes (Deutschum)* in general. He wanted Austria to be the antithesis of Germany and the radical cutting of Germany was supposed to create unconditional Austrians. The medieval traditions, baroque culture and Catholicism were the biggest differentiates from Germany. Some socialdemocrats, like Friedrich Adler opposed the ideas but for the greater good they have toned down their criticism.

In his first days in office Hurdes strove to get rid of everything that was un-Austrian. Teachers were supposed to promote Austropatriotism that was rooted in democratic values and rejected racism. The teaching programme prepared under Hurdes obliged the teachers to strengthening the love of the local fatherlands (*Heimat*) through folk tales, poems and songs. Older pupils should have read more Austrian authors, who praised the beauty of Austria.

The Hurdes teaching programme is also an example of postimperial (postcolonial?) mentality. It mentions the special role that Austria played in Central and Eastern Europe. The unique Austrian burden was to spread Western civilisation into the smaller countries in the region⁴⁴⁰. This image of Austria strengthened the main narrative that presented Austrians as the nation of high culture, a culture higher than the ones of its neighbours. At the same time it deprived the states of Central Europe of their connection to the Western civilisation. The new divisions of the Cold War era only strengthened those points of views.

Aside for the preparation of the new programme Hurdes also introduced additional civic classes that focused on enumerating the achievements of Austria and Austrians. The stark anti-German sentiment of Hurdes led to the replacement of the German language classes (the ones that teach literature, grammar etc.) with the “language of the lesson” *Unterrichtsschprache*. The change was made solely to exclude the word German from the school schedules. In a joking manner the “language of the lesson” was nicknamed *Hurdestani*. This rather absurd idea did not take hold for too long, a reform of 1952 that was tailored to accommodate the language needs of the minorities (Hungarian, Slovenian etc.) changed the

440 For postcolonial perspectives on the Habsburg Empire see: Feichtinger J., *Habsburg postcolonial : Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis*, Innsbruck, Vienna 2003.

name into a strangely sounding *Deutsche Unterrichtssprache*. It was only in 1955 that the simple name *Deutsch* returned. Another changes included the abandonment of the German font (*Deutsche Normalschrift*) and reintroduction of the Holy Cross to the classrooms to strengthen the bond between Austria and Catholicism.

The eagerness and stubbornness of Felix Hurdes may seem meticulous and a tad grotesque but it is true that two years after end of the II World War the young generations were exposed to Austrianist ideas at school. The pupils read poems about the beauty of the Austrian Alps and the heroism or ingenuity of historical figures. Hurdes' actions were supposed to be temporary but as in many cases the temporary turned out to be quite long lasting. Another example of this rule is the German constitution - *Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* that was enacted under Allied supervision in 1949 and operates till this day. Hurdes created a canon of ideas and narratives that influenced several generations to come. The Austropatriotism, the underlining of the importance of high culture and the beauty of the *Heimat* resonate till this day. Now that the reasons behind creating new schoolbooks are known the next step is to analyse the textbooks themselves.

3.2.3. Textbook analysis

Textbooks are by far the most generous sources to study. The youth is exposed to them for a significant part of their lives and are obliged to do so by the state it is mass activity that encompasses a majority of the society. This does not mean that schoolbooks are the only source of knowledge about history and the surrounding world. The monopoly of the schoolbooks is often broken by the media, press articles, television programmes, movies, computer games, internet blogs and YouTube videos. Yet only schoolbooks are so rigorously and meticulously checked in order to present objective facts. The task of the textbooks is and *in extenso* the whole schooling system is not only to transfer knowledge but also to bring up the young generations. At the same time the schoolbooks are the only source of said knowledge that is used on mass scale with a clear target group and with clear teaching methods. Despite all that efforts made by the state it is near impossible to measure the influence that textbooks have on the future opinions and state of knowledge of pupils. With all those problems stacking up why is it worth to investigate the schoolbooks? They are a generous source because of a different factor. The schoolbook is the perfect source for investigating the representation of the official, state and institutional vision of history. In

theory the schoolbook represents what the society wants to teach and which values it holds dear and in high esteem to pass them on to future generations⁴⁴¹. The textbooks are an expression of the expectations that the older generations lays upon the younger.

There is no consistent theory on school textbook analysis. One can only use indirect tools. I have decided to use the methods of discourse and image analysis in my inquiry. In this case I will be analysing the texts and images from the most important Austrian history textbooks. The first step would be contextual analysis: who wrote the text, who is the predicted recipient and in what circumstances the text was created. To be more specific the questions about the teaching programme that served as guidelines for textbook creation need to be asked. When was the textbook published? Are there new editions? If yes than what changes were made in comparison with the older versions? The contextual analysis allows reaching the basics of the construction of the historical narrative. The next step would be to conduct an objective, systematic and qualitative description of the contents and information transfer. Then the contents of the text needs to be reduced to the most important signifiers, most common words, topics and the dominant grammatical and semantic forms. The point of reference will be linked to the main narrative that appears in the textbooks. Additionally the analysis will also include the purposeful omissions and gaps in the edifice of the text. These are called – significant omissions because they too, through their omissions create signifiers in the narrative.

A more detailed analysis will be conducted on four levels:

1. The language level will allow to determine what words and language constructions have been used to describe Austria and Austrians. Are these constructions active or passive? Are personalizations or anonymities used in the text? What adjectives and adverbs do you use and what metaphors are used in the text?
2. Mixed level: what diagrams and statistics, and any other mixed forms (text and image) are used. What is the purpose of their use?
3. Visual level: what images are used? Are they just an illustration or are they with commentary? What emotions does the image evoke? Is the image relevant to the text at which it appeared?

441 This applies of course to the democratic state with rule of law.

4. The level of science and didactics: is the situation presented adequate to reality, whether the subject is presented objectively or subjectively⁴⁴²?

The main axis of the analysis will focus on the crucial events that constitute the myths of the establishment of the Austrian nation. While some lean back on history and reach as far as medieval times, it was the events of the XXth century that prove vital for the sake of this research. How the discourse was constructed around issues like: National Socialism (who were the perpetrators, and who the victims?) the Anschluss (how is it presented, is the opposition towards the Anschluss presented in the textbook?), World War II (how is the conflict presented? Is the focus laid on the military endeavours or the occupation terror and genocide mentioned?), the Holocaust (is it presented separately from the topic of World War II, are Austrians presented as perpetrators or victims?) etc.

By far the most important schoolbook in postwar Austria was *Zeiten, Völker, Kulturen* (ZVK). For decades till the mid-seventies it was almost exclusively used as the only textbook⁴⁴³! The most important for these considerations history of the XXth century was taught in the fourth class of the main school (Hauptschule). Pupils were at the age of 14-15 and it was their first contact with the topic of World War II and National Socialism in their education. The state monopoly on history textbook publishing made the ZVK a convenient source for analysis. The schoolbook was authored by Franz Berger, Herman Schnell, Edith Löbenstein and Klemens Zens and was first published in 1957 – a whole seven years after the end of World War II. Before that date prewar school plans were used and supplemented with the materials provided by the Allies *Erziehungsdirektorium der Alliierten Kommission für Österreich* (Directorate of Education of the Allied Commission for Austria XXth century was

442 This methodology as well as the bulk of the analysis borrows from: Markova I , *Wie Vergangenheit neu erzählt wird*, Marburg 2013 p. 112-114. Also Peter Utgaard prepared an analysis of main narratives of one of the schoolbooks but he focused solely on the most superficial level of main narratives. For more information see: Utgaard P., *Remembering and forgetting Nazism*, New York, Oxford, 2003 p. 71-160. Both Utgaard and Markova focus on the same issues: the Anschluss, World War II, the Holocaust, the Austrian Resistance, the reconstruction of Austria and the State Treaty. The “Austria as the first victim” myth is also heavily focused on. Both of the scholars completely avoid earlier history of Austria.

⁴⁴³ In 1953 *Allgemeine Geschichte der Neuzeit von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart* authored by Franz Heilsberg and Friedrich Kroger was published. Till 1957 it was the only textbook to write about the Second World War. For a short description of the textbook see: Utgaard P., *Remembering and forgetting Nazism*, New York, Oxford, 2003, p. 53. The textbook makes a clear distinction of what is Austrian an German. The Austrians are presented as people who were forced to join the German army and fight for Hitler. The concentration camps were also clearly German. What is Austrian is the resistance against the Germans.

issued in 1957, two years after the State Treaty⁴⁴⁴. The aims of the textbook are to construct understanding and interest in history with a special emphasis on the history of Austria. The most important topic and the narrative axis were the political and cultural processes of nation formation. The teaching of history with ZVK was supposed to create authentic love for one's nation (*Volk*) and fatherland (*Vaterland*). The axiology was based on freedom, humanism and rationalism.)⁴⁴⁵.

The historical period in question had been scheduled for the chapter of the teaching programme named *Fascism and National Socialism as destroyers of world peace. World War II*. The programme names the two ideologies and movements as the opponents of the free and civilised world. Italy, Germany and Japan are the countries which were overrun by fascism and pushed for war. Fascism is the main perpetrator for the civilisation breakdown of World War II. And the blame for the success of fascist ideologies in Germany lies in the *reactionary, Prussian militarism*⁴⁴⁶. The teaching programme makes the topics mentioned above obligatory to teach. Interestingly neither the role of Austria and Austrians in the structures of the III Reich or the Holocaust are mentioned.

Because the 1952 and 1957 editions of ZVK are almost identical I shall focus on the latter. *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen* from 1957 got a new subtitle: *Das Zeitalter der Weltpolitik und Technik*. It encompasses the history from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the proclamation of the Charter of United Nations in 1945. It is divided into thematic blocs named in chronologic order: *Reaction and revolution, Nazism-Socialism-Imperialism, World Wars and peace*. The narrative that is of my interest starts with the economic crisis. The rising unemployment rates led to social unrest and general discontent that undermined the existing democratic system. The suffering of the general populace was then used by unsuitable people, who spread anxiety and chaos through their energetic speeches. Their criticism of the then existing status quo they also pointed at possible solutions to the problems. This led to rapid rise to the movements led by those people⁴⁴⁷. Such looks the first and introductory description. The first thing that strikes the most is anonymisation. There is a complete lack of any specific examples and stories of specific people. The responsibility for future events is sharply limited to a small group of people who deluded and beguiled the masses. Later on the

444 The only difference is the introduction of the text of the Charter of the United Nations at the end. Some texts were reshuffled and reorganised but the content was not changed at all.

445 Wassermann H., *Verfälschte Geschichte im Unterricht, Nationalsozialismus und Österreich nach 1945*, Innsbruck 2004, p. 37.

446 Ibidem, p. 42-43.

447 *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, Vienna 1957, p. 168.

only personal example is mentioned and it is Adolf Hitler who created a homogenous Germany. Hitler enchanted people of all social classes because he used effective propaganda with no scruples⁴⁴⁸. Hitler is the only perpetrator. One could have the impression that he himself swayed the masses and conducted warfare alone. The narrative continues with the descriptions of the action of the secret police, which surveilled the public and private life of citizens. Without any remorse it disposed of political and personal enemies of Hitler. Those who were not caught by the secret police had to flee abroad. People were jailed without trial and placed in concentration camps where they met with inhuman treatment. In many cases the camps were the final destination. The Jews were persecuted through racial driven reforms and in many instances they were deprived from their property. From many places they were transported to concentration camps or later death camps where they were murdered with poisonous gas. *The recent estimates do not show exact numbers – in those camps more than six million people were murdered! Six million people is almost the entire population of Austria! What misery, despair, physical torture and spiritual hardships are hidden behind that number of six million!*⁴⁴⁹

The description of the tragedy of the Jewish population and enemies is brief, laconic and short. It does not stand out from the overall style of the textbook – it is fully written like this: short passages that usually take the space of half a page. The main characteristic of the narrative is the complete anonymity of the terror apparatus of the Third Reich. All the grammar forms used in the passages are in passive voice. It seems that this edition of ZVK creates more questions than it answers. It mentions some opponents of Hitler but does not specify who these people were. It does not describe the situation of people in concentration and death camps. It does not describe the annihilation of the Jews. The pupil will not know if the civilians were aware of the genocide and the existence of the camps. Who built and maintained the camps? All the information given is so laconic that there is no space for such considerations. The quoted ending of the passage is somewhat exceptional as it strives to evoke empathy towards the victims. Especially the comparison to the Austrian population subliminally equates the victims to Austrian which can work in both ways. It can help to empathise by making the comparison to Austrians (and the pupils reading the book were also Austrians) or could indirectly lead to creating an image of Austrians as victims. When taking

448 Ibidem, p. 168.

449 Ibidem, p. 169.

into account the contents of the next subchapter the intentions are clear – the Austria as the first victim of Nazi aggression is the main narrative.

After the short description of world history the next subchapter deals with Austria, more specifically with Austrofascism and the Anschluss. The examples set by Italy and Germany resonated in a part of the Austrian society and drove it to plan similar changes in the Alpine Republic. The results of the actions undertaken were the dissolution of political parties and the suspending of the democratic constitution. The biggest opponent of those changes was the socialdemocracy, which was also the most repressed under the new regime. At the same time the political tensions were deepened by the economic crisis. Those to blame for the fall of democracy is the *Heimwehr* (a nationalist grouping of several paramilitary organisations). After the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss by the (*aufständisch*) National Socialists, Hitler began to meddle more and more in Austria politics. Eventually under pressure the Austrian government fell and the Nazis took power. Simultaneously the Austrian border was crossed by armed German soldiers, tanks and planes. *In that way our Vaterland lost its freedom and independence*⁴⁵⁰. This description omits the social background of the Anschluss – it is only a violent assault. There is no mention of the fact that the killers of Dollfuss were Austrian Nazis and very little is mentioned about the movement in Austria. The passive voice is still prevalent.

The next chapter focuses on the World Wars of which the important part for this thesis is the description of World War II. This part of the textbook is the first one to contain visual images – pictures. A map presents the results of the annexations made by Hitler as well as his military movements. This image is accompanied by a picture of a military cemetery with the fallen from both World Wars. The description under the photo reads: *Here lies more than 40.000 fallen*. Next to the photo there is short text with the information about the number of victims of the two World Wars. The textbook informs about ten million killed in action and twenty one million wounded for the Great War and the numbers of thirty millions of killed in action and thirty five million wounded for World War II. The text is accompanied by a infograph where 1 million of people is symbolised by a white cross with a soldiers helmet on top. The description under the infograph simply states: victims of war⁴⁵¹.

450 Ibidem, p. 172.

451 Ibidem, p. 175.

The narrative about World War II reduced the events of 1939-1945 to solely military meaning. Only the soldiers are victims, no civilian casualties or victims of the politics of terror are mentioned. There cannot be any talk about total war or genocidal war tactics in such case. There is also a narrative continuity between the First and Second World Wars. This emphasises the military aspect of the second one. Also the infographic shows that the Second World War was much bloodier and much worse. The blame for the outbreak of the war is put on the dictators and their aggressive policies. The first international victim of Hitler's attacks was little Austria, which became just a province of the *Grossdeutsches Reich*. The Western powers only protested and did nothing to stop Hitler from further acts of aggression. Their passiveness only encouraged Hitler. The catastrophe of Austria meant a catastrophe for the whole world⁴⁵². The outbreak of the Second World War is described like this: *...after (Hitler) submitted sequential demands towards Poland responsible people from France and UK protested and allied with that country. Hitler believed the alliance to be insincere and after bad advice from his Minister of Foreign Affairs concluded that they will not risk war. Hitler made a pact of non-aggression with USSR and occupied Poland (hat Polen besetzt). The Western Powers declared war on Hitler. Such began World War II*⁴⁵³. What is striking is the fact that Hitler is the only perpetrator. He is the one occupying Poland (by himself). It is his troops that invade Denmark and Norway and France. Hitler attacked UK and the USSR and also occupied the Balkans and Greece. The war engulfed Africa and the Pacific as well. Next to the information about the attack on the USSR there is a footnote telling to compare the campaign with the 1812 Napoleonic invasion of Russia. What follows is the description of the battle of Stalingrad. According to the textbook it was one of the biggest tragedies of mankind. Despite warnings from his generals Hitler demanded the troops in Stalingrad to stay and fight. After many weeks of fighting and heavy Soviet attacks more than 160.000 soldiers fell because of war, cold and hunger. Thousands were held captive. The battle was the turning point of the war in Europe⁴⁵⁴. The chapter suggest that the Second World War was just another military conflict in the long history of Europe and the world. The schoolbook places the war in the context of the conflicts of the Napoleonic era and the Great War. The victims are limited to soldiers. It is no surprise that when limiting itself to military endeavours it is the battle of Stalingrad that holds the main focus. It is this battle that is the biggest humane tragedy. Not the civilian victims of planned genocide, not even the victims of mass bombings

452 Ibidem, p. 175.

453 Ibidem, p. 176.

454 Ibidem, p. 178.

– these people are not mentioned at all. The schoolbook tries to separate the war theatre from the actions of National Socialists. The movement had its own previous chapter. The only perpetrator of the narrative is Adolf Hitler, occasionally taking bad advice or dismissing good advice. It is Hitler who is responsible for the great tragedy, which was the battle of Stalingrad. The soldiers of Wehrmacht are not depicted as aggressors, conquerors or actors of genocide. Actually the Wehrmacht seems to be almost the only victim of the war⁴⁵⁵! As there is no information about the fallen soldiers from other countries (USSR, France, Poland etc.) the focus stays with the German/Austrian troops. Stalingrad became an important symbol, and a myth⁴⁵⁶. The narrative is reinforced by the picture of a German military cemetery. It is finished with the date of the 8th of May 1945 when the shots became silent. The textbook describes the aftermath of the war as a sea of rubble and a sea of spilt blood.⁴⁵⁷

The issue of ZVK from the year 1957 has a chapter about the first years of the Second Austrian Republic, which makes it a better source to analyse than the first edition of the year 1952. The narrative starts with the month of march of 1945 when Soviet troops poured through the *Austrian* border. The Nazis fled to the west leaving the Austrian population to their own fate. There was chaos and fighting and many people tried to flee to the west. The Austrian resistance fighters wanted to stop the destruction of their country, but were too weak to achieve this goal. *Goods were plundered, people robbed and murdered, one's life had no value at all. Such had the Austrians lived through the sad end of the total war*⁴⁵⁸. This passage is important because it is the very first time that the Austrian resistance is mentioned (which did not happen in the chapter about the war). The times that came later were filled with hunger and problems with shortage of basic need goods, which went even worse because of the *occupation*⁴⁵⁹. The country was divided into four occupation zones – this information is reinforced by a map of partitioned Austria – crossing the borders between the zones was a troublesome activity that needed to be mentioned in the textbook. The same page shows also

⁴⁵⁵ Civilian casualties are mentioned only in regard to the dropping of atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima! See Ibidem, p. 181.

