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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to determine the criteria for the success of the coercive diplomacy strategy. It is a strategy whose goal is to influence the change of the opponent's behavior through a credible threat while avoiding war. As the strategy is marked in the theoretical framework, as an alternative to war and the central issue of international relations is the establishment of international security, it raised the main issue of this paper to strengthen the theoretical framework and thus provide decision-makers with useful alternatives in solving international problems. Coercive diplomacy is conceived brilliantly but due to the lack of a solid theoretical framework and especially the criteria for successful implementation, there are a disproportionate number of unsuccessful uses from those that have had a successful outcome. Examining the theory that deals with this issue and analyzing case studies that examined what works in practice and what does not gave a valuable result. In addition to the central question, the paper aims to explain when and under what conditions coercive diplomacy was successful, thus case studies were carefully selected so that they could comprehensively answer the questions asked. The thesis establishes criteria, which, concerning the examined case studies, if used in the way described can lead to the successful implementation of coercive diplomacy. By finding the criteria that lead to the success of a strategy aimed at avoiding war, the motivation was to contribute not only to the academic community but also to avoiding international conflicts in practice. As more and more forms of threats appear in the international community, science is trying to respond to all forms of threats and coercive diplomacy represents the evolution in solving them, so in addition to offering an alternative to war, it is very relevant and attractive for solving problems in the current historical moment.

Keywords: *coercive diplomacy, strategy, criteria*

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Chapter I

1. Introduction

1.1 Motivation and Scope of Research

Complex and demanding international relationships that are characteristic of the 21st century request development of new strategies that can better fit the new challenges that need to be faced in the international environment. Many conflicting interests that needed to be resolved in a non-violent way create the need for new strategies. The new strategies and approaches need to reconcile the need to achieve political goals and the need to preserve peace. Political goals sometimes outreach national interests or desire to achieve political benefits, in some cases; the goal that needs to be reached is related to international safety and the preservation of diplomatic values. It means that even motivation to act can vary significantly. The newly set challenges, with changed priorities and motivation led to the need to develop different approaches.

Compared to the period before the Cold War, the usage of force was not only acceptable but an expected way to respond to the changes in society and pursue political interests. This changed a lot when international society became aware of the potential extent and power of the consequences of international conflicts in which force is used. Changes in the international context made room for the development of new strategies.

Existing strategies were either ineffective or too aggressive for the new demands that strategies needed to achieve to be successful. That opened the door for strategy as coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy (CD) was the response to the need to balance between peace and effectiveness. Although CD is a complex term, the main characteristics of the CD can be briefly explained based on the common understanding of the term. Coercive diplomacy is a

defensive strategy that aims to restore things to the previous conditions, as they were before changes in the status quo. As it uses force to a certain extent in cases when it is necessary, it is also considered a strategy with high risks. The term is explained in detail in the following sections of the thesis.

Although coercive diplomacy has been present in today's society for a long time, the term is not familiar to people. Many find it hard to define or understand the concept that is contained within the term coercive diplomacy. As the cases when the CD was applied up to this day vary a lot and are characterized by different circumstances and factors that influenced the outcome of the strategy, it is hard to create a common ground for understanding what this term refers to. This thesis aims to analyze the term CD diplomacy in a way to show not only the reasons why this strategy is applied but also the criteria for the success of the strategy. This approach provides an opportunity to understand what influences the outcome of the strategy application and to explain closely the nature of the term. Additionally, the effectiveness of the CD strategy is put into consideration, as criteria are primarily used as tools to understand the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the CD strategy.

The causes, duration, and settlement of wars are a perennial topic of study in international relations, although they appear to have grown more complex and significant in the twenty-first century. The Cold War period was distinguished by a type of stability, but today instability, even chaos, seems to mark the dominant order.¹ Understood this way, searching and finding solutions for problems that arise in international relationships is of fundamental importance for maintaining peace. Since the end of the Cold War, approaches developed to analyze issues addressed in this topic, by relying on negotiation and bargaining that typically result in the maintenance of the status quo. The balance of power theory provides

¹ Rosenau (2014): 14.

the best explanation for these approaches. The core element of ‘the balance of power’ is that national security is improved when military power is divided so that no one state has sufficient strength to dominate the others. According to the balance of power theory, if one state obtains excessive power, it would exploit its advantage and attack weaker neighbors, providing strong motivation for those that are threatened to form a defensive coalition. The balance of power theory holds that the combined military of the endangered governments would then discourage (or, if necessary, defeat) the state looking to expand. After all, balancing is the essential conforming behavior, and it tries to uphold the power balance rather than disturb it. The fact that traditional state-versus-state confrontations have decreased in frequency yet violent non-state actors have participated in conflicts more frequently in recent years complicates the picture even further. The non-state actors have gained an increased capacity for collective action, eroding the authority of the state.²

Interdependence, globalization, infrastructural growth, technological advancement, environmental challenges, and terrorism as problems of the contemporary day have prompted scientists from all disciplines to examine the emergence of new issues and look for solutions.

A political science perspective was added to the investigation of these issues. Diplomacy has always sought to end disputes amicably, but in some cases, it was essential to move problem solving to the military sphere in order to accomplish the objectives. Of course, it is referring to unintended escalation here since nations occasionally fail to utilize threats that would be advantageous to them and on other, more frequent occasions, use threats that incite rather than deter.³ Due to this, it is necessary to analyze a hybrid strategy (one that employs both diplomatic and military methods) that is diplomatic but could also involve the use of force in a way that avoids starting a conflict while yet being successful in attaining political

² Florini (2004): 5.

³ Jervis (1989): 198.

objectives. If successful, such a tactic is considered a fantastic alternative to war and a desirable way to settle disputes. The problem is that the probability of this outcome is questioned and the possible backlash of this strategy needs to be taken into account when considering the efficiency of CD. CD strategy can be dangerous if the outcomes are not the desired ones and the goal achievement fails. This means that it could actually lead to serious consequences. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to bring theory and practice together through the examination of the theoretical framework and case studies, which will highlight the theoretical and empirical downsides and help to improve the theoretical framework and the strategy's applicability. Thus, it could be believed that by examining a few applications of coercive diplomacy, the major factors that may impact the outcome of the strategy can be distinguished and that this may provide resourceful insight into issues of the CD strategy. To better analyze the factors that impact CD outcomes, criteria are developed with the aim to use them to see what led to some CD strategies being successful and others not. Criteria are formed based on the existing theoretical understanding of CD and are applied to the case studies that are selected in a way to cover different scenarios. It is of great importance to approach this matter by covering different situations, as it is hard to predict in which future situations CD could be applied.

The idea behind CD is to make it possible to put into action a plan that makes a good alternative to war while also making use of some military force. Since it focuses on persuasion rather than the use of physical force to persuade an adversary to stop his aggressiveness, coercive diplomacy provides an alternative to the reliance on military action.⁴ Even though details about the coercive diplomacy strategy are presented in this thesis, the focus of this thesis

⁴ George (1991): 5.

is not the strategy itself but rather the requirements that must be met for it to be effective. The strategy has so far produced more unsuccessful applications than successful ones.⁵

Therefore, it can be said, “coercive diplomacy is difficult and has a relatively low success rate.”⁶ Thus, in order to accomplish the goal, it is required to logically consider the causes of this and attempt to determine which strategy is appropriate through case analysis. Coercive diplomacy should not be overlooked or discounted as a means of resolving conflict, regardless of the results achieved so far i.e. the number of unsuccessful applications, due to the nature of the tactic for peaceful settlement of disputes, and the potential advantage which the strategy carries as an alternative to war.

Given that the strategy of coercive diplomacy is a strategy with diplomatic elements and with diplomatic aims, but in its application, it serves also with military means; both dimensions are covered in this thesis. The signaling, bargaining, and negotiating that are integral to the design and execution of any military warnings, deployments, or actions are necessarily included in the coercive strategy; these elements are absent or of secondary importance in traditional military strategy. The tactic of coercive diplomacy can employ both positive inducements and assurances in addition to punitive rewards to sway an enemy, just like in diplomacy more generally.⁷ Although, some of the strategy's details exclude some of the traditional diplomatic techniques and military doctrines, instead applying these two categories in a unique approach that calls for special attention. In contrast to the ‘rapid decisive’ military approach, which uses force as a blunt tool, coercive diplomacy aims to make force a significantly more flexible, sophisticated psychological instrument of policy.⁸ Several political, military, economic, historical, and social forces and inertia have shaped the world we live in

⁵ Jakobsen (1998): 1.

⁶ Art & Cronin (2003): 402.

⁷ George (1991): 10.

⁸ George & Simons (1994): 12.

today. Coercive diplomacy is a kind of communication that is therefore appropriate in the current historical setting.

When trying to explain the significance of the CD it is important to include a theoretical perspective. Elman and Elman (2003) state that theorists in international relations typically accept that their area is made up of long-term theoretical combinations made up of various ideas with shared components.⁹ This could be applied as a way of understanding CD. To understand the term CD is important to include all elements that may have an impact.

Once more, as coercive diplomacy is considered an alternative to war it is a combination of more elements than other strategies are. Based on this fact, the ultimate goal of CD is to force some states to give up on certain demands and actions, as well as to refrain from interfering in certain actions. When CD is considered to be used to accomplish these objectives, it must be kept in mind that it does so in a diplomatic manner and does not fall under the category of military equipment. Military methods can be employed as a last resort, but they have limitations. Military resources, as determined by the split into a 5-point scale, are at the penultimate (4th) position just before the shift to full-blown conflict, which entails moving outside the parameters of the plan itself. This is codified according to a five-point scale as follows:

- no military action;
- the threat of force;
- display of force;
- limited use of force; and
- Full-scale war.¹⁰

⁹ Elman & Elman (2003): 47.

¹⁰ Schultz (2009): 263.

Force and the threat of force, although forbidden in international relations¹¹, is a necessary instrument of diplomacy and can, paradoxically, even be considered as an integral part of diplomacy. Diplomacy, therefore, has no effect unless it is supported by some kind of ability to impose will, if necessary by force, and continue to achieve goals following the saying of the German military theorist. A firm theoretical foundation and as much precision as feasible are needed when determining the criteria for the CD's implementation. With the caveat that, given the complexity of the task, no success criteria established on a theoretical or empirical basis could ever be able to guarantee it, the theoretical framework of the CD is to some extent evident (despite the fact that it is continually evolving). It is impossible to establish such standards, but this research tries to identify the optimal CD application strategy that would enable the achievement of the goal and provide a strong theoretical foundation for future research on this topic based on practice.

The goal of the thesis is to research the factors that can influence the outcome of the CD strategy. As the outcomes of the strategy varied a lot through the history of the CD application, a great variety of factors made a decisive impact on it. The thesis aims to break the term CD into smaller parts so that the analysis of the strategy application can be understood more easily. The thesis responds to the problem of the complexity of the term CD and its application. As one of the approaches that are considered significant for the preservation of peace, analysis of the CD is of the ultimate importance. The secondary goal of the thesis is to determine which factors were the stumbling ones in the previous CD strategy application.

With goals set this way, the significance of the thesis lies in a more detailed explanation of the complex CD term and systematic analysis of the existing practices. From the theoretical

¹¹ According to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations"

point of view, the significance lies in explaining the strategic hybrid that CD is, the construction that is set between diplomacy and coercion. While, from the practical point of view, it is important to develop mechanisms to determine if a CD could be successful.

To do so, and to fulfill the aim of this thesis, it is of the greatest importance to understand existing theoretical findings that are used as a basis for any further research. The research and contribution of the thesis are supported by the work of the researchers who set the basis for understanding the term CD. The CD's criteria are defined within this thesis as a way to facilitate the understanding of what influences the success or failure of the CD strategy.

1.2 Theoretical Background

Nowadays achieving political goals is quite challenging. Balancing between diplomacy and war is a hard task to accomplish. Earlier approaches to solving problems have become obsolete, given that there are many more countries in the world than before which additionally complicates finding a solution to opposed interests.¹² Many opposed states' interests are not the only barrier to finding a solution to a conflict situation. Aside from countries, many other entities emerged within the states. Today many entities are involved in shaping state policies that later have their impact on global politics. Entities such as non-governmental organizations, multinational companies, representative offices of international organizations, etc. pursue different interests and ravel the political landscape.

In the past, when one country was under attack or jeopardized in some different way, the response was almost always military. Using force to resolve conflict nowadays is not an acceptable solution. Moreover, the prohibition of force usage in resolving conflicts was codified in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter¹³. Article 2(4) provides that a UN

¹²26 June 1945 the UN charter was signed by 50 states, today has 193 members

¹³United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, available at: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text> (December 8, 2022).

member state cannot threaten or use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any way that diverges from the purposes of the UN. As a result of that, states need to find different but still effective approaches to protect their goals.

One of the possible solutions for the state is coercive diplomacy. The purpose of this chapter is to define the term coercive diplomacy. To define the strategy of coercive diplomacy, the terms ‘strategy’, ‘coercion’, and ‘diplomacy’ are analyzed in depth to understand the whole term in the best possible way.

1.2.1 Strategy

The way term ‘strategy’ is understood has been changing throughout history. It was first used in war-related language and later its usage expanded to other areas such as sports, economics, business, human resources, marketing, etc. The term strategy is generally related to the planning to achieve the ultimate goal. The meaning of the word originates from the Greek word *stratēgia*, which means *generalship*.

One of the simplest definitions of strategy is "the art of creating power".¹⁴ With this definition, the core idea and essential nature of the strategy as a term are emphasized. This definition can be applied in both military and diplomacy settings and manifests the reasons why strategies are used by states in the first place.

With the expansion of the term, definitions that aim to explain strategy increased as well. Yu selected four elements that are fundamental to understanding the term ‘strategy’. The first element is long-term goals.¹⁵ Strategies are always goal-oriented and refer to the future. Ultimately, the purpose of strategy is to secure some advantage or benefit. The second element is ‘*something*’ to achieve a long-term goal. Here it can be stated that strategy is a plan-a

¹⁴ Freedman (2013): xii.

¹⁵ Yu (2021): 10.

deliberate course of action, a guideline for dealing with a situation. The second element can be understood as a guideline, which can be used to express the role and meaning of strategy. The third element is the situation.¹⁶ It refers to the obstacles, barriers, threats, and other undesirable events that lead to the need to create a strategy. This element responds to the question “Why strategy is needed?”

Therefore, speaking about strategy in general, it can be simplified and said that strategy is a response to a concrete situation oriented toward a long-term goal. However, when discussing the strategy defined in the scope of the military context, it is more specific. A military strategy employs the threat or use of military force against an adversary and is used when large-scale force is seen as the best way to achieve such goals. Traditionally, strategic thinking has focused on which component or combination of land, air, and naval forces is the most effective. This may be a too narrow approach to achieving the ultimate goal, which is usually political influence or control—or preventing others from wielding influence or control—and seldom consists of physical destruction itself.¹⁷ It is interesting that for a long time, military strategy was considered to be only understood by political geniuses.¹⁸ The main reason for this way of thinking was that the importance of military strategies was undeniable and fundamental for the state's well-being in the past. Nowadays, the opinion about the role of strategy is different. It is stated that strategy, to be effective and to lead to the set goal, needs to pay attention to both political (diplomatic) and military components. Strategy and its role can be explained as a bridge that connects military means and political goals.¹⁹

Great power conflict, economic interdependence, peacebuilding, climate change, and other non-traditional threats such as pandemics are all complex issues facing today's security

¹⁶ Yu (2021): 11.

¹⁷ Prantl (2022): 2.

¹⁸ Baylis, Wirtz & Gray (2002): 3.

¹⁹ Baylis, Wirtz & Gray (2002): 3.

and policymakers. In the twenty-first century ambiguity, hyper-connectivity, power diffusion, and dynamic technological transformation are significantly shrinking the policy space available to governments and other international organizations. As a result, the practice of international diplomacy necessitates heightened strategic rationale: a clear emphasis on the big-picture and longer-term goals and priorities.²⁰ All these characteristics determine the way strategies are built and constructed, as they need to be adequate to the specific social moment and political context to be effective. When speaking about the effectiveness of strategies one important point needs to be stressed. An effective strategy is critical for mobilizing power and gaining from international clashes, whereas effective diplomacy is required to garner support for the strategy.²¹ This shows that strategy and diplomacy are closely connected and that for achieving long-term goals diplomacy involvement is needed.

To conclude, the main characteristic of today's society in this context is interconnectivity, which more than any law demands a different approach to conflicts among states. Both military and diplomatic perspectives are required to be fully understood for achieving the ultimate goal of the strategy, so the strategy as a term for this research could be defined as "the art of science of shaping means to promote ends in any field of conflict."²²

Separating strategy from policy is only possible at the expense of both. It tempts diplomacy into an excessive concern with subtlety and causes military strength to become associated with the most extreme use of power.²³

1.2.2 Coercion

Coercion can be explained as the practice of persuading someone to do something by using force or threats and other types of pressure to influence the behavior of the opposing

²⁰ Prantl (2022): 2.

²¹ Prantl & Goh (2022): 443.

²² Bull (1968): 593.

²³ Kissinger (1957): 422

party. The word ‘coercion’ originates from the Latin *coercere*, meaning, ‘to surrender,’ and even more suggestively from two older Latin words, *arca* (‘box’ or ‘coffin’) and *arcere* (‘to shut in’).²⁴ Essentially, it is the influence of one side on the behavior of the other side, thus, viewed in the context of international relations, it belongs to the sphere of psychological warfare. Most aspects of international relations and human relationships involve coercion, whether in the family between parents and children, at work between employer and employees, in the welfare state between officials and recipients, or international diplomacy between states such as great powers and small states.²⁵

Coercion is rarely a one-sided or one-time event. Adversaries use various instruments of power at varying degrees of intensity in a never-ending cycle of pressure and counter-pressure in a dynamic and iterative process. Furthermore, while coercion is commonly portrayed as a bilateral process involving a coercing state and a coerced state, the reality is that coercion is frequently a multilateral affair.²⁶ Coercion is also recognized as a component of crisis management practice. Crisis management refers to government actions taken to prevent a crisis from escalating into a war. Despite the importance of such a goal, the respective leaderships seek to advance their interests or, at the very least, minimize losses.²⁷

To properly understand the nature and operation of coercion, it is necessary to separate it from other strategies used by states to influence the behavior of other states. Persuasion is the complete antithesis of coercion.

Persuasion, like coercion, shapes state policy. However, unlike coercion, which seeks to weaken a state's resolve to resist an adversary, persuasion seeks to change a state's conceptualization of its self-interest. It reconfigures a state's preferences and policy priorities

²⁴ Cohen-Almagor (2021): 398.

²⁵ R. Cohen-Almagor, pg.400.

²⁶ M. Helal (2019):41.

²⁷ Snyder & Diesing (1977): 207.

and proposes alternative policy mechanisms to achieve those preferences and priorities. Persuasion appeals to logic and invokes the ‘logic of appropriateness,’ which shapes behavior by presenting certain policies and outcomes as "natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate," rather than threatening punishment.²⁸ Reasons, why people adapt their behavior, are different and indicate key characteristics of these approaches. While in persuasion negotiators speak from the position of equity, coercion demands a position of power. The coercing state aims to compel a coerced state to comply with demands. Of importance to be mentioned as a significant characteristic of coercion is that the possibility of escalation is always present if the coerced state resists the demands of the coercing state. The coercing state must use more severe instruments to compel the coerced state to comply with its demands to constitute coercion.²⁹

1.2.3 Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the behavior of international relations through negotiation and dialog or any other means to endorse peaceful relations among states. Aside from this widely accepted single definition, diplomacy is also a set of practices, organizations, and narratives that are essential for comprehending the evolving nature of the international system and its emerging functional and normative requirements.³⁰ Diplomacy is the art of reaching an agreement between countries that need to work together to achieve results in which both parties have an interest. Diplomacy, traditionally associated with conflict resolution through negotiation, is widely regarded as “an alternative to war—and war as a failure of diplomacy.”³¹ As a result, effective diplomacy necessitates the ability to persuade states that may initially propose an arrangement, but whose agreement is required for its implementation. Skilled diplomats can

²⁸ Helal (2019): 42.

²⁹ Helal (2019): 42.

³⁰ Cornago (2008): 574.

³¹ Brown (2001): 3695.

secure favorable terms for their countries by persuasively outlining the benefits and costs of alternative arrangements to their counterparts.³²

In terms of international policy, diplomacy is the most important instrument of foreign policy and, depending on other elements of the state and the organization of the diplomatic service; it pursues mainly political (economic, military, etc.) interests. Negotiation plays a central role in diplomacy, usually through diplomatic representatives, but in the modern world, it is increasingly done through direct communication between heads of state, heads of government, or foreign ministers, colloquially called "Diplomacy at the Highest Level".³³

The most important diplomatic characteristics are soft power and long-term opportunity. Soft power refers to the negotiation's potential attractiveness. This approach encourages or provides advantageous reasons for bargaining. In addition, long-term opportunity emphasizes the benefits of long-term gain over short-term gain in the negotiation.³⁴ Diplomacy is primarily a peaceful process of negotiation; it can include incentives that are either value-additive or coercive, with the latter sometimes including threats to influence participants' assessments of the benefits and costs of accepting or rejecting specific arrangements.³⁵

Although by explaining diplomacy as an art of persuading, others use the *ratio* as the main tool alongside good communicational skills for achieving set goals, with the introduction of the term coercive diplomacy different approach in international relation behavior is introduced.

³² Brown (2001): 3697.

³³ Gromyko (1983): 12-13.

³⁴ Sylvester (2016): 107.

³⁵ Brown (2001): 3697.

1.2.4 Coercive diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy is the use of threats and limited force to persuade an adversary to abandon a course of action or undo what has already been done. It takes a credible threat and/or the use of limited force to persuade the opponent of the threat's credibility.³⁶ It can be said that coercive diplomacy is between diplomacy and military force usage. In the same manner, it also can be said that coercive diplomacy is between coercion and persuasion as a tool for securing the interests.

Coercive diplomacy is considered an attractive strategy because it offers the possibility to balance effectiveness and peace. This way, an opportunity of achieving objectives without starting a war and with fewer political costs is also a possibility.³⁷ Because of the nature of coercive diplomacy, most rapid solutions can also be made, which can contribute to the limitation of negative consequences that conflict of interest may cause. The theoretical definition of such a strategy begins when the pioneers in defining the concept and its name, Alexander George and Thomas Schelling, dealing with coercion strategies, began to determine the theoretical framework of coercive diplomacy, paving the way for further theoretical determination. According to George: "the strategy of coercive diplomacy is used as a means to alter an adversary's behavior by threatening pain and using limited force in limited amounts, to achieve various political objectives."³⁸ While Schelling intends to separate coercive diplomacy from brutal force and declares, "It is the difference between the unilateral, 'undiplomatic' recourse to strength and coercive diplomacy based on the power to hurt."³⁹ Today the strategy of coercive diplomacy is quite theoretically determined with minor shortcomings that are not

³⁶ Brown (2001): 3697.

³⁷ Art & Cronin (2003): vii.

³⁸ George & Simons (1994): 18.

³⁹ Schelling (2008): 2-3.

uncommon for theories that are evolving. Coercive diplomacy can be defined as a version of diplomacy that relies on the threat of force.⁴⁰ This strategy aims to challenge the obedience of the opponent without the use of full-scale war; the coercer achieves this by presenting the situation in such a way that the coerced party will pay a significantly higher price for disobedience rather than obedience. The focus of coercive diplomacy emphasizes the changing attitudes of the rival and using utility calculations instead of using force.⁴¹

Coercive diplomacy can be interpreted as a defensive strategy whose goal is to force the opponent to stop or undo some aggressive action. George "restricts the definition of the term coercive diplomacy to the defensive use of strategy."⁴² The threats of punishments or limited usages of force are key tools of coercive diplomacy in the persuasion efforts to influence the behavior of others. "Since by definition coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy undertaken in response to an opponent's encroachment or aggressive action, the legitimacy of the actions is assured to a certain extent. It should be understood as an exception from the general ban on threats."⁴³ To achieve goals, it primarily uses threats, persuasion, and limited use of military force. For the sake of more efficient use, it can also be used by means such as positive encouragement in various forms. This means that coercion can also be used in a carrot-and-stick approach, in which threats are combined with positive inducements if the adversary complies. Coercive diplomacy (along with deterrence) is part of a larger theory of influence, according to Alexander George, in which coercive strategies must be combined with inducements and other diplomatic moves.⁴⁴

Obedience by the opponent must be at least partly the result of fear of threats because otherwise, we are not talking about coercive diplomacy, but bribery. The difference is in the

⁴⁰ George & Simons (1994): 2.

⁴¹ George (1984): 225.

⁴² George & Simons (1994): 7.

⁴³ George (1991): 68.

⁴⁴ George (1991): 467.

motive of why someone does something. The focus of coercive diplomacy is on the fear that leads to compliance. This is what differentiates coercive diplomacy from bribery, which relies on financial benefits.⁴⁵ Unlike threats and persuasions, there is a restriction on the use of incentives, and another restriction concerns the use of military force. Military force does not have to be used at all within a coercive strategy if the goals of the strategy can be achieved by threat or persuasion (incentive is only an aid), but if it is used, it must be limited, symbolic, or demonstrative. The limitation of force usage is what distinguishes this strategy from military usage. In addition, the usage of force or the threat that force will be used distinguishes coercive diplomacy from diplomacy. Determining the 'amount' of military force used to demonstrate the power and possible outcomes if the requests of the coercing state are not met is the first problem that arises when discussing the practical implications of this term. The transition from the limited use of military force to war means in both, theoretical and practical terms, the collapse of coercive diplomacy or its failure, and on the other hand, it is not entirely clear how limited that force must be. "If limited force is used as part of a coercive diplomacy strategy, it is used as a signal intended to convince the opponent that non-compliance is too costly. When coercive diplomacy is successful, the opponent complies without having been defeated militarily first."⁴⁶ In the application of the strategy of coercive diplomacy, it is common to demonstrate the determination to enter into a full-scale war (also a form of threat and pressure), which is the goal of using limited military force. Aviation or naval forces are usually used for this purpose. The use of infantry already means an occupation that is contrary to CD, because its goal is not destruction or subjugation but obedience by the opponent to the request or demands (special units are often used, for accurate targeting and information gathering but they are used secretly-unofficially). In considering the Gulf War in 1990-91, Peter Viggo Jakobsen

⁴⁵ Jakobsen (2016): 286.

⁴⁶ Jakobsen (2016): 14.

states that the coalition in the fight against Saddam Hussein "created a need for the coalition to abandon their use of coercive diplomacy (air power) in favor of a ground attack designed to defeat the Iraqi forces (full-scale force)"⁴⁷ (...) and he further summates limited force as "use of air and sea power no matter the scale employed, because these actions all leave the opponent with a choice to comply or resist. The use of ground troops to settle the conflict is operationalized as a full-scale force because it denies the opponent such a choice by imposing compliance upon him"⁴⁸

The strategy of coercive diplomacy is used as a "means to alter an adversary's behavior by threatening pain and using limited force in *limited amounts*, to achieve various political objectives."⁴⁹ If the usage of minimum force is needed to demonstrate the power and possible consequences, two options remain, to stop the force usage or to start a war. In the second case, the goal may be achieved but it could lead to great losses in human lives and resources.

As a kind of coercion in relations between societies has existed since the very beginning of society, it can be said that coercive diplomacy is a very old mechanism for achieving goals in relations between states/nations, but the theoretical definition of this strategy is relatively recent. Its theoretical definition is important because coercive diplomacy differs from coercion. The difference is that coercion is a broader term and can also refer to offensive actions. The point when the strategy was created is that it could use coercive means to a certain level but use them in such a way that threats and limited military force are sufficient to subdue the adversary. The adjustments in the theoretical explanations are created to develop coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war and preserve peace while still being able to achieve the desired goal. Explained this way coercive diplomacy is the lesser of two evils. If the alternative

⁴⁷ Jakobsen (2016): 16.

⁴⁸ Jakobsen (2016): 17.

⁴⁹ George & Simons (1994): 18.

to it is war, then coercive diplomacy can be presented as an additional step before choosing war as a tool to achieve goals.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is organized through five main chapters. Although the thesis is divided into chapters, the cohesiveness of the topic was the ultimate priority.

In the first chapter, the term *coercive diplomacy* is defined using insights and analysis of the papers by relevant authors who have dealt with the theoretical definition of this term so far. Through different interpretations of the authors, efforts are made to give a reinterpretation of the definition based primarily on ideas shared by, the creator of the name of coercive diplomacy, Alexander George. Once the term coercive diplomacy has been defined in this chapter, the focus is shifted to the term criterion and reasons why it is relevant for this research and how this term is connected with coercive diplomacy. After the definition of these two terms, the criteria for the success of coercive diplomacy that have been determined so far are presented, as well as the level of success and relevance of these criteria in determining the realization of the strategic goals. At the end of this chapter, the possible causes of the problem for the success of coercive diplomacy, in general, are listed. At the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to understand the main terms and criteria of coercive diplomacy.

In the second chapter of this thesis, based upon the definitions of the terms coercive diplomacy and criteria, the theoretical and empirical problems in defining these terms are discussed. Due to the lack of a clear theoretical basis for both coercive diplomacy and the criteria for its success, it is necessary to identify possible problems in defining those terms. By the end of this chapter, different approaches among contemporary authors are presented to determine if coercive diplomacy is more diplomatic or military by nature. Consequently, the

usage of diplomatic, military, or combined tools is discussed in the concluding part of this chapter.

In the third chapter, several case studies are presented, both successful and unsuccessful, to analyze the causes of the success and failure of coercive diplomacy strategies in particular cases. In this section, in addition to describing the case study, the circumstances, moves, outcomes, and causes of success and failure are analyzed as well as the impact of previous strategy applications on some subsequent ones. A thorough analysis of the complete context, what preceded it, how it played out, what was the consequence, and which tools were used in the implementation of coercive diplomacy is covered in this chapter. The goal of this chapter is a reconstruction of events to get better insight into the application of the coercive diplomacy strategies and factors that had a major impact on the outcomes. In this way, it can be intended to identify the specific elements that led to a particular outcome. A practical approach is of crucial importance for understanding coercive diplomacy. More than any theoretical approach or discussion about this term, which can only be used as a basis for further analysis of the term and its reach, it is very important to put attention to the actual usage of coercive diplomacy and to determine what influenced the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the coercive diplomacy strategy in some cases. Each of the cases will provide a different perspective on coercive diplomacy application.

In the next chapter, the criteria that need to be met for coercive diplomacy to be successfully applied are suggested based on the conducted research. The goal of these criteria is, that coercer achieves his goals without causing an escalation of the conflict and thus going beyond the theoretical framework of CD, which would mean the unsuccessful implementation of the strategy and avoid non-compliance by the coerced, which would mean the same thing. In this part, the intention is to make a step forward in the current CD theory and offer criteria

for success in the time context after the cold war as well as to offer a good theoretical basis for future research and some other time frames.

The last chapter is reserved for comparing data collected and analyzed in this thesis. This is followed by a discussion in which, based on research, the best way to apply new knowledge is described. In the second part of this chapter, the conclusions made from the case studies are verified or refuted based on the findings.

1.4 Methodology

1.4.1 Methods of scientific research

The characteristics of the methodology of political sciences are found in the selection, concretization, and application of the methods of social sciences and their adaptation to the properties of the subject of political science. In this research, the primarily used method is the case study. CD is not frequently used, so cases that could be analyzed are not very common. Still, the gravity of their consequences should be analyzed in detail. These consequences, as well as the causes, are then collected in the form of data, analyzed, and ultimately converted into a result and conclusion. Using this method, the use of CD is examined, in different contexts, which include social background and time factors. Various sources and types of data were collected and analyzed for this thesis. Through case analysis, the existing theory of CD strategy is examined, in a real place-time context, which provides additional academic and practical value.

As an auxiliary method, scientific description, deduction, and induction were used. There are three types of case studies – exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory, and the second one is particularly significant for this research. Since exploratory is used when nothing (or very little) is known about the subject of research, this type is not particularly important to this research. The explanatory approach in case studies asks questions about how and why, so it

has a certain significance, for example, how the CD was implemented in a certain case and why this way of implementation was chosen. Whereas the descriptive approach, which is particularly significant for this research, deals with what happened, why it started a certain course of action, and what the main variables that influenced that outcome are. The included case studies have certain common characteristics but are different concerning the reasons, method of implementation, actors, time, and place, so it can be said that the research is conducted on several different cases with common characteristics. The logic of literal repetition is impossible here, so it will be necessary to use robust standardization and detailed analysis as in the individual case so that the analysis can detect the characteristics of the CD that can lead to greater success of the strategy. To ensure the highest possible reliability and depth of research, a statistical method is used to determine the deviations in the implementation of CD that is significant for determining the expected flow and turnover in its implementation. As the reliability of inductive reasoning directly depends on the number and representativeness of processed cases, efforts are made to use a sufficient number of representative cases of coercive diplomacy to reach a general conclusion by the systematic application of inductive reasoning, and analysis of individual facts related to strategy implementation. In the case of CD success/failure testing, it is necessary to examine carefully selected case studies because due to the scope of events and their nature, it is not possible to repeat the case in the form of an experiment so it is necessary for the accuracy of the research and for the further possibility of generalizing the results to examine the cases that took place so far.

1.4.2 Data collection methods

To get as good scientific knowledge as possible, following the laws of social sciences, in this research, it was decided to use the following methods of data collection: *Qualitative* – (descriptive) case studies, (historical) external records, the concept of historical time and place

and the systematic use of historical data. *Quantitative* – statistical and data collected for other purposes.

The phenomenon of CD was examined as a structured activity, according to a predetermined plan of observation of its development, theoretical framework, and previous applications, and records were kept of the obtained results of observation. Using the method of the case study was moved from the general to the specific, so it was started by studying individual cases in which coercive diplomacy is used through the analysis of specific individual cases of its application. By collecting data using the case study method, select cases that are typical examples of coercive diplomacy are examined so that knowledge can be generalized and applied to all other cases when this strategy is applied. In the application of historical time and space, the goal of this thesis is to create an explanation for the efficiency of application in that context by direct historical comparison and observation of the application of CD in a certain spatial-temporal context.

1.5 Hypothetical Research Framework

1.5.1 General hypothesis

The effectiveness of CD strategies can be estimated using the list of criteria presented in this thesis.

1.5.2 Special hypotheses

- 1 For CD to be successful the asymmetry of motivation needs to be fulfilled.
- 2 For CD to be successful time urgency needs to be fulfilled.
- 3 For CD to be successful fear of unacceptable escalation needs to be fulfilled.
- 4 For CD to be successful clarity of the settlement terms needs to be fulfilled.
- 5 For CD to be successful adequate domestic and international support needs to be fulfilled.
- 6 For CD to be successful an offer of incentive for compliance needs to be fulfilled.

1.6 Contribution of the Research

Research on coercive diplomacy so far has been reduced to theoretical determination, stages in its implementation, and differences from other theories of coercion, which is still a topical issue. A small number of authors deal with coercive diplomacy and even fewer with criteria for its success, so there is a lack of current literature available relating to this issue. Therefore, the results of this research may be useful primarily to researchers who want to further investigate these issues and institutions and states that aim to conduct coercive diplomacy or defense against it, as well as to certain third parties such as analytical journalists who observe conflict in which central role is played by coercive diplomacy so that they could more easily predict the next move and analyze the situation. By pointing out the most important research in this field and drawing original conclusions, it will provide future researchers with the opportunity to build on their knowledge and draw their original conclusions. In addition, it could provide institutions with guidance in the form of guidelines for the effective implementation of CD and analysis of disputes resolved by this strategy. To parties involved, parties, and individuals who analyze the situation for professional reasons, it will provide research to help them understand the causes, consequences, and outcomes.

Chapter II

1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is primarily to be acquainted with (1) the general concept of coercive diplomacy strategy, (2) the approaches defined in the theoretical framework, (3) some criteria that have been defined so far, (4) the concept of criteria, and (5) possible causes of the problem. A review of coercive strategies similar to coercive diplomacy is also made and a clear distinction between them is underlined. This is done mainly by presenting, examining, and describing some of the approaches that the relevant authors have achieved so far. The beginning of the chapter will focus on the initial way coercive diplomacy was explained and Alexander George who established this concept first. The following step would be to explain the criteria for the implementation of these strategies. New theoretical approaches created by the authors who further developed this term and discussed the variety of its applications also are included in this chapter. This chapter goes further than just defining the term and aims to provide a more practical approach to understanding it. It is important to have in mind that this term constantly develops and that some static, universal definition is not a realistic goal to strive for. The first step, in archiving a better understanding of coercive diplomacy is to underline its importance.

2. Importance of Coercive Diplomacy

To start with the basic observation that coercive diplomacy is a non-military strategy for achieving political goals that in some cases use a certain amount of military force to achieve, those goals. Difficulty defining the exact amount of force that can be used as a part of coercive strategy actions has been already mentioned. What is specific about CD is that diplomatic and military means are used together, which is not such an unusual combination, but what is

unusual is that these means are not used in their usual way and for their conventional purpose. This positions coercive diplomacy in a very interesting spot, between two opposite terms – diplomacy and military force.

As the CD in its essence aims to influence the behavior of the opponent or change his behavior, diplomatic means are not used so much for negotiations but for demanding, pressuring, and possibly blackmailing in more extreme variants. Military means are not intended to completely defeat the other side or destroy it, but to demonstrate what could escalate in the event of disobedience, to influence the decisions of the enemy without the use of full-scale war. As this strategy is considered a good alternative to war, after the Second World War it was used more frequently than before, so the importance of determining the criteria for its successful implementation as well as its theoretical determination in terms of separation from similar strategies is important for science, because of a clearer definition and laying a better basis for further research, and practice, for better implementation by which the process would be better controlled e.g. to avoid escalation.

2.1 Defining the Term

Some definitions of coercive diplomacy are already listed in the theoretical background chapter. For further understanding, a few things should be pointed out as a way to define this term more. Primarily given that, as stated, it is a non-military strategy and its goal is not the military defeat of the opponent but the influence on behavior, a military force within the CD does not have to be used at all - as some authors call it 'cheap success'. This means that the usage of military force is not a requirement for speaking about coercive strategy. The threat of using force can be used for achieving the goal of the strategy. It is important to underline that not using force at all is considered the best possible solution. While the full-scale force usage

is considered a failure, as the purpose of the strategy was to avoid that outcome.⁵⁰ Therefore, the point is that only a diplomatic component can be used in implementing the strategy. The problem with defining coercive strategy is that if force is not used, it is hard to define the difference between coercive strategy and diplomacy. The difference can be summed up by underlining how goals are achieved. In cases when a coercive strategy is applied, a certain behavior is imposed while in cases when diplomacy is used results are achieved by negotiations. Because of that, George defines coercive diplomacy as a defensive strategy. Defensive by its nature, coercive strategy aims to persuade the opponent to stop an action that has already begun, to convince the opponent to undo an action that is already taken, or to persuade an opponent to make changes in its government regime⁵¹

2.1.1 Defensive strategy and low-intensity conflict

It is of great importance to explain why the coercive strategy is described as defensive. The strategy is intended to eliminate undesirable behaviors or if those behaviors have already occurred to return things to their previous state or to force the perpetrator to return things to their original state. Therefore, it can be said that the purpose of this strategy is to maintain the status quo. Since it does not force the opponent to take action but prevents it from taking it or requires from opponent to restore things to their previous state, coercive diplomacy is defined as a ‘defensive strategy’⁵². It is used for resolving disputes, and decision-makers use it when they want to resolve a disagreement in their favor in a relatively peaceful manner, without using military force or if it is necessary to use military force it should be used in a limited way, which is defined as low-intensity conflict and not as an act of war. The problem with narrowing down the definition of coercive diplomacy is strongly connected with the problem of defining low-

⁵⁰ Jakobsen (2007): 31.

⁵¹ Cimbala (1998): 13.

⁵² George (1991): 5.

intensity conflict. A low-intensity conflict is a military conflict. However, these types of military conflicts are localized, between two or more states or non-state groups, which are below the intensity of conventional war. It involves the state's use of military forces applied selectively and with restraint to enforce compliance with its policies or objectives. The main characteristics of low-intensity conflicts are described as "below the intensity of conventional war" or "use of military force used selectively". This does not provide enough data about the exact amount of force that can be used to label the conflict as low-intensity.⁵³

2.1.2 Pressure, fear, and costs

To better understand the term coercive diplomacy, it is important to discuss it in relation to three terms: pressure, fear, and costs. Using coercive diplomacy is drastic; it raises economic and political costs, so the decision-makers try to avoid it. However, even while avoiding it, the opponent must be convinced that the option of war is open. Therefore, the point is to exert pressure by using economic, political, and military means to provoke fear in the opponent. Further, it is important to raise the pressure to the level of fear. To be effective in these efforts it is important to balance the 'costs' or reach the goal with a less invasive method. Only with this approach, the threats would have enough gravity to influence the behavior of the opponent and consequently ensure that the purpose of the action is achieved. It shows how fear of the potential consequences needs to be ensured even when it is questionable if the decision to use a higher level of force would ever be made. It can be explained by emphasizing that coercive diplomacy has at its core the threat of the potential consequence. The opponents are most often threatened by the possibility of war, which is a great expense for both sides. Costs thus represent the barrier for both sides to start military operations. However, opponents must be

⁵³ Sarkesian & Scully (1981): 2.

convinced at any cost that the other side is prepared to pay that cost rather than accept a change in the status quo.

Costs are connected to coercive democracy in more than one way. The cost of disobedience needs to be high enough to be unacceptable to the opponent. If the cost of not complying is not high enough, the opponent lacks the reasons to comply. From the reasoning above, it can be concluded that cost estimation plays a crucial role in the effectiveness of the coercive diplomacy strategy.⁵⁴

Pressure also needs to be analyzed in detail. Taking into account the defensive nature of the coercive strategy, it is important to explain that conflict may be ended by forceful persuasion, i.e. when the opponent is defeated by the effect of a threat. Thus, pressure should be understood as a tool used to achieve the desired goal. Some of the most common types of pressures are political, economic, and military. Pressure is used to avoid failure and the need to use military force. Using pressure is an alternative for resolving conflict without war.

Pressure, costs, and fear are overlapping factors that direct the response of the actors in the concrete situation. Pressures and costs are used as tools to cause fear and to lead further to the desired outcome. Of great importance is to underline that it is very hard to maintain a balance between these factors. To cause the exact amount of fear that will lead to the desirable outcome, but at the same time to limit the fear to the extent that the opponent sees that conflict can be resolved without war.

2.1.3 Final considerations in defining the term

Up to this moment, the efforts to define coercive diplomacy are not yet over. However, to a certain degree, it is determined what coercive diplomacy is, and what is not covered by

⁵⁴ Art & Cronin (2003): 372.

this term. What is lacking is to strictly define the line between coercive diplomacy and other terms – war or military action and diplomacy. The most problematic part is to define the exact highest amount of force that can be used within the term coercive diplomacy. Further analysis of the term coercive diplomacy would be oriented towards a more practical aspect; however, a good theoretical foundation is important for better understanding the essence of this term. It is especially important to use a theoretical basis for understanding the difference between coercive diplomacy and other similar strategies.

The most important theoretical aspects are that coercive diplomacy offers an alternative to the usage of military force and tries to ensure the goal by using persuasion based on fear and pressure, taking into account the complex issue of costs. Additionally, it is of great importance to clearly define that coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy i.e. that is used as a response to an action of the opponent.⁵⁵ It is also important to know that CD starts when the opponent has made a move or when something has already been done and not when the opponent is threatened by an act. Therefore, the goal is to force the opponent to stop doing the aggressive act, while offering him the opportunity to return all things to the starting position without major consequences, i.e. before the coercer is forced to make the opponent to do so. With these remarks, further analysis of coercive diplomacy can be done.

2.2 Approaches According to Alexander George

The criteria set by George did not change much and are very important for detecting when coercive diplomacy starts and when it ends. The approach itself depends on the goal and it further determines the criteria for achieving that goal, so it follows that achieving the goal is causally and consequently related to the criteria. According to George, there are four variants

⁵⁵ George & Simons (1994): 10.

of the CD⁵⁶, it is perhaps more accurate to say four approaches. These approaches are examples of how coercive diplomacy can be used in real-life situations. Different approaches are used depending on the nature of the situation.

Gradually tightening the screw

The first approach is "gradually tightening the screw"; this approach generally does not instill a sense of urgency in the opponent because it is based on the gradual introduction of the CD tools from the request onwards. Of course, the request itself informs the opponent that the opponent will suffer unbearable consequences, so it is certainly better to obey, but due to the lack of deadlines and concrete action in the initial stages, this approach does not have much chance to yield results. The first element that characterizes this approach is the lack of urgency. The second is related to the lack of the information about nature of the consequences or their severity. The threat lies in the idea that the consequences of not complying would worsen gradually. Instead, the demand put on the opponent is accompanied by a threat that punishment will be increased gradually if compliance is not forthcoming. For example, the first step could be to impose economic sanctions and then exacerbate sanctions. If nothing of this works, the limited military force could be used.⁵⁷

Try and see

The next approach is a shade harder and is called 'try and see', it differs from the first approach because it has not had a gradual nature. The time and the threat itself are not defined in this approach.⁵⁸ When the request is made, it is clear that there will be consequences, but the true nature of the consequences is not stated, i.e. it is not stated what specific actions will be

⁵⁶ George & Simons (1994): 18.

⁵⁷ Jakobsen (2007): 18-19.

⁵⁸ Levy (2008): 540.

taken in case of non-compliance. Of the similarity of these approaches, the flexibility of coercive diplomacy is noted. It helps to find the best approach to very diverse situations in which coercive diplomacy can be useful.

Tacit ultimatum

The third approach is the ‘tacit ultimatum’ or implicit ultimatum. The essence of this approach is that no time limit is given to the opponent, but it instills a sense of urgency. This is achieved by certain military maneuvers such as military parades, accumulation of troops at the border, violation of airspace or territorial waters, etc. In this way, additional pressure is put on the opponent, but there is still room for the opponent to obey without ‘losing face’.⁵⁹

Classic ultimatum

Finally, the fourth and the hardest form is the classic ultimatum, and this variant implies a specific request with a specific time limit and specific consequences for non-compliance. This form as the toughest has the biggest risk because it puts the opponent in a position where there is not much (or none at all) room to maneuver.⁶⁰

The four described variants offer a starting position in the imposition of the strategy. More importantly, in these approaches can already be seen some of the criteria such as time limit or sense of urgency. What all four variants have in common is that the purpose is to avoid escalation of military force usage as a tool to achieve goals.

⁵⁹ George (1991): 7-8.

⁶⁰ Levy (2008): 540.

	Specific request	Specific time	Specific consequences
Gradually tightening the screw	X		
Try and see	X		
Tacit ultimatum	X		X
Classic ultimatum	X	X	X

Table 1: Approaches in CD.

As can be seen in Table 1, the approaches differ by how much they are defined and how urgent it is to comply. The first two approaches are similar, just the way consequences change differs. Different contexts and factors can have a role in deciding which of the listed approaches to apply.

2.3 Coercive Diplomacy and Similar Strategies

This section is explaining the difference between a CD and two of the most similar strategies. The purpose of this section is not only to answer the question of what distinguishes CD from other coercive strategies, which should certainly follow the theoretical determination but also to make it easier to understand CD after a clear distinction from similar strategies has been made. The strategies that are most often correlated with CD in the literature are compellence and deterrence, so the choice for the most complete comparison fell on these two strategies.

2.3.1 Compellence

When discussing the difference between CD and compellence it is important to state that CD cannot serve interests such as expanding power of any kind because the CD is used in response to an action already taken. Forcing an opponent to take action by giving something of value would be defined as an offensive action, which George calls ‘blackmail strategy’ and it is not compatible with the essence of CD strategy.⁶¹ This situation is named by Schelling as ‘compellence.’⁶² Therefore, in contrast to a CD, which tries to stop already-taken action or to lessen its effects, compellence is the capacity of one state to compel another state to act, typically by threatening punishment. The main difference is who makes the first move towards some goal. Once again, it should be stated that CD is a response to someone's behavior and a way to restore the status quo, the compellence is its opposite, an action aimed at altering the status quo to gain some benefits.⁶³ Due to its nature, when a CD is used, much of the implementation allows the opponent to withdraw without great costs and avoid military operation.

Still, there are some areas where this compellence and coercive strategy overlap. Both strategies aim to make an impact on the opponent’s behavior. Coercive diplomacy can be perceived as a type of compellence. Coercive diplomacy is a concept that aims for a certain kind of compellence, whereas coercion is a concept that encompasses both compellence and deterrence.⁶⁴ At the beginning of the thesis, positive incentives were mentioned as one of the possible tools for achieving goals. Positive incentives may be included from the coercer in the form of concessions or material goods, which can be further used for the progress of coercion or for mitigation of the political costs, which are not inherent in a war conflict or compellence.

⁶¹ More detail: George & Simons (1994): 7.

⁶² More detail: Schelling (2008): 72.

⁶³ Schelling (1963): 195.

⁶⁴ Jakobsen (2011): 155.

Positive incentives in CD can involve either a transfer of resources to the target or the offer of things that do not involve resource transfer but that are nonetheless beneficial for the opponent.⁶⁵ There is no such opportunity when compellence is used. Positive influence serves only as a means for securing an agreement in a frame of CD, because, according to the theory, the opponent must obey at least in part for fear of consequences otherwise it is bribery and goes beyond the theoretical framework of the CD. Positive incentives contribute to success in a coercive diplomacy strategy by making it easier for the opponent to comply without losing face in a situation when it fears that non-compliance will be too costly.

CD strategy cannot fight aggression by buying off the opponent.⁶⁶ In this lies the difference between these two strategies. The reasons why positive incentives are used and which side makes the first move are the criteria for making a distinction between these two strategies.

2.3.2 Deterrence

Unlike in the past when force was used to preserve or conquer territory, today is also used because of the strategic influence on the opponent's decision-making without the intention to occupy the opponent's territory and population. Deterrence is one of those strategies that are established passively. This means that practically no action is taken by it, but the opponent is informed that if he exceeds certain limits, the consequence awaits him. The effective employment of the threat of retaliation by one power to deter an attack from an enemy power is known as deterrence. This tactic was often used during the Cold War when taking action could mean a threat of global destruction and taking no action, loss of power, and influence so the deterrence developed and fitted perfectly into the situation.

⁶⁵ Art & Jervis (2006): 163.

⁶⁶ Jakobsen (2011): 30.

2.3.3 Final considerations of coercive strategies

It can be said that the CD represents the middle ground compared to the other two strategies in terms of activity. Since compellence is the most active because it forces the opponent to act and thus is offensive, deterrence is completely passive unless 'line crossing' occurs and CD responds to the action as defensive. Coercive strategies therefore not only pursue interests but also are designed to do so carefully according to the situation and possibility. This, of course, does not mean that CD and related strategies can solve all problems and open issues, on the contrary, they can sometimes create new ones, but they contribute to peace by the fact that the intention in using these strategies is not absolute destruction (military solution or occupation) but an influence on opponents' decisions (in fear-induced behavior). As pointed out earlier, force does not even have to be used, which is why the CD is defined as a diplomatic strategy that uses force instruments in the form of threats and military force to support it. Force is thus latent and potential, not obligatory and inevitable. It can serve to support negotiations but does not mean that it is always used for combat purposes. Instead, it can be used to threaten and intimidate opponents, or maneuvers that already have been mentioned (accumulation of troops, relocation of troops, and violation of airspace or territorial water) can be used to send certain messages. Raw force closes the door for negotiations and, unlike the CD, which floats in the space between threat, negotiations, and military intervention (albeit limited). The fact that the CD aims to influence the state of mind of the opponent and balances between diplomatic and military tools speaks in favor of the fact that its implementation requires the agility of the coercer in order not to go beyond the theoretical framework of the strategy and subtlety in order not to experience failure or escalation. The use of CD and other coercive strategies is also not limited to the use of strategy by the state to the state but can be used (although more difficult) to fight terrorism, drug cartels, guerrillas, and other non-state actors that have domestic and especially international character.

2.4 Coercive Diplomacy as Psychological Warfare

Since CD, like other coercive strategies, is based on instilling fear and a psychological component, that component should be also processed. CD can be seen as a strategy within psychological warfare as a form of special war that seeks to cause fear (and positive incentives) to change the behavior of opponents or achieve a psychological effect in their favor. Psychological war is defined as a military or political strategy that seeks to reduce the strength of the enemy by various means and methods, reduce its resistance and readiness to fight, and at the same time increase the strength in one's ranks and gain as many allies as possible. Psychological warfare is used to achieve certain objectives that can be political, military, or ideological by nature by using the opponent's characteristics such as cultural and psychological attributes. One of the most common tools used as a part of psychological warfare is mass communications. This way violence is used with other tools to achieve the same goal.⁶⁷ George defines three variables that undoubtedly have psychological characteristics that affect the outcome of the CD, which supports the statement that the CD, in addition to being a hybrid strategy (includes diplomatic and military means), also includes psychological ones. George claims that the effectiveness of CD "rests in the last analysis on psychological variables"⁶⁸ and the variables that George defines as having a psychological effect are:

- 1) The asymmetry of motivation,
- 2) the time urgency, and,
- 3) the opponent's fear of escalation.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Simpson (1996): 11.

⁶⁸ George (1991): 76-81.

⁶⁹ George (1991): 81.

The asymmetry of motivation

Asymmetry in motivation most often occurs when the status quo is changed in a way that is not approved by or beneficial for the coercer, then the motivation of the target is much stronger than the motivation of the coercer, so the chances of CD success are much higher if the desired goal does not endanger the vital interests of the target. More favorable asymmetry of the information can be achieved by asking what is essential to be achieved. This way the demands would be minimized. Additionally, to that, positive incentives can be introduced.⁷⁰

The time urgency

Time urgency is used as described above in the classic ultimatum variant to provoke a sense of urgency and fear in the opponent so that the opponent does not have time for a strategic response and at the same time is unable to gain the support of the domestic and international public. The intimidation when using an ultimatum is facilitated by time pressures. It can be perceived as explicit evidence of urgency. Still, it is important to state that a lack of a time limit does not necessarily mean a lack of urgency. Given time is usually measured in days or hours to make a decision.⁷¹

Opponent's fear of escalation

Opponent's fear of escalation is an important element of any CD strategy approach because it is key to the theoretical framework and eventual success. Even when the coercer has no intention of engaging militarily or, to explain it using plain language, when it bluffs, it is necessary to provoke the feeling in the opponent that the consequences of disobedience will be incalculable to convince him that it is more beneficial to obey than to enter into confrontation.

⁷⁰ Levy (2008): 540.

⁷¹ Lauren (1972): 139-140.

The capacity to intensify believably against the adversary—that is, to threaten the imposition of a higher and greater price for defiance—allows a coercer to manipulate the level of costs the adversary associates with specific behavior.⁷²

3. Criteria

To determine the criteria for the successful implementation of CD, the criteria that the term implies must be understood first. In this chapter theoretical basis for the criteria and standards of the CD are discussed and then the practical point of view is included to better explain the term and provide useful insights.

3.1 Theoretical Basis of Criteria and Standards

“Suppose you had a basket of apples and you wanted to sort out the good apples from the bad apples. It seems that you would need a criterion or standard by which you could sort them, either a criterion for recognizing good apples or a criterion for recognizing bad apples. However, how could you ever tell whether your criterion for sorting apples was good, one that really selected out all and only the good ones or all and only the bad ones? It seems that to tell whether or not you have a good criterion, you need to know already which apples are good and which are bad, and then you could test the proposed criteria by their fidelity to this knowledge. However, if you do not already know which apples are good and which are bad, how can you ever hope to sort them out correctly? And if you already know which are good and which are bad, by what criterion did you learn this?”⁷³ The citation sums up the problem of defining criteria for CD or any other term. It is quite a challenge to find a way to select all behaviors

⁷² Waxman & Larson (1999): 30.

⁷³ Amico (1995): 1.

that fit into this term and also to exclude those behaviors, which are similar, but not the same as a CD.

Based upon the example with apples, it could be said that criterion is a standard achievement or rule of conduct that serves as a measure of the assessment of the success or assessment of the desirability, suitability, or normality of conduct. A standard of conduct according to which success in progress is evaluated. To know whether things are, as they seem to be, a procedure for distinguishing appearances that are true from false must be ensured. However, to know whether the selected procedure is good, it is important to know whether it succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from false appearances. To know if the criteria provide results, it is needed to know in advance, which appearances are true and which are false. This way a vicious circle is created.⁷⁴ Properly defined criteria help us by managing the direction in which the decision will go and providing justification for the decision made. They are usually created to improve the quality and consistency of decisions, but they also serve as a rule for making fair decisions in case they are applied in the same way for everyone. A key factor in applying the same criteria to all is the development and use of standards. In a way, it is needed to describe the criterion for the success of the performance standard.⁷⁵ Standards serve to determine the minimum level of acceptability that satisfies our request. When standards are developed in the right way that is consistent and the same for everyone and every opportunity, they allow us to assess in as objective a way as possible. In addition to the minimum acceptable level, the standards also provided information about the level below and above it, so it can be assessed and compared accurately and objectively how much one case is better or worse than the other is. Once the criteria have been established, it can proceed to

⁷⁴ Chisholm (1973): 61.

⁷⁵ Mager (1962): 44.

establish their importance by comparing the level of goal achievement with the level of requirements set.

3.2 Practical Aspects of Criteria

Criterion can be described by the statement e.g. "In military intervention, damage to infrastructure is more important than other material damage, but material damage is more important than non-material damage." It can also be expressed numerically with the help of numbers, percentages, estimates, etc. Referring to the previous example e.g. "Infrastructure damage is twice as significant as non-material damage and half as significant as other material damage." In addition, the third way of determining importance is to use decision-making rules. A statement that could be described as such a way of deciding would be e.g. "If the coerced accepts less than a level that is satisfactory for the coercer regarding his request, the pressure by the coercer increases." This third method is the most flexible approach to determining the level that meets the criteria. Therefore, the criteria are used in almost all activities in the form of standards, norms, and average indicators of labor productivity. However, sometimes (as was seen in the third way of evaluation) achievements are also evaluated subjectively. It could be called an assessment indicator based on authoritative opinion. For example, the proper behavior of coercion can be assessed using the subjective opinion of the coercer's decision-maker.

4. The Course of Strategy Implementation

Some guidelines in the form of criteria in the theoretical framework already exist so for the final criteria to be developed it is necessary to rely on the existing theoretical basis that already exists. This is done in the next part, but before that, it is good to be acquainted with what the ideal course of implementation of CD should look like to be able to determine what the criteria refer to. The execution of the CD can go in several directions, so before the criteria

that have been defined so far are analyzed, an attempt is made to explain how the theory views the flow of the execution of the strategy in the field and what measures can lead to greater success.

4.1 The Request

The request should be legitimate and should be backed up with good argumentation, as this is the best way to gain the support of the domestic and international public. The request needs to be in proportion to be considered legitimate.⁷⁶ In practice, it is very difficult to estimate if the request is balanced as each of the sides claims the opposite, based upon its interests. The requirement that a request needs to be legitimate puts certain constraints on the extent of the request. Here it is important to stress why it is important for the request to be legitimate. To be legitimate, in some cases, it does not even have to follow the norms of international law, so strict adherence to legal norms is not necessary. On the other hand, if there is no argument for the legitimacy of the action, the counter-strategy of the coerced should undoubtedly be to emphasize that, which could lead to international support for that party, as well as internal unity due to the 'injustice' that appears.

Aside from legitimacy, the request must be clear or as clear as possible. It is important for avoiding the possibility of subsequent interpretations and the suspicion that new requirements will be made after fulfillment. Often the fulfillment of the request itself is not a problem, but the fear of subsequent requests prevents the coerced from fulfilling it and reducing the coercer's strategic chances of winning. Good communication about requests is of the greatest importance taking into account that the possibility of war is on the table if demands are not fulfilled.⁷⁷ Communication is challenged by the situation itself and by its nature; it can

⁷⁶ More detail: Schelling (1960)

⁷⁷ Schultz (2001): 4.

cause problems in interpreting the message. As expected, there is mistrust between the parties, sending and receiving a message usually depends on interpretation, and can easily lead to misperceptions, because of the well-known phenomenon that the same phrase is addressed to different people and in different circumstances gets different interpretations and understandings. Thus, the same threat to different subjects can be interpreted and understood differently with different degrees of credibility. How much credibility someone has at one moment with the target party is always uncertain, but what can undoubtedly be done, is to make the message clear and realistic. It is critical to state the request clearly so that other demands can be excluded and better communication can be established among parties. In that case, the opponent would be unwilling to fulfill the initial request because it expects another to follow soon after. The desired outcome should be clearly stated.⁷⁸

Another problem that arises, related to defining requests, is the opposing interests of the states or other entities. For example, priorities can be different from the economic or defense sector. For some sectors, the threat may be unbearable, while for others it is insignificant. As the answer must be unique, an agreement must first be reached within the system, which further complicates the decision of the coerced as to what answer to give. Communication between the parties is done verbally (through requests and negotiations) and non-verbally (by taking action), so messages can be sent both ways explicitly and implicitly through various diplomatic and military maneuvers. So if the coercer would, in some way, commit and provide guarantees that if the requirements are met, there will be no new requirements, it could increase the chances of success. The coerced, as it was mentioned above, has an interest in maintaining power, so some sort of a guarantee that if he undoes or stops doing what the coercer considers wrong, leaves things in the same state, would make things better. Alternatively, in other words, guarantees that further actions will not jeopardize the

⁷⁸ Sauer (2007): 3.

coerced's position could more easily lead to an agreement. If it were clear that the ultimate goal is the overthrow of the government, which is often the goal of the strategy, it could be presented as an external influence on the sovereign government, which would certainly not benefit the coercer (except in the case of strong internal support in the territory of the coerced). It is, therefore, necessary to strike a balance between demand, interest, and motivation.