⁴⁵⁶ Utgaard also quotes a story from a reading book from 1960: *Stalingrad! Back then, in the January days of the year 1943, millions of people sat feverishly by their radios and followed the reports about the terrible winter battle for the major Russian city on the Volga, not far from the border between Europe and Asia. Over three hundred thousand men, among them tens of thousands of Austrians, had been surrounded by Russian armies during the Christmas days of the year 1942, and since then defended themselves, frustrated on the frozen fields before the city and in the rows of buildings shot to pieces. In vain! Help from the outside was no longer possible, the ammunition supplies ran out, terrible cold, hunger and frustration broke the resistance of the defenders.* See: *Unser Lehrbuch/ Du und deine Gemeinschaft. 4. Klasse Hauptschule. Salzburg 1960, p. 21-24.* Op cit. Utgaard P. *Remembering and forgetting Nazism*, New York, Oxford, 2003 p. 97-98.

⁴⁵⁸ *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, Vienna 1957, p. 189.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibidem, p. 190.

a photograph of the destruction in the old parts of Vienna. The army of the Allies is depicted as an occupation force not really as liberators. Austria is of course the first victim of Hitler, as confirmed by the said new occupation force of the Allies in the Moscow Declaration. The reconstruction of the state is limited to the economic aspect – no signs of cultural or moral rebirth. The stereotype of Austrians as the nation of high culture also has its place in the schoolbook. *Despite the hardships, Austrians protected their affection and interest towards fine arts.* Examples of reopened State Opera and Theater as well as the reintroduction of Salzburg concerts are given as examples of cultural affinity⁴⁶⁰. Then the Austrian government worked for the true independence and sovereignty of their country which led to the signing of the State Treaty, departure of the Allied troops and introduction of neutrality. The actions of the Allies are presented as if they had a debt to pay to Austria. The year 1955 is crucial – the true end of the long occupation that started in 1938 it is the true end of the war narrative. There are also more photos in this subchapter. Aside for the destruction of monument is the centre of Vienna, a train station and bridge are juxtaposed in their destroyed form and after reconstruction⁴⁶¹. Other photos can be categorised as a showcase of modernity: new airports, dams, factories etc. pointing at the new prosperity of the Republic. The most important pictures of this subchapter are however the iconic signing of the State Treaty in the Belvedere and a picture of a crowd subtitled: *Austrian nation greets its freedom*⁴⁶². The narratives are closed with quotations by Theodor Körner (President), Julius Raab (Chancellor), Leopold Figl (Chancellor) and Adolf Schärf (Vice-cancellor, later President). Even in the textbook the *Proporzsystem* is present: Körner and Schärf were socialdemocrats and Raab and Figl conservatives. Thus the politics of consensus are a part of the narrative in the school textbook, and this consensus led to modernisation and allowed to escape the hardships of the times of Allied occupation.

In the year 1962 a new subject was added to the school curriculum – Social Science (*Sozialkunde*). At the same time a new teaching programme was ushered. The programme strove to put more details into the contents of the schoolbooks. The next edition of ZVK comes from 1967, so five years later after the new programme. The authors remained the same, as well as the contents. The biggest change was adding the *Sozialkunde* texts into the schoolbook. To some chapters additional paragraphs were inserted in order to broaden the

⁴⁶⁰ Ibidem, p. 204.

⁴⁶¹ Ibidem, p. 201.

⁴⁶² Ibidem, p. 207.

understanding of society its changes and developments. The 1967 edition of ZVK has a slightly different font and more pictures and photographs.

The chapter *Nazism-Socialism-Imperialism* has paragraphs added that describe the dissolution of the state, which deprived of the footing of the rule of law, human rights, constitution and independent judiciary is easy to turn on an ordinary citizen, who has no means of protection. It is not only the freedom that is limited but also the state starts to become an intruder into the private life. Everyone can be treated in an inhumane way or even killed without a proper trial. Każdy może zostać nieludzko potraktowany, a nawet zabity bez sprawiedliwego procesu sądowego. The reasons that amount to state persecution are political and religious beliefs. Only a democratic state with rule of law the freedoms and human dignity is protected⁴⁶³. The authors of the textbook want to set the example of the democracy of the Western type against the totalitarian system of the III Reich. The description does not include persecution based on racial premises – only political views are mentioned (which suits the Austrian narrative, where the conservatives and socialists were persecuted under the Nazi regime). As Ina Markova adds only a year later in 1968 an annex to the schoolbook includes the topic of race. Surprisingly the text focuses on the difficult situation of the Black community in the United States of America. The hatred of white people against Blacks is compared with the hatred towards Jews, best exemplified by the Third Reich⁴⁶⁴. There is no in depth analysis of European anti-Semitism, no German or Austrian examples. The main narrative of this subchapter is based on the example of the USA. Of course the conclusions lead to a general, humanistic outcome but perhaps the local example could do a better job.

Also the narrative about Hitler's rise to power has been expanded. After the description of the economic crisis it is pointed out that Hitler used Jews in his propaganda and presented them as an unworthy race that stood behind all the economic failings and hardships. For the first time it is mentioned that Hitler employed policies, that developed industry and provided jobs for the unemployed masses. In the passage about Hitler's political enemies a new set was added, including: Jews, Catholics, socialists and communists. They were sent to concentration camps where six million people perished. Hitler is still the main perpetrator and the villain of the 1933-1945 narrative. The use of grammar strengthens this message: (Hitler) *er verfolgte* – he persecuted, *er bereitete den Krieg vor* – he prepared the war⁴⁶⁵. The Jews are

463 *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, 1967, p. 169.

464 Markova I, *Wie Vergangenheit neu erzählt wird*, Marburg 2013, p. 150.

465 *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, Wien 1967 p. 170

mentioned as political opponents of Hitler rather than victims of his racial policies. The Catholics are supposed to represent the conservative camp in Austria.

The next subchapter similarly to the previous editions treats about the Anschluss. The contents are not changed, only several paragraphs were added. They stress the persecution of Austrians after 1938. After the loss of independence and freedom tens of thousands *honest Austrians* were imprisoned in concentration camps. Despite the perilous circumstances, it was possible to form groups that resisted Nazism and oppression. The textbook also delivers the information that the property of the bank of Austria, of the Catholic and evangelical churches and Jewish possessions were taken by Hitler to Germany (despite the fact that after the Anschluss Austria was a part of Germany)⁴⁶⁶.

The description of the Second World War was not changed either. Paragraphs about the resistance were added. Every man has not only the right but an *obligation* to resist against inhumane treatment. It is the obligation to oppose any state violence and any order, which would infringe the integrity and freedom of another human person. A footnote gives an example of the bomb assassination attempt of the 20th of June 1944 conducted by Claus Stauffenberg. The Bavarian officer is an interesting example of resistance. He was no Austrian but his example helps to solidify the Wehrmacht officers as positive figures (it was against their council that Hitler made mistakes)⁴⁶⁷. Perhaps he was chosen as an example simply because of the notoriety of his act. Stauffenberg assassination attempt is the only personal example of resistance against Nazis in the book.

The subchapter about the reconstruction of Austria is almost identical. The important additions are mainly visual and include changed and expanded iconography. A photo of Allied troops is added. The myth of Austria as a bridge between cultures is reinforced by a photo of the *Europabrücke* which was finished in 1963. The construction of the bridge plays a double role as it also strengthens the industrial development theme. There is also a photo of Nikita Khrushchev and J.F. Kennedy meeting in Vienna in 1961. Here the narration of the Austria as bridge, as well as Austria as a neutral country between two great power blocks is symbolically shown⁴⁶⁸.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibidem, p. 172.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibidem, p. 180.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibidem, p. 212.

The next schoolbook that went under analytical scrutiny is the 1977 edition of the ZVK. It was redone by original authors and a workbook was added to the original textbook. The text was virtually unchanged since 1957, so for 20 years it remained the same, and the dominant narrative thought at school also did not change with it. One could surmise that during those two decades no new academic research was done regarding the time of World War II. What did change was the addition of new photographs. Three new pictures show the iconic NSDAP gathering in Nurnberg in 1936, the second one a group of Jewish children forced to wear clothes with the Star of David and the *Jud* signature. The last photo shows a group of concentration camp survivors⁴⁶⁹. What is the reasoning behind including those photographs? They clearly are supposed to evoke emotions in the reader. The first picture is one of the most well-known Nazi propaganda images it shows perfect geometric lines of infantry with three swastikas in the background. It is a perfect depiction of power, will and organisational skills of the Nazi regime. There is no explanation given under the photograph, as the authors expect for the images to speak for themselves. The next two photos are showing the consequences of the actions undertaken by the regime – they focus on the victims and the use of children, which are at a similar age as the pupils in the history class clearly is aimed at evoking empathy. As for the photograph of the camp inmates, one of the people on the picture is kneeling next to the other in such a way that can evoke the image of the pieta and associate it with the Christian cultural code of sacrifice and victimhood. .

The next chapter about "Authoritarian Austria" did not get the luxury of additional photos. Instead an emotional dialogue between Adolf Hitler and Kurt Schuschnigg was added. Hitler was supposed to say: *Austria did not do anything that would prove to be useful of the German Reich. All its history is a constant betrayal of the nation! I say, I shall solve the Austrian question, one way or another!* Shuschnigg responded: *In this hour I separate myself from the Austrian nation with a German saying and a desire of the heart: „Gott schütze Österreich⁴⁷⁰!* (God protect Austria!) With the unchanged overall narrative of the textbook the inclusion of the quotation only serves emotional purposes. It is a very franc juxtaposition of the small Austria and the Great German Reich. The choice of this quote also influences the idea of Austria as the first victim of the hitlerite aggression. Again it is Adolf Hitler who is the main perpetrator and the villain of the story. Hitler threatens the existence of the alpine

⁴⁶⁹ *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, 1977, p. 171-172.

⁴⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, s. 178.

republic while Schuschnigg bids farewell to the nation. The issue of how the Austrian nation should be understood in Schuschnigg's words is not raised by the schoolbook.

Finally, change has come to the chapter that treats about World War II. For the first time soldiers were not the only actors on the stage of history – this time civilian populations were also included. But to stop this enthusiasm it has to be stated that the changes were rather minor in character. A new graph representing the civilian losses of World War I and World War II was added, as well as a graph depicting civilian losses in Europe and Asia. Asia is treated as a whole; in Europe six countries are specified: USSR, Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia and Austria. The graph does not identify the victims of genocide or concentration camps it is just an overall number. The information about genocide is still a part of the narrative of the previous subchapter about Nazism in Germany and not treated as a part of the war.

World War II in the 1977 edition has new photographs included. One of which presents the total destruction of Warsaw⁴⁷¹. The photograph depicts standing ruins and piles of rubble without any silhouette of a man. Another picture shows street fighting in Stalingrad. Several German soldiers walk through ruins and rubble. The picture of the Stalingrad reinforces the importance of this battle in the overall narrative. Several pictures were added at the end of the subchapter – they focus on mass bombings and their victims. One of them depicts a carpet bombing conducted by Allied planes, and the second one shows civilians among ruins of Vienna. The pictures in the 1977 edition play, a minor supportive role to the text. They emphasise the narrative in which World War II was a tragedy of humankind, a civilizational breakdown – for Austria and the world. The Austria as a victim message is strengthened by the photographs of Allied bombings and Viennese civilians suffering. No new changes in this schoolbook that would validate the turning of the narrative.

What is however interesting is the addition of the workbook. It contains not only exercises to fill in by the pupils but also additional reading texts. Most of the exercises focus on connecting historical persons to dates or certain events. Some exercises reinforce the message delivered by the main schoolbook. For instance on page 60 the pupil is required to list several arguments and explain why Hitler was a dictator. On the next page texts presenting victims of Nazism are prepared. The first example is a description of a typical day

471 Ibidem, s. 183.

of an Austrian political prisoner in captivity – Manes Sperber⁴⁷². Another text is a letter of a Wehrmacht soldier writing to his father from Stalingrad. The juxtaposition of both texts creates the impression that both of them were victims of the times – both Austrians and soldiers. In the main schoolbook also the destruction of cities was depicted by the suffering of Viennese civilians and soldiers fighting in Stalingrad. The workbook achieves synergy with the schoolbook. The workbook also included “numbers to think about” – not an exercise but solely an informative addition. The Austrian victims of war are listed as follows: soldiers - 170.000, concentration and death camps – 35.000, victims of air raids and bombardment – 25.000. Jews were not separated as a distinct group of Austrian victims⁴⁷³. The narrative that comes out of the textbook is similar to the main schoolbook: the victims of National Socialism were mainly political opponents; the suffering of Wehrmacht soldiers is equated with the suffering of civilian populations. The suffering topic was continued in the next chapter of the schoolbook (The Austria reborn). The text is unchanged albeit organised a little differently. Similarly like with previous chapters additional photos were added. The hard times after 1945 are represented by school-children receiving a meal of a soup and yet another picture of people walking in the destroyed streets of Vienna⁴⁷⁴. A small change in the photographs of the signing of the State Treaty occurred as the picture is zoomed in on the figure of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Leopold Figl (his name is also given in the description of the photograph).

The biggest change came (finally!) in the 1988 edition of *Zeiten, Völker, Kulturen*. Two new authors were added to the group namely Oskar Achs and Werned Ademaier. The schoolbook changed completely, became rewritten and reorganised. It also took a more modern form. Instead of being a small book with text divided in short chapters it started to look like the schoolbooks that are used till this day – full of pictures in colour and infographics with short passages of texts. Also the font used in the book is much bigger than in its predecessors. The visual makeover was accompanied by a change in the contents. Pupils are now encouraged to analyse and discuss texts and photographs during the lesson time. Exercises are added to the main body of the textbook and are not published separately. The cherry on top of the makeover is the new subtitle of the textbook: *The time of politics and technology. (Das Zeitalter der Politik und der Technik)*. For the Polish reader it can be a

⁴⁷² Sperber came from a Galician Jewish family and was imprisoned in Germany after NSDAP took power for several weeks. He was released on the grounds of being an Austrian citizen. Sperber was not a typical representative of people imprisoned by the Nazi regime, especially Jews in Central Europe.

⁴⁷³ *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen Arbeitsbuch*, Wien 1977, p.60-70.

⁴⁷⁴ *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, 1977, p. 220-221.

pleasant surprise that the cover of the schoolbook includes many photos and among them a picture of the Pope John Paul II addressing a crowd in 1983. The technology is represented by a starting rocket, so the Pope has to represent politics in that case. Maybe the importance of his pilgrimages to the countries of the Eastern Bloc made an impression on the authors.

Classically the chapters that are put under analytical scrutiny are divided into subparts similar to what came before: *German National Socialism and Holocaust, Authoritarian Austria and under the swastika, II World War*. What strikes the most that the Holocaust finally included in the curriculum is not treated as a part of the Second World War. It took forty three years since the end of the war for the Holocaust to be a part of the teaching plan and to become a separate narrative. For instance in Germany this topic became obligatory to teach in 1962, twenty five years (so one generation) earlier.⁴⁷⁵ Also the framing National Socialism as German (and not even partially Austrian) is noteworthy.