4.2 The Time Limit or Sense of Urgency

The time limit or sense of urgency should be clearly defined. Since the CD is implemented to force the opponent to stop or undo an action that it has taken which is usually illegal/illegitimate or an action that disturbs the balance of power. The reaction requires a certain degree of urgency. If an urgent reaction is not demanded, then it is probably about extortion. Therefore, the time frame must be set exactly giving the date and time and the consequences for non-compliance should begin to be suffered immediately after the deadline expires. Such a reaction would give the coercer credibility for possible future actions and the coerced will get an impression of the serious intent of the coercer. A sense of urgency and urgency is not the same thing, urgency means that something must be done urgently and without delay, while a sense of urgency means seeing something as urgent. It is necessary to convince the opponent to look at the situation as urgent and to create a certain feeling of tension. "The coercing power needs to generate a sense of urgency for compliance to motivate the target to comply."⁷⁹ Detecting elements that can slow down compliance can help in making a realistic request because it would be useful to take into account how much time the coerced takes to meet the request, so the time frame should not be too short or unattainable. It should not be given too much time, so that the coerced would not make some counter-strategic move, which would make the implementation of the CD more difficult, or in an even worse scenario,

⁷⁹ George (1991): 77

unenforceable. "On the other hand, it is possible that creating a sense of urgency might backfire and encourage a desperate or committed opponent to wage a war preemptively."⁸⁰

4.3 The Credibility

The credibility of the coercer's threats is one of the deciding factors based on the potency of the threat, the reputation of the coercer (whether one is recognized as someone who fulfills his threats), and the interest of the coerced to comply. The coerced must be convinced of the credibility and high level of motivation of the coercer as well as the readiness of the coercer to raise the stakes so high to the level of crossing all lines. Without it, the coerced can interpret the action as a bluff and not comply with the request. Verifying the believability of capability is frequently easier than determining the credibility of intentions, if only because capability is associated with tangible elements such as force structure.⁸¹ In addition to credibility, a request should be created that does not violate the vital interests of the coerced, because that could lead to 'absolute resistance', i.e. the coerced willingness to cross all lines, which would lead either to the withdrawal of the coercer or war and in both cases to the failure of the CD. "What one does today in a crisis affects what one can be expected to do tomorrow."⁸²

4.4 Proportionality

In the selection of punishment, proportionality is something to be concerned about, but also making completely certain, visible, and measurable the unpleasant consequences that will follow. The form of punishment should be measured (proportionate). Proportionality in international relations is an extensible term, but the general guideline is the same as in the philosophy of criminal law, the level of punishment should be proportional to the amount of damage/pain caused by the perpetrator. Of course, this does not imply retaliation in the sense

⁸⁰ George (1991): 78.

⁸¹ Long (2008): 11.

⁸² Schelling (2008): 93.

of ‘an eye for an eye,’ but the severity of punishment should be proportional to the severity of the undesirable behavior. The penalty should be proportionate to the gravity of the offense committed.⁸³ In the case of CD, it is impossible to codify the types of penalties and offenses, not only because of the huge (almost endless and numerically abundant cases that could be prevented by the CD strategy) number of ‘offenses’ for which the CD can be used but also the fact that codification would further complicate execution because if any case could be codified for un-codified offenses would be impossible to use CD on legal principle *nulla poena sine lege* which means that there is no penalty without the law. For CD, after all, it is not so important to be following the law, but still in case of lawful codification, would be legally impossible to enforce the CD for those un-codified offenses, because it would give the impression of illegitimacy. When things are transferred to the international level, the branch of international law, international humanitarian law (also laws of armed conflict) has three principles: military necessity, distinction, and proportionality. In its 2005 study of customary international humanitarian law, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) affirms that: “Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive concerning the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”⁸⁴

In the same study, as ‘excessive’, based on Article 51(5) of 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions stated, “The disproportion between losses and damages caused and the military advantages anticipated raises a delicate problem; in some situations, there will be no room for doubt, while in other situations there may be a reason for hesitation. In such situations, the interests of the civilian population should prevail.”⁸⁵ It can be stated that for this reason the principle of proportionality is usually based on the principle of legality. However,

⁸³ Hirsch (1992): 56.

⁸⁴ ICRC’s study on customary international humanitarian law (IHL) (2005).

⁸⁵ Sandoz, Swinarski & Zimmermann (1987)

since there is no supreme authority in international relations that could impose legal norms, proportionality, in this case, depends on the assessment of the subject who implements the CD. For now, it remains for the coercer to rely on subjective feeling and public opinion research, and to the greatest extent concerning his interests when choosing a penalty.

4.5 Positive Incentive

In addition to an assessment of a proportional penalty, the choice of penalty for non-compliance may be accompanied by an incentive from the side of the coercer, but the incentive should not be in the form of trade, i.e. the incentive should only serve as a means to further facilitate the coerced's decision. The CD is designed as a strategy of pressure and is based on a threat, so the fear of a realized threat is necessary for the strategy to remain within its framework. Since the coercer has its interests and goals to achieve with as little cost as possible, the use of positive inducement is of course allowed, but the fulfillment of the set conditions must be the result of fear of punishment and not of the reward offered for fulfillment. Channeling fear and eventual encouragement are therefore acceptable, but trade, bargaining, and any form of *quid pro quo* relationship go beyond the CD framework and transition into bargaining. Inducing fear in the coerced aims to induce psychological changes in the form of behavioral changes and decisions. The positive stimulus has a similar goal, so it can serve as a good adjunct to inducing behavioral change.

4.6 Internal, External, and Support within the Coalition

Regardless of whether the CD is implemented unilaterally or in a coalition, internal and external support is an item that must be met to avoid greater costs than benefits in the implementation of the CD. "Various examples highlight how domestic, as well as international support for a cause, or at least lack of open opposition to the policies, contribute to the

credibility of the issued threats.”⁸⁶ If the CD is implemented unilaterally, it is necessary to ensure the widest possible internal consensus to avoid a political crisis or revolt of the local population, which can further lead to the cessation of CD implementation due to internal problems. In the case of a coalition, the establishment can be a problem given the differences between coalition partners, and further, the maintenance of the coalition and the commitment to the goal itself can be a problem. Usually, there is one entity in the coalition that has the greatest interest, so it is always problematic for that entity to retain the support of those whose interest is smaller or non-existent. Divisions, either internally or within a coalition are typically exploited by coercion and tend to reduce credibility, efficiency, and goal achievement. However, enlisting the support and assistance of international partners frequently strengthens domestic public opinion in favor of strong crisis intervention. International backing validates the political leadership's claims that the operation serves a moral purpose.⁸⁷

4.7 Review of Defined Criteria

To determine the criteria leading to the successful application of CD, it is necessary to rely on the existing theoretical findings and work of the authors who analyzed this topic so far. Given that the criteria set by the authors represent their view in a given time frame following the theoretical framework and empirical knowledge, the criteria still can be developed under circumstantial changes. It should be stated that this type of criteria is not a static term, it constantly develops and reshapes due to other changes in international dynamics. Today, the criteria for coercive diplomacy are not understood in the same way as before. Because of that, criteria need to be constantly reviewed and analyzed, so that their essence is captured as a part of the current research and application of the CD strategy.

⁸⁶ George (1991): 78.

⁸⁷ Byman & Waxman (2002): 156.

More important than the way CD is defined is to understand the criteria necessary for the successful implementation of the strategy. The strategy needs to be constantly adapted to the current environment. It is challenging due to the fact that the main definition is based on the understanding of the theory during the period of the Cold War. A lot changed in the perception of coercive diplomacy from the moment when the theory was introduced until today. For example, the CD was considered a strategy implemented by the state over the state, which later changed due to changes in an increased number of actors in international relationships. Many non-state actors also became a part of the international landscape, which effortlessly changed the way term coercive diplomacy is interpreted.⁸⁸ The main problem with coercion over such entities is the fact that these groups do not have a standard military hierarchy, i.e. they consist of fragments between which, often, does not exist a clear communication which results in great difficulty in determining to whom to direct the request. Furthermore, in the implementations of the CD, coalitions often play a bigger role than the states themselves. For example, the United Nations frequently participates in these operations. In favor of strategy usage is that in the new world order, the focus has shifted from the traditional 'military defeat' to other forms of achieving desired goals. Although military defeat is still present as a concept, and it is deeply rooted in our society, searching for alternatives is imperative in modern society.⁸⁹ By increasing awareness that political goals can be achieved without conflict escalation to war, room is made for coercive diplomacy.

4.8 Criteria According to Robert Pape

First and foremost, it is crucial to note that Pape's criteria are more like conditions for success or failure than they are actual standards. Nevertheless, once the conditions have been

⁸⁸ Violent non-state actors are militant groups such as terrorists, guerrilla groups, criminal cartels, and various other armed groups.

⁸⁹ By this term, it is implied the threat of military force and the use of military force below the level of war.

clarified, they can be a huge asset in identifying the standards. According to Pape, a coercive technique can only be effective under certain conditions. In particular, in conventional conflicts, coercion is most likely to succeed when is directed at the military, rather than civilian, vulnerabilities. As a part of his work and contribution, he discusses denial and punishment theories. According to punishment-based theories, increasing the expected costs in the victim's decision calculus above the expected benefits will result in coercion. Punishment theories hold that the level of risk (expected costs) generally determines success. By exaggerating the expected destruction and suffering, adversaries are supposed to accept demands rather than continue the conflict. The expected costs will far outweigh the expected benefits in the victim's decision calculus.⁹⁰ In his decision calculus, Pape's denial theory emphasizes that the most effective means of coercion in conventional conflicts is to reduce the victim's expected benefits below expected costs. To begin, specific benefits may be targeted to reduce expected benefits, but Pape believes that states are incapable of manipulating opponents' perceived benefits.⁹¹

That denial strategy has a high likelihood of success because it undermines the target state's confidence in its military strategy. While according to Pape punishment strategy fails for a variety of reasons, the denial strategy is more suitable for success. First, territorial stakes in coercive conflicts are frequently very important for national security or nationalist reasons. Second, individuals and states can place a high value on specific territories not only for security reasons but also as powerful drivers of national identity and cohesion. Third, coercion is common during wartime, when states' willingness to tolerate costs usually increases. The fourth reason punishment rarely coerces is that conventional weapons, even when used deliberately to cause massive casualties, can inflict only limited damage on civilians. Fifth, modern states can reduce their vulnerability to indiscriminate attacks through defense, evacuation, and rapid

⁹⁰ Pape (1996): 19.

⁹¹ Sullivan (1995): 15-17.

adjustment to economic disruptions; and finally, civilian punishment is unlikely to turn the target state's citizens against its government. The perceived causal chain, where civilian hardship causes public outrage, which leads to political opposition to the government, does not hold up.

With these introductory remarks, the following criteria can be discussed.

Territorial stakes

There are various reasons why territory is important to a social group (history, resources, 'holy land', strategic position, etc.). It undoubtedly had the greatest impact on conflicts throughout history. In addition to the reasons that are important in material terms, i.e. resources such as food or water, some territories have symbolic significance, such as Jerusalem. It could be any territory that gives an identity to a group or contributes to the identity of that group. All doctrines of modern international law recognize the importance of territory in the relationship between national states.⁹² Concerning these social and existential meanings of territory, there is one natural and instinctive understanding of the territory that is prevalent in the animal world. Territoriality in the animal world is important for safety. Control of a specific territory most likely provides the human species with a sense of security, which could explain some of human's violent behavior in territorial conflicts. Human territoriality is a powerful geographic strategy for controlling individuals and objects by trying to control an area.⁹³

Here it is important to reflect on three main elements of a state: a permanent population, defined territory, and sovereign government. The territory is certainly essential for the survival of the state as a subject. In the light of coercive diplomacy and its goals and nature, the focus should not be on the coerced's territory. If the territory is the focus, it will probably be

⁹² Gottmann (1973): 2.

⁹³ Sack (1986): 5.

interpreted, as an act against the entity itself and the strategy will lead to war. As this is against the goals of coercive diplomacy, the territory should be excluded as the focus of the coercive diplomacy strategy.

Specific territories

When it comes to territories in the context of coercive diplomacy, the situation is much more complex than it seems. Specific territories are perceived differently than state territories, which are understood in a constitutional way that was previously explained. If a group of people shares a common identity and forms a political entity through institutions while also having the ability to mobilize resources, it naturally tends toward self-determination and self-management. Each and every intervention with their self-regulation of social relations is perceived as an attack, which strengthens group coherence, increases identification with the group, and strengthens nationalism. Nationalism increases the likelihood of war because it requires 'national enemies' which creates a more serious nature of the conflict.⁹⁴ Individuals may pay attention to their community's share of resources, for example, and attempt to eliminate nationalist rivals to increase their community's share of resources. Similarly, nationalism can cause individuals to become frustrated and aggressive as a result of grievances that affect their national community.⁹⁵

In a broader sense, homeland refers to the place where a person's identity (linguistic, cultural, national, religious, etc.) is formed. As previously, stated, national identity does not have to be related to ethnicity, but it does have a territorial component as a common denominator. In this way, regardless of ethnic, religious, or even linguistic differences, all inhabitants (or the majority) develop an attachment and emotional connection with the territory that they consider their homeland. "A nation must have a place to call its own to exist."⁹⁶ As a

⁹⁴ Snyder (2002): 66-67.

⁹⁵ Hall & Malešević (2013): 125

⁹⁶ Kaiser (1996): 8.

result, national identity and cohesion contribute to the sense that community members share a common goal and should work together to protect it. All of this in addition to the previous point may be an aggravating circumstance for CD implementation.

The willingness of states to tolerate costs

It is a well-known thesis that violence begets violence. In other words, people who are exposed to violence much more easily and more often commit violence. Not only due to this fact but also in light of a growing feeling of apprehension and exposure, both personal and collective, there is a shift in the consciousness of the attacked group. This means that risks and costs are differently perceived if one feels exposed and vulnerable. It elicits a strong sense of community as well as the need to protect identity, material goods, and lives. If all of the above is threatened to the point where it is more likely to be lost than preserved, the feeling that there is nothing more to lose leads to a willingness to pay a higher price than the one who has something to lose.

Baldwin said, “The most dangerous creature in a society is a man who has nothing to lose.”⁹⁷ Taking this observation into account, the opponent should always be left with ‘something to lose’, and should not be backed into the corner. By making an opponent hopeless, it becomes more dangerous than ever.

Civilian casualties

Civilian casualties are unfortunately inevitable in armed conflicts and sometimes they are even the main target even if the ultimate goal is an attack on governments. Since the government depends on the support of that population, the idea is to attack civilians to erode support for the government. Pape argues that strikes on civilians rarely have an impact on the effectiveness of pressure on the government. To weaken the enemy, the focus should be on the armed forces and not on civilians. Pape states that civilians do not have real ‘military value’ in

⁹⁷ Baldwin (1963): 84.

the conflict so they should be excluded. The punishment strategies aimed at an enemy's civilian population rarely result in meaningful concessions.⁹⁸

Vulnerability of states

The core of this consideration is that modern states are no longer as vulnerable as they once were, particularly in the military sense - they are capable of carrying out various diversions and counterattacks that can aggravate the enemy's situation. Furthermore, the population is no longer as vulnerable as it once was, owing to previously unavailable mobility, shelters, and so on. Food can be preserved, relocated, and so on, so the modern state is no longer economically dependent on current yields. This change should be taken into account when making strategic moves.

The Role of domestic public

The role of the domestic public is the last condition defined by Pape, and it should be understood not only as a way to lose power but also as a way to lose public support. This condition is of great importance as it can lead to long-term effects on strategy. The CD's punishment strategy may lead to causal links between CD implementation and turning the domestic public against the government, political opposition, and ultimately overthrowing the government, which may hold responsibility for the consequences of CD implementation on their society.

Patrick Bratton presented an interesting summary of Pape's reflection on CD criteria. He said that most forms of diplomatic coercion or coercive diplomacy are absent under Pape's assumptions. According to Pape's theory, force can only be used; it cannot be effectively threatened, as Pape's dismissal of 'risk' strategies demonstrates. Because of Pape's

⁹⁸ Snyder (1991): 31–52.

assumptions, a large portion of coercion—all that occurs before air warfare or the imposition of sanctions—is excluded. This relates to the first point, which is that punishment must ‘work’ independently of other tools. Pape's assumptions and success criteria unnecessarily limit our understanding of coercion.⁹⁹ It can be concluded that according to Pape, any action that can be interpreted as aggression or immense threat can negatively influence the outcomes of the strategy. It can even lead to more severe outcomes that are, within the CD context, perceived as a failure. Strategic action should be created in a way to avoid these types of behavior, as this application of the punishing theory is a direct line for failure.

4.9 Criteria According to Alexander George

As for the pioneer in CD, summarizing, Alexander George, based on numerous case studies processed, has given several criteria that can be more of a starting point than a firmly applicable criterion with a high success rate. Both successful and unsuccessful examples were taken into account and as he said, the criteria were set in a way that it could, not must, lead to success. Maybe the criteria were set in a generalized way, but they are certainly a good starting point for future research and further operationalization. From free interpretation, criteria are divided into basic and additional:¹⁰⁰

The basic criteria are:

1) Asymmetry of motivation

Asymmetry of motivation occurs when one side is ready to invest much more effort and resources than the other is. It can also happen when the advantages of one side are at the same time the disadvantages of the other side. Due to the severe disparity that exists between

⁹⁹ Bratton (2003): 368.

¹⁰⁰ George (1991): 76-80.

opponents, asymmetry is a defining factor in warfare.¹⁰¹ All states and social groups tend to increase their power and influence, but due to the difference in size and power, the same opportunity to increase power is tempting for some states, too complicated for others, and for some too small to entertain.

2) Sense of time urgency

Sense of time urgency is one of the psychological methods that aim primarily to cause fear in the opponent and further aim to reduce the level of attention and the desired level of rational decision-making. The opponent's perception of urgency is frequently a major motivator for recognizing the credibility of coercive threats.¹⁰² This urgency, however, can also lead to reactions such as impatience, irritability, and anger that make decisions hasty or radical, so it can be freely assumed that such decisions would not lead to outcomes favorable to either side. It can be assumed that short-term pressure could lead to the desired reaction when the coerced is still in a state of impatience, where it could hastily make a decision that would suit the coercer. If too much time is left, the decision can be drastically different because the state of urgency or chronic stress is simply not a state in which good decisions are made. With more time given, decisions are no longer rational but soaked in cortisol, a stress hormone, and left to parts of the brain in charge of emotional responses such as fear, panic, and aggression, that is, they are exposed to an emotional state in which it is not possible to expect a rational and prudent response.¹⁰³ It can be concluded that giving a lot of time to make decisions is not the best possible way to approach the coerced party. A state of urgency increases the chances of achieving the outcome that is desired.

¹⁰¹ Arquilla (2011): 8.

¹⁰² George & Simons (1994): 221.

¹⁰³ Given that institutions are made up of people it is to be expected that the way an individual reacts to stress will not be much different from the way a group united in an institution reacts.

3) Fear of unacceptable escalation

One of the very important criteria is fear of unacceptable escalation. Within international relations, all actors are ready to accept a certain level of consequences. Related to this, it is of great importance to determine to which degree a strategy or counter-strategy would be successful, given that consequences occur on both sides. Both the coercer and the coerced suffer political and economic consequences and possibly human losses. The coercers are economically threatened by the military budget and military weapons and for the coerced, in addition to these elements, the whole infrastructure and economy are involved. In terms of human lives, the coercer endangers its trained army, whereas the coerced endangers the entire population. The political costs are reflected in the loss of domestic and international public support, as well as power. Understanding the pros and cons of such a strategy, as well as preparing for all possible outcomes, including eventual warfare, is an important aspect of gradual escalation in the use of force in military coercion.¹⁰⁴ Of great importance is to determine the degree of consequences that the opponent is not prepared to accept. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the degree of consequences that the opponent is unwilling to accept, to impose them as likely to force the opponent so that he needs to meet the requirements to avoid them. In addition, additional criteria are:

1) Clarity of the settlement terms

Clarity is of essential importance for any type of communication to be effective. With clarity, trust is increased and the intentions and desires are clear for the other side. A sent message should reach the intended recipient, in the exact form in which was sent, under the condition that it was formulated clearly in the beginning. Coercive diplomacy is strengthened if the target is reassured about specific terms for ending the crisis.¹⁰⁵ In addition, clarity

¹⁰⁴ Stephenson (2002): 7.

¹⁰⁵ George & Simons (1994): 286.

contributes to the legitimacy of the action. It can remove the coerced's suspicions, that there will be new requests when the existing ones are met, which often can be the cause of the lack of motivation to meet the request. George believes that communication takes place in two ways, by words and actions, and therefore both types of communication need to be clear to prevent misinterpretations or underestimations by the opponent. George sets this criterion as important, but he also argues that clarity of the requirement is not always desirable or necessary for success, so it is, according to him, sometimes useful to make the requirement vague, to remain flexible about what the desired change in the target's behavior is. However, he further states that a clearly stated requirement makes communication difficult and makes it more difficult for the coerced to fulfill the requirement and avoid punishment, thus reducing the CD's chance of success.¹⁰⁶

2) Motivation

Motivation is something that stimulates action or behavior that leads to the achievement of goals or a reason for action to implement the vision into reality. It serves as fuel to turn vision into reality. The strength of the coercer's motivation, therefore, derives from the goal, i.e. the 'reward' that would follow after the action. So in the case where the coercer is focused on the goal, it is to be expected that he will do something that he is not completely willing, to reach the goal. This could lead the coerced to comply with the requirements to prevent greater harm. If there were no such motivations in the coercer, success would almost certainly be absent. "Without sufficient motivation, any action undertaken by the coercing power will not be perceived as threatening enough to influence the decision-making of the target."¹⁰⁷ Coercers can be motivated to some extent and intentionally pretend to be motivated much more to intimidate the opponent, but in that case, the coercer must be careful that the

¹⁰⁶ More detail: George (1997): 76.

¹⁰⁷ George (1997): 77.

coerced does not see through the bluff, because any further action would be meaningless. As a result, the best solution is probably not to begin implementing the strategy without sufficient motivation.

3) Adequate domestic and international support

In the best possible case, the coercer should have domestic and international institutional and non-institutional support for the action. Domestic and international support is required for the necessary military-diplomatic measures. Inadequate public support may limit policymakers' choice of military instruments to achieve their goals.¹⁰⁸ To ensure it, it is necessary to present the goal of the action as legitimate, but this task, as it has turned out so far, is not easy. In the cases when the coercer's top-level decision-makers do not habitually continue providing real leadership, the coercer's message may become diluted, and goal clarity may be lost. There will be insufficient domestic and international support.¹⁰⁹

The opposition can come from different branches of government i.e. legislative that commonly approves funds for military actions and in some cases approves the diplomatic or military action itself. Most executive authority opposition comes from government professionals involved in economics, diplomacy, or security (military personnel), which can result in resignation/desertion, low morale, obstruction, and so on. Because the court level plays a significant role in interpreting the legality of an action, the constitutional or Supreme Court (depending on the judicial system) can declare a certain action illegal, which could prevent further implementation. Non-institutionally, within the social system, disapproval can be found from retired professionals, prominent lawyers specializing in the subject, religious and non-governmental organizations, and so on. International support can be expressed both

¹⁰⁸ George & Simons (1994): 223.

¹⁰⁹ Art & Cronin (2003): 371.

inside and outside of institutions. In its institutions or international organizations, another state or group of states may support or condemn the action. They may send an official protest or support, and that support or protest may lead to the formation of a coalition on one side or the other. Outside of the institutions, international support or condemnation is primarily expressed through protests, the media, and certain experts. From a theoretical standpoint, it is not particularly important that the action is legitimate and legal, or that all of the above conditions are met. It is essential to provide adequate support, which means that the opposition must be outnumbered. Nevertheless, for effective implementation and to avoid long-term negative consequences, the action should be based on law and justice.

Final considerations of George's criteria

As George himself points out none of these criteria guarantee the success of CD but can increase its success. Essentially, George probably did not intend to define the criteria for the success of the strategy, but to systematize the instrument, which, according to him is an "age-old instrument of statecraft that had never been systematized."¹¹⁰ Also, when it is taken into consideration that the empirical world creates theory and theory can later improve the empirical world, it can be said that: George's goal was to develop a policy-relevant theory of coercive diplomacy in which threats, persuasion, positive inducements, and accommodation were incorporated into a crisis bargaining strategy that offered political leaders an alternative to war or strictly coercive strategies.¹¹¹

With all of the criteria listed by George, it is clear that many different aspects are important for the success of the CD strategy. What is of the greatest importance is that these criteria overlap and should be perceived holistically. For example, the support of international actors and the

¹¹⁰ George (1991): 16.

¹¹¹ Levy (2008): 539.

clarity of the requests are directly connected. If clarity lacks, the support could be restrained as well. In addition, balancing motivation and fear of escalation cannot be separately observed. If the fear of escalation is higher than motivation, then the probability to comply with the requests is higher.

4.10 Criteria According to Peter Viggo Jakobsen

Peter Viggo Jakobsen based his research on the foundation set by George, but it could be said that he ‘modernized’ the strategy, given that George adapted the strategy to the Cold War period, Jakobsen referred to the post-Cold War. Based on the case studies, he presented his ‘Ideal policy’ which consists of four conditions (criteria) without which the CD is almost certainly unsuccessful but also points out that the implementation of these 4 criteria does not guarantee success.¹¹² The ideal policy is therefore designed to increase the chances of success, but according to Jakobsen, failure can still occur “due to misperception, miscalculation or preference for fighting to preserve honor.”¹¹³ The conditions contained in the ideal policy are the following:

1) A credible threat of force

Credibility is based on words and action, so if those two types of messages are inconsistent, credibility is in crisis. However, there must also be a capacity that supports the words, i.e. the objective possibility to put the words into practice. When capacity is discussed, it is not necessarily related to the size and wealth of the army, but also motivation and other factors. To be perceived as credible in international relations, what is said must be convincing and the realization of the predicted outcomes must be probable. The probability refers not only

¹¹² Jakobsen (1998): 4.

¹¹³ Jakobsen (1998): 32.

to technical possibilities but to readiness, that such a political move is made. It includes accepting the risks and potential consequences. The subjective perception of the opponent is the most important factor, because, Henry Kissinger once wrote: "A bluff taken seriously is more useful than a serious threat taken as a bluff."¹¹⁴ This means that the subjective perception of the opponent is the most important factor, even more important, than the realistic power and capabilities of the opponent. The way another side perceives the opponent is crucial for the effectiveness of the coercive strategy. If the other side perceives that the threat is highly probable, it will fulfill requests to avoid negative consequences.

2) Deadline for compliance

Even though the deadline is comparable to the sense of urgency, this criterion is fundamentally different, since the sense of urgency aims to cause panic and thus influence the decision, whereas the deadline aims to point out an exact period after which there will be a definite consequence if compliance is not met. In some cases, it is critical to ensure that the opponent does not gain a strategic advantage, and in others, that the opponent is forced to make a decision. Even ignoring the deadline is a decision (whether he thinks it is a bluff or is prepared to face the consequences). The deadline must be realistic, taking into account how long it takes to stop a specific action or return the situation to its previous state unless part of the strategy is that the opponent fails to meet the requirement by the given time limit, which goes beyond the CD's framework.

3) Assurance to the adversary that compliance will not lead to more demands

Persuasion, which is based on trust, is an uncharted territory in international relations, based on the concept of anarchy in the international system. It is also troublesome that the core of persuasion is to remove doubt, but when a person is forced to act unwillingly, it is difficult

¹¹⁴ Gaddis (1982): 299–300.

to remove the doubt so that he will not be forced to do something against his will in the future. There is barely any potential for trust among states because a betrayed state may be unable to recover.¹¹⁵ Therefore, the coercer should, at the moment of coercion, find a way to convince the coerced that there will be no additional demands because there is a good possibility that the coerced would not agree to the conditions because of fear of new demands. There is no completely safe way to trust someone in international relations, so it is up to decision-makers to assess the situation with the help of professional services, especially intelligence, and diplomacy, prepare for the worst possible outcome, and hope that promises will be fulfilled. Because trust is critical for a peaceful resolution that leads to persuasion, the first step in building trust, which does not take long, is in the communication of decision-makers on both sides. Their actions, in fact, greatly contribute to mutual trust. Furthermore, several questions are imposed such as *how much effort are decision-makers willing to expend to put what has been agreed into action?* Finally, *how much support do decision-makers have within their ranks to put what has been agreed into action?* Although reputation is important in determining whether a party's assurance is credible, the calculation within expert services based on a rational approach and available information remains the best indicator.

4) Carrots for compliance

Offering carrots for compliance is permitted in the CD theoretical framework, but it is neither obligatory nor decisive. Yet, as George points out, a positive stimulus can be provided, but if the requirement is met solely because of it, it is a bribe. As a result of the fear of coercion, the request must be fulfilled in part, and that is the only way in which the theoretical form would be satisfied. However, it is reasonable to believe that the opponent will agree to a certain

¹¹⁵ Mearsheimer (1998): 10.

amount of pressure if he also has some incentive, such as a partial victory or a win-win situation.¹¹⁶

Final considerations of Jacobsen's criteria

Jacobsen's use of predefined criteria does not guarantee success. However, an important step forward is that it guarantees the strategy's failure if the 'ideal policy' criteria are not followed. This fact greatly simplifies the subsequent search for a 'perfectly ideal policy' that would guarantee success or, at the very least, increase the chances of success. He makes a step forward from George's understanding of criteria adapting them to requirements of the modern society and this way makes criteria more relevant for this moment. Once again, all of the criteria are connected and have a significant level of interconnectivity.

4.11 Possible Causes of the Problem with Criteria

The authors dealing with this topic have different perspectives on the criteria. Jakobsen, for example, believes that incentives are essential to success, whereas George believes that incentives are only a supplement. According to George, even that supplement should be used with caution because CD fails if the coerced has agreed to obey because of the incentive rather than fear. The issue of assurance is also discussed in depth, even though it is clear that there can be little trust in the relationship between the opposing parties. The use of limited military force is also one of the most contentious issues, first in terms of the amount and scope of force, and then in terms of duration. There is no clear determinant of how much force is 'just enough' for the time being. Pape emphasizes technological modernization as an important factor, which is related to the limited use of military force to some extent because it is certainly easier to

¹¹⁶ Byman & Waxman (2002): 9.

shoot accurately at targets nowadays than it was previously (assuming that it is easier to limit force with precision).¹¹⁷

As a result, the main issues are a lack of a clear theoretical framework and a lack of agreement among the authors. In addition, scientific challenges arise, for example, it is necessary to have demand, credibility, fear, and coercion... but within all of these elements, there are variables and many ways to set them up. Because this strategy is based on psychological warfare, it is an element that should be considered, particularly in asymmetry in motivation, fear of escalation, and setting a time limit. Although a narrowing of the framework has been discussed, the broadening of the framework in terms of codification success/failure should also be considered, given that there are temporary successes or failures, and sometimes CD is divided into several stages, one of which is a success and the others are failures (more details in the case study section). Therefore, instead of success or failure, it would be useful to consider an extension of the codification to variants based on whether the result is more of a successful or more of a failure.

4.12 Final Considerations

The CD is undoubtedly difficult to implement because it is much easier to force someone to do something. It is critical to determine the type of tools and criteria that will be used based on the goal. The order in which those tools will be used in response to the opponent's counter-strategy, all within a given theoretical framework, depends on the behavior of the other party. As previously discussed, the question of the limited use of military force remains open, that is, how much force is considered limited in terms of the scope of the action, the number of weapons used, and the territory in which it is used. In empirical terms, it is also an aggravating circumstance, because if the other side opposes the request, it would be much easier to win and

¹¹⁷Pape (1996): 23.

occupy it militarily than to select and limit a force. Everything that lacks a clear framework can be subject to free interpretation, so departure from the theoretical framework can be subject to relativism in this case. As a result, it is critical to distinguish CD from other coercive strategies and to separate the two. In addition to contributing to the theory of a very interesting and complex topic like a CD, it may also be empirically relevant. Based on the criteria described in this chapter, this topic will be investigated further through case studies analyzed as a part of this thesis.

Chapter III

1. Problems and barriers in understanding this term

1.1 Introduction Remarks

There are both theoretical and empirical reasons why CD is difficult to define. In this part of the thesis, both types of reasons are addressed in the hope that this could contribute to a better understanding of cases when CD is applied. Considering that, the previous part explained what CD is and what separates it from similar coercive strategies, in this part, this topic would be critically assessed and three currents that rule in theoretical terms (which reflect on practical implementation) are described. The explanation in this chapter goes beyond the definitions and theoretical frameworks. The purpose of this chapter is to include an empirical perspective. Additionally, this chapter aims to focus on the challenges in defining, applying, and theoretically determination of CD strategy. This chapter should be understood as a preparation for case studies analyses later in this thesis. To better understand the problems that arise concerning CD, the introduction section of this chapter discusses CD as a means of resolving conflict.

1.1.1 Coercive Diplomacy as a Response to Conflict

CD strategy applies when conflict exists. Thus, it can be said that CD is constructed in such a way that represents the means of resolving conflict and preventing it from escalation while achieving the set goals. Additionally, it should be stated that it is much more difficult to achieve the goal when conflict must be limited or avoided.

To better understand the nature of CD it is of great importance to define and explain what conflict is. As conflict is such a significant term for coercive diplomacy strategy, it is

important to briefly reflect on its theoretical definition. Conflicts are a constant in the social community, so, naturally, they have become the subject of attention of theorists in various fields of science. Nicholson defines conflict in the following way: *Conflict is an action that occurs between rational, but not always conscious, beings. A collision between two celestial bodies is not referred to as a dispute. The desires, requirements, or obligations of the parties concerned are used to define a conflict.*¹¹⁸ In other words, conflicts, particularly in international relations, arise as a result of competing interests among the parties. Because conflicts are unavoidable, a strategy that achieves good results without expending excessive resources has become a desirable outcome. Conflict analyses in international relations generally hold that there is no single cause of conflict or a single way to resolve it, so the analysis of the conflict's onset and resolution must take a multifaceted approach.

Conflict is a consequence of both competition and cooperative efforts. States must be concerned with the means necessary to sustain and protect themselves. The more intense the competition, the more states seek relative gains rather than absolute gains.¹¹⁹ In a conflict between states (or non-state actors with an international dimension), a solution is usually reached by complete submission to one side and the imposition of the will of the other party or by compromise. The CD is not based on a compromise between the parties, but rather on coercion, so it is based on demand, which already entails a threat otherwise it, would be meaningless. On the other hand, it is not based on total subjugation, but on influencing the opponent's will, which can deepen the conflict. Conflict resolution has evolved into a multidisciplinary endeavor and a top priority on a global scale because the outcome often dictated the future course of events in relations between societies (short-term or long-term). The diplomatic and military services are largely responsible for resolving conflicts in

¹¹⁸ Nicholson (1992): 11.

¹¹⁹ Waltz (2001): xi.

international relations; hence, these services' tools have been changed and used as a starting point for conflict resolution, which is consistent with the CD approach since it only combines those two parts. This in turn has significant ramifications for the ability of the international community to respond quickly with crisis prevention tools across the board, including diplomacy, financial support, and military participation.¹²⁰

The relationship between diplomacy and the armed forces has existed since they both came into existence, and it has only gotten stronger over time. One of the many significant issues in the study of history and national security is how force and diplomacy interact.¹²¹ It is stated that security and diplomacy have a complicated and changeable relationship.¹²² Thus, it can be said that the CD strategy was developed as a type of crisis management approach through the combining and integration of diplomatic and military measures. A great instrument for settling international issues whose severity, even if does not result in war is the integration of these two areas into a single strategy, especially if it is successful. Given that CD is a crisis management approach and that management has its processes and procedures, it can be claimed that these three processes—prevention, containment, and limitation—are what make CD work.

The concept of conflict prevention has been around for a while, but it has only recently gained popularity as a 'subject' because of the tremendous destruction and millions of lives lost in the two world wars. Of course, diplomacy plays a big part in this, but because certain professional and technical discussions about operational control (such as territory or infrastructure) are involved, military experts frequently take part in the discussions. One of the most significant functions of diplomacy as a branch is conflict prevention. Due to these factors, coercive diplomacy was created, which links the same two branches as the strategy under

¹²⁰ Chalmers (2004): 12.

¹²¹ Weaver (2014): 137.

¹²² Barston (2013): 244

consideration. This is backed up by the growth of military diplomacy, which the majority of nations practice through fostering links between their armed services by sending military envoys on diplomatic missions.

Military attachés, who conduct diplomatic activities and keep in touch with the recipient country's Ministry of Defense, are responsible for conducting military diplomacy. The focus of these actions is on military cooperation. Force is a fundamental component of foreign policy in anarchy because it can be used both violently and 'peacefully.'¹²³ To prevent conflicts, the military branch developed, while 'preventive diplomacy' emerged in the diplomatic branch. The phrase might be pertinent to the subject of the study.

The significance of cooperation between these two branches (diplomacy and the army) seems perfectly evident given that negotiations continue throughout the actual military battles. International negotiations have some of the dynamics of interpersonal and inter-organizational levels of negotiation, but they also have large diplomatic bureaucracies, the potential for military coercion, the influence of transnational and non-state actors, the absence of an overarching legal framework, and the impact of other international events on any specific negotiation.¹²⁴ The goal of conflict resolution should be to force the opposing party to yield rather than to dare them to exacerbate the situation. Resistance and questions about the coercer's intentions are possible when the target is requested to carry out a significant assignment for them. Target is likely to benefit from the imbalance of interests if the coercer pursues goals that do not reflect its vital interests or makes demands that violate the very important interests of Target. This is because the target will be more motivated than the coercer will.¹²⁵

¹²³ Art (2004): 3.

¹²⁴ Hopmann (1996).

¹²⁵ George (1991):78.

The next phase of crisis management would be containment, which stops flare-ups. In this application, it refers to restricting one side's undesired behavior by forcing the other to follow the CD's rules. The word was once used to characterize the American effort to block the rise of communism. In addition, if the conflict has already erupted, the next move would be to restrict it to stop its spread and spillover. Any conflict spillover endangers the strategy and even the interests because coercive techniques always need the conflict to be as extensive as it is necessary to achieve the goal.

With the main focus to reduce the usage of force and finding a way to achieve interest without escalation of conflict, different means are used. One of these means is the CD strategy. Still, the CD is not a concept completely aligned with the idea of conflict prevention. These inconsistencies are explained in the following section.

1.1.2 The illogicality between the concept of CD and conflict prevention

In the context of international affairs, military strength, and diplomatic representation are frequently seen as opposing poles. Therefore, it seems strange to combine a forceful tool and a peaceful tool at first. Even though using military force and diplomacy might occasionally be regarded as contradictory, it is a practice that is commonly applied. Since soldiers are typically linked with battle and the use of force and diplomacy is described as the art of conducting relationships for advantage without confrontation this is reasonable.¹²⁶

It is important to consider how the two services combined can contribute to world peace. A theoretical attempt to theoretically limit the strategy that uses these tools may not seem logical at first glance, but in practice, it turns out that it can be a useful tool in achieving goals with minimal resource consumption. Diplomacy combined with military means is pursued through the threat of force, which adds to the confusion (due to the illogic between

¹²⁶ Muthana (2011): 1.

diplomacy and threat). The term ‘coercion’ means the use of various tactics that interfere with free will (which makes it repressive). Consequently, it is challenging to see coercive techniques as contributing to peace. The terms ‘coercion’ and ‘peace’ are part of a broad semantic field that also includes the terms ‘power,’ ‘domination,’ ‘violence,’ ‘war,’ and ‘sanctions.’¹²⁷ In the case of CD, the use of threats is the main action, but in some other coercive strategies, those are blackmail, extortion, and even torture. “The more broadly those concepts are defined, i.e., the more strongly ‘conceptual stretching’ occurs, the greater are their overlaps and ambiguities.”¹²⁸ Since its objective is to compel obedience from the victim, it may entail both the threat of using or even threatening to use physical force as well as the psychological pressures that result from the threat to compel the victim to take actions against its interests. Then, the question imposes itself, *how is it defensive?* Numerous components of the strategy are involved in the theoretical determination of a CD, although the theory interprets these components differently than the strategy's aim. The next issue is now at hand. The first thing that is theoretically insufficient is the fact that George defines a CD as a strictly defensive strategy¹²⁹, while defining a strategy as a way an agent prevents or compels a target to restore things, the perception of offensive and defensive tactics causes a dilemma. The phrases offensively and defensively are relatively flexible when the goal is to maintain the status quo, depending on the viewpoint but also subject to relativization. When the goal of the CD is discussed, statements like these can be found in the literature: If this objective is defensive, it is hard to come up with offensive ones.¹³⁰

The CD is intended to be a form of coercion that would be effective when a global norm is broken or the balance of power is upset, but in practice, it is quite similar to the

¹²⁷ Coercion and Peace: PRIF's new Research Program (2018): 5.

¹²⁸ Coercion and Peace: PRIF's new Research Program (2018): 5.

¹²⁹ See: George (1991): 5.

¹³⁰ Freedman (1998): 15

offensive form of coercive tactic. Another factor that makes it difficult to make a precise theoretical assessment of the CD is the fact that the term is associated with compellence, a method that is aggressive but comparable to the CD nonetheless. One of the challenges in this research is to distinguish the CD from other comparable methods because this adds to the analysis's illogic.

To conclude, the CD strategy is a term that is set between diplomacy and force, defensive and offensive actions, compromise, and forcing to something.

1.1.3 CD tool usage

Notwithstanding the many lessons, history teaches us about how aggressors misjudge the relevant balances of power, the existence of a significant military power imbalance between rival nations tends to incite war aggressors in the militarily superior nation, and the imbalance can be the primary driving force behind actions that spark a war.¹³¹ To prevent escalation, it is important to specify the tool's usage order within the CD. For instance, it is useful to decide whether the theoretical definition of the CD calls for using the tools in a specific order, from the easiest to the hardest, or whether the tool should be selected based on the circumstances. George cites four variations, one of which calls for a progressive increase in pressure. Even if some authors believe that this strategy is the sole viable alternative, steady escalation may be the only choice available.¹³² One of the opinions is that CD tools should not be divided but should be considered as a cohesive whole. Current discussions of coercive tools (airstrikes, economic sanctions, etc.) frequently focus on one weapon alone rather than taking into account the impact of multiple instruments in combination.¹³³ A military force, when used in a demonstrative and exemplary sense, can sometimes produce results in the gradual introduction

¹³¹ Brown (1994): 95.

¹³² Correll (1999): 39.

¹³³ Byman & Waxman (2002): 31.

of tools when threats, economic sanctions, and other visible pressures (military maneuvers) fail to do so.

However, the line between what is demonstrative and what is exemplary must also be drawn. Even if the border could be defined properly, it would not mean much practically because it is unquestionably important to be prepared for war if there is a show of force. Exemplary use serves as both a model and a warning of what can or will come: *'You did not believe my threat; here is an example for you to chew on of what I can do to you if you do not change your ways.'* "Exemplary use means moving just beyond the border of threat to make it clear by the action taken that the coercer is deadly serious about escalating the use of force if the target does not comply."¹³⁴ In the case of disobedience, the force increases, escalates and in case of further disobedience grows into war.

The meaning of limited use is this: *'You failed to take both my threat and my exemplary use seriously; you need more persuading; let me now give you a better idea of the consequences that your continued noncompliance will bring.'*¹³⁵

Theoretically, it has been proven that when military force is used brutally instead of with restraint, the plan has failed. Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate the limited use of military force to determine when the strategy is successful and when it is not. To answer all of the demands, the theoretical and empirical problems with the definition of CD are determined in the following parts.

¹³⁴ Art & Cronin (2003): .9-10.

¹³⁵ Art & Cronin (2003): 10.

1.2 Theoretical Problems

It is vital to outline the theoretical issues that arise when determining the CD because of some theoretical conflicts and the intricacy of the method. The lack of CD success criteria is strongly tied to theoretical gaps since to establish the criteria; one must first establish what they mean. The main theoretical idea of CD is to find ways to accomplish specific objectives more economically and, if at all feasible, without resorting to violence or war and serves to generate attention but is defensive, which is uncommon given that the main goal of defense is to respond to danger. Even one of the defensive goals is described as a goal that can blur the line between offensive and defensive. Additionally, it is found to be helpful to make a distinction between the three quite diverse defensive goals that coercive diplomacy can pursue. The goal might be as simple as putting a stop to the action. While the reversal of what has already been done is a more ambitious goal. An even more ambitious objective is to cease the hostile behavior of the adversary by advocating changes to the structure of the adversary's government or the nature of the regime, as Bruce Jentleson emphasizes in his work. This kind of demand pushes the boundaries of coercive diplomacy since it may blur the lines between the offensive and defensive uses of threats.¹³⁶ It is a great example of how confusion can be created about the nature of the CD. From all said above, it could be underlined that setting goals to a great extent can influence the way CD is characterized.

The term 'coercion' itself appears inadequate given that it relates to the imposition of a threat and is ultimately a form of assault. On the contrary, diplomacy refers to the peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiations and compromise. This makes things more complicated because subject matter experts frequently disagree and use different definitions of the same words. The body of research shows how challenging it is to understand, much less

¹³⁶ George (1991): 8.

plan strategically, the essential elements of success in any context other than conditional and statistical ones.¹³⁷

In the following text, some of the main theoretical problems are presented and discussed with the aim of better addressing the problems in understanding the term coercive diplomacy.

Is CD diplomatic or military strategy?

The first theoretical concern is if the CD is a diplomatic or military strategy. This confusion was already mentioned in different contexts, but the dual nature of CD is not introduced here. It is quite underlined that the legitimacy and support of the CD strategy in the international context are dependent to a great extent on the response to this question. As the usage of force is tolerable to a certain extent, it is clear that in an international context, the diplomatic nature of CD is more desirable and it is more likely that it will get support. CD can be understood either way, as it has both types of elements in it. Due to these reasons, it is very important to further address this topic.

The CD combines threats of force with, if required, the limited and selective use of force in discrete and controlled steps.¹³⁸ Thus, it can be explained as a strategy that mainly has a diplomatic approach but at the same time incorporates limited force or threat that force could be used to achieve diplomatic goals. Understood this way, it can be carefully explained that within CD force, as a military strategy element, is used in service of diplomatic goals. It puts into a different light the understanding of CD. Coercive diplomacy is also defined as the use of political and psychological tactics that must be coordinated with diplomatic efforts and sensitive to the political limitations, worldviews, and perceptions of the enemy.¹³⁹ According

¹³⁷ Jentleson (2006): 2.

¹³⁸ George (1991): 5.

¹³⁹ Levy (2008): 539.

to this definition, force is not distinguished separately. It is correct to say that threat of force is a more psychological tactic than a military strategy.

It is extremely hard to determine which elements of CD have more importance and determine their nature. One of the possible options is to say that in each situation when CD is applied different elements would be dominant. However, this approach does not help a better understanding of this theoretical problem. The most accurate response is that CD is neither a diplomatic nor military strategy, but a strategy that is a mixture of both theories and is somewhere in between diplomacy and military. This response does not provide a clear understanding of this theoretical problem, but it is most suitable to explain the role of coercive diplomacy.

Overlapping terms

The already addressed theoretical problem now is distinguished in this chapter as well due to the great importance that it has. Overlapping terms are of great importance for CD strategy to be clearly understood in the common context of real-life use. Overlapping happens because the theoretical determination of CD is challenging due to combining it with comparable methods.

As the term CD is between military and diplomatic strategies, it is often misunderstood as some other strategy that prevails more over military forces. For example, the term ‘coercive diplomacy,’ ‘deterrence,’ and ‘compellence’ are three particularly notable elements of coercive military strategy and commonly are used not as similar terms but as the same terms. It is crucial to distinguish between these prospective elements and the full coercive military strategy. While each of them has been the subject of substantial, theoretical, and policy study on its own.¹⁴⁰

¹⁴⁰ Cimbala (1998): 13.

The fact is that a number of terms, including comparability, coercive diplomacy, military coercion, coercive military strategy, and strategic coercion, are used to characterize coercion more or less consistently.¹⁴¹ Thus, it can be said that coercive diplomacy is a type of coercion, as Robert J. Art notes.¹⁴² What is common for all these terms is that their common element is the usage of force to a certain extent. Some of their elements are the same which leads to the second theoretical problem - overlapping. It is especially challenging for those who are not familiar with this term in a detailed manner but just have some general knowledge about this term and its meaning. The consequence of that could be significant as the opinion about some action can be made depending on the usage of the term, which further can influence the level of legitimacy, and support that this action gets.

One of the most important cases of overlapping is between the terms CD and compellence. Even though George clearly distinguishes CD and compellence, the CD is still referred to as a defensive tactic. On the other hand, it can be seen in some publications that the CD also uses coercion and deterrence.¹⁴³ This topic was addressed in detail in the previous chapter, but in this context needs to be mentioned and briefly analyzed.

A great number of definitions that are used for defining CD strategy cause additional confusion in determining the meaning of this term and the distinction that it has with similar but yet different terms. Overlapping and consequent problems with defining the term, cause difficulties to determine which factors contribute to successful coercion.¹⁴⁴

As was already said, the theoretical concept of CD has a problem with coercive strategy and the distinction between them, particularly the distinction between CD and compelling. According to Schelling, coercion is the capacity of one state to compel another state to take


¹⁴¹ Bratton (2005): 100.

¹⁴² Art (2007): 166.

¹⁴³ See: Sperandei (2006).

¹⁴⁴ Bratton (2005): 100.

action, typically through the threat of punishment.¹⁴⁵ George described coercion as a direct method of forcing a target to give up a desired result. Consequently, this is an offensive move that, unlike CD and deterrence, does not wait for the opponent to act but instead compels him to do something that is often illegal, i.e., to give up something that is legally his in favor of the compeller.



The main distinction between compellence and CD is described in the illustration above. It is of fundamental importance to reflect on different occasions when the defensive or offensive nature of the CD is discussed. Exactly due to the overlapping of the terms, which is a second theoretical problem that is distinguished and separately analyzed, this dilemma is so widely present. Here, it can be stressed that coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy and that this attribute distinguishes it from other compellence.

To conclude this topic, a great variety of strategies with similar approaches and small but fundamental differences make overlapping so present when it comes to this topic. By analyzing

¹⁴⁵ More detail: Schelling (2008): 72.

how and when something is done instead of only with which aim, this aspect can be clearer and the overlapping problem can be reduced.

Proportionality in the use of tools

The following issue, as mentioned in the previous part of this thesis, could be whether there is, in theory, a requirement that the tools be used in a particular order or whether the coercer can just select the tool that, in his/her opinion will be of the most help to him/her at the time. This is primarily connected to the dilemma about force usage and the application of more invasive methods that can be more effective but still more disruptive to the sovereignty of the other entity. Because of that, this problem is one of the most important ones in a theoretical sense.

Given that George values the diplomatic component more, it stands to reason that the instruments should be applied in ascending difficulty, starting with the simplest. However, that depends on the current perspective on the

case. There is a high chance, in some cases, to be completely aware that the simplest action will not lead to the results that are desired. Depending on factors such as urgency, this could be an unacceptable solution, as it would prolong the outcomes, which could cause a great number of negative consequences. The worst-case scenario, if the simplest tools are applied and results are not achieved, is that the conflict escalates to war. Therefore, choosing the right tool in the concrete situation and fulfilling the condition of conditionality is of essential significance. To add, one possible scenario as well is that the selected tool is more severe than it is needed, but that due to this selection of a tool, the perceptions of the risks and potential gains of the enemy can lead to war, as they don't perceive any benefits from compliance as are already extremely exposed to the negative treatment of another entity. Using more serious tools

from the very beginning could lead to a lower chance of compliance. It is very important thus to find a way to achieve proportionality.

The way the coercer is involved in the event at different stages may also affect how the tool is used.¹⁴⁶ It is obvious that in some instances the threat must be fulfilled to earn credibility for further employment of the approach because credibility is called into question if simply a threat is issued and the threat is never carried out. It has long been accepted diplomatic know-how that preserving credibility in international politics necessitates keeping promises and threats to build a reputation for determination. Thomas Schelling's writings were the most significant contributors to this idea. A new consensus contends that it is incorrect as well, contending that a state's relative capabilities and interests are the only factors that determine its legitimacy.¹⁴⁷

The proportionality of tools used as a part of CD strategies is still in the process of reshaping and it is not clear what is the right amount of force that needs to be used. The selection of the tools is connected to the condition that the usage of military force needs to be limited.

Limited use of military force

The strategy's limited use of military force is undoubtedly the most challenging aspect. Every time CD is discussed, the amount of military force that can be used is discussed. How many weapons, for how long, which targets are permitted or prohibited and when will they become excessive? The response to all these questions is important to the understanding of the usage of military force that is permitted.

¹⁴⁶ Levy (2008): 539.

¹⁴⁷ Mitton (2015): 408.

First, it is important to distinguish between limited war and limited military force. A limited conflict does not necessarily indicate a limited deployment of military force. The objectives of limited war are equivalent to or similar to those of full-scale war. Limited wars sometimes escalate to full-scale conflicts. Limited war is limited in terms of resources or territory but its goal is conquest or occupation. Coercive diplomacy requires consent since the target must decide between cooperating and resisting. The target is not given this option when full-force tactics are used.¹⁴⁸ These differences make the first step of clarification regarding the usage of force within the CD strategy. Most of all, it is important to define how the usage of force should be perceived i.e. what are the main elements of it.

Therefore, the CD is unquestionably distinct from tactics that employ full-scale, restricted, or either offensive or defensive war. Coercive diplomacy, to put it another way, tends to avoid using military force and works to prevent escalation. This tactic incorporates air and naval force into a coercive diplomacy technique since it, by nature, gives the opponent the option of complying or not.¹⁴⁹ The desire to prevent escalation is an important aspect of CD, and thus it requires, by nature, to limit force to the level that needs to be done to achieve goals. Additionally, it is of great importance to underline that the level of force also depends on the other side. The opponent is allowed to leave the conflict peacefully by utilizing restrained military force, meaning they still have a choice. Unlike CD, where it is about some sort of consent, total war is about utterly breaking the resistance and violently controlling the enemy. In addition to the fact that the coercer may need to preserve resources in the case of an escalation, CD's main goal is the expansion of influence rather than occupation. In addition, the collapse of the CD and political risk resulted from the escalation into a larger armed confrontation.

¹⁴⁸ Jakobsen (1998): 15.

¹⁴⁹ Jakobsen (1998): 15.

This is theoretically quite difficult because there is no clear theoretical determinant of how much force should be considered limited. Here, the theory is based on general principles that need to be improved upon and made more concrete. There are not any guidelines in the sense of a set of norms that should be universally followed by the (scientific) community. Some recommendations that fit into the idea of the restricted use of military force have been gathered through analysis of the considerations of some authors. It should begin with a defensive aim that influences the opponent's resolve not to break it.

Limited force is not the best course of action if the occupation is the goal. Coercive diplomacy functions best when the desired outcome is constrained. For example, coercive diplomacy has struggled to bring regime change, but it has also failed to prevent a state from developing a nuclear program that it sees as essential to its existence.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, targets should work to halt the coercive action's unlawful behavior or repair the harm it has caused. Any other objective, that is not consistent with the nature of the CD, is considered unpermitted pressure, which might lead to concerns that the motive is not defensive. Thus, the level of usage of force can determine if the term CD can be adequately applied. The idea is to show power to the opponent and what can be done if the other side does not comply.¹⁵¹

The branches of the army that are employed should be those that offer the option of coercion. Since they are utilized when there is an occupation or total control, ground forces are understood not to be a part of this military category. This technique incorporates air power and naval power into a coercive diplomacy tactic because it by definition gives the opponent the option of complying or not.¹⁵² Therefore, by necessity, these should be air forces and maybe naval forces, which can discontinue operations without having to go through a laborious

¹⁵⁰ Chester, Crocker & Hampson (2007): 316.

¹⁵¹ Art & Cronin (2003): 364.

¹⁵² Jakobsen (1998): 15.

process of withdrawing from enemy territory. However, using ground forces to resolve the entire conflict, such as seizing control of all contested territory, indicates the deployment of full-scale force because it removes all options and the potential for further (conventional) escalation.¹⁵³ Because the force within the CD is specified as restricted and demonstrative, the quantity of weapons employed is the area with the most uncertain terrain. The definition of the word ‘demonstrative’ is ambiguous and depends on the context and framework in which it is used. It would be impossible to restrict the use of force to a specific quantity of bombs, for example. However, it should unquestionably define the demonstrative force to distinguish it from brute force. It could be characterized in this context as a force that is solely focused on achieving the desired outcome. Accordingly, even if it is constrained by other criteria, the use of force ceases to be demonstrative and serves no purpose once it becomes obvious that the aim will not be attained.

This, among other theoretical problems, is even harder in practice. Determining the exact amount of force is quite challenging, and represents the line that distinguishes CD from other types of actions. Aside from the theoretical problems that are quite challenging, it is also important to mention and analyze empirical problems. The following chapter is dedicated to this type of problem.

1.3 Empirical Problems

It is vital and also helpful for scientific studies to discuss the empirical issues that come up in the execution of CD to comprehend the broader picture of a strategy that is both theoretical and experiential as it was used several times up to this moment. For the theory to reflect social reality is very important to discuss empirical issues that may arise when the strategy is applied. Empirical facts can be gathered, processed, and evaluated through

¹⁵³ Jakobsen (1998): 15.

experience in these and other circumstances, and conclusions can be derived from them. Some future CD implementations will take into account the experience obtained in earlier circumstances if it is assumed that the behavior is virtually completely the consequence of experience. Nevertheless, this section is focused more on the issues that come up during CD implementation experiences and go into greater detail in both the analysis of the case study and the subsequent analysis of these cases. Thus, observations made in this part are significant for later analysis of cases.

Trust between parties

The first empirical issue that should be underlined is trust between parties. Trust or lack of trust is one of the most important empirical issues. It can determine the outcome of the strategy to a huge extent. For example, it is fundamental to believe that agreement, especially the other side needs to believe that demands that are imposed on the other side would not escalate or be added to when what is asked for is fulfilled. Without trust, the other side can question if the existing list of requests would be expended.

One issue that arises during the implementation of the strategy is mistrust between the parties because the CD is essentially reduced to a request and the expected fulfillment of the request. Both the side making the request and the party being asked have little faith that their requests will be carried out and that no further requests will be made once they have been. Naturally, there is little to no trust between the parties in the conflict, if any at all. International relations take place in anarchy, whereas politics within states is governed by hierarchy, which is the most visible distinction between them and domestic politics.¹⁵⁴ The threat, force (or punishment), and persuasion are all parts of crisis management according to the CD. They should be implemented in some order to follow the strategy's general framework; however,

¹⁵⁴ Kydd (2005): 12.

there is a side issue with implementation. At this point, it relies on assurance to persuade the opposition that there will not be any additional demands and that the only objective of coercion is what is formally established as the goal. Of course, in the event of obedience, actions against the target will cease. According to an analogy with Hobbes' natural state on a personal level, anarchy reigns, which is why it is unreasonable for states to uphold moral and just laws because there is no assurance that other states will do the same.¹⁵⁵ According to state logic, it makes sense for each state to utilize all of its resources to protect itself against other states' hegemony in a world without a global sovereign to ensure its security and existence. The Hobbesian thesis, when applied to international politics, asserts that states desiring security will undertake aggressive actions, including war, in the face of chaos and mistrust. Because sometimes both parties will be driven by a need for security, a defensive factor rather than aggression, this battle will occasionally be tragic.¹⁵⁶ Other manifestations of the trust issue are also possible. The target may believe that the threat is a bluff and has no chance of coming true when there is a crisis control element or threat present. When given the option of giving in to a threat or betting that it is a bluff, the target may decide to take the latter course.¹⁵⁷ If indeed, the target perceives the threat in this way, he may refuse to comply with the demands, which could escalate the disagreement, or he may even step up his actions since he believes he cannot stop them, which is known as escalation. Since there is no point in making concessions if the challenger will undoubtedly back down from its threat, the target will always resist if the threat is understood to be a bluff.¹⁵⁸ This demonstrates a lack of belief on the part of the attacked party that the threat will materialize. This kind of issue may cause the CD application process to stall, end completely, or fail altogether. The coercer also suffers a loss of credibility going forward. It is challenging to expect confidence in CD given that negotiations frequently rely

¹⁵⁵ For detail: see the understanding of morality in Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*.

¹⁵⁶ Kydd (2005): 13.

¹⁵⁷ Schultz (2004): 4.

¹⁵⁸ Schultz (2004): 32-33.

on bluffing and that coercion is frequently used to impose new demands, but it would be beneficial to create a system that would increase trust between the parties. Although it can be seen that mistrust can hinder the application of CD on both sides, even if there is mistrust between the parties in the conflict, it is still preferable to have some form of persuasion than none at all. In general, military persuasion refers to the use of weapons of war and military skill to sway the opinions and actions of other state and non-state actors, particularly to advance one's own political and military objectives.¹⁵⁹

Choice of tools

To choose and create tactics, some tools are being designed. Which set of tools contributes the most to the strategy's original aim should be carefully considered during the strategy-building process. Moreover, how and for what purposes specific tools are used? According to experience, the same tool produces different results under various conditions, thus it would be beneficial to look at the conditions under which the tools produce the best results. To optimize impacts in the field, it is crucial to apply the proper pressure at the appropriate time, although this does not always work out well. It concerns the selection of instruments based on the level of 'offense' committed by the target and the objective established by the coercer. It ought to be efficient while still having the potential to put further pressure on the situation. If, for instance, military force is utilized as soon as the request is made, there is no other way to exert pressure other than through war, which would indicate that the strategy has failed.