One can be under the impression that it was the Waldheim Affair of the year 1986 that was behind the long awaited change of the textbooks. Just to recap Kurt Waldheim, elected president of Austria in 1986 was discovered to lie in his autobiography about his activity in the years 1938-1945 hiding his participation in atrocities committed in the Balkans and Greece during the war. The scandal that broke out resulted in a heated discussion within and abroad of Austria. The Austria as victim myth started to show cracks and eventually broke. However that is just pure coincidence. The spirit of the times was already subverting the almost four decade long narratives. The teaching plans for the new schoolbooks were actually prepared in 1985 and only then the books went into the preparation phase. It is within the reach of possibility that the massive influence of the Waldheim affair had some impact on the authors of the schoolbook. Nevertheless the teaching programme of 1985 already suggested to present totalitarian systems (fascism, Nazism and communism) and to include the topics such as anti-Semitism, genocide, mass murders, racism, resistance and exile⁴⁷⁶. The fact that these topics were taken into consideration a year before the Waldheim affair is proof that they are a sign of broader shift in historical narratives and tendencies. So how did the textbook address the tasks laid upon in by the teaching plan?

475 Markova I., *Wie Vergangenheit neu erzählt wird*, Marburg 2013, p. 175. The topic of Holocaust was not immediately included in the curricula of school textbooks in Europe. It took decades for the assessment of the past to take shape in an organized teachable form. It started to appear in the late sixties and seventies. Holocaust started to play the role of a model, paradigm or measure of representations of other atrocities in accordance with a process of narrative. It became universalized. See: Carrier P., Fuchs E., Messinger T., *The International status of education about the Holocaust: a global mapping of textbooks and curricula*, 2014.

476 Ibidem, p. 175.

The first subchapter focuses on the fall of democracy and the creation of *German fascism*. The description is much more detailed than in previous editions. The economic hardships of the working classes, while still present are expanded by the perspective of the middle class and its discontent with the worsening of the economic situation. The German ruling classes were accused not only of a lost war but also of treacherous payments of war reparations to the Western Allies. Many people turned their backs not just to the politicians in power but to democracy as a system. Surprisingly the text continues with the unchanged decryption from 1957 edition about unemployment and Hitler's propaganda (his and his only!). The text is followed by a reprint of a NSDAP propaganda poster showing a sea of unemployed workers⁴⁷⁷.

If the first step was propaganda then the second one had to be terror. The first victims of the NSDAP regime were communists – political opponents. A graph depicts next categories of victims: communists, Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, liberal, freemasons, Marxists, Negroes, minority groups and socialists. On the one hand Jews were not described as the main target of Nazi repressions but the list is surprisingly broad and inclusive. The political opposition message is stronger than the racial enemies – there is also no mention of Slavs (Poles, Russians etc). Anti-Semitism has been described for the very first time. Its geographical source is located in the city of Vienna where Hitler encountered the radical attitudes towards Jewry in his youth and decided to make it one of the pillars of Nazi ideology⁴⁷⁸. Again Hitler is the ultimate driving force behind the evil.

Another novelty is a detailed description of how democracy was dismantled by the members of the NSDAP. The changes in legislation and new racial laws are given as examples. The famous Nurnberg NSDAP meeting is now captioned as a propaganda – and an exposition of force. The pupils are then asked by the book to discuss the issue of dismantling democracy⁴⁷⁹. The pupils are also confronted with the reality of being a child in a fascist system. The subchapter describes the lives of youth, their participation in Nazi organisations as well as engagement through sports and other means. The racial and exclusive character of those organisations is emphasised⁴⁸⁰.

477 *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, 1988, p. 35.

478 *Ibidem*, p. 36.

479 *Ibidem*, p. 37.

480 *Ibidem*, p. 39.

The depiction of resistance against the Nazi regime is presented solely from an Austrian perspective. The representatives of resistance groups are limited to Christian Socialists (the conservative camp) and the Socialists – conveniently representing the two big political blocks that formed after 1945. The first character presented in the textbook is a Catholic monk Roman Scholz and a socialist partisan Otto Hass⁴⁸¹. This example is an interesting transposition of the political shape of the II Austrian Republic to the fascist Ständestaat (where socialists were a prosecuted group – but this nuancing is absent from the textbook). The reason for is is the fact that the main narrative focuses on an idealised version of common resistance against a common enemy – German Nazis. The fact that the majority of Austrian guerrilla fighters composed of Communists is omitted.

The most important addition to the 1988 textbook is a systemic representation of knowledge about anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. This time the already used picture with children bearing the *Jud* signature is accompanied by the photograph depicting Austrian Jews forced to clean anti-Nazi slogans from building facades and streets⁴⁸². Under the photographs a short text passage describes the tragic situation of Jews under the National Socialist regime. Jewish shops were closed and Jews were expelled out of their apartments and deprived of property. Then came the enforcement of ghettos and eventually, after the Wannsee conference, the genocide. A picture showing a group of Jews in the Warsaw ghetto and the rail ramp in the Auschwitz death camp underline the description. The textbook mentions the utter destruction of the Warsaw ghetto and the deportation of more than 400.000 people from Warsaw⁴⁸³. A brief mention of the suppression of societies of Germany and *Ostmark* also appears in the text. The *Ostmark* was a part of Germany at the time so this serves only the purpose of artificially specifying the „Austrian experience“. The chapter ends with a description of the world of concentration camps. Aside for the pictures of barbed wire and guard towers the process of mass killing (gas chambers and burning of the bodies in furnaces) is described. The whole paragraph is written in the passive voice and do not point at any perpetrators. At the same time the textbook asks a provocative question: *Also Austrians participated in the Holocaust. What does that mean for today*⁴⁸⁴? This is noteworthy, as it is the very first time that Austrians are mentioned differently than presented as something else

⁴⁸¹ For more on Scholz see: Klusacek Ch., *Die österreichische Freiheitsbewegung – Gruppe Roman Karl Scholz*, Vienna 1968.

⁴⁸² *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, 1988, p. 40-41.

⁴⁸³ *Ibidem*, p. 43.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 37.

than just mere victims. The textbook also encourages both the teachers and pupils to meet with witnesses of history (former concentration camps inmates).

The following chapter about the Anschluss is also much more nuanced and detailed than before. The lack of any resistance of the Austrian troops during the German aggression is pointed out. *With the taking of the country Hitler found many supporters in Austria. However in the society there were also those who resisted*⁴⁸⁵. The visual representation of these event show the dichotomy of supporters and opponents. One photograph shows Hitler speaking to a cheering crowd in Heldenplatz in Vienna, the other one shows Austrian politicians being transported to Dachau concentration camp. This picture is significant because it strengthens the overall narrative arch of the textbook and one of the most important myths of lying at the base of the II Austrian Republic – the myth of the “common concentration camp experience” that brought Austrian politicians together. The caption under the Dachau picture mentions the Christian Democrats and Socialists (omitting other political groups) who suffered together under the Nazi regime⁴⁸⁶.

The topic of repressions against the Jewish population of Austria returns in this subchapter. Many Austrians turned to racial hate and anti-Semitism, which resulted in violence. The subchapter ends with deliberations about the question why so many Austrians were so happy to greet Hitler. The text continues however to mention that while many said “yes” to the Anschluss, some did it out of fear. Another part of the Austrian society wanted the unification with Germany already in 1918 and many doubted the viability of the I Austrian Republic⁴⁸⁷.

The II World War subchapter, while visually enhanced, clings to the Hitler as the only perpetrator trope. The war started with Hitler’s plans – and only his. The message is supported by caricatures of Adolf Hitler from the period in question as well as a photograph of marching Wehrmacht soldiers. The text tries to rationalise Hitler’s reasons for war listing: the urge for conquest and the necessity to acquire cheap labour force. *Druga Wojna Światowa zaczęła się od planów Hitlera i tylko wyłącznie jego*⁴⁸⁸. The first conquest of Hitler was little Austria. The description of the war itself is rather vague. The turning point of the war is still the battle of Stalingrad now shown with a photograph of a triumphant Soviet soldier rising the red

485 Ibidem, p. 74.

486 Ibidem, p. 75. The subchapter goes into details about the discussions about the future of Austria that the politicians had while in captivity.

487 Ibidem, p. 77.

488 Ibidem, p. 89.

scythe and hammer banner above the ruins of the city (somewhat reminiscent of the famous photo of hanging the same banner on the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin). The “great human tragedy” of previous textbook edition was changed to “a military defeat”. The narrative about the battle of Stalingrad did not change much. It is still Hitler who is responsible for this defeat, as he did not heed the advice of his rational military aides. The madness of Hitler is emphasised with quote from gen. Franz Halder who described the Führer as a screaming, mad, fist raising and behaving somewhat idiotic⁴⁸⁹.

The Allied bombardment of German and Austrian cities is mentioned in greater detail this time. The destruction of Dresden is described in detail. Also the devastation of 37.000 apartments in Vienna is added to the Dresden example. The paragraph enlists the destroyed buildings of importance: the St. Stephen Cathedral, the Opera, Vienna University, museums and theatres. The choice of the listed buildings is by no means arbitrary. It not only shows the barbarity of the Allies but also conveys the image of Austria as a land of high culture. The schoolbook really tries to equate the devastation caused by the Axis and Allies. The Germans dropped around 74.000 tonnes of explosives while the Allies used 1.9995.000 tonnes. The photographs show women and children standing next to destroyed building and piles of rubble⁴⁹⁰. This trope evokes the iconic figure of the *Trümmerfrau* (woman of the ruins) – many women were employed after the war to clean up the rubble after the destruction caused by the war. Another topic that victimises the German population that is accompanied by pictures of women and children is the issue of the refugees from the East. The description is very vague and only briefly mentions the issue. But its inclusion is noteworthy.

The resistance movements in Europe during the II World War is mentioned briefly as well. There are only two examples given – the Stauffenberg assassination plot and the French resistance action and the massacre of the population of Oradour-sur-Glane⁴⁹¹. The narrative about the Second World War ends with the description of yet another Allied bombing – the two atomic bomb attacks on Japan. The perpetrator of this crime is mentioned by name – Mayor Thomas W. Ferebee – a member of the Enola Gay bomber crew. He is the only named perpetrator of the war that is mentioned by name in the textbook (aside for Adolf Hitler). The

489 Ibidem, p. 91. General Halder strongly opposed Hitler’s military plans and goals in the USSR, especially the division of invasion forces to Caucasus regions. Hitler wanted to deprive the USSR from its oil-fields but that was an overstretch of the troops. Halder was right to criticise Hitler’s plans and was in open conflict with Hitler. For his actions Halder was removed from command. In one case Hitler physically assaulted Halder ripping the Iron Cross from Halder’s uniform.

490 Ibidem, p. 92.

⁴⁹¹ In fact an SS official was kidnapped by the French resistance in Oradour-sur-Vayres

photographs next to the text show the devastation of Hiroshima and children exposed to radiation from the nuclear blast. The chapter ends with a graph enumerating the number of war casualties, including civilians. Similarly to the first edition of ZVK the narrative ends with a moral call about the scale of horrors and destruction that the biggest conflict in history brought to millions of people⁴⁹².

The next chapter treats about the liberation and reconstruction of Austria after 1945. While the narrative about the uncertainty of new times and economic hardships (shown by the photo of children getting their soup rations), the 1988 edition of ZVK introduces new elements. The year 1945 is to be regarded in more positive tones as the year of liberation. The narrative of the long occupation of the years 1938-1955 is broken⁴⁹³. Photographs show the devastation of Vienna's landmarks (Cathedral etc.) but also includes a scene of Soviet soldiers fighting in the streets of the Austrian capital city. As a source text from the historical period the whole contents of the Moscow Declaration is included – also with the passages about the Austrian responsibilities for war crimes. If anything defines the 1988 edition of ZVK it is the breaking of old narratives and introduction of new ones instead. The modernisation brought by the Marshall-Plan is another way of painting the Allies in more positive light than the bombing descriptions and photographs did in the previous chapter. The reconstruction process is more less the same as before with a bigger focus on the persona of Bruno Kreisky (which does not surprise considering his 4 term chancellorship). Karl Renner also is given much more space and is even quoted. Renner is the symbolic figure of the reestablishment of the Austrian state, Kreisky's role is small but nevertheless his presence is noted during the events of 1955 and the signing of the State Treaty⁴⁹⁴. Similarly as in other chapters this edition has much more visual content. The everyday problems of the reconstruction times are exemplified by the picture of corpses' removal from bombed buildings, and are juxtaposed with the stabilisation of later times – construction of industry, usage of machinery in agriculture and even the re-establishment of cultural life in the shape of examples of theatre plays (two photos are devoted to theatre and film)⁴⁹⁵. The significance of cultural life has been elevated in comparison with the earlier editions and the narrative of Austria as a land of culture is

⁴⁹² Ibidem, p. 95.

⁴⁹³ Ibidem, p. 106-109.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibidem, p. 110, 122-123.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibidem p. 121. The theatre play being: *Waiting for Godot* and the movie, a comedy: *Hallo Dienstman* from 1952.

prevalent in almost all chapters now. Noteworthy is also a short inclusion of the topic of denazification – a policy introduced by the Allies that stands valid till this day⁴⁹⁶.

The ZVK edition from 1996 is very similar to the previous one – yet it includes some changes that have to be mentioned. First of all the textbook is actually a bit shorter than before. The John Paul II photo from the cover is gone. There are several paragraphs that were erased – like the information about the Austrian roots of Adolf Hitler. Also the information about anti-Semitism as basis of NSDAP ideology is gone. The textbook proposes a more general overview of the history of anti-Semitism since the Roman times and the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple, through the medieval ages and early modern pogroms of the Jews till the Holocaust as the final act of anti-Semitism⁴⁹⁷. Other changes and additions include a question for the teacher and pupils to be discussed in class about the role violence plays in politics (on the occasion of the assassination of Engelbert Dolfuss, other examples include the Sarajevo assassination of Franz Ferdinand and terrorist attacks conducted by radical-right winged groups⁴⁹⁸).

The subchapter about World War II did not change much. There is less photos than in the previous edition. What has been added is a short description about the fate of Wehrmacht soldiers in captivity that is accompanied by a co-example of the fate of Soviet soldiers⁴⁹⁹. The depiction of this issue is a photograph of a German soldier behind barbed wire of a Soviet detention camp. The photograph of bombed Vienna is replaced with an even more symbolical and emblematical devastation of the city of Mozart – Salzburg. The message of Austria: small country of great culture that fell victim to the turmoil of the XXth century. The subchapter about Austria after 1945 – sees an interesting shift in narrative. It is again the year 1955 and the signing of the State Treaty that is central to the reconstruction and success of the II Austrian Republic. The role of 1945 as the year of liberation, while present is less significant⁵⁰⁰.

The narrative presented by the *Zeiten Völker und Kulturen* schoolbook in many of its aspects did not change through the timespan of more than forty years influencing at least two generations of Austrians. The first stellar backbone of the ZVK narrative arch is the positioning of Adolf Hitler as the sole perpetrator of the disasters of the XXth century. It was

⁴⁹⁶ Ibidem, p. 114.

⁴⁹⁷ *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, Wien 1996, p. 40-41.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibidem, p. 75.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibidem, p. 83.

in Hitler's head that all the mad plans of war and genocide were born. It also seems that he is the only one who put those ideas into motion. The prevalent use of passive voice when describing Nazi war crimes creates an illusion of National Socialism without real people behind the ideology. One could expect that with the progress in World War II research would transfer eventually to the world of the textbooks and the narrative would be nuanced in the later editions of ZVK. The opposite is true. The sole authorship of crimes of Hitler has been reinforced by the additions that appear in later editions. The quotes, photographs and examples serve as reinforcement of narrative not as mean to broaden it. Only after 1988 the question of the role that Austrians played during the difficult times of 1938-1945 are asked. The cracks in the edifice of the main narrative are not coherent with what came before and do not constitute a new quality, feel rushed and feel included because of some forced necessity. The new formula of open questions to be discussed in class prove to be a positive example leaving the initiative on the side of the teachers and encourage free thought and discussion. They might serve as narrative breaker but with the same amount of possibility they could encourage pupils to repeat what they just have read in the textbook and help to implement the main narrative.