The strongest kind of pressure, i.e., military action, should not be used right away; rather, it should be used as a last resort if all other options fail to produce the desired outcome. It is possible to combine numerous tools, but it is important to consider which tool

¹⁵⁹ Cimbala (2002): 5-6.

combinations are most appropriate or which will work in concert with one another, and which will work against one another. “The ability of a force to act as a form of functional diplomacy, in which ‘adversaries’ would negotiate a ‘negotiated’ agreement with one another using graduated levels of military force, was appealing to the ‘new strategists.’ This strange and ‘vicious’ ‘diplomacy of violence’ gave the old customs of official ‘gentlemen’ who focused their efforts on the quest for settlements a kind of perverse and destructive twist.”¹⁶⁰ Naturally, care must be taken to ensure that the tactics employed are not viewed by the target as being too soft to avoid coming across as insufficiently motivated or helpless. The main goal must be to influence someone's conduct or force him to decide unless it is for sport or retaliation. Violence must be anticipated to be coercive. It must also be preventable through accommodation. Bargaining power is the ability to cause harm. Exploiting it is diplomatic—vicious, but diplomatic.¹⁶¹

It would undoubtedly be ideal to use the instruments gradually and in due time. This implies starting with the CD as soon as the target moves and determining the speed of application of the tools from the easiest to the most challenging based on the circumstance. This is a carefully orchestrated installation of fear that is easily uncontrollable. Because the target must be persuaded that accepting the conditions will protect them against more attacks, but they must also be given an option that makes accepting the conditions more advantageous than having to deal with the repercussions. In coercive diplomacy, assurances are promises—implicit or explicit—to refrain from punishing the target or to stop punishing them if the target complies.¹⁶² The employment of tools within a CD is dependent on the agent executing the strategy because, as was already established, there is no set timeline for their use. To ascertain

¹⁶⁰ Nathan (2002): 135.

¹⁶¹ Schelling (2008): 2.

¹⁶² Greenhill & Krause (2018): 249.

which instrument produced the desired result in which circumstance, a case analysis might be helpful.

Escalation

The very core of the strategy and its course is in the escalation of the situation to make clear to the opposing side that if it does not agree to meet the criteria, there will be an unbearable and significantly less profitable escalation than meeting the requirements. The objective of the CD is not to start a war; rather, it is to psychologically influence the opponent and persuade him that war is an option. On the other hand, the coercer wants to avoid starting a war because if starting a war was in the coercer's best interests, there would be no need for a strategy and the war would start right away. In this situation, an escalation would first involve a demand and a threat, followed by political and economic pressure, a threat of using military force, a public display of force, and finally the use of minimal force. Even with the use of limited force, there is an opportunity for escalation if one uses a little amount of force at first and then builds up the amount of force, but only to the point where the amount of force is restricted and not comparable to what would be used in a conflict. Sometimes the escalation can go past the point where it can only use small amounts of force and become a larger force. When political leaders do not specify a predetermined level of force or a point at which they give control to the military commander to use decisive force to make the enemy helpless, they open the door for a slippery slope toward limited warfare.¹⁶³

Motivation and counter-coercion

Ultimately, a motivational difference that is significant in real-world application is reached. It is important to carefully consider what is expected of the adversary and how far either party is willing to go. Political leaders must determine whether to alter their grand

¹⁶³ Stephenson (2002): 10.

strategy or reconsider using military force in further pursuit of diplomatic objectives if a planned military campaign is not intended.¹⁶⁴ There is minimal possibility that the opponent will give up on using strategies that are limited, like CD, if they are forced to do something that is regarded as being in his best interest. Restricted interests call for limited military and political goals. Coercive diplomacy is the preferable course of action if critical interests are not at stake.¹⁶⁵ It is believed that there is nothing to lose when a society's vital interests are threatened, which creates a preparedness for a war to break out. This is not in the coercer's best interest because, in that case, he should not begin with a CD but rather declare war. Even if it were possible to exhaust the opponent using CD tools, there is a risk of using counter-strategies that, if they do not cause the CD to collapse, at least cause it to be expensively delayed. To a certain extent, ability matters. Both sides do estimate one another's military tactics. These power assessments do have an impact on resolve, particularly when the target feels it has powerful anti-coercive tools at its disposal that can neutralize or reduce the coercer's military might.¹⁶⁶

1.4 The Problem in Determining the Criteria

It is required to set criteria to give a framework for the available alternatives and to systematically govern decision-making based on these criteria for the process of selecting a decision-making solution from the available alternatives to be successful. To make the criteria as detailed as possible, it is desirable to identify what has previously been done in terms of the criteria and any issues that may develop.

The theoretical framework that addresses coercive methods focuses more on the progression and results of these strategies than on the standards or coercive instruments that produce specific results. Unfortunately, there is little relevant literature and theory available.

¹⁶⁴ Stephenson (2002): 10.

¹⁶⁵ Wijk (2014): 106.

¹⁶⁶ Art & Cronin (2003): 407.

The majority of coercion theories were created by American scholars; however, there are not many significant ones. None of these studies distinguishes between coercive diplomacy and military coercion, nor do they account for the transatlantic disparities in political and hence strategic culture.¹⁶⁷ The reason CD has a poor success rate is likely due to the absence of specific success criteria as well as its overall lack. The tool or technique that would be most effective in the implementation of a coercive strategy could be determined by analyzing the strategy flow, but there is no theoretical foundation upon which to base this analysis. Only 30% of initiatives, according to Patrick Regan, were deemed successful.¹⁶⁸ Considering that the CD is a tool for foreign policy, it would be beneficial to have guidelines in place to aid in the selection of a tool that will increase the likelihood of a successful outcome and potentially reduce risk. As a tool for foreign policy, the strategy's very outcome is understood both in terms of how it is applied and in terms of the foreign policy objectives it helps to attain.

There are issues with the criteria in these areas since the CD applies political, economic, and military pressure. The criteria can be political, economic, or military, and each of these categories has its disadvantages.

Problems related to the criteria of political pressure

Political pressure is a reasonably cheap instrument that can be used to exert pressure on both the government and the general populace. As a result, it might be difficult to predict which pressure would provide the desired result because doing so could complicate matters if the pressure is applied to the incorrect group. In reality, political isolation is a cheap, ineffective declarative tactic. First of all, it is of little use to a government if it does not have the world community's goodwill as a foreign policy objective if it is not accompanied by

¹⁶⁷ Wijk (2014): 100.

¹⁶⁸ Regan (1996): 345.

pressure. Second, it is more likely that political isolation will strengthen the regime than make it weaker.¹⁶⁹ A clear criterion, that would determine in which situation is necessary to exert political pressure, according to which group, would undoubtedly contribute to the improvement of the theoretical framework of the CD and its easier implementation in practice.

Problems related to the criteria of economic sanctions

Economic sanctions are still insufficiently effective, but they are having a greater and greater influence on the entities they are intended to target in our linked world. In the 1960s and 1970s, academics lost more and more faith in the effectiveness of economic sanctions. However, during the last ten years, both academics and decision-makers have grown more upbeat. Case studies will eventually demonstrate how particular regimes have been considerably undermined by economic sanctions in some situations, leading them to rethink their choices. However, due to the potential for trading on the black market, a case study will also detail instances where sanctions have merely served to reinforce the regime financially. Once more, this fosters serious deliberation, in which case economic sanctions will produce outcomes and perhaps draw conclusions.

Problems related to the criteria for the use of military force

Taking into account that CD is a political-diplomatic strategy, politicians rather than military decision-makers decide how much and how long to utilize armed forces, which leads to a lack of understanding of military doctrines. Given that the final choice (even though professionals undoubtedly have an impact) is in the hands of non-experts in the use of these funds, this poses problems in the establishment of criteria. Because of this, using military action is thought to be just marginally more effective than sanctions. Sanctions work just slightly better than military interventions. This is due to a lack of political will to use military force

¹⁶⁹ Wijk (2014): 110.

decisively, which can be explained by risk aversion and a lack of knowledge about how to employ military force most effectively. Through the research of case studies, several authors have determined success according to their standards. As a result, there is frequent uncertainty regarding criteria and results.

Success and failure

At this point in the strategy's evolution, neither success nor failure should be strictly defined due to the ambiguity of the different segments that exist in both the theoretical and practical domains. As a result, it would be simpler to develop criteria in the future that would be appropriate for the strategy's eventual complete codification. It would be helpful at this point to expand success and failure to include momentary success and failure, current, inexpensive, and expensive. Even while there is a place in such operations to assess partial failure, the outcome of a CD is often stated as success or failure (which would also clarify certain doubts). Temporary success is described by Peter Viggo Jakobsen as being followed by fresh non-compliance. If the target complies with the majority of the coercer's requirements, partial success could be determined by looking at the factors that led to compliance and those that prevented compliance. As a result, taking a more open-minded approach would help determine the criteria by comparing the causes of successful, partially successful, and unsuccessful cases. This would give insight into which requirements are more easily met and help determine precisely which objectives can be accomplished using the CD. In this approach, the theoretical foundation of the CD may be expanded as needed to make it effective and practical.

Equalization of coercive strategies

Because establishing the criteria is essential and the two tasks are interdependent, this thesis also discusses how to distinguish CD from other coercive tactics. It is vital to distinguish that approach from related strategies to avoid confusion about to which strategy the criteria

belong. It is frequently the case that coercive methods that are conceptually clearly separated are equalized in theory (and even in practice), making it difficult to discern which of the strategy is specific requirements apply.¹⁷⁰ Due to the similarities between these strategies, some of the criteria do overlap, but if each strategy has a distinct theoretical foundation, purpose, and aim, it seems to make sense that each strategy would also have a set of criteria. Theoretically, deciding the criterion would be simpler if the authors agreed on the CD's lowest common denominator, or if a framework is supported by the majority of scientists. Thus, it would be beneficial to change the posting from success-failure to success, partial success, and failure. This would further ensure that the attention changes from the strategy's flow to its outcome (even though the flow is also important but more processed than the conclusion). Since the CD is an instrument for foreign policy, as has been stated, even this fact makes it challenging to establish the criteria because, in the empirical sense, it matters much more whose objectives have been met, while, in contrast, in the theoretical attention is paid on how it has been implemented.

Overlapping strategies and their impact on defining CD success criteria

Previously in this thesis, the differences between the coercive strategies that were the most similar were discussed to get a general understanding of the differences, but in this section, the coercive strategies that overlap with the CD will be described in detail to determine which criteria could belong to the CD and which may overlap with other strategies, which may be a topic for future research.

It is important to take into account details of the compellence and deterrence techniques to cover as much of the theoretical ground as feasible and the effect on the criteria (given that

¹⁷⁰ For example: In Art & Jervis (2005): 164 was stated: „Because it entails coercion, coercive diplomacy is a form of compellence “while George distinguished coercive diplomacy from compellence as stated earlier.

the CD is described in the previous sections). These three coercive tactics are similar in that they all prey on people's fears of escalation and some form of coercion. All coercive tactics have the psychological influence on the threat or opponent as their central component, and their success depends on the target's level of cooperation.¹⁷¹ Due to its unique character, the psychological component should not be ignored because doing so can result in unchecked use or abuse. The use and abuse of psychology in public policy, particularly its involvement in warfare and the growing employment services sector, as well as the coercive and punishing nature of many psycho-policy interventions, have, however, received little attention.¹⁷²

Compellence in more detail

After examining previous words, Schelling defined compellence in the well-known book *Arms and Influence*. J. David Singer examined the terms 'intimidation' and 'compulsion,' and he also mentioned the terms 'persuasion' and 'dissuasion,' but ultimately chose the term 'compulsion.'¹⁷³ It represents an offensive coercive strategy aimed at forcing the opponent into action. Unlike the other two strategies, it has an offensive character¹⁷⁴, but it is most similar to a CD, except that the difference is that a CD has a defensive character and that the goal of a CD is to stop action and not to force an opponent to do something. Forcing someone to do something even includes phases, the first of which is diplomatic use, in which the threat of using force compels the target to do something. In contrast to the CD, the third phase—the employment of full-scale force or as much force as is required to accomplish the goal—is critical. The second step is the demonstrative use of force. "Virtually every campaign of coercion includes elements of diplomacy, (...) and almost every campaign of coercion also

¹⁷¹ American psychological association, Dictionary of psychology, the term: Power-coercive strategy "in social psychology, is a tactic based on the uses of economic, social, and political power to affect societal change, usually through nonviolent measures (e.g., organized boycotts, strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations, registration drives, lobbying)."

¹⁷² Friedli & Stearn (2015): 41.

¹⁷³ *Arms and Influence* (2008): 71.

¹⁷⁴ Schelling (2008): 72.

includes elements of economic penalties. (...) Military threats and actions often progress along a scale of escalation, starting with modest airstrikes and ending, in some situations, with ground presence or operation.”¹⁷⁵ Thus, in a practical sense, compellence permits the presence of infantry that is already en route to the occupation but forbids it within the CD. Coercive threats are comparable to what is known as ‘coercive diplomacy.’ For instance, both ideas let the coercer employ minimal violence.¹⁷⁶

However, despite its aggressive nature and the manner the military is employed in occupation, coercion is still a tactic that differentiates it from the use of full-scale force. The use of compellence involves the use of a threat of force, which the compeller fundamentally hopes will not be used, as opposed to the use of brutal force. Additionally, using harsh force is a military non-diplomatic action that is largely motivated by the attacker's might rather than his goals. Even if it has an offensive personality, compulsive behavior uses covert aggression to capitalize on the anxieties of its target.

Deterrence in more detail

The idea of deterrence states that one party can utilize a threat conveyed to the other side to prevent them from misbehaving. Deterrence, however, is ineffective because it only proposes a reaction to something unpleasant and remains silent in the absence of provocation.¹⁷⁷ Deterrence attempts to stop the enemy from starting such encroachments and, if dissuasion fails, to prevent the ensuing crisis from escalating to war. Coercive diplomacy is a strategic response to such encroachments by enemies.¹⁷⁸ There are various sorts of deterrence depending on the agent being protected and the opponent's behavior. There are two types of deterrence: direct deterrence, where a threat is made to a foe to stop hurting the interests of the

¹⁷⁵ Treverton (2000): xi.

¹⁷⁶ Greenhill & Krause (2018); 97.

¹⁷⁷ Schelling (2008): x.

¹⁷⁸ Levy (2008): 543-544.

entity making the threat and extend deterrence when a threat is made to stop endangering another entity. A deterrence strategy can be used to stop an armed attack on the territory of one nation or another (direct deterrence) (extended deterrence).¹⁷⁹

The literature also distinguishes between general and immediate deterrence, where general deterrence refers to situations where a party is prevented from seriously considering an attack or from endangering the interests of the person implementing the strategy, and immediate threat refers to someone who has already started making preparations for an attack. In light of this, "deterrent threats may be made in reaction to an imminent threat of attack (instant deterrence), or a deterrent policy may strive to avoid such short-term crises and military conflict from emerging" (general deterrence).¹⁸⁰ During the Cold War, when two powerful blocs faced off against one another and war posed the threat of wiping out the entire planet, deterrence was frequently employed as a foreign policy instrument in the hopes that the opposing side would not want to be held accountable for the end of the world. Some questioned whether the advantages of nuclear deterrence were either worth the horrifying possibility that nuclear weapons could be unleashed, purposefully or by accident, during the period of heated Soviet-American competition.¹⁸¹ Even though this tactic was employed throughout and after the Cold War, it gained theoretical popularity at that time because of the uniqueness of the historical context. The Korean War, Berlin Crisis, and Cuban Missile Crisis, which involved the United States and involved the most dangerous nuclear crises, involved political issues that were not necessarily existential and may have been handled very differently if they had taken place at all in a world without nuclear weapons.¹⁸² It may be stated that deterrence can help prevent conflict by highlighting explicitly what could cause conflict (and, therefore, how to

¹⁷⁹ Huth (1999): 27.

¹⁸⁰ Huth (1999): 27.

¹⁸¹ Gavin (2018): 6.

¹⁸² Gavin (2018): 7.

avoid conflict) and by urging on prudence. This is because some situations have been handled amicably.

A final consideration of coercive strategies

Common to all coercive tactics is the coercer's intention to persuade the opponent to adopt a certain viewpoint or make a particular choice against his or her will or interests in favor of the coercer. This is primarily accomplished by frightening the target and informing them that all other options are more expensive and less cost-effective than the one that is needed. The fundamental idea of coercion is contended as the exercise of power by a specific person(s), or organization(s) through the employment of threats supported by sanctions in the form of evils to be inflicted, advantages to be withheld, or benefits not to be granted.¹⁸³ Therefore, the coercive strategy employs both threatened and actual use of force, but both have the same goal of altering the opponent's conduct rather than destroying or occupying him. Additionally, this sets them apart from purely military approaches. The specificity of these tactics is a bluff because results can occasionally be obtained without the use of physical force and, in some situations, even without the coercer's ability or willingness to employ force. In addition to the phrases defense and offensive, the term 'influence on theory' refers to a vigorous defense. When it comes to CD, this phrase refers to a certain proactive approach for defensive purposes. Conversely, CD employs proactive methods for defensive goals as opposed to basically defensive deterrence and compellence, which is offensive.

¹⁸³ McCloskey (1980): 340.

2. Developed Criteria

Based upon the analysis conducted so far about the CD and identified problems that arise related to it, the following criteria are identified so far. The purpose is to help define what aspects and in which way can contribute to the success of the CD success/failure. Taking into account the complexity of the term, it is clear that this topic needs to be divided to determine how certain aspects can influence the outcome of an action.

The practical contribution of this thesis to understanding CD is demonstrated through these criteria. The initial idea is to create a framework for rethinking the already applied CD strategies as a way to see what in practice determines the outcomes of CD strategy. To analyze CD strategies, criteria were applied to four different cases, which helped in understanding the elements of CD.

Regardless of their effectiveness, the fact that some CD application criteria have previously been established provides a solid analytical foundation. Criteria provide a certain basis and framework for further theoretical analysis.

The following criteria are selected as the most important aspects when discussing CD. Additional to the importance that each criterion has, it is important to underline that all criteria have to be perceived in a holistic manner. After analyzing each of the criteria independently, it is of the greatest importance to observe how each of them interacts with others in concrete examples. Of great importance is to be aware that external circumstances also have great importance when it comes to the outcome of the CD strategy application.

1) Asymmetry of motivation

The first remark that needs to be made is that the coercer should be more motivated than the opponent should. This represents the first criterion to be distinguished. Motivation is of great importance as it determines readiness to act and/or readiness to obey. If the opponent were motivated more than the coercer is, the response to the actions of the coercer would be negative i.e. the resistance would be of a greater level. The resistance would make the coercer's mission harder to be accomplished. It means that if the coerced is motivated not to obey demands more than the coercer is motivated to impose demands; it is highly likely that CD would be unsuccessful or at least less successful.

Which incentives will get results or which threats would be effective depends on the level of motivation of both sides.

It is also important to emphasize the importance of territorial concerns for everyone; therefore, CD would likely fail in such arguments because the defender's motivation would be the main point of focus. When it comes to national security or nationalist reasons, the geographical stakes in coercive disputes are frequently very significant. Second, people and states may value certain regions not only for security reasons but also because they are essential sources of national identity and cohesion.¹⁸⁴ In this category, “the strength of the coercer’s motivation”¹⁸⁵ could also be included within the scope of this criterion. This can be stated because the asymmetry of motivation already shows the strength that should certainly be on the side of the coercer if he intends to succeed in implementing the strategy. Pape presents the target's point of view and contends that the citizens of the target state are unlikely to rebel against their government in response to civil punishment. The alleged causal chain, according

¹⁸⁴ Pape (1996): 21-24.

¹⁸⁵ George (1991): 76-80.

to which popular outrage over civic misery leads to political opposition against the government, does not hold up and meets this condition.¹⁸⁶

Based upon these observations, it can be said that motivation (in terms of tools) can be implemented to a certain degree, i.e. it is significant for both parties in the conflict. For example, if the motivation of the coercer is high to achieve the goal, the possibility of escalation is much higher as well. The coercer more likely will use the demonstrative force, while if the motivation were lower at least more time would pass until this action would be undertaken. Each action is colored by the motivation and it definitely determines the final outcome. In the same way, the coerced will refuse positive incentives or persist through the fear of escalation. This way also the connection among criteria is expressed.

2) Sense of time urgency

The second criterion is the sense of time urgency. According to Jakobsen,¹⁸⁷ it should impose a sense of urgency on targets to avoid procrastination, evoke psychological effects, and awaken fear and the need for urgent action. In this category, it is 'a deadline for compliance'¹⁸⁸ which can be classified, because the imposition of a sense of urgency should be imposed by a certain time limit.

To explain why the sense of urgency is important, several reasons should be addressed. First, under pressure, it is more likely to make a less calculated decision motivated by the fear and effects of the threat. If the coerced has limited time to comply, other options would be less researched which can contribute to the overall aim to achieve the set goal and restore the status quo. More time means more opportunities to research alternatives, and if the coerced thinks that he has to act under a set deadline, the chances are higher than if the sense of urgency is lacking.

¹⁸⁶ Pape (1996): 21-24.

¹⁸⁷ George (1991): 76-80.

¹⁸⁸ Jakobsen (2006).

The following reason is that sense of urgency provides legitimacy for any type of action. If the message that the coercer sends is - instant action is required and restore the status quo as soon as possible - the actions of the coercer would have more legitimacy. The message that the other gets is that situation is serious and that actions are needed. This way, the sense of urgency could interact with international and domestic support.

In addition, the third reason the sense of urgency is important is to avoid procrastination as CD spends resources and requires a lot of effort from the coercer. Additionally, if for example, the coercer reacts to an undemocratic regime – it is clear that this way many people suffer, and prolonging that is not synchronized with the purpose of CD actions.

3) Fear of unacceptable escalation

Aside from asymmetry of motivation and sense of urgency, a very important element of CD is fear of unacceptable escalation. Fear of unacceptable escalation serves to psychologically act on the opponent and cause fear of escalation, which represents an unacceptable price concerning the price of what is required of him.¹⁸⁹ This criterion includes a realistic threat of using force to vanquish the adversary or prevent him from achieving his goals swiftly and at a low cost, which can be referred to as escalation dominance.¹⁹⁰ The threat must be believable and have a realistic chance of coming true to instill terror in an adversary – regardless of whether the coercer intends to fulfill it or not. Additionally, coercion frequently happens during times of conflict when states are typically more willing to tolerate expenses.¹⁹¹ However, Pape offers a target perspective as opposed to using coercion. Defense, evacuation, and other modern state capabilities can diminish their vulnerability to counter–civilian actions. The perspective of the party experiencing coercion concerning the specified criterion is

¹⁸⁹ George (1991): 76-80.

¹⁹⁰ Jakobsen (2006).

¹⁹¹ Pape (1996): 21-24.

provided by conventional munitions' limited ability to harm civilians even when intentionally deployed to produce enormous casualties and rapid adjustment to economic dislocations.¹⁹²

Fear of escalation can be explained as the price the coerced is not willing to pay. In many cases, the coerced cannot pay the price if the power of the coercer and the coerced are on different sides of the scale. In some cases, which is important to underline, the fear does not have to be related just to force usage but to the consequences of economic sanctions for example. When the coerced is under fear of escalation, he chooses to settle just to avoid the potential consequences. Fear of escalation is the core characteristic of CD as it was explained in the theoretical part of the thesis. The CD should help and support the achievement of the goals using the power of the threat that could be used as a way to avoid actual escalation and war.

The coerced, thus should be convinced that if he does not comply the threat would become reality. Through this criterion, the CD essence is manifested. It could be said that if this criterion is not fulfilled, and the coerced does not fear escalation or does not find potential escalation unacceptable the whole CD strategy fails.

4) Clarity of the settlement terms

Clarity of the settlement terms is considered that the opponent would more easily agree to obey if the demands were set and there was some kind of guarantee or assurance that there would be no new demands if he obeyed.¹⁹³ This group falls under a promise to the adversary that compliance will not result in additional demands, which meets George's criteria.¹⁹⁴

The clarity of the settlement terms guarantees that once complied with the request, nothing more will be requested. It is additionally facilitated this way to understand what the coercer wants to achieve and sets a better framework for making settlements. If the conditions

¹⁹² Pape (1996): 21-24.

¹⁹³ George (1991): 76-80.

¹⁹⁴ Pape (1996): 21-24.

of the settlement are not clearly defined, a lot of space is left for misunderstandings. For example, the coerced may agree to conditions in a way he understood it, but if the clarity is lacking, the coerced might expect different actions or different extents of the action that was undertaken. The same could happen with the process of lifting sanctions if the coerced complies. The coercer may lift some sanctions but not all that were expected by the coerced. Misunderstandings like this could not only lead to a setback in the cooperative path of the coerced and the coercer but also it could also lead to the escalation of the conflict and even in some cases failure of the CD. If one side feels played and thinks that the deal that was made was also broken, it is highly probable that it would result in the completely opposite action from the desired one. The chances for success would be reduced significantly. To avoid this scenario, it is important to have clear settlement terms. When discussing concrete CD, it is important to reflect if the terms were clearly defined. If not, one of the potential reasons for failure is identified.

5) **Adequate domestic and international support**

George mentioned it as an extra condition, but without support for the deployment of the CD against the target, the CD is unlikely to be enforced since criticism from the local or international public would swiftly produce issues like a populist uprising or the implementation of international sanctions.¹⁹⁵

Support plays an essential role in the success of the CD. Without support, the CD lacks legitimacy and the coercer's actions could be interpreted as an act of violence. Thus, for the CD's action to be legitimate international and domestic support is of fundamental importance. If the support lacks it is hard to justify the action.

¹⁹⁵ George (1996): 21-24.

What is also important to mention is that support is important for both sides. It is much easier to resist the pressure of the coercer with the support of international actors. Depending on the support distribution, the chances for success are different.

Gaining and losing international support could lead to more severe consequences. With international support, the problem with changes in the status quo is recognized. In addition, if the problem with changes related to the status quo is recognized, it is clear that some actions are needed. This way the coercer's legitimacy to act upon the certain situation would be reinforced and it would provide favorable conditions for focusing on goals that need to be achieved related to the coerced and not about the ways to gain international support or explaining it in the domestic context.

International support can directly influence how efficient both sides would be and it determines the position of the opponents, and their power and thus influence how far they can go in protecting their goals.

6) Positive incentives

In essence, the CD is based on influence and fear, and it has already been mentioned that meeting requirements must result at least partially from fear.¹⁹⁶ Positive encouragement is appreciated, though, first because it might help with the decision and second because it might offer a way out in terms of maintaining dignity or framing the situation so that something is gained and nothing is lost.

Positive influences are important to show the coerced that he can benefit from the settlement, making it more appealing to comply with the terms set by the coerced. Offering carrots is an act of goodwill and can facilitate negotiations. Using positive incentives can help to achieve goals without using any amount of force and more rapidly resolve situations. The

¹⁹⁶ Jakobsen (2006).

nature of the CD aims to use the lowest level of force possible or in the best case avoid using force at all. Positive incentives can help with that endeavor.

To conclude, the deductive fusion of defined criteria in the list above should aid in the ultimate goal of defining the criteria for CD success so that the topic does not needlessly blur into terms that are called differently but mean the same thing. From the aforementioned descriptions, it was evident how many defined criteria of relevant authors essentially overlapped.

3. Currents in the theoretical basis

George defines CD as a predominately-diplomatic approach that may or may not entail the use of force. Some currents, however, believe that this tactic is more military, more diplomatic, or a combination of both. Although this study is based on George's original definition, it is important to comprehend all three currents. Because of the specifics that, for instance, sometimes the CD's initially defined goal can be accomplished but the framework of the strategy was broken for example, by the transition from limited force to brutal, it must be determined when it begins and when it ends to start establishing the criteria. Simply said, the CD is the space between discussions and ruthless military force; however, how this space will be represented depends on the scientist's perspective whether he is more in favor of the diplomatic or military component of the strategy. Some scholars alter the framework in this situation based on whether they view the CD more as a diplomatic or a military tactic. This is not meant to suggest that the framework of the strategy is open to interpretation, but rather that within the boundaries of the CD, it is possible to determine how far the strategy needs to be stretched to serve as a viable alternative to war due to complexity (ability to use both diplomatic and military means) (which is one of its goals).

First point of view

According to one group of academics, the CD plan is only in place before the first bomb detonates. The CD is seen as ‘threat diplomacy’ by this group, which focuses primarily on negotiating tactics and sees them as essential to the strategy's success. When military action is utilized, the potential for (aggressive or warlike) escalation does, in fact, drastically increase, and dealing with the fallout from escalation further complicates (already complicated) the decision-making process. However, no matter how difficult the decision-making process is, it is unlikely that anyone will believe your threats if you are resolved not to carry them out.

Therefore, although CD does not always require the use of armed force or violence, it should not be ruled out as an option or a method. Anyone who studies the theory of war will agree that the pinnacle of military skill is to overcome an opponent's resistance without engaging in physical combat, but this can only be done if the adversary is convinced that physical force is the only way to overcome his resistance.¹⁹⁷ Therefore, the military component of the approach cannot be disregarded, initially as a kind of direct pressure and eventually as a form of fear. When the attitudes of the authors in this corpus are analyzed, it is found that even while they believed that the CD had failed because of the use of force, they still maintained that the use of sparser acts of force was a legitimate exception.¹⁹⁸ This view's theoretical underpinning is the assertion that the CD provides an alternative to relying on military action, which is accurate. However, in this context, ‘military action’ refers to war, and a key component of the CD is a force other than war. Sadly, there are not many instances of CD working in practice, but Operation ‘Uphold Democracy’ can be pointed out, carried out in Haiti in 1994, which sought to remove the military regime and install the country's democratically

¹⁹⁷ Tzu (2000): 8

¹⁹⁸ More detail: George (1991): 6. Use of "just enough force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution to protect one's interests and establish the credibility of one's determination to use more force if necessary"

elected president. In this instance, a credible threat of the use of force and an execution date was made. The operation was later followed by a peace operation, but the goal itself was achieved by a threat, so in this case, it can be said that this is an example of the best possible outcome of the implementation of the CD, or cheap success, but without a credible force standing behind that threat it would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve success.¹⁹⁹

The second point of view

Another school of thought contends that the proper compulsion does not start until there are actual pressures, like sanctions or military action. According to them, CD as a tactic only works when some sort of stick (pressure) is applied, or when force is applied. This school of theorists has a more pessimistic view of the CD and almost completely ignores threats, which have played a large role in diplomacy for ages and are the least expensive means of attaining objectives. While it is true that goals are rarely achieved without a stick, there is a chance that a threat or bluff could succeed, therefore it would be unwise and hasty to pass up the chance and instead go methodically, beginning with the lowest options. These authors contend that the use of force during a strategy differs from the use of force during a war, but that the goal can only be reached under the so-called ‘strong form’ of CD, which entails the application of sanctions or military action. Given, among other things, that the goal of the CD is to get to the goal ‘cheaply’, at the moment when the pressure starts, the hope should always be that the coerced would give up before the involvement of military force is necessary. Given that the CD is still ‘basically a diplomatic strategy’²⁰⁰, and that its goal is to force the opponent to obey and not to destroy or occupy him, even if military force is used, it should be “just enough force of appropriate kind”.²⁰¹ The Cuban Missile Crisis may be used as an illustration of this kind of

¹⁹⁹ George & Simons (1994): 3.

²⁰⁰ George & Simons (1994): 3.

²⁰¹ George (1991): 5.

CD, and given that it put the world on the verge of nuclear war, it also serves to highlight the risk that might result from the escalation and failure of CD. In this case, it was specifically about creating a balance of power between the superpowers; the USSR responded to the US deployment of nuclear weapons in Turkey by deploying nuclear missiles of its own in Cuba. After a serious and perilous crisis, the USSR removed its weapons from Cuba in exchange for guarantees that the US would not invade Cuba and that Turkey's nuclear arsenal would be destroyed. Therefore, in addition to the threat, persuasion was also utilized in this case, and a specific action was taken by the United States to block Cuba and prevent Soviet ships and submarines from delivering missiles without engaging in combat. In addition, the situation when the CD strategy needed to include force was in Afghanistan. This example would be further discussed, but after threats and efforts to make the coerced comply without force usage were unsuccessful, the force was included. According to this point of view, at this moment the application of CD fully started.

The third point of view

Alexander George, a pioneer in CD codification, provided the guidelines that this current adheres to. According to George, it is equally important to send clear signals during the first phase, which includes making threats and demands, intimidating others through various acts of coercion and force, and using minimal force from the military. If not equally effective, all factors, in the opinion of this group of authors, are at least equally significant. The gradual imposition of the 'tools', theoretically offered by CD, can be useful for determining how much 'pain' is the coerced willing to endure, or what price is willing to pay before he agrees to comply with the request. These tools can be roughly grouped into three groups: the first would be the diplomatic palette, which includes strong written or oral protests, the symbolic withdrawal of ambassadors, or the withdrawal of all diplomatic staff (severance of diplomatic relations), etc. It may also include suspensions and exclusions from international organizations,

which further can lead to the next group of tools, since the next group of tools is economic pressure, and the exclusion, among other institutions, may also apply to international financial institutions. The elimination of credit, suspension of exports and imports, and the possibility of an arms embargo all fall under the category of economic instruments, which brings us to the third category of tools. The third category of military actions ranges from restricted use of military force within the coerced region itself to several types of force demonstrations (military parades, military drills close to the coerced border, etc.). It makes sense to move from the least painful to the more invasive tools unless the coercer lacks reliable information that one set of tools will not provide the desired effects. It would be fine to omit that set of tools in that situation.

4. Final considerations

This chapter aims to identify issues that make it challenging to develop criteria for success in CD implementation through in-depth analysis of the CD and highlighting the theoretical and empirical issues that occur in defining the strategy and criteria. It was a necessary step to create a theoretical basis for the analysis of the case studies that are the following part of the thesis. Each of the problems and criteria is fundamental for the proper analysis of the selected cases. The theoretical aspects are complex by their nature and have a few very debatable spots such as the amount that can be used and remain in the field of the CD. Because of that, these problems need to be selected and analyzed with a special focus on the issues that could cause misunderstandings between CD and other types of strategies. By making clearer, what this term stands for and what distinguishes this term it is clearer how to in practice perceive CD strategies. All important aspects that may arise in practice and from the responses to it depend on the success of the CD strategy.

Additionally, a careful difference was drawn between coercive tactics and knowing precisely and unambiguously what the criteria pertain to. The number of criteria that are called differently and refer to the same item has been decreased by combining the previously stated criteria and overlapping them. This has facilitated the task so that the analysis would not have to be unnecessarily blurred and repeated. Additionally, the so-called soft, hard, and medium theoretical currents are discussed, which should help readers understand the author's differences with the strategy's original creator's conception.

The summary of this chapter provides a theoretical basis for applying these constructs in the analysis of CD applications. The problems presented in this chapter show, which points, could be problematic for both defining if some behavior is a CD strategy and then if a CD strategy is successful and which elements determined success or failure. With this aim, refined criteria are listed to facilitate this quite demanding field of research.

In light of the different challenges to global security - including those posed by war, economic collapse, and other factors - society must come up with new defenses against these dangers. In this case, the CD can be quite important. Its role in conflict prevention is prone to change, and there are increasingly more ways to engage in it. However, to engage it properly and thrive successfully, it is of fundamental importance to be careful regarding the criteria listed in this chapter. Balancing between military and diplomacy approaches, force and persuasion is quite a challenge and it is hardly a defined area. As with any subject that is not well defined, the application of CD is full of challenges and questions that arise. Efforts should be made to clarify the criteria as much as possible as this strategy has very great prospects to be frequently used it is important to put it in the spotlight and see its nature more precisely.

To conclude, before it can be used to solve international issues successfully, its theoretical foundation must be established, and it must also be distinct in both theoretical and

practical terms. Efficiency must first be carefully reviewed and assessed, which was the goal of this chapter. Then, criteria for its effective implementation must be established. A more precise and direct approach needs to be applied as a way to this strategy, which is poorly interpreted and confused with other similar strategies.

Before starting a discussion about cases and practically analyzing the CD strategy, it is important to underline the sensibility of international relations. Each decision is constantly scrutinized by the public due to the high stakes involved; if interpreted incorrectly, this might have serious repercussions among states that could affect a large number of people. However, if successful, the CD strategy can save the lives of many and prevent the usage of force, which is set as a primary goal.

Case studies

1. Introduction

For this thesis to respond to the goal set at the beginning of the research and to explain to the core the nature and role of CD it is crucial to include practical aspects. Case studies have an essential role in the analysis of how CD was applied in practice and what potential problems it faced. By using case studies as a parameter, it could be determined how a CD can be effective. This is especially important since there is no clear distinction between success and failure when it comes to CD. The task is to see how certain circumstances aside from the strategy itself can influence it with the ultimate goal to draw conclusions that may help the future CD strategies become more effective.

By researching four cases when CD has been applied, the important aspects such as when and how is best to use it are discussed. The initial task of this chapter is to present the

cases so that the reasons why CD was used can be identified. The second task is to critically analyze the CD strategy application. It is important to determine which aspects can determine if the purpose of the CD strategy application will be fulfilled. Understanding aspects related to the events can help in making conclusions about the usage of CDs. For example, the first case that is analyzed is Iraq. The case of the use of CD in Iraq 1990-1991, which represents the first use of CD after the Cold War, and in the literature is referred to as a failed use of the strategy due to escalation into full-scale war. The next case is the use of CD in Haiti 1991-1994, which was marked as a cheap success (meaning that military force was not used). The following example is the case of Libya 1992–2003, which will be split into two parts, with the first part representing the years 1992–1997 and being conceptually referred to as a failure of the CD. Between 1997 and 2003, the second phase, which is characterized by inexpensive success, occurred. The final case that is examined is the case of Afghanistan 1998–2003, and it can also be divided into two phases, before the attack on the World Trade Centre and after that. Such a case and its development can provide insight into what has changed in a given period in the same area, which led to a different outcome. Both steps in this instance signify the CD's failure. Through these four examples, factors could be found that would suggest specific actions to take at a specific time and could determine if the approach was successful or unsuccessful, which would, in part, harmonize theories and practices. The different types of conflicts and background stories of these conflicts help get more accurate insights into the CD strategy usage. The fact is that a great variety of factors can have an impact on the results of the strategy and the course of events that will happen later.

Even though each case's results varied, there were great examples of how the technique was used across all of them. However, because each case's circumstances were unique, each case's outcomes also varied. The psychological component, which is the CD's key component, has been applied in each of these situations with varying degrees of success, but the

circumstances in each are unique due to factors like government stability, internal opposition, motivation, international support, the likelihood of conflict, global conditions, and others. The fact that these are so-called asymmetric conflicts, in which the opposing parties represent a much stronger state, on the one hand, seeking to advance its interest and a much weaker state on the other hand resisting efforts to uphold its interest, is common to all of these activities. It is sometimes surprising that the weaker side resists for a longer period and more successfully than could be expected, depending on how vital the interest being fought for is to the weaker side, how many resources it has, and how much opposition it will offer. Determining the reasons for resistance, potential lost opportunities for agreement, and the effectiveness of particular strategies requires careful analysis of case studies. The examination of the CD, which forbids war and the threat of force through the UN system, is the last step in attaining goals in the current time environment. Yet the legal framework endorsed in Article 51 of the UN Charter grants the right to individual or collective self-defense and offers the potential for the Security Council to approve an action or use of force that justifies the realization of one party's interests if that action has international support. Given that the UNSC can adopt all necessary measures to curtail or constrain the 'renegade' side, as will be revealed below, not only the threat but also the invasion of one country is possible. Sometimes 'powerful players' willfully choose not to utilize coercion to benefit from a much more successful tactic, such as war (which could be one of the possible causes of a large number of failed CD implementations). In light of the aforementioned, case study analysis in CD use is crucial due to the strategy's analysis as well as the broader knowledge it provides that may be applied to science and the area.

2. IRAQ

The first case analyzed in this section will be a case of Iraq and CD application. First, the events that are of importance for this matter will be analyzed.

Given that the coalition's participation in the operation in Iraq was the first of its kind following the Cold War, there was likely no consensus on the code name (which is surely not a priority in crises). It is a great way to show how everything including the name was new about this type of conflict. Although it is commonly referred to as the Gulf War, the US occasionally refers to it as a Desert Shield or Desert Storm, while the British Army used the code name Operation Granby for the same operation. Therefore, those are all names for the same fight that occurred between August 2, 1990, and February 28, 1991, between Iraq and a coalition of 35 nations. Under the UN mandate, the Coalition led by the US had the objective to convince Iraq to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait. This case is intriguing since a large-scale operation was started after the time Iraq was given to restore things to their prior state expired. Excessive force or the almost total lack of restricted military power led to military success but CD failure. Specifically, the airstrikes themselves were far more than merely demonstrative, and in the end, a ground invasion served as the perfect testament to the CD strategy's failure.

2.1 Background of the Conflict

To understand the application of CD strategy and outcomes, it is fundamental to also understand the background of the conflict. Before the First World War, Kuwait was viewed as an autonomous area within the Ottoman Empire under the terms of the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913, which was signed but never ratified. Kuwait's former membership in the Ottoman Empire serves as the main justification for the Iraqi claims. As a result, Basrah and Bagdad, which are close by, served as the Ottoman chain of command for Kuwait, according to the Iraqi viewpoint.²⁰² Iraq has always considered itself to have a historic right to Kuwait and has refused to recognize the autonomy and legitimacy of the Kuwaiti Emir. Kuwait has had an opposing viewpoint for a long time before, so it was worth noting that Kuwait signed a

²⁰² Casey (2007): 86.

secret agreement with Britain in 1899, making it *de facto* a British protectorate. According to the agreement, Britain protects Kuwait in exchange for obligating Kuwait's ruler (and his successors) not to allow the exploitation of any land or oil without Britain's prior consent. Britain has also agreed to pay a set amount of money each year, with the important caveat that the agreement be kept secret.²⁰³ According to the Iraqi side, the Kuwaiti ruler lacked the legitimacy to sign such an agreement because Kuwait was considered part of Iraq within the Ottoman Empire, so such an agreement could only be signed by the Iraqi ruler. Because of Iraq's claim to Kuwait, the British Army even deployed military forces in 1961 in an operation called Vantage to protect Kuwait and prevent Iraq from occupying it (the forces were replaced in 1963 by Arab League forces).

Kuwait supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, and Iraq's debt to Arab countries, including a significant amount (approximately \$14 billion) to Kuwait, became one of the reasons for the conflict's resolution. The total cost of the war for Iraq was estimated to be \$452.6 billion, which equated to approximately eight years of Iraq's GDP at the time.²⁰⁴ Iraq intended to repay war debts with money earned from oil production through the economic method of a negative shock, i.e., by reducing output and raising prices. Kuwait, on the other hand, has used positive shock to increase international support for the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, as well as to increase oil production while decreasing prices. Iraq wanted to establish itself as the Arab world's leader at the time, so it reasoned that since it was fighting Iran on behalf of the entire Arab world, it should write off its debts to Arab countries. As the Arab world failed to do so, and Kuwait's economic maneuver weakened Iraq's economic position even further, Iraq accused Kuwait of extracting oil from its oil sources. Soon after, however, a solution was proposed; Kuwait could use Iraq's oil sources if it united with it. Fearing the spread of the 1979

²⁰³ More detail: Aitchison (1933).

²⁰⁴ Mofid (1990): 125.

Islamic Revolution in Iran, the West sided with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war and made significant political, military, and intelligence efforts. As a prelude to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Baghdad in 1984, \$2 billion worth of U.S. commodity credits were made available to Iraq, trade picked up, including the sale of helicopters to Baghdad, and the Arab Gulf states were encouraged to extend financial support²⁰⁵

In February 1982, the United States removed Iraq from the 'supporters of terrorism' list on which it had been placed in 1979.²⁰⁶ The United States and Iraq re-established official diplomatic relations on November 26, 1984, with Aziz visiting Reagan at the White House after meeting with Shultz. Newton was confirmed as ambassador by the Senate in 1985, and he served in Baghdad until 1988. In doing so, the US effectively re-established diplomatic relations with Iraq, which had been severed due to the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. During the Cold War, the US did not view Iraq favorably due to the close ties between Iraq and the USSR, but during the Iran-Iraq war, the situation between Washington and Baghdad changed, and the USSR remained Iraq's main supplier of weapons.

The Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict began on July 31, 1990, with failed negotiations in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where the Iraqi and Kuwaiti sides attempted to resolve issues concerning oil, money, and territory. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, after failed negotiations. The Iraqi army quickly overpowered Kuwait, occupying strategically important points such as the Emir's Palace and declaring Kuwait liberated from the Emir of Kuwait. Within hours, Kuwait and the United States requested an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council, which passed Resolution No. 660 on August 2, condemning the invasion and calling for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and stating that: 'Iraq withdraws immediately and

²⁰⁵ Jentleson (1994): 42-48.

²⁰⁶ Congressional Quarterly (2008): 1886.

unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on August 1, 1990".²⁰⁷ Concerned about foreign intervention, the Arab League passed a resolution in August 1990 urging that a solution be found within the organization. The Arab League also demanded that Iraqi troops withdraw from Kuwait, which was opposed by a delegation from Iraq, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation Organization - PLO (which at the time represented the Palestinian people within the Arab League). The 18th Summit was held in Cairo on August 10, 1990. In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, an emergency summit was convened. The conference condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and demanded that Iraqi troops leave the country immediately, unconditionally, and completely. A resolution was approved to establish an Arab force that would be deployed between Iraq and Kuwait to enforce an Arab solution to the current Gulf crisis. The summit reaffirmed its full support for Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, promising to back measures taken by these countries to protect their legitimate rights.²⁰⁸

After the request to withdraw the troops when the CD strategy application started, but without any success, the following step was to introduce economic sanctions. Because Iraqi troops did not withdraw from Kuwait on August 6, the United Nations Security Council passed a new resolution No. 661 (the second in a row related to this conflict) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter imposing economic sanctions on Iraq.²⁰⁹ This resolution also established a committee to monitor sanctions implementation and provide observations and recommendations. This was followed on August 9 by Resolution No. 662, which declared the annexation of Kuwait illegal and urged UN members and non-member states not to recognize such an illegal annexation. Kuwait's annexation was declared null and void. Because of the intense diplomatic activity surrounding this conflict, a new resolution No. 664 was passed on

²⁰⁷ United Nation Security Council Resolution 660 of 2 August 1990.

²⁰⁸ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2000).

²⁰⁹ This chapter determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and determines measures to take military and nonmilitary action to "restore international peace and security"

August 18, requiring Iraq to allow third-country nationals to leave Iraq and Kuwait by international law. It is also required that these people's health and lives are not jeopardized in any way. Shortly after, on August 25, another resolution, No. 665, was passed, to establish a no-fly zone that would allow an embargo against Iraq to be imposed. In addition, calls on all members to take all necessary political and diplomatic measures to ensure the embargo's implementation. Subsequently, several resolutions concerning this conflict were adopted (666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677 678, 700)²¹⁰ of which resolution No. 678 (November 29, 1990) is by far the most important for the analysis of the CD, which gave a clear deadline for the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait (January 15, 1991) and provided legal ground for the use of force for non-compliance. On January 14, 1991, the United States Congress passed a resolution authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq by UN Resolution No. 678. A congressional resolution required the president to report on progress toward achieving Iraq's obedience at least once every 60 days.

After the international community's demands were not met, a campaign of airstrikes on Iraqi forces began on January 17, 1991, with attacks on strategic targets by planes and cruise missiles. Iraq launched rockets at Israeli cities in response to the attacks, to which Israel did not respond (at the request of the United States). The air campaign was divided into three phases. The first target was the air defense and air force so that once those parts of the Iraqi army were destroyed; the coalition could continue to lead the campaign unhindered. That portion of the campaign was relatively brief, especially in comparison to previous conflicts such as the Vietnam War or World War II. Given the precision with which the attacks were carried out, the goal was most likely to disrupt the axis around which the Iraqi army gravitated. The targets in the second phase were command and communications to disrupt the command's communication with lower levels of the army, leaving the army without clear instructions for

²¹⁰ Search engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions: <http://unsr.com>

further action. In the second phase, the air defense deployed in Kuwait was also targeted, which can be seen as the focus of the attack in terms of location. The third and most extensive phase involved attacks on Iraqi military targets in Iraq and Kuwait, with the ultimate goal of withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, i.e. restoring the situation to its previous state and undoing what had been done. The goal of this phase was to engage Iraqi forces in psychological and physical activity to break the resistance and prepare for ground intervention.

The CD's demise was signaled by the preparations for the ground intervention. Given the coalition forces' superiority and Iraq's near inability to defend itself, airstrikes, defined as the ability to project military power through control and exploitation in, from, and through the air, were likely to be able to achieve defined goals. This was demonstrated by the fact that, following heavy air attacks on February 22, 1991, Iraq agreed to the USSR's terms, which required Iraq to withdraw its troops to their positions before the invasion of Kuwait within three weeks. The US refused to sign the agreement and instead gave Iraq a 24-hour deadline to withdraw its army. In February 1991, the Soviet Government announced that President Gorbachev and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had reached an agreement on a formula for the full and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. President Bush welcomed the Soviet attempt to end the Gulf War diplomatically but noted that the Soviet proposal would not obligate Iraq to abide by the terms of all UN resolutions condemning its invasion of Iraq.²¹¹ Following that, on February 24, 1991, a ground campaign of coalition forces led by the United States began, first in Kuwait and then in Iraq. The allies launched the ground attack in its entirety on February 24, 1991, at 4 a.m. local time. The assault was carried out during the day by ground forces from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrein, Qatar, Oman, Syria, and Egypt.²¹² Upon intense fighting

²¹¹ U.S. Department of State Archives, United States Relations with Russia: After the Cold War 1990-1991

²¹² Schwartz (1998): 198.

on the mainland, including artillery, Iraq began withdrawing from Kuwait on February 26, 1991, and set fire to Kuwaiti oil fields in the process. In a deliberate act of war, invading Iraqi soldiers damaged, destroyed, and ignited hundreds of oil wells in desert oil fields across Kuwait.²¹³ Following that, on February 27, 1991, President Bush declared Kuwait liberated and declared a cease-fire.

On February 28, 1991, Iraq was defeated and forced to withdraw from Kuwait. The goal of this action was, undeniably, to restore the original state but the US intention was also to change the regime, which is somewhat in line with the CD - a cessation of the adversary's hostile behavior through a demand for change in the composition of the adversary's government or the nature of the regime²¹⁴ From 1990 to 1998, the United States explicitly sought to achieve the first two goals by using the threat of force or limited force. While the US government wished to change the regime in Baghdad throughout the period, its efforts were generally aimed at removing the government rather than persuading the Iraqi government to be more inclusive or change its nature.²¹⁵ The regional balance of power, established after the Iran-Iraq war, was threatened to be upset by shifting the balance of power in favor of Iraq, so this factor must also be considered. Even if the primary reason was in principle collective security, the balance of power, in this case, is not negligible. The 1991 Gulf War was a case of collective security as much as balance-of-power politics.²¹⁶

Not long after significant diplomatic activity and economic sanctions were imposed, Saddam Hussein believed he would receive significant support from the Arab world and underestimated the United States' readiness to defend Kuwait. In the Arab League, 12 out of 20 countries voted in favor of a resolution requiring Arab countries to deploy weapons; among

²¹³ Hirschmann (2009): ix.

²¹⁴ George (1994): 8–9.

²¹⁵ Alterman (2003): 277.

²¹⁶ Yetiv (2008): 85.

Iraq's neighbors, only Jordan supported Iraq. Egypt and Morocco delivered weapons to Saudi Arabia at the request of the Saudi government, which was directly threatened by Iraq. The delivery of weapons to Saudi Arabia by these Arab countries and some Western countries produced results, as the force used was able to contain Iraq not only from the occupation of Kuwait but also to deter it from attacking Saudi Arabia. The legal establishment of a no-fly and no-drive zone based on UNSCR 688, which calls for the protection of minorities, has contributed to Iraq's inability to act in the region, but the US's ultimate goal of regime change has not been accomplished, and the force used far outweighed the demonstrative one. In this case, a wide range of tools for CD realization and execution were used. From the mildest, persuading Iraq to stop the action through demands (threats) to return things to their previous state, to attempts to overthrow the regime or change its nature.

In the case of the use of CD, the tacit ultimatum was used, because a clear implicit deadline for fulfilling the conditions was given, and the use of force began intensively without gradual reinforcement, as would be the case, for example, in the variant gradually turning the screw. Furthermore, no inducement was provided (an inducement was provided to some Security Council members to vote for UN Security Council Resolution No. 678, which provides 'all necessary means' for removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait), and no assurance that the penalties would be terminated once the conditions were met. The Bush administration went to great lengths to ensure the Security Council's approval of Resolution No. 678. It pursued the USSR vote by refusing to press it on the Baltic states' self-determination. The administration persuaded Saudi Arabia to provide aid to the USSR as an additional inducement to vote for the resolution, even though the USSR was not expected to contribute troops.²¹⁷ It ought to also be

²¹⁷ Quigley (1992): 43.

noted that there were subsequent requests specifically that after the ceasefire, Iraq would allow weapons inspectors to conduct controls and destroy any weapons of mass destruction.

This was emphasized in UN Security Council Resolution No. 687, which mentioned Iraq's signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction on April 10, 1972.²¹⁸ Later, by resolution No. 699, it was confirmed that the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have continuing authority to carry out activities authorized by Section C of Resolution No. 687.²¹⁹ On the Iraqi side, it can be assumed that the motivation was high because the removal of Saddam from power was at stake. Expectations that the Arab world or the Soviet Union would provide support were exaggerated, and fears of a loss of internal support were sparked by previous strong advocacy of the thesis that Kuwait belonged to Iraq. In addition, disbelief in a massive military coup may be one of the reasons for disobedience during diplomatic activity. One possible conclusion is that coercive diplomacy failed because Saddam Hussein miscalculated the likelihood or outcome of massive military action.²²⁰

The Iraqi government agreed to the imposition of arms inspectors, but because it appeared to be more about disarming the defeated side, Iraq made it difficult to carry out that obligation. That was the goal that did not fall under the CD strategy because it was not established by the coercer. Iraq obstructed UNSCOM and the IAEA's work less than three months after the adoption of SCR 687. This was to be the first of many such impediments.²²¹ Because Iraq's war with Iran ended three years before the intervention and a large number of conventional weapons of the Iraqi army were destroyed in the intervention, additional weapon

²¹⁸ United Nation Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991

²¹⁹ United Nation Security Council Resolution 699 of 17 June 1991

²²⁰ Alterman (2003): 282.

²²¹ Pearson (1999): 14.

destruction could leave Iraq completely demilitarized and defenseless. Iraq's future was envisioned as one of a largely demilitarized state. Washington policymakers were certain that these circumstances would lead to the early demise of the Iraqi regime.²²² The ground operation itself was excessive and meant going beyond the CD, "Operation Desert Storm"²²³ represents not coercive diplomacy but pure coercion."²²⁴

Economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure did not cause an overreaction on the Iraqi side, but when the threat became immediate and certain, the situation changed. The threat delivered had an immediate impact on Iraqi behavior, but it was the incorrect threat. Rather than comply with UN demands, Iraq increased its efforts to deter a coalition attack. The Iraqis tested missiles, prepared for civil defense, and issued a steady stream of statements declaring that war was unavoidable and that the coalition's costs would be extremely high.²²⁵

As a result, the coercer or US-led coalition used diplomatic pressure in the form of UN activities and economic sanctions, made a clear and credible threat, secured international support, and used limited military force. However, the incentive was not used (which is not required but is desirable), and ground action was initiated, which would result in the collapse of the CD regardless of other circumstances. Not only was there no guarantee or assurance that no further requests would be made, but following the cessation of military action, a subsequent request was made for the Iraqi side to accept inspectors for armaments and weapons destruction. So it can be said with certainty that Saddam underestimated the readiness of the international community to react. According to George, Saddam also hoped that the US would

²²² Harrer (2014): 14.

²²³ The name for the ground operation that followed the air campaign

²²⁴ Art & Cronin (2003): 282.

²²⁵ Jakobsen (1998): 53.

fail to maintain public support due to the losses and casualties it would suffer in a possible military conflict.²²⁶

The case of Iraq, when viewed through the lenses of Proportionality, Reciprocity, and Coercive Credibility, can provide answers to the theoretical framework (keeping the strategy within the CD's theoretical framework) questions.

2.2 Examining the Criteria

Asymmetry of motivation

Asymmetry of motivation was on the side of the target rather than the coercer because the application of coercion jeopardized the vital interests of the ruling structure, i.e. overthrowing the current government, so the target was put in a position to have nothing to lose. Even though the coalition led by the United States and France was highly motivated to force Iraq out of Kuwait, the interest of a much weaker Iraq was somewhat stronger, as evidenced by the fact that a large military force was required to break the Iraqi resistance. The coercer's motivation was thus strong, but the target, while fearing regime change, did not experience it credibly enough, relying on the eventual support of another part of the international community. Also important within this criterion is the target's internal support; it can be said that at the time, the coalition could not gain the favor of society within Iraq in such a short period, especially given the historical context (Iraq wanted to impose itself as the leader of the Arab world). The invasion of Kuwait was justified by a call for Arab nationalism and Iraq's desire to position itself as the Arab world's leader in pursuing regional interests through this event, as well as the Iran-Iraq war.

²²⁶ George & Simons (1994): 255.

When one side is in a position where any acceptable outcome is off the table, it is clear that motivation for complying with the coercer's demands is also close to none. This means that in a scenario similar to Iraq, a strong desire to resist the demands of the coercer is present.

Although the coercer also had a strong motivation, with this type of demand and all-or-nothing situation, it did not play the most significant role. However, definitely contributed to the outcomes that were previously described. Thus, it can be concluded, that asymmetry of motivation determines the course of action that both sides will take and thus directly is connected to the final result of the CD strategy – its success or failure.

It is completely legit to think that if the dispersion of motivation was different the outcomes of the CD strategy application would be different as well.

Sense of urgency

The sense of time urgency was imposed correctly by providing a clear and precise deadline for fulfilling the request, but it appears that the Iraqi side was not concerned that the threats would materialize. Not due to a lack of credibility or an insufficiently clearly imposed time limit, but due to a lack of understanding of the historical moment in which the West took precedence. Iraq hoped that the USSR would protect its interests in the region and prevent any intervention, but the USSR was unable to do so due to internal issues. As a result, the intervention began shortly after the deadline, lending credibility to the entire operation.

The time limit and a sense of urgency were set in this case. Because the situation was already serious and each intent to resolve it was without results it was clear that the threat itself is not enough. The sense of urgency and short deadlines had the purpose to make the decisions of the coerced according to the coercer's demands and to achieve the results as soon as possible. An additional reason was to limit the negative consequences of the current situation in Kuwait.

In this case, due to the whole situation, a sense of urgency did not play a significant role. It was important to emphasize that resolving the situation rapidly was important but that actions of compliance were not an option in general so it could not be rushed this way. When discussing the case of Iraq, the lack of power and that sense of urgency had shown how each of the criteria influences the other. Because of that criteria needs to be discussed in the concrete context of the case that is perceived.

Fear of unacceptable escalation

Fear of unacceptable escalation was not established well, partly because Saddam himself had little to lose and much to gain from the escalation that failed the CD. To some extent, there was an escalation, but it ultimately resulted in a conventional war defeat. Several resolutions were passed in a short period, sanctions were imposed, and the air campaign began the day after the deadline. The escalation was intense but gradual at the time.

Pressure was gradually increased with an incentive, i.e. an exit strategy that the coercer provided to the target to get out of the conflict fulfilling the coercer's request, but with a justification in the form of an incentive to meet the requirements. Therefore, the target must be persuaded that until it obeys, it will not be able to receive the incentive. This requirement was somewhat met in the instance of the Iraq crisis in 1991. The pressure was gradually intensified through the use of threats, diplomatic activity, and sanctions, but since the military interventions had been quite intense from the very beginning, the only choice to do so was a ground operation.

However, 7 days after an intensive air campaign (1000 take-offs per day), a land invasion began, signaling the strategy's failure. In Desert Storm, coalition air forces from ten nations launched an air campaign against Iraq with over 1800 fixed-wing combat and 1000

support fixed-wing aircraft.²²⁷ Even airstrikes were deemed too intense to be classified as limited or demonstrative. When the threats went unheeded, allied forces launched a month-long air campaign with approximately 100,000 sorties.²²⁸

It shows how the fear of escalation was the correct thing to worry about and how this aspect of the CD can be crucial.

Clarity of the settlement terms

Clarity of the settlement terms as described was not satisfied because declaratively the reason for the start of CD implementation was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait but there were also statements from the US administration that spoke in favor of overthrowing Saddam Hussein and regime change in Iraq. This is evidenced by the statement from May 1991 Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates stated: “Any easing of sanctions will be considered only when there is a new government”²²⁹

That, of course, was not the only goal against Iraq policy. “The US goals during this period included evicting Saddam from Iraq, keeping his military weak, deterring him from attacking Kuwait again, preventing him from invading the Kurdish area of Iraq, destroying his weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and making certain that he did not acquire the wherewithal to reconstruct his WMD programs.”²³⁰ In addition, after the operation, new requirements were established, which is not in line with the theory and further obscures this criterion.

When it comes to clear requests - it can be stated that the request definitely was clearly defined and that desired actions of the coerced were communicated successfully. This led to

²²⁷ Frostic (1994): 9.

²²⁸ Art & Cronin (2003): 281.

²²⁹ Gordon (2010): 17.

²³⁰ Crocker & Hampson (2007): 305.

the great support of the public and the support of the many states when the CD was applied for the first time in the Iraqi case. The problem with the request is related to the latter change of focus from the liberation of Kuwait to stopping Hussein's regime. Even the goal of stopping Hussein's regime could be supported and considered legitimate if the real threat was connected to it and the reason why the usage of force is needed in this particular case.

It is also important to mention here that this is a great example of an additional request that may be added to already existing ones. It would not be strange to think that even if the initial demand to withdraw troops from Kuwait was fulfilled, the coercer would demand a change of the regime. Examples like these are of great importance to have in mind when analyzing the application of the CD today. One can refer to the Iraq example and claim that for this reason CD strategy is not accepted and face certain distrust.