The second prevalent part of the narrative is the approach towards victims and victimhood. The continuity is obvious – while the 1988 edition and onward nuances the Austrian guilt and responsibility the main Austria as a victim narrative is not broken at all. Austria was the victim of German but also Allied aggression. The second part of this statement changed only in the newer editions of ZVK – the Allies were presented as both liberators and perpetrators (bombings, Hiroshima). With the implementation of new visual means – photographs and quotes from diaries and other sources what can be noticed is the rising employment of emotions in the narrative. There is an increasing use of photographs of women and children as well as a military victims of war (Wehrmacht soldiers mainly). The Austrian casualties of war are always used in context of the fallen soldiers and later with civilians from Poland, USSR or Japan, German refugees expelled from the East etc. The narrative creates a “community of victimhood” for all those people. Late editions of ZVK also start to focus more on the suffering of the Jewish population – but even their special case is treated in the context of the war as a civilizational breakdown that equals the victims. The biggest change in this narrative is the inclusion of civilians. Firstly the only victims of war were the soldiers and World War II was treated similarly to other historical military conflicts (like the Thirty Years War, Napoleonic wars or the Great War). The shift is noticeable: firstly only soldiers

mattered, than the civilian themes were introduced and eventually the civilian history became the majority of the material presented to the pupils. The moral evocation of the first editions of ZVK was replaced by a more and more emotional and empathic message. Importantly to take note, the emotional connection is most of all built by the depiction of the fate of Wehrmacht soldiers, Austrian political prisoners or most notably the civilian victims of Allied bombardment.

The Austrian state is often described as if it existed in spirit in the years 1938-1945. The Ostmark is separated from Germany on several occasions in the narrative, as if there was continuity in the existence of the Austrian state. At the same time this narrative is one sided, the authors only write about the Alpine Republic in terms of continuity when it comes to positive examples (like the resistance against Nazism. When the topics delve into war crimes it is always the Third Reich that is responsible. A notable exception is the inclusion of the full text of the Moscow Declaration but that is a source text and not a part of the narrative prepared by Austrian historians. A certain narrative fiction is being created that wants to show the *Gründerzeit* – times of the founders of new Austria and the chaos that came before it⁵⁰¹. After the chaos came peace and prosperity – the heroes of the story are the politicians like Renner, Figl or later Kreisky. With their governance came times of modernisation and cultural growth – a success story of a small country of high culture. While there is little mention of the Austrian nation per se – the narrative about the vital years creates the basic mythos: common suffering and common work towards the restoration of Austria. The narrative represents the „epic” meta-narrative of Hayden White – an integrative synecdoche, a story where the events of the outside world (forces of nature) lead the hero to the achievement of self-identity. While not stated *expressis verbis* in the textbook – this is the meta-level of the narrative of the history of the XXth century. The catalyst for the “hero journey” is the economic crisis of the late twenties that leads to rise of fascism and Nazism, wars and then successful reconstruction. The “good” triumphs over the “evil” in the form of economic and, most of all, cultural development and achievements – in which Austria excels.

There are of course many more school textbooks issued by various publishers. To include them in this inquiry would be desirable but has to be left for further research. The reasons for this is that after *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen* the number of available textbooks grew significantly and they present a new and different quality. The *de facto* monopoly of

⁵⁰¹ The term *Gründerzeit* refers to the period of rapid industrial growth in Germany and Austro-Hungary in 1871-1874. The times after 1945 or 1955 are treated as the new *Gründerzeit*.

ZVK was broken ushering a new period. At the same time the period between 1945 till 1988 seems sufficient enough as a time framework and the focus on the dominant textbook and its evolution can show the process of change of narratives better than the more scattered and dissimilar textbooks created on the free market. This statement does not exclude expanding the research of Austrian textbooks into the future for comparative reasons.

3.3 Breaking the consensus. Failed opposition - FPÖ

The main axis of political conflict in Austria goes between the two main camps the socialists (SPÖ) and the Christian-democrats (ÖVP). However, already in 1949 the two main parties were accompanied by a small formation of the Independents. In the American occupation zone in Salzburg on the 25th of March 1949 Herber Alois Kraus and Viktor Reimann created *Verband der Unabhängigen* (VdU). – Union of the Independent. On the 9th of October of the same year the formation joined the elections as *Wahlpartei der Unabhängigen* and received 11.17% - the best result in the short history of this political party⁵⁰². The vast majority of the party's electorate recruited from former Nazis and German repatriates from Czechia, Moravia and Poland. SPÖ believed that the new political movement would be another right-wing party and will take the electorate away from ÖVP. They could not be more wrong as VdU managed to gather support from traditional electorates of both socialists and conservatives. VdU's main goal was to create a formation that would be in opposition to the “grand coalition” parties. At the same time they have positioned themselves on the political spectrum as liberals, with the freedom of the single person as ideological basis. However because of the significant influence of former Nazis the party also featured German-national undertones⁵⁰³. One of the main objectives of VdU was the restitution of all rights to former Nazis. In 1953 elections VdU received a little below 11%, a small downfall. The second elections were the catalyst for the resurfacing of all the institutional problems of VdU that had much higher electoral ambitions. A strife within the party led to political infighting. This process led to the resolution of the party in 1956. The members of the Austrian parliament that were elected from the lists of VdU suddenly had nowhere to go. In order to survive politically they have created a new political party in Vienna on the 7th May

⁵⁰² Election results are found at the website of the Ministry of Interior Affairs: <http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI/sitemap/>, Access: 16.05.2019.

⁵⁰³ Livonius Thilo v., *Die ideologische Entwicklung der FPÖ unter Jörg Haider*, Monachium 2002, p. 21. One of the mottos of the campaign was: *Österreich ist ein deutscher Staat*.

of 1956. The party's name was *Freiheitliche Partei Österreich*, FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) and as future will show it became one of the most significant movements in Austria. Anton Reinthaller became the first chairman of the party. He was an ardent Nazi and a member of the NSDAP. During the times of *Ostmark* he served as the Minister of Agriculture in the Seyss-Inquart government. FPÖ in the 1956 elections received only 6,5% of the total votes. Considering the situation it was a success as the new formation managed to cross the election threshold. In 1958 the nationalistic Reinthaller became replaced by a much more liberal Friedrich Peter. The support for FPÖ stabilised at 7% in the 1962 election. Friedrich Peter, a former member of the Waffen-SS took a more liberal course, but did not totally discard the German-national elements. His strategy was to become a reliable coalition partner for other Austrian parties. His policy led to a split in the party – in 1963, the national wing of the party formed *Nationaldemokratische Partei* – NDP (later this party became illegal because of adherence to National Socialism). The breaking in the party led to the loss of a part of electorate. Peter tried in vain to convince people that both liberals and nationals can have a place in FPÖ⁵⁰⁴. In the elections of 1966 and 1970 the party barely made it above the election threshold and got results slightly above 5% in both cases.

Then came the year 1970 – a significant year for the Third Camp. It was the year when the long four-term chancellorship of Bruno Kreisky started. In the 1970 elections SPÖ received 48% of the vote share. Instead of going for the grand coalition with ÖVP. Kreisky decided for a minority government. He could only do this because he managed to secure political stability thanks to the Members of the Parliament who entered if from FPÖ. Friedrich Peter's risky game finally paid off. The coalition was only informal but a first step for FPÖ to position itself outside of the anti-establishment image. The first support from Kreisky came in the form of the reform of electoral system that strengthened smaller parties, and gave them more seats in the *Nationalrat* (the lower house of Austrian parliament). The new law was tailored specially for FPÖ. At the same time, in a surprising twist of events Kreisky began to use the discourse and narratives that was associated with the national-liberal camp. An unlikely development for a social-democrat such as Kreisky. This was most exemplified with the rather anti-Semitic quarrel between Kreisky and the famous Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal. Kreisky went as far as suggesting that Wiesenthal collaborated with the Gestapo

⁵⁰⁴ Lux G., *Das Jörg Haider Experiment*, Wien; Graz; Klagenfurt 2009, p. 150.

during World War II⁵⁰⁵. The political flirt between the socialists and the Third Camp reached its peak in 1983 when the socialists lost absolute majority in the elections and FPÖ was invited to form a coalition government. Without a doubt Kreisky's attitude towards the national-liberal camp allowed it to flourish and grow stronger. However the fruit of this growth were seen later after the Kreisky era. In the years 1971, 1975 and 1979 the electoral results of FPÖ was stable and did not surpass 5-6%. Yet the results while providing stability were unsatisfactory for the young generation of politicians and activists. In 1978 Peter resigns from leading the party and is replaced by the former mayor of Graz Alexander Götz. Only two years later Götz resigned in favour of the liberal Norbert Steger. In 1983 despite being a part of the government the party barely passes the threshold with 5%. It was the worst result since 1953. In 1986 the revolution finally came in the form of young and ambitious politician Jörg Haider. His ascent to chairmanship was the herald of a new era of populism and redefined the role of FPÖ in Austrian politics.

The upcoming campaigns were much different for the national-liberal camp. Despite the fact that it was conducted in the shadow of the Kurt Waldheim affair, Haider decided to use this moment to attack the two main parties, as part of the establishment as well as to reject the lie of "Austrian nation" that created the Waldheim affair in the first place⁵⁰⁶. More importantly the style of Haider was different – he posed to be a celebrity rather than a politician. In 1990 FPÖ received a smashing result of 16, 6%, and it was just the beginning. At first Haider decided to flirt with the pan-German ideas of the past issuing controversial statements. Of those the one that got the most attention was praising the employment policies of the Third Reich in 1991, or calling the members of Waffen-SS „men of honour” in 1995⁵⁰⁷. This course led to another break in the party as in 1993 a liberal wing of FPÖ decided to create a new movement called Liberal Forum. This did not stop Haider from achieving even more success. In 1994 in local elections in Carinthia FPÖ got one third of the votes and in the parliamentary elections it received a record 22,5%. Since that time Carinthia became the stronghold of the Third camp. In 1999 in the local election to the Carinthian *Landtag* FPÖ got 42% of the votes and became the strongest party in the region. In the federal elections of the same year the Third Camp received 27% of votes becoming the second biggest party in the parliament for the first time. While the socialist secured victory ÖVP formed a coalition with

⁵⁰⁵ Pelinka A., *Austria's attitude towards Israel: Following the European mainstream*, <http://jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&TMID=111&LNGID=1&FID=382&PID=0&IID=1595>. Access: 16.05.2019.

⁵⁰⁶ Lux G., *Das Jörg Haider Experiment*, Wien; Graz; Klagenfurt 2009, p. 153.

⁵⁰⁷ In German: anständige Menschen.

FPÖ that governed twice till 2006 causing massive discontent both in Austria and abroad. European countries decided to implement diplomatic sanctions on Austria for including a far-right party in the government. Despite the fact that in the coalition government Haider did not hold any position (he even resigned from chairing his party in order not to become a vice-chancellor) the backlash was strong. The president of Austria Thomas Kleistl requested a declaration from the government that it will abide to the rule of law, pluralism and democracy⁵⁰⁸. Being part of the government meant problems for the anti-establishment party that FPÖ used to be. In hastened elections of 2002 it received only 10% of the vote leading to a crisis that led eventually to the departure of Haider and the creation of a splinter populist party called *Bundnis Zukunft Österreichs* (BZÖ) – The Alliance for the future of Austria. The party however fell into disarray after the death of Jörg Haider in a car crash in October 2008. FPÖ under a new young leader Heinz-Christian Strache managed to regain the support and reach 27% levels of electoral support. As of early 2019 the party is again in coalition with the Christian-democrats forming a coalition government under Chancellor Sebastian Kurz.

After presenting an outline of the political history of the Third Camp after 1945 the next step is to investigate the vision of nation held within this camp. Unfortunately William T. Bluhm did not conduct any in-depth interviews with the representatives of FPÖ; perhaps because during his stay in Austria in the sixties it was not a significant party and nothing hinted at the future success. Nevertheless there are sources that can be referenced: namely the political programmes. VdU – the ideological and structural predecessor to FPÖ during its short lifetime managed to produce two of such programmes. FPÖ made programmes in 1957, 1968, 1985, 1997 and in 2011. BZÖ delivered a programme in 2013.

When the Allies allowed political life in Austria in 1949 one of the groups that used this allowance was VdU: a liberal, democratic and national formation. The party positioned itself as German-national since the very beginning⁵⁰⁹. Other tropes as reconstruction of sovereignty, critique of the *Proporzsystem* or broader inclusion of mechanism of direct democracy became main tropes for the Third Camp. Of course during the Allied occupation the VdU could not be very open about the German-national ideas. They were just subtly hinted. For the protection of state independence it was necessary to acknowledge the membership in *deutsches Volkstum*. (German “peopleness” nationality)⁵¹⁰. The 1954

⁵⁰⁸ Lux G., *Das Jörg Haider Experiment*, Wien; Graz; Klagenfurt 2009, p. 162.

⁵⁰⁹ Livonius T., *Die ideologische Entwicklung der FPÖ unter Jörg Haider*, Monachium 2002, p. 76.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 78.

programme from Aussee went much further. While the first point of the programme emphasises the sovereignty of Austria the second directly states that *Österreich ist ein deutscher Staat*⁵¹¹. Austria is a German state and has to take into account the entirety of the German nation, not only the part that lives in Austria but also outside of its borders (including South Tirol). VdU wanted to promote the idea of participation in the German culture but also a common identity for all Germans⁵¹². The pan-German elements are also visible in the plan for foreign policy where nation states should become the corner stone for United Europe⁵¹³. The Aussee programme is full of ideas that adhere to the times of National Socialism. The economy should serve the purpose of building a healthy and united nation. State interventionism was considered as a viable option, which is surprising for a liberal party. The first FPÖ programme was highly influenced by the Aussee programme of VdU. The state policy should be national, liberal and social (in that order)⁵¹⁴. Additionally FPÖ named itself „the national party in Austria”. It goes without saying that there was one word missing from that slogan – „German-national”. FPÖ set the goal to protect German Austrians and their identity not only on the territory of the Alpine Republic but especially in South Tirol. *Austrians are bound by history and culture with the German nation for thousands of years, without this connection there cannot be an Austrian identity*⁵¹⁵. Being a part of German culture meant also being a part of European culture. Having said all that there was no trace of undermining the Austrian statehood in the programme, there was any talk of unification with Germany⁵¹⁶.

Under the chairmanship of Friedrich Peter the liberal wing of the party rose to significance. A strong anti-communist tone was adopted (an interesting call-back to the anti-communist attitudes of National Socialists). *The future will belong to communism or to freedom* spoke Peter in 1964 speech⁵¹⁷. It seemed that freedom and democracy was more important than maintaining the German identity in Austria. The 1968 programme of Bad Ischl highlights just that. The defence of freedom and Austrian neutrality became to priority⁵¹⁸. This declaration was followed by another: *we acknowledge our participation in the democratic Austrian state and at the same time to the German national and cultural*

511 Ibidem, p. 79.

512 Ibidem, p. 79.

513 Ibidem, p. 79. In German: *Die echte nationale Gesinnung ist ein Baustein des vereinten Europa.*

514 Ibidem, p. 81.

515 Ibidem, p. 83.

516 Ibidem, p.83.

517 Ibidem, p. 85.

518 Ibidem, p. 86.

community⁵¹⁹. In more detail this idea meant the support for German culture in Austria as well as support for the German speaking population of South Tirol. The next programme came in 1985. The so called Salzburg programme emphasised Austrian neutrality, ecological issues but also protested against too little representation of German history in Austrian schoolbooks⁵²⁰. The traditional South Tirol issue was broadened and now included all German speaking minorities in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire⁵²¹. The year 1985 could be described as the peak of the liberal influence in FPÖ and the party itself could be described at the time as liberal-national and not the opposite. The year 1986 brought a giant change with the start of the Haider era. In this moment it is important to mention the populist pivot and modernisation processes that Jörg Haider introduced in FPÖ as it is crucial to understand the approach of this party towards the idea of Austrian nation. For Haider ideology had secondary significance, everyday issues came first. FPÖ became an anti-establishment, protest party that focused on criticising the broken political system of Austria. With the change of content the more important change concerned the style of politics. Haider was a hyperactive politician, always ready to be in the news, to comment or to provoke. He used the tabloids to promote himself. Only the effectiveness in gathering support mattered, the results were stunning – a growth from 5% to 27%. Perhaps this is why during the chairmanship of Haider FPÖ produced only one programme in 1997. Perhaps the document was not necessary as once noted, the only programme FPÖ needed was Jörg Haider⁵²². While the party did not produce many programmes at that period it did however use short lists pointing at current problems. In 1993 FPÖ proposed 24 theses for political renewal of Austria. It concentrated on bashing SPÖ and ÖVP, and presented FPÖ as the only „party of change”. Other issues included ecology, immigration and support of the families. Austria was mentioned in point 3: *Austria is our homeland and this is a basic presupposition for all our actions. We want to protect the natural habitat and cultural heritage of our forefathers in order to present it to future generations. The love of one's country should breed love for other nations. This positive patriotism is a response to rabid nationalism as well as the utopia of multiculturalism.* Point 7 stated: *Austria for Austrians. Uncontrolled migration is beyond common sense. The protection of culture, identity and social progress necessitates the limitation of immigration. Obligatory identity check at the borders and systemic deportation of illegal immigrants is the only way to ensure effective migration rights.* The last point (23)

519 Ibidem, p. 86.

520 Ibidem, s. 94.

521 Ibidem, p. 95.

522 Sully M., *The Haider Phenomenon*, Nowy Jork, 1997, p. 56.

adds: *We are for protection of natural ethnic groups and protection of their identity and culture. However this protection must not be extended to immigrants. Austria is not a country of immigration*⁵²³. There is little mention of the traditional pan-German identity and it seemed at the moment that it was a theme of the past. Other political actions of Haider focused on destroying the corrupt system of the II Austrian Republic and a proposal to create a Third Republic with a presidential system. In 1997 FPÖ proposed a new programme in Linz. The first striking content is evocation to Christian values, something that the rather secular Third Camp never did before and to some extent it was an anti-clerical party⁵²⁴. Belonging to Christian Europe has to be understood in the context of Muslim migration. All in all the traditional landscape of Austria includes church bell-towers and not minarets. Between the liberal camp and the Church there is a supposed *Wertkonsens* – common values. Austria is mentioned only in the context of having a „right to a homeland” *Recht auf Heimat*. Heimat became the leitmotif of FPÖ – a new idea of Austro-patriotism emerged. Austro-patriotism includes: *the need to belong to Austria, a democratic state, with the rule of law and rights of man. It is a need to belong to Austria that protects its cultural heritage and its natural resources and landscapes. Austria is a country which developed in connection with German and European history, which possesses many specific (only for Austria) traditions and regional identities*⁵²⁵. Austro-patriotism also means the protection of various ethnic and national groups, including the German speaking minority in South Tirol, as well as all the German speaking populations of the countries of the former Soviet Bloc. Support is crucial for the economic and cultural survival of those communities⁵²⁶. The right for homeland expands the traditional understanding of nation in the Third Camp. While the majority of Austrians belonged to the German cultural circle, the Habsburg Empire was multinational: Germans, Croats, Roma, Slovaks, Slovenes, Czechs and Hungarians are all part of Austrian heritage and these groups have the right to develop their traditions and achievements. The coexistence of those groups created the specific separateness of Austria. At the same time the programme rejects immigration and multiculturalism (these mistakes should not be repeated on Austrian soil⁵²⁷). The last component of Austro-patriotism is ecology and protection of

523 *Freiheitliche Thesen zur politischen Erneuerung Österreichs* [in:] Sully M., *The Haider Phenomenon*, Nowy Jork, 1997, p. 50-52.

524 Das Parteiprogramm der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs

http://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/Contentpool/Portal/PDFs/Parteiprogramme/Parteiprogram_eng.pdf, p. 8, Access: 16.05. 2019.

525 Ibidem, p. 10.

526 Ibidem, p. 7.

527 Ibidem, p. 8. Haider had the French model of integration in mind.

traditional farming⁵²⁸. Later the programme states that Austrian school system should cherish the Austrian idiosyncrasy⁵²⁹. The Linz programme of 1997 did not bring many changes regarding the liberal part but when it comes to the German-national traditions it is revolutionary. FPÖ which was a Germanist formation since conception abandoned the German trenches and moved completely into the safe zone of the Austrian Alps. The 1997 programme may indeed support the idea that Austrians are actually ethnic Germans but the nation is considered as a statenation, a *demos* – where everyone can nourish his or her identity. The German cultural influence over Austria was reduced to one small mention that is not significant when compared to the descriptions of other imperial influences. The main motto of the programme shows where the important issues lie: *Österreich ist kein Einwanderungsland*.

The ideas of Heimat were continued in 2011 where FPÖ positions itself not as the national party in Austria but as *Soziale Heimatpartei*⁵³⁰. Populist policies completely transformed FPÖ – from liberalism it went into third-way socialism of Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder. The only German remark appears with the never-ending topic of South-Tirol. The move towards social-democracy and political centre seems to be stable and constant. The communitarian ideas of national (or maybe patriotic?) community took over the liberalism that was dominant in FPÖ for decades⁵³¹.

BZÖ was formed in 2005 and this party was just a one man show of Jörg Haider. With his death in 2008 the party slipped into insignificance. The party had no true political programme using slogans like *Den sozialen Weg gehen*. BZÖ was supposed to be *ideologiefrei aber zukunftsorientiert* – free of ideological influences and oriented towards the future⁵³². That future ended with the abrupt death of the party leader in a car crash. Before that Haider managed to publish two books that show a more personal account of a journey from a German nationalism to Austro-patriotism.

528 Ibidem, p. 28.

529 Ibidem, p. 114.

530 Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Graz 2011, https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_englisch_web.pdf.

⁵³¹ See: Król M., *Europa w obliczu końca*, Warszawa 2012. Król defines the major gaps in European cultural and political lives. The most important gap is between communitarian idea of democracy and singular (individual) liberalism. It seems that in the case of FPÖ the communitarian side had won the struggle and direct democracy is more important than liberalism.

532 The party programme of the BZÖ is accessible here: http://www.bzoe.at/assets/files/Programm_BZOE_WEB.pdf, Access: 16.05.2019.

Die Freiheit die ich meine the first of Haider's books was published in 1993, and the second one *Befreite Zukunft jenseits von links und rechts*, four years later in 1997. Those four years seem fundamental in the breakthrough in Haider's thinking, and since he was the charismatic leader of the Third Camp at the time he influenced the whole political party. The evolution of Haider's thinking is evident. The first book looks like scriptures of an opposition revolutionary, who wants to change the whole system. The second is a much calmer analysis of the political situation of the time. The first book is more of a manifesto the second one looks to the future problems in more detail. In 1988 Haider stated that the Austrian nation was a freak (child monster), *an ideological freak, you know, as well as I, that belonging to one nation is one thing and belonging to a state is another*⁵³³. (*Das wissen sie so gut wie ich, dass die österreichische Nation eine Missgeburt gewesen ist, eine ideologische Missgeburt, denn die Volkszugehörigkeit ist die eine Sache und die Staatszugehörigkeit ist die andere Sache*). The people who Haider lists as his inspiration are Margaret Thatcher, Karl Raymond Popper and Bruno Kreisky. He believes himself to be the heir of the revolution of 1848 and a radical liberal⁵³⁴. The revolts of 1848 combined both of Haider's ideological footholds: liberalism and nationalism, and were an expression of achieving national sovereignty. The claim for a democratic Germany is also of importance here. Liberalism is the core of Haider's ideology. The liberalism of John Stuart Mill, Robert Blum or Friedrich von Hayek is the answer to the problems of the XXth century (*Jahrhundert der Unfreiheit – age of unliberty*). The modern liberalism had nothing to do with its true roots and serves only to disintegrate society with hedonism, anarchy and egoism⁵³⁵. *The term liberty has always been connected with the responsibility for the community. There is no freedom without responsibility and limitations. The freedom of one ends when the freedom of another starts*⁵³⁶. It goes without saying that the community that Haider mentions means a nation. Nation became the symbol of liberal emancipation since the French Revolution. This was the true meaning of revolution that was distorted by Marx and his acolytes of the year 1968⁵³⁷. Modernity in Europe, continues Haider, expresses the will of national sovereignty. *The national identity is an exponent and at the same time the key to understand the variety of life. [...] Every nation aspired to national independenc. Every nation aspired to cultural and identity variety. Imperialisms such as the Soviet, French or Yugoslavian were successfully repelled*⁵³⁸. When Haider speaks about the

⁵³⁴ Haider J., *Die Freiheit die ich meine*, Frankfurt am Main 1993, p. 12.

⁵³⁵ Ibidem, p. 28.

⁵³⁶ Ibidem, p. 37.

⁵³⁷ Ibidem, p. 74.

freedom to choose an identity he mentions three levels: the level of family and friends, the spiritual-religious level as well as regional level and the belonging to a nation state as the final level. A national identity can only develop and flourish in the conditions of liberty. In such a way – the struggle for national identity is the struggle for freedom.

How does all that compare to the Austrian case? *There are only specific identities and specific nations. A man believes in the stupid idea of the Constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus), [...] Austrians were or are Celts, Illirians, Slovenians, Croats, Hungarians, Roma or Jews but in their majority they were Germans. From this multitude in the framework of German culture an independent identity was created, it is unchangeable and incomparable with any other! [...] The German elites threw the word nation from their dictionary. [...] German self-hate and national masochism is tragic and worthy only of pity. Us, as Austrians, do not want to participate in this. We want to go our own way*⁵³⁹ Austrians are the nation of the same culture (*Kulturnation*), as Germans but not the nation of the same constitution (*Verfassungsnation*). Haider continues his thought about the relations between Austrians and Germans in the next chapter which is devoted to the understanding of the past. He strongly criticises the mainstream historical narrative that the main proponents of which are ÖVP and SPÖ. He believed that: *a fiction is created that Austria was the „first victim of Hitler” and because of that the responsibility for the past disappears. [...] Because of that everything what happened in the years 1938-1945 is ascribed to a „different nation”, namely the Germans. Through this approach in the idea of the Austrian nation the ties to the German past are cut. Austrian history and identity is inseparably connected to the history of Germany*⁵⁴⁰. Haider later adds: *Austrians do not bear any collective guilt for this darkest chapter in history, but are as much responsible as the Germans. Such is the truth*⁵⁴¹. Haider does not shy away from the troubled past, he affirms it because it the only way to still be a part of the German nation and German culture. He accepts the baggage of history unapologetically. Perhaps in this context his controversial remarks about the „men of honour” make more sense. Haider concludes: *Who goes with me, supports FPÖ without brown stains. Supports also the lack of fear in discussions about the past and supports historical truth. Who goes with me supports FPÖ, which is distanced to the times of National Socialism, but which approaches the generation, that after bitter experiences managed to find the way to*

⁵³⁸ Ibidem, p. 78.

⁵³⁹ Ibidem, p. 82-83.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 113.

⁵⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 118.

democracy, with respect. [...] Who goes with me, chooses FPÖ, which presents not materialistic but cultural values, which is supporting respect towards minorities and which clearly distances itself from racism and anti-Semitism⁵⁴². Late on he adds: There is nothing to justify national-socialism. No normal man, who is sane, will pursue such a path⁵⁴³. The clear demarcation from the Nazi-past is the result of the scandal that resulted in Haider's controversial remarks about the benefits of employment policies of the Third Reich that costed him the seat of the governor of Carinthia. That is one explanation. The other given by prof. Klaus Ottomeyer from Klagenfurt states that what Haider did resembled Catholic sacrament of confession. When Haider spoke he did not speak to former Nazis, he spoke to the generation of the children and grandchildren of former National-Socialist. In a moment of expiation Haider proposed a *kollektiver Unschuld* – a collective plea of being not-guilty⁵⁴⁴. In meta-cultural terms Haider played the role of the prophet Jesus – by taking the whole guilt on himself, he lifted the burden of the Austrian population⁵⁴⁵. The ability to play with cultural roles and skilfully use pop-cultural references (like a Robin Hood carnival costume – stealing from the rich, fighting the establishment) Haider became such a successful politician.

Having established what the Austrian nation meant for Haider, he enumerated the troubles and dangers that threatened it: multicultural society and Islam, which in his views is incompatible with Western democracy and its values. The rest of the book is devoted to the project of the Third Austrian Republic. The fight for the renewal of Austria is a cultural war – a *Kulturkampf of the XXIst century*⁵⁴⁶.

Befreite Zukunft jenseits von links und rechts appeared only 4 years later after *De Freiheit die ich meine* and the book is a clear love letter to the electorate of the Social-Democrats. While in the previous book Haider was a revolutionary in the second one he is a timid reformer who wants to co-govern Austria. Gone is the project of the Third Republic. The main focus is the problems with global capitalism and the situation of the workers.

⁵⁴² Ibidem, p. 118

⁵⁴³ Ibidem, p. 117.

⁵⁴⁴ Ottomeyer K., *Die Haider Show. Zur Psychopolitik der FPÖ*, Klagenfurt 2000, p. 65.

⁵⁴⁵ Ottomeyer K., *Jörg Haider. Mythenbildung und Erbschaft*, Klagenfurt 2009, p. 80 After his death Haider achieved a cult status. A relic was made out of his crashed car. A bridge was named after him and a museum displaying his private belongings erected in Klagenfurt, the capital of Carinthia. There was even a petition to the Pope to beatify Haider. Because a hero could not die in an unhonourable way – while driving under the influence of alcohol many conspiracy theories were devised instead. See: Wisniewski G., *Jörg Haider. Unfall, Mord oder Attentat*, 2009.

Haider proposes a project similar to the Third Way of Tony Blair's New Labour⁵⁴⁷. The main source of inspiration for Haider is once again Bruno Kreisky, this time without the company of Margaret Thatcher. *FPÖ, writes Haider, is in many ways in the position of the old socialdemocracy from the Kreisky era. We are a social and democratic freedom party. We want less Marxism, but more social market economy. We want less levelling down, but more development. We want less group egoism and more community. We want less clerks and more democracy for nations instead*⁵⁴⁸. Even the crucial idea of liberty is presented in the context of social welfare: *Without social safety there is no freedom, and without freedom there is no social safety. Then only tutelage and administration that breaks human dignity exist*⁵⁴⁹. The rest of the book is a plea to get rid of the ideological fossils like neo-liberalism and socialism. There should be policy without left and right, as there should be social policy without socialism. Ideologies are just substitutes for religions. Instead of ideologies specific problems need to be addressed in an efficient way⁵⁵⁰. FPÖ should pursue a new path that will be open to all sides and not limited by any ideological straight-jackets. The future belongs to freedom and movements that represent it. The future belongs to parties that can enter coalitions not with other parties but with their voters⁵⁵¹. The populism that Haider employed as a political strategy changed his worldview and steered him into the realm of direct democracy. Haider was a herald of a new era of populism that reached the surface after the 2008 financial crisis and the crisis in the Euro-zone. This populism however let him abandon the traditional pan-German views of his political camp. If the majority of the population did not want something than he would not pursue this kind of policy. The process of Austrian nation building was a success. It hard to find better evidence for the failure of the pan-German movement in Austria than the almost complete abandonment of the topic by the major opposition force. FPÖ lost the battle for the German soul of Austria but by this they have one the political battle for power. FPÖ is once again in government of Austria and its nation.

3.4. Closing comments

The analysis of the activity of political actors and their use of state institution in nation-

⁵⁴⁷ Haider J., *Befreite Zukunft jenseits von links und rechts*, Vienna 2001, p. 87.

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 30.

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 29, 34,

⁵⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

building processes show how political elites use the requirements of a modern administrative state in the nation building process. The phases of nation building by the elites could be divided into two: the radical phase that ended symbolically in 1955 with the State Treaty and adoption of neutrality. Then came the appeasement phase – soft nation building. . The first phase was the most significant as it was this decade that influenced the main narratives the most. This is the most evident when it comes to education. The teaching programmes as well schoolbooks that were prepared in the 50ties continued to influence another post-war generation of Austrians for more than thirty years. The Austria as victim myth was reinforced by anti-German legislation that forbid using the very term German at schools or the existence of German associations. The elites devised several symbols for the new nation which include neutrality, devotion to high-culture etc. The politics of demarcation from Germany can be seen in surprising places like with the example of 23 Austrian-German terms that need to be used in legal texts of the European Union. The conservative camp was the one that led the Austrian political elites through the radical period of nation-building from 1945 to 1955. The socialists and later social-democrats decided to roll with these types of policies despite their traditional pan-German attitudes. While after 1955 the politics of consensus required toning down the topic and issue of Austrian nation all the policies that were set in motion during the radical period were still in force. At the same time an insignificant opposition in the form of the national-liberal movement tried to oppose the idea of a distinct Austrian nation but with little success. Only after 1986: the Waldheim affair and the introduction of populist policies of Jörg Haider the main narratives started to change. The national-liberals adopted a more Austrianist Heimat approach and the political and historical discussions were now much more balanced and nuanced. The Austrian nation could afford the discussion about its founding myths and possibly a reconfiguration of national myths. They were most useful in the first radical phase and done their job. The vision of the nation shared among the political elites was firstly that of a cultural one, even ethnic in some instances. The Austrians were supposed to come from a different Germanic tribe than the rest of the Germans and this was enough to justify the existence of the Austrian nation. As the socialists gained power the shift from *Kulturnation* to a political nation (*demos*) became more and more evident. Even the national-liberal opposition accepted Austrians as a political nation of different cultural backgrounds but predominantly German. An Austrian version of *Verfassungspatriotismus* was the result of the state nation building. Fritz Fellner said that Austrians are the last “old nation” of Europe, but his perspective is Western and limited to state nations. There are also old and historical culture nations in existence (like the Polish one). Austrian nation-building process started with

the foundations for a *Kulturnation* but quickly the process became automated by the state with judicial, educational and symbolical policies. Thus a state-nation of the Western type with elements of *Kulturnation* was formed. At the same time the state driven commemorations and symbolism does not evoke much emotion and does not sway the general population. The general narratives are accepted by the Austrian society but the level of national integration is superficial.