Adequate domestic and international support

Criterion concerning *adequate domestic and international support* has been largely successfully implemented. International support was provided within the UN as well as in the Arab world and within the US and coalition countries. "First, Bush mobilized an allied coalition that included major Arab powers, thus isolating Saddam Hussein from diplomatic support and denying his asserted symbolism as the embodiment of Islamic brotherhood and/or Arab nationalism. Second, the Bush administration backtracked the international coalition in support of containment against Iraq into US domestic policy support: A favorable UN resolution to expel Iraq became a wedge that pried a slender but favorable majority from the US Congress for the same mission."²³¹ However, it was clear at the time that the support was not long-term, so the matter needed to be completed quickly. This could be one of the reasons for the hastily executed action that resulted in excessive force.

²³¹ Cimbala (2002): 118.

The very end of the Cold War, when this event takes place, and the collapse of the USSR are the two major events that determine the moment when the conflict in Iraq happens. However, as little insofar as the USSR was concerned, it could be considered that the USSR was preoccupied with its internal difficulties and it was unlikely to have the potential to challenge the West over the Iraq situation. Saddam expected to be backed by both the USSR and the Arab world. As a result, the US and its allies' threat had to be seen as credible, powerful, and realizable. However, in addition to the expected support, Saddam relied on the international community's lack of determination as well as the potential denial of domestic support, primarily from the American public. If these three criteria were mostly in sync (balanced), with no miscalculations or vague images from either side, the outcome would be much easier to predict, making decisions cheaper for both parties. As we can see, domestic and international support (or) absence is a critical factor.

Furthermore, regardless of the coercer's strength, the target's solution and counter-strategy should not be overlooked. As well as the target's readiness to absorb political-economic and military strikes, i.e. what is the target's international position (and geostrategic), what trade partners it has (and resources such as oil), and the state and motivation of the armed forces.

As international political relations were not clearly defined, and actions and power of the state were hard to predict and estimate with accuracy, many miscalculations took place. The challenge was to determine how others would behave and thus choose the course of action that is the best in the given situation. All these factors contributed to the very challenging application of CD and probably caused its limited results.

Here it is of great importance to stress the need for actions to be proportional to the damage that the behavior of the target can cause. Only when it is proportional, the action can

also be legitimate and lead to the support of the international community. The demands of the coercer changed by the behavior of the coerced. First, results are tried to be achieved without any usage of military force. The actions tried to be influenced by imposing military sanctions and threatening with force usage. Up to a certain point, the coercer's behavior, led by former US president Bush, was proportional. The primary goal was to liberate Kuwait, which was successfully achieved by applying CD strategy methods. Although this was a success, the CD strategy faced limitations when failed to stop Hussein's regime. George Jr Bush wanted to invade Iraq for reasons that never were truly explained. At that precise moment, the coercer exceeded the limits of the CD strategy's proportionality. As a prerequisite for coercive diplomacy, proportionality is needed to clearly define the goal of the strategic application and to act on a defined threat. "These inherently limited means require that the objectives also be limited so that there is proportionality between ends and means. The main source of disproportionality is an objective that goes beyond policy change to regime change."²³²

To explain further, goal setting needs to be proportional to the problem in behavior that is identified and the potential consequences of that behavior. Clarity and precise definition of the goal and the reasons for any action within CD strategy must be fulfilled. Thus, reasons such as some previous connections to terrorism or threat to American citizens and neighboring states are far from a clearly defined reason to act. This is the first way in which it can be claimed that the criterion of proportionality is violated.

The other aspect of that is that the goal itself exceeds the reach of CD strategy at that moment; the usage of force was not proportional as the threat was abstract and hypothetical and the force used in this case was anything but demonstrative.

²³² Jentleson & Whytock (2006): 51.

To conclude, the criteria of proportionality are not accomplished in this case.

An offer of incentive for compliance

In addition, the last criterion *an offer of carrots for compliance* was not implemented. Not only that no incentive had been provided to allow Saddam to save face, but also when a written guarantee was sought from the US that they will not attack Iraq if he returned things to the previous state, the US replied that they do not want to talk until Iraq started the withdrawal. "President Bush spoke to reporters in the Rose Garden of the White House in response to the Soviet peace initiative, which had been formulated by Iraq's foreign minister Tariq Aziz and Soviet Union president Mikhail Gorbachev in talks in Moscow the previous day. President Bush said he found the peace proposal unacceptable because parts of the proposal qualified as conditions for peace when the United Nations resolution called for an unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. President Bush also said the U.S. had evidence that Iraq was practicing a 'scorched earth' policy towards Kuwait, burning and destroying oil facilities. He went on to state that Iraq must withdraw, with a public announcement to that effect, from Kuwait before noon on Saturday, February 23, or the Iraqi people will "face further hardship."²³³ There, on the one hand, the US wanted to present itself as a credible coercer, but it was overlooked that the incentive could lower the price of the action if it resulted in a positive outcome. Given that the majority of the theoretical criteria (intentionally or unintentionally) failed, the action failed in terms of successfully implementing a CD strategy but succeeded in defending Kuwait from Iraq.

In terms of incentives, their absence greatly reduced the Iraqi leadership's flexibility for decision-making.

²³³ C-SPAN (video), Reaction to Soviet Peace Proposal, February 22, 1991.

2.3 Conclusion Remarks

Based on what was presented in this chapter the following observations can be made. The CD strategy failed as the full range of military force was used. The idea of CD as a barrier to war and full-scale force usage failed to be fulfilled. The main reasons for that could be the following. First, the change is an ultimate goal that needed to be achieved with the CD strategy. Shifting from the goal to liberate Kuwait to regime changes was the first problematic decision. From this observation, it can be concluded that a successful CD strategy requires consistency in its goals and clearly defined and elaborated reasons why actions like these are required. Without that, the CD is doomed to fail.

As was already stated, all these aspects are interconnected. Changing goals and having too aggressive an approach also influences the level of support and reduces preparedness for compliance. The second important lesson is that the opposite side should never be left without something to lose. It is very important to have that in mind with this concrete example to which all theoretical concepts can be applied. The mistake was that not only demands were too selective but also positive incentives lacked.

Although the CD strategy in Iraq had many flaws and ended as a partial failure, it can be used as a great way to determine what CD has to be or better said what CD cannot be to be successful. Additionally, this CD strategy has great value as the first application of CD and a step forward to developing a strategy that will serve as an alternative to war.

3. HAITI

3.1 Background of the Conflict

The Haitian crisis arose following the country's first democratic elections. In essence, President-elect Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Roman Catholic priest, was deposed by a military

overthrow led by military officers backed by the business elite. Aristide advocated for the rule of law, economic reforms, and the fight against corruption, as well as the imposition of certain constitutional laws on the army, which was particularly opposed despite the overwhelming majority (approximately 67%) winning in the elections.²³⁴ During this crisis, the coercer's main goal was to restore democracy and return the legitimately elected president to power. Haiti's deeply divided political system went through a period of profound transition. These eight years were marked by constant disorder and protracted violence, as they witnessed a struggle between two large opposing groups with fundamentally different visions of their country's future. Supporters of Haiti's traditional political power structure, known as the *mahout* and comprised of the army and other henchmen, as well as their allies among the political and economic elites, sought to maintain the status quo or, under international and domestic pressure, to accept at least cosmetic change. Many voices called for social, economic, and political reform and confronted traditionalists.²³⁵

The elections were held following the exile of the Duvalier dynasty, which ruled Haiti from 1957 to 1986. Between 1986 and the first (generally recognized) democratic elections in 1990, Haiti was ruled by five different regimes, most of which had military support. Following Duvalier's departure, power was transferred to the Conseil National de Gouvernement (CNG), which was led by army general Henri Namphy. This was a temporary governing body established by Duvalier on the eve of his departure, consisting of three civilians and two military personnel. Given that the Duvaliers' rule in Haiti ended with military officials refusing to support them, it is safe to say that the army would take the lead in unstable times until the first democratic elections. Shortly after the Duvalier dynasty's departure, the CNG officially expelled the Volunteers of National Security (VSN), a brutal paramilitary formation through

²³⁴ Poppen & Wright (1994): 11.

²³⁵ Metz (2001): 415.

which Duvaliers instilled fear in Haitians. The CNG ruled for exactly two years (February 7, 1986, to February 7, 1988), and after that came Leslie Manigat, who represented the civilian government but was very much under the army's control and had their support. The Civic government lasted four months (February-June 1988) and was followed by a massive voter boycott. As a result, the military administration and Henry Namphy were restored to power (until September 17, 1988). The next day, on September 18, 1988, a group of officers deposed Namphy and installed General Prosper Avril in power. From the time of the Duvaliers, he was a general and their adviser. He remained in power until March 10, 1990, when he was forced to hand over power to General Hérard Abraham, who ruled for three days. The transitional government is then taken over by Haiti's Supreme Court Judge, Ertha Pascal-Trouillot. She was in charge until February 7, 1991. After intense military disorder and major shifts in the late 1980s (resulting in the firing or retirement of 140 officers on various charges of corruption and even cocaine smuggling), an election commission was formed and announced in December 1990. "Jean-Bertrand Aristide was inaugurated as President on the fifth anniversary of Dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier's flight into exile. He was elected in December 1990, in what was widely heralded as the first free and fair elections in Haiti's then-186-year history."²³⁶

The military was the most vocal opponent of the democratically elected president because Aristide intended to separate the police from the army and to ensure that army members accused of crimes against the population were tried in civilian courts. The populist priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president in the elections, which were monitored by foreign observers and considered essentially democratic. Aristide had previously criticized the Duvalier dynasty by saying that the army did not agree with the choice of the people, so

²³⁶ Congressional Research Service, *Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns* (2008): 40.

everything was following the Haitian saying that 'ballots are made of paper but bayonets are made of steel'.²³⁷

The first intervention attempt took place before the inauguration on January 7, 1991, but without success. "One month before the President-elect was to take office, an attempted coup d'etat occurred in the early hours of January 7. Neo-Duvalierist leader Roger Lafontant, supported by a segment of the Army, forced provisional president Ertha Pascal Trouillot to step down and proclaimed himself president of the country on national radio, announcing that he "had joined with the armed forces and the police to take power to defend the interests of the common fatherland, to guide it along the path to a true democracy" and to "reveal to the world the errors and outright failure of international communism"²³⁸ However, 8 months later, there was a culmination of dissatisfaction in the army that lasted the entire time, resulting in a military coup, the occupation of the presidential palace, and the arrest of the president. "September 29, 1991, the Armed Forces of Haiti overthrew the democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in a coup d'etat. After a shootout at his home, Aristide fled to the National Palace, along with 150 soldiers and police officers who remained loyal to him, but the loyal forces were overcome and the Chief of the Presidential Guard was assassinated. The President was forced to leave the National Palace and was taken to the military headquarters, where he was compelled to resign."²³⁹

Ambassadors of Venezuela, France, and the United States were involved in saving the life of the president of Haiti and successfully negotiated that his life be spared, but the army demanded that he leave the country. „Through mediation by the Ambassadors of France, the United States, and Venezuela to Haiti, President Aristide was given safe conduct to travel to

²³⁷ Jakobsen (1998): 110.

²³⁸ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on The Situation of Human Rights in Haiti Chapter III: The Political Situation in Haiti

²³⁹ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on The Situation of Human Rights in Haiti Chapter III: The Political Situation in Haiti

Venezuela, along with certain officials from his government."²⁴⁰ Aristide was later transferred to France, and military officials declared the coup a success. The international community reacted primarily through the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS), which issued an immediate condemnation of the military coup and called for Aristide's return to power as a legitimately elected president. Except for strictly humanitarian aid, economic sanctions targeting the country's finances were imposed. "On October 2, in an unprecedented move, OAS ministers meeting late into the night constituted a resolution to embargo and diplomatically isolate the junta government."²⁴¹ The US administration, led by President Bush at the time, called for the restoration of democracy in Haiti and other countries, particularly through the OAS. The United States has also responded by freezing funding for the so-called de facto regime.²⁴²

The first attempt at negotiations took place "on October 4, 1991, an OAS Delegation headed by Secretary-General, Ambassador João Baena Soares, and comprising six Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the member countries, traveled to Port-au-Prince to undertake negotiations for the restoration of democracy in Haiti."²⁴³ After an unpleasant incident in which armed soldiers seriously endangered the security of OAS negotiators, that organization was forced to withdraw from Haiti. Regardless of previous events, the temporary diplomatic success was achieved by the agreement of February 25, 1992, when the so-called Washington Protocol was signed in. The document calls for the restoration of democracy, but more importantly, guarantees amnesty for members of the junta and those who support it.²⁴⁴ "On March 27, the Haitian Supreme Court rejected the Washington accord as unconstitutional.

²⁴⁰ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on The Situation of Human Rights in Haiti Chapter III: The Political Situation in Haiti.

²⁴¹ Sprague (2012): 66.

²⁴² More details in Executive Order of the President of the US no. 12775.

²⁴³ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on The Situation of Human Rights in Haiti Chapter III: The Political Situation in Haiti.

²⁴⁴ Protocol of Agreement between President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Prime Minister-Designate René Théodore under the Auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS) Washington D.C. 25 February 1992.

Cedras and the Senate both rejected the accord in April, demonstrating that the military was unwilling to allow Aristide's return."²⁴⁵ After Parliament and the government of Haiti had rejected the agreement, further negotiations with the US and the international community were also rejected. Instead, the government proposed its version of the agreement, the so-called Villa d'Accueil Accord, which does not mention the return of Aristide and the restoration of democracy; instead, the current government presented itself as a negotiator against the international community. "On May 8, the army, the executive installed by the army President Nerette and Prime Minister Honorat, and the Parliament signed the Villa d'Accueil accord which called for a government of 'consensus'."²⁴⁶

The situation that was explained required a certain external response. The response was needed to make a change and influence the restoration of the previous, legitimate course of action. The CD was the best possible choice for addressing a situation like this one. This type of strategy was invented having in mind exactly situations like this one.

Until the Clinton administration took power in the United States, the attitude toward Haiti was based on economic sanctions and negotiations, but when the Clinton administration took power, the economic sanctions were immediately strengthened. This tightening of the embargo has bolstered Haiti's military leadership by, for example, using the oil embargo to create illegal oil import routes on the border with the Dominican Republic, and increasing their incomes while impoverishing the population. Furthermore, the top of the junta intensified the drug trade, so economic sanctions financially bolstered Haiti's military leadership. The Clinton administration responded with a naval blockade that forced the Haitian government to return to the negotiating table.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁵ Kumar (1998): 22.

²⁴⁶ Kumar (1998): 22.

²⁴⁷In more details: Deployment of U.S. Naval Forces Regarding the Petroleum and Arms Embargo of Haiti: Communication from the President of the United States Transmitting Notification of the Deployment of U.S.

This change of course and more serious application of CD strategy increased pressure, which resulted in an almost complete blockade of Haiti, resulting in a new agreement known as the Governors Island Accord, which was signed in July 1993. That agreement was slightly more detailed than the Washington agreement, and it stated that senior military officers should be retired and the police should be reformed, but a concession was made, as in the Washington agreement, regarding amnesty for junta members.²⁴⁸ Based on the agreement, a diplomatic victory was declared, and UN Security Council Resolution 867 was passed, establishing a mission in Haiti (UNMIH), with 700 military and police personnel. When everything was agreed upon and certain, and the American ship carrying members of the UN mission arrived within striking distance of Haiti, The Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), a paramilitary group backed by a military junta, barred staff from entering. The USS Harlan County was ordered to return to Cuba's Guantanamo Bay. The USS Harlan County arrived in Port-au-Prince Bay on October 11, 1993, with a cargo of 200 combat engineers and military trainers. However, after a daylong standoff at the docks with a small gang of military attaches armed with guns and yelling "No US intervention!" the troop carrier retreated in shame. Perhaps the outcome could have been predicted, given the inconsistency of the troops' mission - to restore democracy - and their orders to 'run the other way' if they encountered any opposition.²⁴⁹

The Port-au-Prince Agreement, signed by former US President Jimmy Carter and Haiti's Military-Appointed President Emile Jonassaint, was the most recent diplomatic effort. The agreement envisages the withdrawal of the military junta from power, reforms of the army and police, as well as the establishment of the US military mission, and the withdrawal of

Naval Forces to Participate in the implementation of the Petroleum and Arms Embargo of Haiti, U.S. Government Printing Office (1993).

²⁴⁸ Governors Island Agreement, 3 July 1993.

²⁴⁹ Orenstein (1995): 89-90.

economic sanctions, and again guarantee amnesty for members of the junta.²⁵⁰ This agreement was confirmed in the UN by the adoption of Resolution No. 940 (which was one of many adopted on the issue of Haiti at the time) which allows the use of military force to establish democracy in Haiti. "Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations authorizes the Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti..."²⁵¹

According to the September 19, 1994 agreement and resolution, a coalition led by US forces entered Haiti without using force. The junta agreed to the demands, but only after Clinton issued an ultimatum threatening military intervention if new negotiations failed. "President Clinton ordered U.S. forces to prepare to launch a military intervention (Operation Restore Democracy) to restore the democratically elected Aristide to power. To avoid a potential invasion of Haiti, President Clinton also dispatched a last-minute diplomatic team of former President Jimmy Carter, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). This two-prong approach of diplomacy backed with the threat of military invasion was successful."²⁵² On September 28, 1994, a resolution in parliament was passed guaranteeing amnesty for junta officers, and following the initial Washington agreement, the police were separated from the army and placed under the control of the Ministry of Justice. President Aristide would return to Haiti on October 15.

²⁵⁰ PA-X, Peace Agreement Access Tool, Agreement Signed by Jimmy Carter and Emile Jonassaint, the Military-Appointed President of Haiti, in Port-au-Prince, on 18 September 1994

²⁵¹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 940, 31 July 1994

²⁵² Clinton Digital Library, Haiti: Restoring a Democracy.

This raises the question of why obedience seemed to have come so easily. To be sure, the Clinton administration posed a credible threat, but so did others. There was also a mini-conflict when paramilitary forces prevented a US ship from delivering people and equipment, as demonstrated. So, what prompted Haiti's junta to agree to coercive terms this time? From the political turmoil in Haiti, it is reasonable to conclude that the junta was much more volatile in 1994 when an ultimatum was issued than in 1993 when a threat was ended with non-compliance. From September 1991 to October 1993, the de facto coalition remained united in its rejection of the international community's demand for Aristide's return and the restoration of democracy. External US coercion did not affect the internal distribution of power within the de facto coalition, and the coalition remained united in its rejection of both the Washington Protocol and the Governors Island Accord. However, as the crisis with the US government dragged on, as did the imposition of harsher external sanctions, different members of the de facto coalition were affected differently. The increase in external coercion increased FRAPH's power and capabilities in comparison to the other members of the de facto coalition. These changes in the coalition's internal power distribution reduced the distribution of benefits for the business elite and threatened to dethrone the military high command as the army's and the coalition's dominant player. Between November 1993 and September 1994, as these members' power and benefits began to dwindle, they increasingly preferred a strategy of defection over continued resistance to US pressure.²⁵³ Therefore, in this case, both internal and external factors contributed to the CD's success. Of course, they are related in the sense that the junta's instability was most likely caused by external pressures that caused various currents within the junta to want to reconsider the distribution of power and responsibility. When such a competitive atmosphere exists on the internal level, there is a tendency to resolve disagreements with the external factor as soon as possible to relieve pressure and continue the unhindered internal struggle. It can be said that the CD

²⁵³ Barlow, (1991): 94.

was implemented here in a more peaceful form, where sanctions and diplomatic action were used in addition to threats as a psychological method that eventually yielded results. The junta weakened as the pressure increased, which could be explained over a three-year period in which the junta resisted the pressure, but as the pressure increased, the junta became more unstable, eventually succumbing to pressure and obeying the demands of the coercive party. The military force that was disembarked to monitor the implementation of the agreement did not practically have a combat purpose, but a demonstrative, peacekeeping, and nation-building purpose. The operation officially ended in 1995 when it was replaced by Operation UN (UNMIH), with personnel from the original mission remaining in Haiti in support of the UN mission.

3.2 Examining the Criteria

Asymmetry of motivation

Asymmetry of motivation in the case of Haiti, was initially on the side of Haiti under President Bush, as the administration felt, it could lose more than the military junta could. However, when the Clinton administration assumed power in the United States, the center of gravity of motivation shifted to the side of the coercer. To be sure, the junta showed determination later on, but the determination to restore democracy became noticeably stronger with the arrival of the Clinton administration, which tightened sanctions and made it clear that force was an option. In terms of motivation, the case of the USS Harlan County served as a thorn in the side of the junta leaders. However, the circumstances were unfavorable for the US administration at the time because only three days earlier, an incident in Somalia had occurred in which American soldiers were killed, making it completely unfavorable for US public support for another bloodshed in such a short period.²⁵⁴

²⁵⁴ The Battle of Mogadishu occurred on 3–4 October 1993, USS Harlan County incident occurred on 6 October 1993.

Motivation is on the side of the target when its vital interests are endangered, which did not happen in this case. The restoration of democracy is a vital interest, but it was not a regime change, but a return to the status quo, as stated in the agreements and resolutions. If the external power demands something from the target that is more important to it than the target, then the asymmetry of motivation strongly favors the external power, and coercive diplomacy is likely to succeed under these conditions. If the external power demands something from the target that goes beyond its vital interests, the asymmetry of motivation favors the target, and the external power's coercive diplomatic efforts are likely to fail.²⁵⁵

Sense of urgency

The sense of time urgency was not initially imposed in a positive way, which explains why it took three years to bring President Aristide back to the country. However, following the SBUN 940 resolution and Clinton's ultimatum, the results were obtained in a short period. The force, which had been threatened before the 1994 ultimatum, was not perceived as sufficiently potent and certain and thus did not instill a sense of urgency. The Bush administration did not intend to use or threaten to use force, which is likely why the junta felt no sense of urgency for a long time. The threat of military intervention when was imposed created a sense of urgency that was highly effective.

The issue of sense of urgency is addressed in the following way: “A deadline had been set and Clinton now launched an 'extra mile for peace' initiative similar to the one Bush had made during the Gulf crisis.”²⁵⁶ After three years of failure, the United States finally decided to implement a policy that met the requirements of the ideal policy. When this occurred, coercive diplomacy quickly resolved the conflict peacefully.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁵ George (1993): 15.

²⁵⁶ Jakobsen (1998): 119.

²⁵⁷ Jakobsen (1998): 119.

It was requested not only to put pressure and to try to influence the behavior of the coerced but to impose the threat of military force usage i.e. to use CD to the full extent to achieve desired results and to influence the behavior of the coerced.

Fear of unacceptable escalation

Concerning the fear of unacceptable escalation, there was no fear at first because there was no threat, and as for the sanctions, they were not implemented consistently enough at first, so the junta benefited from them rather than harmed them. The problem was that the consequences of the sanctions were mainly a problem for the civilians. The burden of sanction applied mainly to them.

For coercive diplomacy to succeed, the external power's coercive punishment for noncompliance must be perceived as so overwhelmingly credible and potent by the target that it becomes convinced that compliance with the external power's demands is the best course of action rather than accepting the cost of non-compliance.²⁵⁸ When Clinton imposed a naval blockade, however, it immediately paid off and brought the junta's representatives back to the negotiating table. This criterion also provided the result when the UN approved the use of force and when the deadline and ultimatum were set. The answer to the question of why there was a fear of escalation at that time and not in the USS Harlan County incident, which resulted in resistance, lies in the fact that at the time of compliance, in addition to international support through the UN system, internal support in the US, will of the coercer to act as the end was coming to the turmoil within the junta, which altogether resulted in obedience of the de facto government of Haiti.

The clarity of the settlement terms

²⁵⁸ George (1993): 80.

In terms of this criterion, the clarity of settlement terms was unambiguous from the start. Although some aspects changed with each subsequent agreement, the demand for the return of a legitimately elected president, the restoration of democracy, and the reform of the armed forces remained constant. Even after issuing the ultimatum and pledging obedience, the situation was crystal clear. So on September 15, 1994, President Clinton stated on television: “Your time is up. Leave now or we will force you from power.”²⁵⁹ Therefore, this criterion is set ideally and clearly, but only in the final period of the crisis. The CD was certainly weakened by the period before the request was made clear because “if the target is reassured over specific terms for ending the crisis, coercive diplomacy is strengthened.”²⁶⁰

Adequate domestic and international support

With the criterion of adequate domestic and international support, a complication occurred, resulting in a delay in achieving the goal. There are numerous examples where an external threat has not resulted in internal coherence, and not every coercive action has received international and/or domestic support. Domestic support was initially weak or insufficient “until Clinton's televised address on September 15, polls had, with a few exceptions, shown that 60 percent or more of the American public opposed an invasion.”²⁶¹

Even when the American ship was attacked while attempting to disembark members of the previously agreed-upon mission, which was sent to Cuba in Guantanamo Bay, the administration's support was insufficient. The Pentagon and Republicans in the US Congress blocked possible repeated attempts to disembark personnel, demonstrating a lack of domestic support for action at the time. However, the administration's support, even if weak at first, began to grow stronger as the US introduced a law that included greater US engagement in the Haitian refugee crisis. “The formal effort to interdict the Haitian migrant vessels, Operation

²⁵⁹C-SPAN, White House, The Oval Office, 15 September 1994 at 9:00 pm.

²⁶⁰ George & Simons (1994): 281.

²⁶¹ Jakobsen (1998): 123.

Able Manner, thus began on January 15, 1993, five days before President William Jefferson Clinton took office. Faced with the prospect of an overwhelming migration from Haiti, President Clinton chose to continue the operation and the Bush Administration's policy while also pushing for the return of democratically-elected President Aristide, who had fled Haiti after a military coup in September 1991."²⁶² "The Coast Guard interdicted 25177 Haitian migrants during the conduct of the Operation, with the highest volume of interdictions occurring in June and July 1994. As the number of migrants became too large for Coast Guard vessels, many were taken to the American naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for processing. The repatriation of these Haitians continued until early 1995."²⁶³ As a result of this situation, the US administration supported the intervention after economic sanctions failed to produce results. Following UN Security Council Resolution No. 940, international support was gained, providing a boost to the intervention as well as helping to convince and reassure the domestic public. As a result, international support existed, and domestic support existed more in terms of administrative pressure on Clinton's cabinet than public support. As previously stated, the domestic public supported the intervention in a certain percentage, but the rest of the public was appeased and encouraged by the international support provided by US diplomacy.

An offer of incentive for compliance

An offer of carrots for compliance was made from the start and continued until the end in the form of amnesty for junta members. The strategy's general idea was that combining a positive incentive and a negative threat produces an effect in which the threat is easier to accept when combined with the incentive. There was a combination of these two elements in this case,

²⁶² Clinton Presidential Library, Inventory for FOIA Request 2011-1040-F, Records on Operation Able Manner:
1.

²⁶³ Clinton Presidential Library, Inventory for FOIA Request 2011-1040-F, Records on Operation Able Manner:
2.

but the question of balance remained. As a result, it is necessary to assess the extent to which, at a certain point, increasing the threat and decreasing the incentive is required, and vice versa. The crisis's conclusion demonstrated that it is a strategic good move to encourage the incentive from the start and gradually increase the threat while keeping the incentive on the table at all times.

3.3 Concluding Remarks

The CD application in Haiti was much more successful compared to the previously analyzed Iraqi situation. The ultimate results showed that CD can be a success and that the threat of military force usage can help to prevent war.

The proportionality of the response and trying to achieve the goal without force usage are some of the reasons that can explain why this time the strategy was a success. The way the CD strategy was delivered was much more aligned with the nature of the CD. The problem of defining the demonstrative amount of force was avoided.

Some of the external factors influenced the more successful implementation of the CD strategy. In this case, fewer actors were included, which simplified the whole situation. Even though significant progress was made in this case, some negative remarks should also be made, so that is more clear which aspects are of importance when comes to CD strategy application.

The first negative aspect is the amount of time needed for results to be achieved. In addition, the other problem is that many citizens suffered due to imposed sanctions. It should be considered, what is the price of the actions and is it worth paying it. Especially this question is important when a long period and low efficiency are taken into account. These aspects do not lead to the conclusion that CD is an unsuitable strategy but only suggest that matters like these should not be excluded from the discussion about CD. It is very useful to think about flaws that a previously applied CD had, as this is the best way to improve CD strategy.

4. LIBYA

4.1 Background of the Conflict

The example of Libya from 1991 to 2003 is the next to be discussed. It is separated into two parts, with the first phase representing the years between 1991 and 1998 and, theoretically, the failure of the CD, and the second representing a quick success from 1998 to 2003.

4.1.1 Phase one

Even though the US and Libya have been at war since Gaddafi deposed the pro-American ruler and took office, a specific period has been considered since it relates to the usage of CD, which is crucial for this analysis. Additionally, in the time before the period that is discussed, there was some pressure on Libya, but no clear strategy meant to achieve a specific aim, other than perhaps aiding in the destabilization of Gaddafi's regime and inflicting punishment.²⁶⁴ The intention was to overthrow the regime, and it may be stated that some CD components were also utilized in the 1980s. Since Libya continued to participate in funding and organizing operations against the West, it may be considered that this compulsion is more akin to punishing. However, as was already mentioned, there was no systematic strategy and no defined goal, therefore there was no success.

„As Libya's leader Muammar Gaddafi did not comply with the demands, on April 15, 1986, the Americans bombed Tripoli and Benghazi, killing his adopted daughter.“²⁶⁵ The distinction between coercive diplomacy and military coercion described in an earlier section of this thesis could be highlighted here. Due to these factors and the availability of an analytical framework, the period that is discussed is taken into consideration. Namely, the central topic

²⁶⁴The 1986 attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi were carried out in retaliation for Libya's alleged involvement in the bombing of the LaBelle discotheque, which was a meeting place for US soldiers on duty in West Berlin.

²⁶⁵De Wijk (2014): 17.

in the mentioned period, as was pointed out, was the alleged support of Libya to terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction. Besides that, „The United States linked Gaddafi's regime to such major perpetrations as the 1972 Munich Olympics killing of Israeli athletes, the 1973 assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Sudan, and the 1975 raid of a meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna, led by the international terrorist known as Carlos the Jackal. Libya also was accused of providing financial, technical, and logistical support to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Japanese Red Army, and others.“²⁶⁶ The 1986 attacks, meanwhile, did not garner the favor of the world community, thus the next case was required to win that support. Because of the use of force in 1986, a draft resolution calling for an end to the use of force against Libya was on the UN Security Council's agenda and had to be rejected by the US, the UK, and France.²⁶⁷ The hope that the attacks would rely on Article 51 to legitimize and allow the use of force while simultaneously gaining international recognition failed, assuming it ever existed.

Following these incidents, on December 21, 1988, a bomb was detonated on board Pan Am Flight 103, killing 259 people, including 190 Americans. The incident, which was the initial catalyst for the first phase of coercive diplomacy to commence after a joint declaration by the US and the UK, has been blamed on Gaddafi and the Libyan intelligence service. The fact that the plane's wreckage was found on British soil rather than, say, in international waters greatly helped the American and British sides of the investigation because it made it more practically viable.

²⁶⁶ Jentleson & Whytock (2006): 56.