4. Conclusions and closing comments

Insel der Seligen – *The isle of the blessed* is an unofficial name for the Alpine Republic of Austria. It shows Austria as a country of happy people. While the term can be traced back to early medieval period it was Bruno Kreisky who reformulated an old *topos* with new meaning: A state of developed social market economy with high standards of living. In 2007 The Economist – wrote a piece on Austrian economy titled *The sound of success* (a call back to the famous musical *Sounds of Music* that takes place in Nazi occupied Austria). The nation-building processes of the Austrian elites: historians, politicians *et consortes* is another success of the isle of the blessed. In 1956 only 49% of Austrian citizens believed that Austrians are a people (Volk) of their own, while 46% believed that Austrians were a part of the German people⁵⁵². In 1964 people who believed that Austrians were a nation or were becoming a nation was as high as 70,4%. Only 15.3% expressed the view that Austrians are not a nation. The numbers went up in 1970 when 82% believed that Austrians are or are becoming a nation and only 8% believed that they are not. In 1994 survey the vast majority of 86% believed that Austrians were or were becoming a nation. The number of people rejecting the idea of Austrian nation capped at 8%⁵⁵³. When asked the question if:

1. Nationhood was based upon people's endorsement of the state in which they live; even if these people spoke different languages as for example in Switzerland
2. Nationhood is based upon a common language; no matter, if the people speaking the language live in one or more states

70% chose the first answer and 28% answered the second option⁵⁵⁴. This question does not however take the feeling of Austrian German dialects as distinct from the German dialects of Germany. The surveys mentioned above lead to the conclusion that the acceptance of German culture as one's own is more common among Austrians than the feeling of being part of the German nation (which is estimated at 5-8%).

Other surveys show that the acceptance of Austrian nation was higher among the voters of SPÖ (79,5%) and ÖVP (74,5%) than that of FPÖ (44%). The rejection of Austrian nation among voters also shows the distinction with SPÖ (8.7%) ÖVP (11,4%) and FPÖ

⁵⁵² Wagner G., *Österreich Zweite Republik*, Vienna, Thaur 1987, p. 2:1432

⁵⁵³ Op.cit.Ibidem, p. 1433-1436. Thaler, *The Ambivalence of Identity*, West Lafayette 2000 p. 167-168.

⁵⁵⁴ Op cit. Ibidem, p. 173

(53%)⁵⁵⁵. The poll was conducted in 1965/1966. The electoral results of FPÖ at the time were around 5%, so the high number of people rejecting the idea of Austrian nation and embracing the Germanist approach did not constitute a significant part of the society. In 1990 in a world survey about national pride Austria ranked as the second most proud nation. The first place was occupied by the Polish⁵⁵⁶.

The creation of the Austrian nation was a success and there are various scientific inquiries in what the Austrian national identity actually entails. Olivier Rathkolb lists the most important aspects:

1. Pro-Western neutrality
2. Demarcation vis-à-vis Germany and Eastern Europe
3. Demarcation vis-à-vis the Slavic roots
4. The Austrian welfare state – a community of solidarity
5. Austria as a nation of culture⁵⁵⁷

Rathkolb correctly identifies the neutrality as the key component of Austrian's identity. The topic has resurfaced in the education policies of the Second Austrian Republic. The year 1955 is presented as the true moment of liberation, independence and sovereignty. The economic hardships of the years 1945-1955 can be attributed to the Allied occupation of Austria, with the economic development came also the neutrality and the two are now intertwined. Austria saw unprecedented progress since 1955 developing a stable, high-wage, social market economy. The importance of the era of Bruno Kreisky was the introduction of developed social policies that served as integration. The education policies also show the idealised vision of Austria as the nation of (high) culture and natural beauty. The demarcation from Germany is more evident is the stance of historians and politicians especially in the first decade after 1945. The not so evident point 3 – the demarcation vis-à-vis the Slavic roots is also traceable. While the historians are aware of the mixed ethnic composition of Austria and used that fact as an argument against Austria being German – the Slavic part of Austrian history is often overlook if not absent from the school curriculum. The politicians interviewed by Bluhm show an ethnic understanding of their national ancestry and trace it back to

⁵⁵⁵ Op.cit Bruckmüller E, p. 62.

⁵⁵⁶ Rathkolb O., *The Paradoxical Republic. Austria 1945-2005*, New York Oxford 2014 p. 6.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibidem, p. 1-25.

Germanic tribes of Bayuvaren not to the mix of Illirians, Celts and Slavs⁵⁵⁸. The Slavic components of history are also usually absent in the history books for schools.

Ruth Wodak with her research team analysed the discursive identity and after the investigation concluded that to be part of Austrian nation means in general to be an Austrian citizen, to be proud of the social and economic achievements of the state, to be glad for the peace (in the context of wars in former Yugoslavia), and only then comes the first symbol of the neutrality. Wodak constitutes that Austrians feel more multi-cultural than mono-ethnic (Germanic) about themselves. Austrians are proud of their natural beauty and ecologic policies, the political stability (which is partially a myth perpetrated by the politics of consensus) and successes in sports. The symbols that people usually adhere to are the anthem and the flag. Wodak summarises the work by naming the Austrians as a “state nation” with components of cultural nation (encountered in informal discourse, almost absent from the official one) and to some extent an essentialist nation – especially connected to the strong feeling of regionalism and Heimat. In one point Wodak would agree with Rathkolb the Austrians give little place for minorities in their national understanding and mostly identify with the German-speaking majority. Especially the Carinthian Slovenians are mentally kept at a distance from the Austrian nation⁵⁵⁹. In broader terms Austrians feel that the immigrants from the south (Balkans) East and the Islamic regions are foreigners and not Austrians, despite their long stay in the country. Wodak also finds out that the demarcation against Germany is still a prevalent component of the Austrian identity. It is most easily identifiable in the use of the Austrian dialect in Austria in such a way as *Hochdeutsch* is used in Germany. The different wording is crucial as exemplified with the case of the legal texts in the EU. Austrians also have a rather negative attitude of the Habsburg-monarchy seeing it as chaotic and full of strife, quarrels, political infighting and eventually a failed state. The national myths are concentrated on the years 1945-1955 (liberation, neutrality). The periods of the First Republic as well as times *Ostmark* are taboo and not eagerly talked about. Those times are a part of collective “un-memory”. It is clear that from the discursive analysis the Austrian nation starts in the period after the Second World War. The Austria as victim myth is still prevalent despite the changes done in the historiography and academia. The politicians still

⁵⁵⁸ This is even more evident in the border land of Carinthia which is home to a Slovenian minority. It is no coincidence that this land sees the most pro-German stances in all of Austria. For more see: Bigham J., *The politics of memory in the Austrian province of Carinthia: How distinctive are the collective memories of the three main political parties of Carinthia?*, doctoral thesis defended at University of Aberdeen, 2008.

⁵⁵⁹ Wodak, *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität*, Frankfurt am Main 1998, p. 487-490.

continue to follow the path set by Felix Kreissler and focus on the Austrian resistance against the Nazis.

What does that all mean for the theoretical level? In his analysis Peter Thaler promised to deliver an answer but never actually delivered. Firstly the easiest confrontation would be with the ideal type of the nation of Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska. A nation should have:

1. *A name (own or given by others but accepted by the community).*
2. *Language, which is treated as a mother tongue*
3. *Territory (also called motherland), which is inhabited by at least a part of the nation*
4. *A belief in common ancestry*
5. *Own history*
6. *Own culture in which a significant part of the community participates and identifies with*
7. *Own state or a desire to pose a sovereign state organization*
8. *A feeling of emotional bond*
9. *A feeling of otherness towards other communities and the feeling of worth*⁵⁶⁰

The Austrians in the First Republic did have a name, but it was interchanged with Austrian-Germans (1) but did not consider their language distinct from German (2). The national territory was regarded as divided into several Germanic states (3). Also the belief of common ancestry, history and own culture was shared by the Germans (4,5,6). Austrians possessed the state but had no desire to continue in possessing it (7). The emotional bond was also shared with Germans and there was no true feeling of otherness (8,9). If using the framework of Budyta-Budzyńska it becomes evident that there could be no talk of Austrian nation in the times of 1918-1938. Not one point is truly fulfilled in that case. When looking at the period since 1945 it becomes evident that that situation was drastically different. The name became distinct to the point that every mention of German was rejected (1). The language, while shared with the rest of Germans is treated as a distinct dialect and codified that way. The case of *Hurdestani – Unterrichtssprache* is further evidence that effort was put into making a clear demarcation from German while still using it – a truly schizoid development (2). The territory is clearly distinct now and it can be seen in the works of Austrian historians as well as


⁵⁶⁰ Ibidem, p 30-31.

schoolbooks that the current shape of the state is projected into the past creating a false sense of continuity (3). The belief in common ancestry is more complex – while the historians did their best to highlight the non-Germanic components of the Austrian ethnic composition, the political elites focused on the distinct German tribal differences. This created tensions between the understanding of Austrians as a state nation or *Kulturnation*. The path of *Kulturnation* had to lead to the inevitable acceptance of German influences in Austria and the state-nation was much safer territory (4). While in fact most of Austrian history was shared in one form or another with Germany the predominant narrative uses every instance of semi-independent or independent statehood to justify the existence of a separate nation. The myth serves its function (5). The insurance of using high-culture with a mixture of regional components is prevalent in the works of historians, in school textbooks, in the visions and actions of politicians and used on the currencies. The myth of Austrian nation as a nation of high-culture is one of the most significant components of national identity (6). The possession of one's state was a key component of the Austrian politicians, especially in the period of 1945-1955. The State Treaty and Neutrality are the cornerstones of the Austrian – state nation identity with immense symbolical influence. Politicians and their politics of commemoration are centered on regaining of sovereignty. The narrative is prevalent especially in schoolbooks. The point 7 of the ideal type of national identity perhaps is the strongest difference from the period of 1918-1938. The strict policy was introduced by the Allied powers during the post-war years and the political elites of Austria accepted this with little to no opposition. While the FPÖ tried to undermine the idea of the existence of the separate nation it never broke the politics of consensus and tried to advocate the unification with Germany. The legal enforcement proved critical in this regard. The *Historikerstreit* following Karl Dietrich Erdmann's publication shows that there is consensus also among historians (even if some of them accept the vision of Austrians as a German – cultural nation, there will to have an independent Austria is never broken)⁵⁶¹(7). The feeling of bond and the clear demarcation from Germans is the result of the policies introduced by the politics of consensus of the two main political parties. Even the traditionally pro-German Third Camp had to reject their German-national ideas in favour of more locally understood identity. (8,9). In the case of the Austrian nation after 1945 all the points of Budyta-Budzyńska are fulfilled positively with the

⁵⁶¹ Perhaps the myth of Austria as better Germany was helpful in that point. The understanding of being better was predominantly an economical one and it was a shock when in 2017 the statistic showed that Germany is a more developed economy with higher-wages and social security programmes. Notice the intertextual play of calling Austria a better Germany. On the one hand it justifies the existence of the Austrian state as it is doing better than its German counterpart and yet at the same time accepts the premise that it is a German state. See: <https://www.agenda-austria.at/warum-oesterreich-nicht-mehr-das-bessere-deutschland-ist/>

exception of point 4 which is more blurry and complex but does not hinder the general outlook. The Austrian nation is positively confirmed as fulfilling the requirements of the ideal type of a nation.

The narratives that were created and used by the historians and politicians cannot be attributed to one subgroup of approaches towards nation formation summarized in the graph below:



The two major subgroups of historical narratives that shine through the graph are on the opposite edges of the primordial-natural and constructivist-historical axis. This is hardly a surprise. This process can be traced in historiographies of other nations but it was usually spread out much more broadly across the time. In the Austrian case the constructivist turn away from primordialism took just 30 years - a generation. The other mixes of possibilities are more of an intellectual curiosity (even if of highest quality). It also has to be noted that the border between the natural axis and primordial/historical is less obvious than the graph shows and for instance Massiczek has to be listed in both categories. Also noteworthy all the historians writing from the outside perspective (from the Anglo-Saxon world) are predominantly constructivists and were so before the constructivist turn in Austria. Most historians understood the Austrian nation as a cultural one – only after the constructivist turn it became treated as a state/political nation. Olivier Rathkolb and Anont Pelinka are the best

examples. Ernst Bruckmüller could be as well, if it were not for his ahistorical projections of the Austrian nation into the past (even if done within the constructivist framework).

The political elites in their majority perceived the Austrian nation as their own construct – something that was the result of their successful policies, and as a political tool to mobilise the voters. The exceptions from this consensus came from the early stage of ÖVP (in the years of 1945-1955) when the fierce anti-Germanism and a cultural understanding of the nation were predominant among the conservatives – which is best exemplified by Missong's writings. The interviews conducted by Bluhm also show that lower tier politicians had no problem with identifying Austrians even in ethnic terms. Nevertheless the projects of ethnic and cultural Austrian nation were burdened with the danger of bringing the Germans too close. The cultural and ethnic similarities were historically too close. Only the acceptance of the political nation could guarantee the achievement of the main goal: demarcation from Germany. The same can be said about the constructivist approach – if there was no longer any need to justify the historical existence of the Austrian nation there were no obstacles from showing that it was in fact constructed after 1945. This consensus was slowly accepted even by the national-liberal Third Camp. The FPÖ eventually in the 90ties accepted Austrians as a political nation. Perhaps it was the persistence of the Germanist camp that the cultural idea of the nation was rejected as inconvenient.

Let us examine now the process of Austrian nation making according to theories. Firstly the model of Józef Chlebowczyk will be confronted with the Austrian example:

	Focus	Main process	Social development	Political expression
Phase I	Language and culture	Standardization of language	Ethnic-linguistic group -> nationality	The right for linguistic self-determination
Phase II	Political	Development of historical consciousness	Nationality-> a) nation b) national minority	Right for national self-determination

Phase II	Stage “a”	Internal sovereignty	The right for national self-determination
	Stage “b”	External sovereignty (borders)	The right of a nation for self-determination

The Austrian case seems to follow the pattern outlined by Chlebowczyk. However upon more detailed inspection it turns out that the Phase I was very short and superficial. While the establishment of the canon of Austrian culture was not that difficult concerning the heritage of the Habsburg Empire the language issue proved problematic – there were attempts at trying to disavow German but not as a language but as a name. The Hurdestani issue is the best example. The official support for regional dialect and the making of the Bavarian-Austrian dialect as standard language serves the purpose. The work of historians shows that there was a need for narratives that projected not only the Austrian historical consciousness but also the Austrian statehood into the past. As for the Phase II the political struggle of the years 1945-1955, and to some extent the myth of the resistance in the years of 1938-1945 construct the bulk of the Phase II – the struggle for sovereignty. The signing of the State Treaty became the pivotal date in the main narratives both in schoolbooks as well as in political symbolism. The goal of the national movement was established – self-determination. That is why Vienna has one of the most monumental statues honoring the Red Army – which is treated as a liberator and not as occupation force. Liberation from Nazi Germany was the first step for national sovereignty, the Neutrality was the final act of the national struggle. In this sense the Austrians seem to be a typical example of nation making processes and policies according to Chlebowczyk. The one thing that stands out is the short time period of the process that took barely the time of one (or one and a half) generation. Also worth mentioning because it was a state driven process – there was a state before there was a nation Austrians fall into the Chlebowczyk category of Western European nation-making and not the Central-Eastern nations.

Hroch’s phases A-B-C (elites - mass mobilisation - politicisation) occurred in Austria simultaneously showing the fact that Austria had a developed social structure in 1945 and was a latecomer to the nation-building processes. While it were the elites, as usually started the nation formation the mass participation in political life as well as a high development level contributed to the fact that there could be no distinction of phases in the Austrian case (maybe

the elite phase A could be distinguished but it would last only for a short period of time and there is little merit in doing so).

However Hroch's typology of the models of the timeline of nation-formation show one interesting thing. The Austrian model according to Hroch's typology would look like this:

PP – IR-/AB/BC/BR - NS⁵⁶²

The economic history of Austria shows that the industrialisation levels in the Austro-Hungarian Empire were high they did not occur in the core Austrian lands of the Empire (with the exception of Styria). It was the times of the *Ostmark* and then the use of Marshall Plan funds in modernisation of the economy and thus social structure that finally allowed the formation of the modern Austrian nation. All the prerequisites: Industrial Revolution (IR), the arrival of constitutionality and democracy (BR) as well as phases of elites/mass mobilisation/politicisation (ABC/PP) led to the achievement of sovereignty (NS). The processes here described. While the political structure developed much earlier even in the times of the Habsburg Empire – it was not accompanied (yet) by a modern societal structure. The industrialisation started before the phases of political agitation but continued to happen simultaneously after 1945. Because all of the processes happened in a short time span – the Austrian model of nation making should be framed as: delayed simultaneous nation formation. The catalyst for the creation of the Austrian post-war nation was the trauma of Nazi rule and even more importantly the trauma of the Second World War. As Budyta-Budzyńska and Hroch pointed out – war and trauma as well as an existence of conflict of interest

⁵⁶² See Chapter 1.6.2 to recall Hroch's typology:

Transformation within national movements:

1. Beginning of national agitation (phase A-B)
2. Transition from national agitation to mass movement (phase B-C)
3. Adoption and presentation of political programmes (PP)
4. Establishment of statehood or autonomy (NS)

Transformation within modernisation:

5. Arrival of democratisation and constitutionality (BR)
6. Industrial revolution (IR)

are among the major factors that start and then lead populations through the process of national emergence.

Another question that needs to be answered is the role of nationalism in Austrian nation-building. Anton Pelinka believes that the Austrian nation was devised without nationalism. But if we were to treat this term in a more neutral way, as Gellner, did than the modernisation processes of the Austrian economy would prove his thesis. The change in society was first and then came the nation. The negative anti-German attitude that was noticeable in the decade of 1945-1955 could constitute some ersatz of nationalism. The negative emotion towards everything that was German was transformed into a positive identity of belonging to the Austrian state. This process was noticed by Ruth Wodak in her discourse analysis.

The main historical narratives of Austrian historians exemplify the main myths of Topolski's categorisation of narratives. First of all the historiography is based predominantly on the myth of revolution – the revolutionary moment being the long occupation of the years 1938-1945. The strict categorisation shows that everything that happened before the revolutionary period is considered inferior – that is true especially when talking about the First Austrian Republic. This meta-narrative of Topolski also explains why there is a strong reluctance to identify with the earlier periods and the imperial past. Both the socialists and the liberals adhere to the fight against monarchy, and the conservatives remain silent on the topic because of their complicity in the crimes of the Austro-fascist regime which for the sake of consensus are better to be left alone. Another meta-narrative is the myth of the sublime but only in regard of the Austrian high-culture, one of the cornerstones of modern Austrian national identity.

What lessons for the theory does the Austrian example bring? It seems that the Austrian nation confirms the constructivist (modernist) theories. Peter Thaler proved in his book that there is little merit when talking about an Austrian nation before 1945. At the same time the rules of Paul James's abstract communities are the same whether they happen among the Austrian population that considered itself German in 1918 or Austrian in 1960. James's approach however does not show the true content of change of national identity, as well as the transition period. Anthony Smith's ethno-symbolism is only partially true. While some Austrianist historians tried to find as much continuity in the population that inhabits the territories that now constitute Austria this did not lead to the formation of an Austrian nation,

even when including the ahistorical constructs of Bruckmüller like the *Hofratsnation*. On the other hand the primordialists do have a point. There would be no Austrian nation without the tradition of the existence of Austrian statehood. Contradictory to what Heer wrote – the expansion of the Habsburgs into the Protestant Czech lands and other provinces made Austria a centre of the Empire thus creating a group of elites that were always interested in keeping Austria as a separate state – as shown by Katzenstein. The structural factors of being separate were not enough though. It was only the trauma of *Anschluss and war*, a dream come true in a nightmarish form. Had the Third Reich won World War II there probably would not be an Austrian nation, but history showed otherwise. Austrian nation was created out of necessity. Austria was not a subject but an object of history since 1938 and the decisions regarding the country and its population were made elsewhere – among the Allies. The Allies policy found avid followers among the Austrian conservatives but also among several socialists and even communists. In the most crucial phase of nation building it were the conservatives from ÖVP that set the tone. The socialists had a more moderating effect since the mid-sixties transforming the Austrian nation into a political one. The political elites begun their labour and delivered an Austrian nation in the time-span of one generation – quite an achievement.

The existence of the Austrian nation nowadays is beyond doubt, but the Austrian national identity is not without its problems. Because the nation-formation processes were so rapid the results are superficial. Oliver Rathkolb points out that in the era of globalisation and its problems many Austrians prefer to shelter themselves in the safe cluster of regional identities (which are supported geopolitically through the remoteness of Austrian valleys and mountains that separate the regions). At the same time a small but significant part of Austrian society exhibits a lean towards cosmopolitanism – either European or global⁵⁶³. The Austrian identity was the strongest in the 1980ties, and then slowly started to give way to regional identities – a fact which was used by Jörg Haider to gain electoral success, especially in the land of Carinthia. The weak turnout and involvement in national celebrations like the thousand years of Austria in 1995-1996 as well as the celebrations of fifty years of neutrality show that the society is not that engaged emotionally in their national identity. In fact the neutrality is perhaps the best metaphor for the Austrian national identity – it is as Robert Musil wrote - without qualities⁵⁶⁴.

⁵⁶³ Rathkolb O., *The paradoxical Republic*, New York, Oxford 2014, p. 24-25.

⁵⁶⁴ Musil's most famous books is *Man without qualities*, it depicts a story of a man who leaves it to the outer world to shape him, as he does not find sufficient incentive to do it himself.

Bibliography

- Achs O., Adelmaier W., Schnell H., *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, Vienna 1988.
- Ackerl I., *Die großdeutsche Volkspartei 1920-1934*, Vienna 1967.
- Acton J., *Nationality*, [in:] *The Home and Foreign Review*, London 1862
- Alter P., *Nationalism*, London 1991
- Anderson B., *Imagined communities*, London, New York 2006.
- Andics H., *50 Jahre unseres Lebens. Österreichs Schicksal seit 1918*, Vienna 1968.
- Andics H., *Der Staat, den keiner wollte: Österreich 1918-1938*, Vienna 1962.
- Andrzejewski P., *Paradoks narodowego liberalism, Historia i idee Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, *Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki* 2014 nr 22.
- Andrzejewski P., *O zasadności stosowania teorii postkolonialnej w badaniach nad historią Europy Środkowej*, [w:] *Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki t.2*, 2017.
- Ardelt R., *Zwischen Demokratie und Faschismus. Deutschnationales Gedankengut in Österreich 1919-1930*, Vienna 1972.
- Ardrey Robert, *The territorial imperative*. New York 1966.
- Armstrong J., *Nations before nationalisms*, Chapel Hill 1982.
- Assmann J., *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis*, Munich 1992.
- Bader W., *Austria between East and West, 1945-1955* Stanford 1966.
- Bailer-Galanda B., *Haider wörtlich. Führer in di Dritte Republik*, Vienna 1995.
- Bauer O., *The question of nationalities and social democracy*, Minneapolis 2000.
- Bauman Z., *Ponowoczesność jako źródło cierpień*, Warszawa 2000.
- Bauman Z., *Socjologia*, Poznań 1996.
- Becker J., Hillgruber A., (ed.) *Die Deutsche Frage in 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert*, Munich 1983.
- Berchtold K. (ed.), *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868-1966*, Vienna, 1967.
- Berger F., Löbenstein E., Schnell Z., *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, Vienna 1957.

- Berger F., Löbenstein E., Schnell Z., *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, Vienna 1967.
- Berger F., Löbenstein E., Schnell Z., *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, Vienna 1968.
- Berger F., Löbenstein E., Schnell Z., *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen*, Vienna 1977.
- Berger F., Löbenstein E., Schnell Z., *Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen. Arbeitsbuch*, Vienna 1977.
- Billig M., *Banal nationalism*, London 2004.
- Bischof G., Pelinka A., (ed.) *Contemporary Austrian Studies 3: Austria in the Nineteen Fifties*, New Brunswick 1995.
- Bischof G., Pelinka A., (ed.) *Contemporary Austrian Studies 5: Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity*, New Brunswick 1997.
- Bischof G., Pelinka A., Karlhofer F. (ed.), *Contemporary Austrian Studies 7, The Vranitzky Era in Austria*, New Brunswick 1999.
- Bigham J., *The politics of memory in the Austrian province of Carinthia: How distinctive are the collective memories of the three main political parties of Carinthia?*, University of Aberdeen, 2008.
- Bluhm W., *Building an Austrian nation*, New Haven, London 1973.
- Bodi L., Thompson P., (ed.) *Das Problem Österreichs*, Clayton 1982.
- Borodajkewycz T., *Wegmarken der geschichte Österreichs*, Vienna 1972.
- Born H., *Für die Richtigkeit Kurt Waldheim*, Munich 1987.
- Bottomore, T.B., *Elites and society*, London 1964.
- Botz G., Sprengnagel G., (ed.) *Kontroversen um Österreichs Zeitgeschichte*, Frankfurt am Main 1994.
- Braunthal J., *The Tragedy of Austria*, London 1948.
- Breully J., *Nationalism and the state*, New York 1982.
- Breully J., Introduction to: Gellner E., *Naród i nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 2009.
- Brückmüller E., *Nation Österreich. Kulturelles Bewußtsein und gesellschaftlich-politische Prozesse*, Vienna 1996.
- Budyta-Budzyńska M., *Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych*, Warszawa 2010. Brubaker R., *Nacjonalizm inaczej. Struktura narodowa i kwestie narodowe w nowej Europie*, Warszawa-Karków 1998.

- Bukey E., *Hitler's Austria: Popular sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945*, Chapel Hill 2000
- Burghard A., Matis H., *Die Nation-Werdung Österreichs*, Vienna 1976.
- Carsten F., *Faschismus in Österreich. Von Schönerer zu Hitler*, Munich 1978.
- Cartsen F., *The first Austrian Republic 1918-1938*, Aldershot 1986.
- Carrier P., Fuchs E., Messinger T., *The International status of education about the Holocaust: a global mapping of textbooks and curricula*, 2014
- Chałubiński M. (ed.), *Idee a urzędzeni świata społecznego*, Warszawa 1999.
- Chlebowczyk J., *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów*, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983.
- Chodubski A., *Wstęp do badań politologicznych*, Gdańsk 2008.
- Cronin A., *Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria*, Ithaca 1986.
- Csaky M., *Wie deutsch ist Österreich – eine ewiggeistrige Frage?*, *Die Presse*, 21 December 1985.
- Czernin H., *Der Haider-Macher. Franz Vranitzky und das Ende der alten Republik*, Vienna 1997.
- Dachs H., *Österreichische Geschichtswissenschaft und Anschluß 1918-1930*, Vienna, Salzburg 1974.
- Deletant D., Hanak H., *Historians as NationßBuilders: Central and South-East Europe*, London 1988.
- Deutsch K., *Nationalism and social communication*, Cambridge 1953.
- Deutsch K., Folz W, (ed.) *Nation-building*, New York 1966.
- Dijk (van) T., (ed.) *Dyskurs jako struktura i proces*, , Warszawa 2001.
- Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes (ed.) *Widerstand inf Verfolgung in Wien 1934-1945*, Vienna 1975.
- Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes (ed.) *Rechtsextremismus in Österreich nach 1945*, Vienna 1981.
- Du Gay P., Hall S., *Questions of Cultural Identity*, Los Angeles 209
- Ehalt H., *Ausdrucksformen absolutistischer Herrschaft. Der Wiener Hof im. 17. Und 18. Jarhundert*, Vienna 1979.
- Duszak A., (ed.): *Krytyczna analiza dyskursu* , Kraków 2000.

- Engelbrecht H., *Geschichte des österreichischen Bildungswesens. Band 5*, Vienna 1988.
- Erdmann, K., *Die Spur Österreichs in der deutschen Geschichte*, Zurich 1989.
- Eriksen T., *Etniczność i nacjonalizm*, Kraków 2013.
- Fellner F., *The problem of the Austrian Nation after 1945*, [in:] *The Journal of Modern History* 60 (1988).
- Fellner F., Schmidt G. *Ende ohne Epoche der Deutschen Geschichte?* [in:] *Zeitgeschichte*, Vienna 1977.
- Fiedor K., *Austria: zarys dziejów politycznych*, Łódź 1996.
- Figl L., *Reden für Österreich*, Vienna 1965.
- Focault M., *Porządek dyskursu*, Gdańsk 2000.
- Friedjung F., *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland 1859-1866*, Stuttgart 1897-98.
- Fuchs A., *Geistige Strömungen in Österreich 1867-1918*, Vienna 1949.
- Garscha W., Schindler Ch., (ed.) *Arbeiterbewegung und nationale Identität*, Vienna 1994.
- Geertz C., *Old Societies and New States*, New York 1973.
- Gehl J., *Austria, Germany and the Anschluß 1931-1938*, London 1963.
- Gehler M., Sickinger H., (ed.) *Politische Affären und Skandale in Österreich. Von Mayerling bis Waldheim*, Thaur 1996.
- Gellner E., *Narody i nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 2009.
- Giddens A., *The Nation-State and Violence*, Cambridge 1985.
- Giddens A., *Power, Property, State*, 1981.
- Giddens A., *Nowoczesność i tożsamość*, Warszawa 2001.
- Goldinger W., *Geschichte der Republik Österreich*, Vienna 1962.
- Görlich E., *Die österreichische Nation und der Widerstand*, Vienna 1967.
- Görlich E., *The Celtic background of Austria*, [in:] *Celtic Yearbook* 1970, Dublin 1970.
- Graver E., *Rethoric and essentially contested arguments* [in:] *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 11 (3).

- Greenfield L., *Nationalism. Five roads to modernity*, Cambridge, London 1992.
- Haller M (ed.), *Identität und Nationalstolz der Österreicher*, Wien-Köln-Weimar 1996.
- Hack Ch., *Alpiner Skisport und die Erfindung der Österreichischen Nation 1945 – 1964*, Karl-Franzes University of Graz, 2013
- Haider J., *Die Freiheit die ich meine*, Frankfurt am Main 1993.
- Haider J., *Befreite Zukunft jenseits von links und rechts*, Vienna 2001.
- Hayes C., *The historical evolution of modern Nationalism*, New York 1931.
- Hamilton W., *The genetical evolution of social behaviour*, Journal of Theoretical biology 7 (1964).
- Hanisch E., *Die Ideologie des politischen Katholizismus in Österreich 1918-1938*, Vienna, Salzburg 1977.
- Hanisch E., *Der lange Schatten des Staates. Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert.*, Vienna 1994.
- Hantsch H., *Österreich: Eine Deutung seiner Geschichte und Kultur*, Innsbruck 1934.
- Hantsch H., *Österreichs Schicksalweg*, Innsbruck 1934.
- Hantsch H., *Geschichte Österreichs*, Graz 1953.
- Hayes C., *The historical evolution of modern nationalism*, New York 1931.
- Heer F., *Kampf um die Östereischicche Identität*, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar 1996.
- Heiss G., *Pan-Germans, better Germans, Austrians: Austrian historian on national identity from the First to the Second Republic*, [in:] *German Studies Review* 16, 1993.
- Hegel F., *Philosophy of mind*, Oxford, 2001:
- Herzstein R., *Waldheim. The missing years*, New York 1988.
- Hroch M., *European Nations. Explaining their formation*, London, New York 2015.
- Hobsbawm E., *Nations and nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge 1990.
- Hobsbawm, E. , *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today*, [in:] *Anthropology Today* 8(1).
- Hobsnawm E., Ranger T., *The invention of Tradition*, Cambridge 1983.

- Hochman E., *Imagining a Greater Germany. Republican Nationalism and the idea of Anschluss*, London, 2016.
- Hoffman G., *The Survival of an Independent Austria*, [in:] *Geographical Review*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Oct., 1951).
- Hofbauer H., *Westwärts: Österreichs Wirtschaft im Wiederaufbau*, Vienna 1992.
- Holzer G., *Verfreundete Nachbarn, Österreich-Deutschland. Ein Verhältnis*, Vienna 1994.
- Hoor E., *Österreich 1918-38 Staat ohne Nation. Republik ohne Republikaner*, Vienna 1966.
- Howarth D., *Dyskurs*, Warszawa 2005, p. 11-15.
- Hörnig K., Winter R., (ed.), *Widerspenstige Kulturen. Cultural Studies als Herausforderung*, Frankfurt am Main 1999.
- Höbel L., *Republik im Wandel. Die Große Koalition und der Aufstieg der Haider-FPÖ*, Munich 2001.
- Huizinga J., *Men and Ideas*, New York, 1959.
- Hurdes F., *Österreich als Realität und Idee*, Vienna 1946.
- Jambor W., *Der Anteil der Bundesländer an der Nationswerdung Österreichs*, Vienna 1971.
- James P., *Nation formation. Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*, London 1996.
- Kadan A., Pelinka A., *Die Grundsatzprogramme der österreichischen Parteien. Dokumentation und Analyse*, St Pölten 1979.
- Katzenstein P., *Disjoined Partners*, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1976.
- Kaufmann F., *Sozialdemokratie in Österreich: Idee und Geschichte einer Partei von 1889 bis zum Gegenwart*, Vienna 1978.
- Kedourie E., *Nationalism*, Oxford 1993.
- Kleindel W., *Die Chronik Österreichs*, Dortmund 1984.
- Klenner F., *Eine Renaissance Mitteleuropas. Die Nationswendung Österreichs*, Vienna 1978.
- Klusacek Ch., *Die österreichische Freiheitsbewegung – Gruppe Roman Karl Scholz*, Vienna 1968.
- Kłoskowska A., *Kultury narodowe u korzeni*, Warszawa 2005.
- Knight R., *Wortprotokolle der österreichischen Bundesregierung von 1945-1952 über die Entschädigung der Juden*, Frankfurt am Main 1988.

- Kohn H., *Idea of Nationalism*, New York 1946.
- Konrad H., Neugebauer W., (ed.) *Arbeiterbewegung-Faschismus-Nationalbewußte*, Vienna 1983.
- Kopińska V., Krytyczna analiza dyskursu – podstawowe założenia, implikacje, zastosowanie, [in:] *Rocznik Andragogiczny* 26, 2016.
- Koref E., *Die Gezeiten meines Lebens*, Wien 1980.
- Kozeński J., *Austria 1918-1968: dzieje społeczne i polityczne*, Poznań 1970.
- Kralik R., *Österreichische Geschichte*, Vienna 1913.
- Kreisky B., *Die Zeit, in dir wir leben*, Munich 1981.
- Kreisky B., *Politik braucht Visionen*, Königstein 1982.
- Kreissler F., *Der Österreicher und seine Nation ein Lernprozess mit Hindernissen*, Vienna 1984.
- Kriechbaumer R., *Von der Illegalität zur Legalität: die ÖVP im Jahr 1945; politische und geistesgeschichtliche Aspekte des Entstehens der Zweiten Republik*, Vienna 1985.
- Kriechbaumer R., *Von der Illegalität zur Legalität: Grundgeschichte der ÖVP*, Vienna 1985.
- Kriechbaumer R., *Die Ära Kreisky. Österreich 1970-1983*, Vienna 2004.
- Król M., *Europa w obliczu końca*, Warszawa 2012.
- Leder A., *Prześlona rewolucja*, Warszawa 2014.
- Leser N., *Genius Austriacus*, Vienna 1986.
- Leszczyński A., *Skok w nowoczesność: polityka wzrostu w krajach peryferyjnych 1943-1980*, Warszawa 2013.
- Livonius Thilo v., *Die ideologische Entwicklung der FPÖ unter Jörg Haider*, Monachium 2002.
- Luckmann T., *Invisible religion. The Problem of Religion in Modern Society*. London 1970.
- Lutz H., Rumpler H., (ed.) *Österreich und die deutsche Frage im 19. Und 20 Jahrhundert*, Vienna 1982.
- Lux G., *Das Jörg Haider Experiment*, Wien; Graz; Klagenfurt 2009.
- Łazuga W., —*Rządy polskie" w Austrii. Gabinet Kazimierza hr Badeniego (1895 - 1897)*, Poznań 1991.
- Madajczyk P., *Marzenie o narodzie doskonałym. Między biopolityką a etnopolityką*, Warszawa 2017.
- Markova I , *Wie Vergangenheit neu erzählt wird*, Marburg 2013.

- Manosc hek W., *Austrian Reaction to the Exhibition –War of Extermination. Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941 to 1944*”, in Bischof G., Pelinka A., Karlhofer F. (ed.), *The Vranitzky Era in Austria*, New Brunswick 1999.
- Mantl W., *Politik in Österreich*, Vienna 1992.
- Massiczek A., *Die österreichische Nation: Zwischen zwei Nationalismen*, Vienna 1967.
- Mathis F., *1000 years of Austria and Austrian Identity: Founding Myths*, (ed.) Bischoff G., Pelinka A., *Contemporary Austrian Studies 5: Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity*, New Brunswick 1997.
- Mauss M., *Oeuvres*, Paris 1969.
- Mein Vaterland, mein Österreich*, Vienna 1935.
- Meissl S., Mulley K., Rathkolb O., (ed.) *Verdrängte Schuld, verfehlte Sühne: Entnazifizierung in Österreich 1945-1955*, Vienna 1986.
- Menasse R., *Erklär mir Österreich. Essays zur österreichischen Geschichte*, Frankfurt am Main 2000.
- Menasse R., *Das war Österreich. Gesammelte Essays zum Land ohne Eigenschaften*, Frankfurt am Main 2005.
- Michels R., *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, 1915.
- Missong A., *Die österreichische Nation*, Vienna 1948.
- Mommsen H., *Die Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage im Habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat*, Vienna 1963.
- Mommsen H., *Widerstand und politische Kultur in Deutschland und Österreich*, Vienna 1994.
- Mouzelis N., *Organisation and bureaucracy: an analysis of modern theories*, New Brunswick 2009.
- Mölzer A., (ed.) *Österreich und die deutsche Nation*, Graz 1985.
- Nadler J., *Österreich. Erbe und Sendung in Deutschen Raum*, Salzburg, Leipzig 1934.
- Nairn T., *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited*, 1997.
- Ne nning G., *Grenzenlos deutsch: Österreichs Heimkehr ins falsche Reich*, Munich 1988.
- Novotny A., *Bewährung des österreichischen Nationalcharakters in den Wirren, Sieden und Niederlagen des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*,[in:] *Die österreichische Nation 27*, Vienna 1975.
- Ottomeyer K., *Die Haider Show. Zur Psychopolitik der FPÖ*, Klagenfurt 2000.

- Ottomeyer K., *Jörg Haider. Mythenbildung und Erbschaft*, Klagenfurt 2009.
- Pareto V., *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, New Brunswick 1991.
- Parkinson F., (ed.), *Conquering the Past. Austrian Nazism yesterday and today* Detroit 1989.
- Pelinka A. Weinzierl E., (ed.) *Das große Tabu: Österreichs Umgang mit seiner Vergangenheit*, Vienna 1987.
- Pelinka A., *Austria: out of the shadow of the past*, Oxford 1998
- Pelinka A., *Zur österreichischen Identität : zwischen deutscher Vereinigung und Mitteleuropa*, Vienna 1990.
- Pelinka A., *Nationale Identität*, [in:] *Nationale und kulturelle Identitäten Österreichs: Theorien, Methoden und Probleme der Forschung zu kollektiver Identität*, Wien 1995.
- Pelinka A., Sickinger H., Stögner K., *Kreisky-Haider. Bruchlinien österreichischer Identitäten*, Vienna 2008.
- Pfeifer H., *Werden und Wesen der Republik Österreich*, Wien 1967.
- Pick H., *Guilty victim. Austria from the Holocaust to Haider*, London, New York 2000.
- Plaschka R., Stourzh G., Niederkorn J., (ed.), *Was heißt Österreich? Inhalt und Umfang des Österreichbegriffs vom 10. Jahrhundert bis heute*, Vienna 1995.
- Pollak W., *Tausend Jahre Österreich*, Vienna 1975.
- Prutsch U., Feichtinger J., Csaky M., (ed.) *Habsburg postcolonial: Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis*, Innsbruck 2003.
- Puchalski L., *Ausgewählte Quellen im Diskursfeld Identitäten. Österreich*, Wrocław 2009.
- Rathkolb O., *The paradoxical Republic*, New York, Oxford 2014.
- Rathkob O., Schmid G., Heiß G., (ed.) *Österreich und Deutschland Größe: Ein schlampiges Verältni*, Salzburg 1990.
- Reiterer A., (ed.), *Nation und Nationalbewusstsein in Österreich. Ergebnisse einer empirischen Untersuchung*, Vienna 1988.
- Reiterer A., *Österreichische Nation – Deutsche Kultur - europäische Identität*, [in:] Nowotny H., Taschwer K., (ed.), *Macht und Ohnmacht in neuen Europa*, Vienna 1993.

Romejko A., *Przemiany austriackiej tożsamości narodowej*, [in]: *Procesy migracyjne w kontekście przemian kulturowo-cywilizacyjnych*, Polak E., J. Leska-Ślęzak J., (ed.), Pelplin 2007.

Renan E., *What is a Nation?*, text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11th, 1882, Paris, 1992.

Renner K., *Staat und nation*, Vienna 1899.

Renner K., *Die Gründung der Republik Deutschösterreich, der Anschluß und die Sudetendeutschen*, Vienna 1938.

Rot-Weiß-Rot-Buch, Vienna 1946.

Scharsach H., Kuch K., *Haider: Schatten über Europa*, Cologne 2000.

Schärf A., *Österreichs Erneuerung 1945-1955*, Vienna 1960.

Shell K., *Jenseits der Klassen? Österreichs Sozialdemokratie seit 1934*, Vienna 1969.

Schüssler W., *Preußen und Österreich in der deutschen Geschichte*, Göttingen 1963.

Smith D.A., *Nationalism and modernism*, New York 1998.

Smith K., *Mutually Contested Concepts and Their Standard General Use*, *Journal of Classical Sociology*, Vol. 2, No.3, (1 November 2002).

Sowa J., *Fantomowe ciało króla*, Warszawa 2011.

Srbik (von) H., *Österreich in der deutschen Geschichte*, Munich 1936

Stadler K., *Austria*, London 1971.

Stadler K., *Sozialistenprozesse : polit. Justiz in Österreich 1870 – 1936*, Vienna 1986.

Steinbach P., *Widerstand. Ein Problem zwischen Theorie und Praxis*, Cologne 1987.

Stiefel D., *Entnazifizierung in Österreich*, Vienna 1981.

Storzuh G., *Vom Reich zur Republik*: Vienna 1990.

Sully M., *Political parties and elections in Austria*, London 1981.

Sully M., *The Haider Phenomenon*, Nowy Jork, 1997.

Szacki J., *Historia myśli socjologicznej*, Warszawa 2005, p. 905.

Sztompka P., *Socjologia zmian społecznych*. Kraków, 2005.

- Talos E., Neugebauer W., *Austrofaschismus. Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934-1938*, Vienna 1984.
- Talos E. Dachs H., Hanisch E., Staudinger A., (ed.), *Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs*, Vienna 1995.
- Talos E., Hanisch E., Neugebauer W., Sieder R., (ed.) *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich. Ein Handbuch*, Vienna 2000. .
- Thaler P., *The Ambivalence of Identity*, West Lafayette 2000.
- Thompson E., *Trubadurzy Imperium*, Kraków 2002.
- Tilly Ch., (ed.) *The formation of mmational states in Western Europe*, Princeton 1975.
- Topolski J., *Metodologia historii*, Warszawa 1984.
- Topolski J., *Jak się pisze i rozumie historię*, Warszawa 1998.
- Topolski J., *Wprowadzenie do historii*, Poznań 2009.
- Utgaard P., *Remembering and forgetting Nazism*, New York, Oxford, 2003, p. 78.
- Użule-Fons S., *Między Rosją a Niemcami. Proces uświadomienia narodowego i politycznego Łotyszy w XIX wieku*, Poznań 2004.
- Uhl H., *Zwischen Versöhnung und Verstörung. Eine Kontroverse um Österreichs historische Identität fünfzig Jahre nach dem Anschluss*, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar 1992.
- Ullrich P., *Hegemonie und Erosion: Politische Kultur und politische Wandel in Österreich*, Vienna 1990.
- Üblagger R., *Die nationalen Traditionen der österreichische Sozialdemokratie* [in:] Mölzer A., (ed.) *Österreich und die deutsche Nation*, Graz 1985.
- Vorländer H. (ed.), *Demokratie und Transzendenz: Die Begründung politischer Ordnungen*, Bielefeld 2013.
- White H., *Metahistory*. London 1973.
- White H., *Tropics of discourse*, Baltimore-London 1988.
- Wagner G. (ed.) *Österreich : von der Staatsidee zum Nationalbewusstsein*, Vienna 1982.
- Wagner G., *Österreich. Zweite Republik*, Vienna 1983,1987.

- Waldenberg M., *Narody zależne i mniejszości narodowe w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej*, Warszawa 2000.
- Wallas A., *Österreich-Konzeptionen und jüdisches Selbstverständnis. Identitäts-Transfigurationen im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert*, Tübingen 2001.
- Wapiński R., *Polska i małe ojczyzny Polaków: z dziejów kształtowania się świadomości narodowej w XIX i XX wieku*, Wrocław 1994.
- Wapiński R., *Polska na styku kultur I narodów: w kręgu przeobrażeń narodowościowych i cywilizacyjnych*, Gdańsk 2002.
- Wassermann H., *Verfälschte Geschichte im Unterricht, Nationalsozialismus und Österreich nach 1945*, Innsbruck 2004.
- Weinzierl E., Skalnik K., *Österreich: Die Zweite Republik*, Graz 1972.
- Weinzierl E., *Österreichische Nation und österreichisches Nationalbewusstsein*, [in:] *Zeitgeschichte* 17, Vienna 1989.
- Wereszycki H., *Historia Austrii*, Wrocław 1972.
- Wereszycki H., *Pod berłem Habsburgów: zagadnienia narodowościowe*, Kraków 1975.
- Werner E., *Geringer Anlass – weitreichende Konsequenzen? Die Affäre Kreisky-Peter Wiesenthal aus dem Jahr 1975*, Vienna 1997.
- Winter E., *Ignaz Seipel als dialektisches Problem. Ein Beitrag zur Scholastikforschung*, Vienna 1966.
- Wiesenthal S., *Recht, nicht Rache*, Frankfurt am Main 1988.
- Wodak R., de Cillia R., Reisigl M., Liebhar K., Hofstätter K., Kargl M., *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität*, Frankfurt am Main 1998.
- Wolff-Powęska A., *Pamięć brzemię i uwolnienie*, Poznań 2011.
- Zaremba M., *Komunizm, legitymacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej w Polsce*, Warszawa 2001.
- Zientara B., *Świt narodów europejskich*, Warszawa 1996.
- Zöllner E., *Volk Land uns Staat. Landesbewusstsein, Staatsidee und nationale Fragen in der Geschichte Österreichs*, Vienna, 1984.
- Zöllner E., *Der Österreichbegriff. Formen und Wandlungen in der Geschichte*, Vienna 1988.

Zöllner E., *Geschichte Österreich*, Vienna 1990.

Links and internet sources:

- Acton J., *Nationality*, [in:] *The Home and Foreign Review*, London 1862
<https://archive.org/stream/ra634742501londonoft#page/n9/mode/2up>
- Bischof G., *The Politics of History in Austria*,
<https://sites.fas.harvard.edu/~ces/conferences/Austria/Bischof.pdf>,
- Hayes C., *The historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*,
<https://ia801603.us.archive.org/4/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.13165/2015.13165.The-Historical-Evolution-Of-Modern-Nationalism.pdf>
- Knight R., *Austria and Nazism: Owning up the past*,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/genocide/austria_nazism_01.shtml
- Pelinka A., *Austria's attitude towards Israel: Following the European mainstream*,
<http://jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&TMID=111&LNGID=1&FID=382&PID=0&IID=1595>
- Sierakowski S., *The five lessons of populist rule*, Project Syndicate, January 2 2017,
<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/lesson-of-populist-rule-in-poland-by-slawomir-sierakowski-2017-01?barrier=accesspaylog>
- Stalin J., *Marxism and the national question*,
<https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm>
- *What is Transitional Justice?*,
<https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice>
- Moscow Declaration, October 1943,
<http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html>
- Austrian Ministry of the Interior:
https://bmi.gv.at/412/Nationalratswahlen/Historischer_Rueckblick.aspx
- Austrian Denazification:
<http://www.entnazifizierung.at/denazification-in-austria/>,
<http://www.nachkriegsjustiz.at/prozesse/volksg/index.php>,
- Austrian Resistance Archive:
https://www.doew.at/cms/download/40g3m/en_second%20republic.pdf,
https://www.doew.at/cms/download/40g3m/en_second%20republic.pdf
- The Accession Treaty of the Republic of Austria to the European Union:
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:1994:241:TOC>
- World Economy Statistics:
<https://www.worldeconomics.com/GrossDomesticProduct/Austria.gdp>

- *The Sound of Success*, The Economist, 22 November 2007,
<https://www.economist.com/special-report/2007/11/22/the-sound-of-success>
- Das Grundsatzprogramm der ÖVP, 1995.
www.steirischeroeaab.at/wp.../Grundsatzprogramm-der-ÖVP.pdf
- Das Parteiprogramm der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs
http://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/Contentpool/Portal/PDFs/Parteiprogramme/Parteiprogram_eng.pdf
https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_englisch_web.pdf
- Das Parteiprogramm der Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs
http://www.bzoe.at/assets/files/Programm_BZOE_WEB.pdf

List of Abbreviations:

ÖVP – Österreichische Volkspartei

SPÖ – Sozialistische Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs

FPÖ- Freiheitspartei Österreichs

KPÖ – Kommunistische Partei Österreichs

ZVK – Zeiten Völker und Kulturen.