²⁶⁷ Draft resolution: S / 18016 / Rev.1, for which nine members of the UNSC voted at the session on 21 April 1986, five members were against and one member abstained. As the permanent members of the Security Council voted against it, the draft resolution was rejected. In more details: United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2682 meeting, 21. 04. 1986: 43.

After finding a piece of a cassette player with a number on it that indicated it was a “Toshiba” model in which a bomb had been planted, the inquiry established a link between the attack and the Libyan secret agency. „On February 2, 1989, NSY reported that scientists at RARDE had located a tiny part of a circuit board embedded in the frame of the luggage container, AVE 4041-PA, the container which had housed the improvised explosive device (IED). The tiny chip had numbers on it which could help in its identification. This chip, smaller than a fingernail, was compared with the circuit boards of other electronic components. It was identified and linked to a circuit board used in several models of Toshiba radio cassette recorders, the RT-8026, RTSF16, RT-SF26, and RT-8016S. The radio was all twin speaker models”²⁶⁸ A joint US-UK statement put an end to rumors that Iran might have been behind the assault when the investigation was finished. On November 14, 1991, the United States and Great Britain jointly announced the filing of criminal charges against two Libyan individuals. The accused Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah allegedly worked for the Jamahiriya Security Organization, a Libyan intelligence agency (JSO).²⁶⁹ In a sense, this is where the pressure against Libya and its leadership starts. Five demands were made to Libya after the US and UK accused Libya of aiding two of its citizens in blowing up the Pan Am 103 airplane and later claimed they were working for the Libyan intelligence service. The two Libyan suspects were the subject of concurrent indictments from the United States and the United Kingdom, which pushed for their extradition to stand prosecution in either country.²⁷⁰ The demands placed on Libya are the following:

1. surrender for trial the suspects charged with the bombing;
2. accept responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials involved in the bombing;

²⁶⁸ Marquise (2006): 38.

²⁶⁹ Wicker (2002): 10.

²⁷⁰ Schwartz (2007): 556.

3. disclose all it knew of the bombing and allow full access to witnesses and evidence;
4. pay appropriate compensation; and
5. commit itself to cease all forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups and promptly, by concrete actions, prove its renunciation of terrorism.²⁷¹

In response to the attack on Pan Am 103 and UTA Flight 772, the UN passed Resolution No. 731, which internationalized or supported the issue (a flight for which France, regardless of the previous case, also accused Libya of participating in the downing of the plane). Libya was urged to comply with all US, UK, and French demands, including extraditing the two suspects in the bombing, among other things. That resolution was related to earlier UN resolutions No. 286 from 1970 and No. 635 from 1989, both of which denounced the terrorism that Libya was charged with committing. The UN Security Council issued Resolution No. 748 after Libya failed to comply with the demands outlined in Resolution No. 731. This resolution demands that Libya cease all support for terrorism and imposes sanctions on the country until the demands are met. The UN made history by passing Resolutions Nos. 748 and 883, which were the first to expressly denounce a nation's support for terrorism. "Solidarity among the Permanent Five produced the Council's first significant sanction program with a counter-terrorist objective. In the form of Resolution No. 748 and No. 883."²⁷² Libya refused to comply with the conditions and demanded proof to back up the charges. Following the strike, the West's approach to Libya has changed from one of regime change, which has persisted since Gaddafi took office, to one of counterterrorism. The Clinton administration urged the international community to enact resolution No. 883, which tightened the sanctions and increased pressure on Libya because it was clear that the country would not cooperate even after the implementation of sanctions. In Libya, the sanctions have led to significant economic issues.

²⁷¹ Statement Announcing Joint Declarations on the Libyan Indictments, November 27, 1991.

²⁷² Damrosch (2002): 319.

From 1992 to 1998, growth in Libya's gross domestic product was only an average of less than 1% per year. In 1993, the country's GDP fell by 30% from the year before. The unemployment rate rose to 30%. In 1994, the rate of inflation reached a peak of 50%, while real per capita income declined.²⁷³

Libya has not openly admitted that it was involved in the downing of the jet, but it has made clear that it is prepared to bring criminal charges against any officials if the US and UK provide evidence of their involvement. The Libyan side employed a diplomatic counter-strategy when the pressure increased by taking the matter before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It called for arbitration by the Montreal Convention. "Libya first indicated its intent to arbitrate the issues surrounding the prosecution of Al-Megrahi and Fhimah under the Montreal Convention in a letter dated January 17, 1992, in which Libya invoked the Montreal Convention and requested arbitration of the dispute."²⁷⁴ Such a possibility is offered by the Convention, specifically by the following clause: "Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. Any one of the Parties may request that the dispute be brought before the International Court of Justice by the Court's Statute if, within six months of the date of the arbitration request, the Parties are unable to reach an agreement on how the arbitration will be conducted."²⁷⁵ The United States and the United Kingdom responded that under the UN Charter, the Council was expressly authorized to override treaty provisions necessary for carrying out its exclusive function to restore international peace and security. The intention of the Libyan side to remove

²⁷³ Jentleson & Whytock (2006): 65-66.

²⁷⁴ Evans (1994): 37.

²⁷⁵ Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation (with the Final Act of the International Conference on Air Law held under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization at Montreal in September 1971). Concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971, Vol. 974,1-14118, Article 14(1): 183.

the dispute from the Security Council did not meet with approval from them.²⁷⁶ According to Security Council Resolution No. 883, sanctions on Libya would be lifted right away if the extradition of those accused of carrying out the jet attack and the fulfillment of other requirements outlined in earlier Security Council resolutions had taken place.²⁷⁷ Consequently, Resolution No. 1192's Article 8 stipulates that while these measures are still in effect, it is nevertheless willing to lift them after the accused attackers have been extradited to the Netherlands (a neutral country).²⁷⁸

Regardless of how the persons charged with crashing the plane were ultimately extradited to the Netherlands to face trial, that is, more than ten years after the said incident, the CD failed in this case. The main ones, which unquestionably point to the theoretical and practical collapse of CD, will be presented. The reasons why, by the CD's theoretical framework, are numerous. Despite earlier resolutions stressing urgency, Resolution No. 748 sets a compliance deadline (April 15, 1992) and calls on all states to prohibit both the sale of armaments and flights to and from Libya.²⁷⁹ The Libyan side failed to meet that deadline. In addition, Libya was asked to comply with the following demands: release the bombing suspects for trial; take responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials involved in the bombing; reveal all information it had regarding the bombing; grant full access to witnesses and evidence; pay just compensation; and immediately demonstrate its renunciation of terrorism by taking concrete steps. Which is also an indicator of disobedience. Considering that the part that was fulfilled was implemented 7 years after the sanctions gave the first results. The military threat was also used to some extent in a doctrine colloquially called the Rogue Doctrine, which in the circumstances following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the already certain collapse of the

²⁷⁶ Schwartz (2007): 559.

²⁷⁷ Security Council Resolution 883, Article 14.

²⁷⁸ Security Council Resolution 1192, Article 8.

²⁷⁹ Security Council Resolution 748.

Soviet Union, Gen. Powell with his aides introduced to President Bush and the then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. In a speech on August 2, 1990, President Bush adopted and introduced the doctrine, which reads in part, “Our duty today is to tailor our defense capabilities to these shifting strategic conditions.” “We are aware that our forces can be smaller in a world without the immediate threat to Europe and the possibility of a world war, a world in which the size of our forces will be increasingly determined by the requirements of regional contingencies and presence during peacetime. The specific military configuration that is required is being determined by Secretary Cheney and General Powell”.²⁸⁰ “Outside of Europe, America must possess forces able to respond to threats in whatever corner of the globe they may occur.”²⁸¹ It may be concluded that this stage of the use of coercive diplomacy in the instance of Libya was ineffective because there was no response and the requirements were not met.

4.1.2 Phase two

The first move toward addressing the differences regarding the suspects in the air attack was taken during a meeting of Libyan government officials and representatives of the UK in Tripoli in April 1998. In particular, the Libyan side agreed to the idea of holding the suspects' trials by Scottish law on neutral ground. The Netherlands, to which the suspects were extradited in April 1999, was ultimately declared to be neutral ground and sanctions on Libya were withdrawn as a result of the agreement after technical difficulties in voting a panel of judges and choosing the judicial system at trial. This incident determined that Libya will move in an entirely different route during the following years. When Libya decided to give the families of the victims \$ 2.7 billion in 2003, the situation surrounding the Lockerbie case acquired its final denouement. December 19, 2003, when the Libyan government declared it was abandoning the

²⁸⁰ Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush, United States Government Printing Office Washington (1991): 1090.

²⁸¹ Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush, United States Government Printing Office Washington (1991): 1090.

WMD production program, may be seen as the culmination of Libyan compliance. Libya's commitment to give up its weapons of mass destruction program and, on the other hand, its determination to return Libya to the community of nations, i.e., to stop being seen as a rogue state, were both confirmed after parallel announcements by the governments of the US, UK, and Libya. Immediately following the Libyan announcement on December 19, President Bush remarked that Colonel Gaddafi had made a bold pledge that, if honored, would make the world a safer place. The President promised that stronger relations with the United States and other free countries will be possible as long as Libya upholds its obligations and proves its seriousness. The President of the United States expressed his hope that Libya would be able to assist in regaining a safe and respected position among nations.²⁸² Sharp words were exchanged afterward, but in 2004 the US withdrew its travel ban on its nationals to Libya and emphasized the importance of its diplomatic mission in Tripoli.

What ultimately led to Libya making compromises in comparison to the previous era, apparently without much of a fight, or as Jakobsen put it, 'cheap success' realization? First and foremost, it did not happen overnight; the suspects' surrender in April 1999 was timed to the start of the bombing of Yugoslavia, which had begun in March of that year, and the announcement of the end of the WMD program came barely six days after Saddam Hussein's capture (December 19, 2003). Adam Roberts emphasized that it's conceivable that watching a fellow Arab leader be abruptly toppled may have helped Gaddafi focus.²⁸³ Additionally, an odd coincidence occurred with the admission of guilt in the Lockerbie case, which took place 8 days (March 11, 2003) before the US invasion of Iraq (March 19, 2003). The Lockerbie case was resolved in a sequence of procedures beginning in 1998 and coming to a conclusion in a deal to give \$2.7 billion in compensation to the victims' families in August 2003, after Iraq was

²⁸² Libya-next steps in U.S. Relations, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 108. Congress 2. the session, U.S. Government Printing Office, February 26, 2004.

²⁸³ Roberts (2005): 119.

overthrown by a ground invasion.²⁸⁴ As previously indicated, 1999 also saw Libya deport the Abu Nidal gang, sever relations with other extremist Palestinian organizations, shut down training facilities, and repatriate accused terrorists to Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen.²⁸⁵

From the foregoing, it may be seen that military interventions in other countries had a demonstrative nature and that they offered direct and unequivocal proof of the veracity of threats made against ‘rogue governments.’ Gaddafi now submits to authority as a result of everything that has happened. Gaddafi's wish to see Libya rejoin the international community and the ‘carrot’ that the US offered in return, which allowed Gaddafi to ‘save face,’ were also significant factors in this conclusion. The initial phase, which began in February 2004, was restricted to allowing Americans to travel to Libya using their passports, allowing American oil corporations with historical assets in Libya to start talking about returning, and creating a U.S. Liaison Office in Tripoli. These steps were swiftly followed by a second phase, during which the ILSA sanctions were lifted and U.S. companies were usually permitted to resume operations in Libya.²⁸⁶

4.2 Examining the Criteria

Asymmetry of motivation

The initial phase since the 1986 strikes on Libya was criticized by the world community, Libya benefited from an asymmetrical incentive. This increased the likelihood that the subsequent attack would also be rebuked. The problem with the first phase was that it all happened without a strong background and it was not deeply explained why the military force was necessary. To further elaborate, it is important to emphasize that the reasons that motivate

²⁸⁴ Jentleson & Whytock (2006): 68.

²⁸⁵ Takeyh (2001): 68.

²⁸⁶ Schwartz (2007): 575.

coercers are significant enough and that changes in the status quo represent the real threat. In the case of Libya, the reasons for actions were barely defined with just general observations such as a change of regime that is not democratic or connections with terrorist organizations. It was not narrowed enough why the coercer is motivated to act. For motivation to be on the side of the coercer, it is of great importance to have a clear goal and strong benefits that can be the result of the efforts made with the strategy. On the other hand, the motivation of the coerced was to defend and protect the whole system, and the existing regime, and thus the stakes were extremely high. Additionally, as the lack of clearly defined goals, this was the opportunity to relativize the influence and intentions of the coercer.

Additionally, what contributed to the criticism of the international community is the high number of casualties. For the coerced state, it was of the greatest significance to criticize the way coercers used force and harmed many of their citizens. By emphasizing this consequence of the strategy's application, the coercer's side could lose much more - international reputation and legitimacy for further actions. If the coerced state was presented as the victim and relativized the reasons for its actions, the strategy will fail and the regime will remain. Thus, it can be claimed that the motivation, in this case, was on the side of the coerced state. How asymmetry of motivation further contributed to the failure of the coercive diplomacy strategy in the first phase and success in the second is elaborated in the following way.

There were consequently few predictions that the attack would occur. Although the US's goal in Libya has changed from regime change to combating terrorism (which should logically aid the process), it appears that Gaddafi still fears overthrow, which strengthened his determination. For the coerced, the stakes were to lose all or to win all, and as it was discussed in the theoretical part of the thesis, it is not recommended to put the coerced in a position colored by such extremes. If there are only two options to win or to lose, in this case, for the

coercer to successfully influence change of the regime, or not, there is not much space left for CD strategy. Any type of incentives or negotiations is off the table. In these cases, it is almost always higher motivation on the side of the coerced and thus the application of CD is hard as well as its success. For the coercer, success is important but is not fundamental as it is for the coerced and there lies the major difference in the motivation of the two opposed sides.

While the asymmetry was huge in the first phase, the second phase brought the change. The coercer maintained the balance between methods and aims to such an extent that the opposing side was not even allowed to assume that the balance would tip in favor of force. The Libyan leadership's purpose changed during the second phase when it was determined that the sanctions would be withdrawn, trade would restart, and Gaddafi would maintain his position as leader. At that point, the coercer's goals and resources were in favor, and the outcome was ultimately, what was anticipated.

What is important to state is that a major change was in the motivation of Libya to cooperate and try to find a different solution than war. Interests have likely changed and that influenced changing attitudes regarding accepting some CD requests. Here it can be seen how the motivation of both sides can be a decisive factor in the outcome of the CD strategy.

Because of that, it is noted that success in Libya was a cheap success as it happened without major influences of the coercer.

Sense of time urgency

Aside from the motivation and its asymmetry, a sense of urgency is of great importance when analyzing CD success or failure. Credibility is related to the temporal urgency in this situation. Fundamentally, the opponent must be made to feel a sense of urgency as a psychological requirement, but for that to happen, the adversary must believe that a serious threat is genuine. However, it is evident that occasionally, even a convincing installation of a

sense of urgency fails. “Each case demands a specific analysis because occasionally the opponent is so committed to resisting that he is willing to die for his cause, or sometimes that may lead to worse repercussions, as it did to the United States after the 1986 bombing raid against Tripoli and Benghazi in the Libyan case.”²⁸⁷ From this observation, it can be learned that a sense of urgency cannot be observed separately from other factors. Sometimes, a sense of urgency has been put aside due to the extreme attitudes of both sides. No matter how urgent the issue is the outcome will be the same. Applied to the case of Libya, during the first phase no pressures could influence the clear strategy of win or lose approach. As the regime itself was in question, changes or compliance were not an option. On the other hand, the desire to cooperate was of great importance, and in that manner; the sense of urgency had a great role, not only for the coercer but also for the coerced. In the second phase, Libya was compelled to comply with all demands quickly due to a mix of isolation, economic harm, and a genuine military threat. The desire to overcome these difficulties as soon as possible influenced Libya to comply with the requests in a short time.

An important remark is that if the deadline is not established or is set inappropriately, it can be interpreted unfavorably. “Historically, an unwillingness to set a deadline for compliance has been perceived as a sign of weakness.”²⁸⁸ Deadlines were established in the first phase, and as time went on, intense diplomatic action and penalties piled on the pressure. Due to the absence of a genuine military threat, Libya failed to demonstrate urgency during the first phase of negotiations, even though the sanctions severely affected the nation's economy. It imposes an important question, would the outcomes of the first phase be different if the sense of urgency is emphasized? Due to initial argumentation regarding this criterion, it is reasonable

²⁸⁷ Jakobsen (1998): 3.

²⁸⁸ Jakobsen (1998): 3.

to think that in a win-or-lose situation, urgency would not have much impact. Still, this option cannot be completely excluded.

Fear of unacceptable escalation

Although there were escalations before the second phase, fear of an unacceptable escalation only became apparent afterward. The usage of force was not avoided; the bombing in 1986 is an example of that. This showed how serious the consequences could be if a greater amount of force is used. However, the other side of the coin is that the likelihood of escalation was not high, many due to international reaction to events in 1986. The international support would be later discussed in more detail, but connected to escalation, it is important to mention that judgment for force usage provided a good basis for concluding that further usage of force would be limited and that the current level of force is the limit that will not be crossed. This reasoning puts the fear of unacceptable escalation (usage of force) on low levels.

However, the scenario was quite different when it comes to other actions that threaten with force. The first round of sanctions increased to the point that the Libyan side was unable to conduct oil commerce, which was the mainstay of the country's economy. In this aspect, it was quite clear that potential escalation may happen, not only in the type of actions but more important in the type of consequences for the economy.

It is difficult to establish whether Libya's economic fragility affected its compliance in the second phase as a result of the passage of time (although it is not essential because the first phase is recorded as a failure, but the pressure that led to the goal is seen as a whole) or the possibility that the sanction may lead to more undesirable consequences.

Thus, it may be said that in this case, fear of unacceptable escalation is not the main factor but that others are contributive and cannot be left out when discussing how certain decisions were made. Here the fear of the economic consequences was greater than the fear

that force will be used. What can be concluded from the case of Libya is that escalation does not have to be just related to force but to another type of consequence related to the actions of the coercer.

Clarity of the settlement terms

Both the first and second phases of the settlement had clear parameters. The above-mentioned explicit demands were outlined in the first phase. The demand was scaled back in the second phase to the surrender of individuals who were considered responsible for terrorist attacks, the stop of support for terrorism, and the halting of plans to produce weapons of mass devastation.

The requests from the coercer were clear. Libya was aware of all actions that will lead to the settlement. It could be said that due to the change of the goal from changing the regime to preventing and responding to terrorist activities, Libya could not be sure that in the same manner, settlement requirements would not be altered.

In the second phase, when the settlement was more probable, the clarity of terms was of great importance and contributed to the cheap success that was achieved in this phase.

Adequate domestic and international support

Because it is impossible to combat international terrorism without such support, and because such support was lacking in 1986 when the US attacked Libya, it was particularly crucial in this situation. Although the US-imposed sanctions undoubtedly had some impact on Libya, Libya was still able to trade oil inside OPEC and collaborate internationally in other areas. The UNSC began issuing resolutions and enacting sanctions, which raised the cost for Libya in the proper sense and seriously harmed its economy. As part of the effort to fight terrorism after the attack on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, the desire to bring Libya back into the international community, the immediate military threat, and the general

willingness of the international community to do so all helped to ensure that this criterion was successfully implemented in the second phase. An offer of incentive for compliance.

An offer of carrots for compliance was missing in the first phase. However, in the second phase, the offer included Libya's reintegration into the international community and the preservation of Gaddafi's rule, as well as the lifting of sanctions, which drastically increased the chances of success of the entire operation. "In mid-2001 State Department officials sought to restart the secret talks."²⁸⁹ "U.S. negotiators reiterated the quid pro quo of the permanent lifting of UN sanctions."²⁹⁰

4.3 Concluding Remarks

Although the path was long and hard, the CD strategy influenced Libya's behavior. The criteria presented above show what aspects influenced the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. It is important to distinguish the power of economic sanction. Libya decided to cooperate when the potential power of the sanctions was taken into account and the long-term calculation was made. The first phase was too inconsistent, and not focused, and the coerced side thought that sanctions and other aspects could be differently addressed.

The long time needed for settlement contributed to Libya's different approach that secured success. Still, time is an important factor when analyzing CD success. The desired status quo was interrupted during the intervening period.

²⁸⁹ Jentleson & Whytock (2006):71.

²⁹⁰ Jentleson & Whytock (2006):72.

5. AFGHANISTAN

5.1 Background of the Conflict

Osama bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan and the support given to him by that nation are major factors in the CD-related activities there. Bin Laden remained in Afghanistan during the struggle between Afghanistan and the Soviets, and after the Soviet forces left, he went back to his native Saudi Arabia. He remained in Sudan from 1991 until 1996 before being expelled and returning to Afghanistan. The Taliban authority in Afghanistan had already seized control of several regions and was actively encroaching on the other ones. He had labored to further the holy war against the US ever since his arrival, which culminated in the 1998 attacks on the embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania). At 10:30 a.m. local time on August 7, 1998, terrorists in a truck exploded a sizable bomb in the American Embassy in Nairobi's back parking lot, close to the entrance to the basement garage. Two hundred thirteen persons were killed in total.²⁹¹ “On the morning of Friday, August 7, 1998, a truck laden with explosives drove up Laibon Road to one of the two vehicular gates of the US Embassy in Dar es Salaam. ...The bomb attack killed more than 10 people...”²⁹²

In retribution, then-President Clinton gave the order to attack bin Laden's bases in Sudan and Afghanistan. “...In retaliation for the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the US military strikes several locations linked to bin Laden's network, including six terrorist training camps and a pharmaceuticals factory in Sudan that is thought to have produced chemical weapon components, according to intelligence sources. Later, the US administration acknowledges that the industrial bombing was a mistake.”²⁹³ Bin Laden and his organization did not suffer much from such retribution, but diplomatic pressures through SBUN Resolutions

²⁹¹ Ronczkowski (2011): 202.

²⁹² Ronczkowski (2011): 203.

²⁹³ Rubin & Colp Rubin (2015): 274.

Nos. 1333 and 1267 attempted to persuade the Afghan government to extradite bin Laden and close terrorist training facilities. The Taliban government proposed that the US recognize that Islamic preachers would decide bin Laden's fate rather than extraditing him, but the US rejected and insisted on the adoption, respect, and application of UN resolutions. Neither was bin Laden extradited nor did the attacks on US targets stop as a result of the US attacks on Afghanistan.

The Taliban rule was harshly attacked in the US and the world community before the World Trade Center attack and was also ostracized as a rogue state. At the time, the international community's (mainly the US) objective was to compel the Afghan government to hand over bin Laden, but the second phase's more obvious purpose was also present in this one: regime change. Phase two starts when the US government declares that Osama bin Laden was responsible for the Twin Towers attacks. The United States' approach was driven by a 'never again' mentality, fear of the next assault, a desire to punish the enemy, pressure from military preparations, an urgent need to bolster homeland security, and the desire to punish the enemy. For the first time, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cited Article 5 of its constitution, which states, "An attack on one is deemed an attack on all."²⁹⁴ However, there was a clear view in the US administration that no distinction would be made between those responsible for the attacks. Bush said, "We will make no distinction between those who planned these attacks and those who harbor them."²⁹⁵ Following the World Trade Center assault, the CD assumed additional significance, and the Taliban leadership was pressured into accepting bin Laden's immediate surrender under the threat of using force. The Taliban have looked for proof that bin Laden was involved in the Twin Towers attack, and some proof has been formally submitted. However, the Taliban steadfastly resisted extradition and maintained that bin Laden could only be tried in Afghanistan. The Taliban government has also denied that

²⁹⁴ Collins (2015): 21.

²⁹⁵ Woodward (2002): 30.

there are any terrorist training facilities in the area they control. On the other hand, President Bush desired entry to the camps at this time to neutralize not just bin Laden but also the Taliban regime and those who support terrorism. After 9/11, the administration did not seem to see a conflict between its opposition to 'nation-building' before and its new dedication to 'democratic enlargement'. The administration seemed to believe that it was enough to remove obstacles to democracy ('tyrants and terrorists'), and the 'democratic forces' unleashed would then take care of the rest on their own. This belief may have stemmed from the administration's declared belief in historical teleology or the idea that history is moving inexorably toward freedom.²⁹⁶ An aggravating circumstance was the later-confirmed fact of a regime shift. The fact that the objective in the Afghanistan case was different from the target makes it more intriguing. In other words, the Taliban regime was the target, and demands and conditions were made of it, with the end goal being to isolate Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

The use of force was swiftly approved by Congress to demonstrate resolve and cohesion. It was not in doubt, totally certain, and credible. Initial plans called for an air offensive to bolster 'friendly forces' or groups opposed to the Taliban administration to overthrow it if it did not comply with the demands. The Taliban's military outposts and regions that were thought to be used as terrorist training grounds were targeted by the US and UK Air Force. Under the CD, there was no overuse of force. The so-called 'flexible targets,' which included bigger Taliban formations and movable military equipment, were then eliminated after the 'fixed targets' had been destroyed. After the Taliban's air defense began to deteriorate gradually on October 17, the air campaign entered a more aggressive phase of operations. The emphasis moved from bombing preplanned static targets, such as military installations, to targeting targets of opportunity, such as troop concentrations and vehicles, as well as the target

²⁹⁶ Buley (2008): 114.

list was broadened and engagement zones were formed.²⁹⁷ Military leaders now had more discretion to behave as they saw fit. As a result of the operation on the ground, the first batch of soldiers was sent on October 21 in the shape of paratroopers. The raid on the Tora-Bra complex of caverns, which was thought to contain bin Laden, was the first land operation of a more significant kind. Although the US organized the attack, the US Army did not officially supervise it; instead, it was directed against the Afghan force, which is why the US forces were afterward blamed (for not taking responsibility and for the absence of more determined engagement). The first significant ground operation, in which numerous American soldiers participated, was Operation Anaconda, assuming that this attack was not formally a ground operation of the US Army. Even though the Bonn Agreement was ratified and the Taliban government was overthrown on December 9, 2001, thanks to the capture of Kandahar, Operation Anaconda was carried out in 2002.

5.2 Examining the Criteria

Asymmetry of motivation

When it comes to motivation, the situation is quite complex, in this case, a religious perspective is included as well. Bin Laden took the role to lead the holy war against the US. The perception of Afghan people and soldiers is quite different when the religious component is added. The majority of people supported his actions quite a lot. Bin Laden was highly motivated, as much as the US who just responded to the attacks committed.

²⁹⁷ Lowrey (2011): 53.

If it is taken into account that the Taliban's national interests were not harmed by bin Laden's surrender and that the US's national interest was not harmed by bin Laden's refusal to surrender, then motivation in both phases should have been on the side of the US, but it turned out that motivation even won out in the first phase in favor of the Taliban. When the attack was carried out on American soil in the second phase, both sides became significantly more motivated. Especially, when it is spoken about phase two, after 9/11 it became clear that motivation is even higher on the US side. However, there was a threat to the Taliban's essential interests in the form of a regime change policy, which enhanced motivation on both sides.

The gravity of the conflict resulted in high motivation on both sides and a lack of preparedness from each side to settle. Due to hard and challenging circumstances, it is clear why the stakes were set so high. The US was determined to change the regime to establish democracy in Afghanistan and to secure peace that way. It was important for them not to permit 9/11 to happen ever again.

In this case, it is very hard to speak about the asymmetry of motivation and this is probably the reason why CD failed in this particular case. When both sides are unwilling to find a middle ground, combat as the traditional way of resolving conflicts is the only solution.

Sense of time urgency

A sense of time urgency certainly existed even if there was no explicit deadline within which the requirements must be met. “No doubt the terrorist attacks of 9/11 added a sense of urgency and legitimacy to war...”²⁹⁸

²⁹⁸ Newman (2013): 86.

The Afghanistan case is a great example of how a sense of urgency can be felt and imposed without any formal declaration. The US felt jeopardized in a very serious manner that Western societies didn't expect or even considered. The main mission was to secure peace and prevent similar cases. The results were required to be quick and to resolve the current threat. What differentiates the Afghan case from other cases is that the conflict started with a demonstration of force against the US.

The decisions were made in a rush on the US side but without desired effect on the coerced side. In the same manner, the CD actions escalated rapidly into war after it was clear that the Taliban are not open to settlement or cooperation.

The gravity of the situation excluded a scenario similar to that in Libya when phase 1 was long and the time under sanctions could cause the change. In this case, prolonging actions could in the worst-case scenario cause another 9/11, and this was not an acceptable risk for the US. From this example, a sense of urgency can be understood in, to some extent, a different context. Sometimes this criterion is used as a strategic tool to make the coerced come to a decision in a short time, but in this case, urgency is applied for both sides. Not only that it was threatened with force to comply with demands urgently, but also it was of the ultimate importance for the US to achieve results rapidly.

Sense of urgency in the case of Afghanistan is not only a matter of strategy but was a real urgency to resolve such a serious, menacing, and perilous threat.

Fear of unacceptable escalation

Fear of unacceptable escalation had to exist with the Taliban because it was quite certain that unbearable consequences would occur but the Taliban did not show fear of the consequences that were threatened. "Considering that Afghanistan had gone through decades

of civil war that had destroyed the country, there was not much left for the U.S. to threaten with destruction.”²⁹⁹

In some way, it seemed that Taliban people embraced destruction. Here it is important to emphasize that they fought for a higher goal, they saw Americans not as their political opponents but as enemies that stand in their fight for Allah. The religious component here had a major role. There was no room for fear. It was clear that any threat made by the US would not result in a change of action. It is of great importance to be aware of the reasons why the fear of escalation may be put aside. As the primary role of this criterion is to push the coerced side to make a decision and to comply with the demands of the coercer to avoid that escalation, the lack of this element can lead to the complete failure of the CD strategy.

In the position when the coerced is immune to threats, the essence of coercive diplomacy is in question. Without the ability to make effective threats, it can be said that the chances for CD to be successful are close to none. In some cases, a change in the object of the threat that could escalate is one of the solutions. But in this case, the threats were direct and serious from the very beginning so the room for changes like these lacked.

To conclude, in this case, fear of escalation was nonexistent. The coerced behaved like desiring that the other side pushes the conflict into a more serious direction and that was the stumbling block for the success of the CD strategy. Other criteria add reasons for failure, but this one is the decisive one. By analyzing this case, it is clear that a lot depends on the coerced attitude and its desired outcomes and reasons for the conflict in the first place.

²⁹⁹ Tarzi (2005): 29-30.

Clarity of the settlement terms

The official term was the surrender of bin Laden and the cessation of support for terrorism. The second phase was expanded to regime change, even if not explicitly stated it was one of the main goals as a method for long-term confrontation with terrorism in Afghanistan. The clarity of settlement was quite clear. The US had a direct approach, which was further elaborated by the aim to create a more diplomatic and thus safer international environment.

What is additionally important to mention is that the clarity of terms, which were highly defined, was not of great importance in this case, as the opponent did not consider them.

Adequate domestic and international support

Congress passed a unanimous resolution condemning the attacks on the Twin Towers, and the UN passed Resolutions No. 1368 and No. 1373 calling for those responsible for the terrorist attacks to be brought to justice and for all members to fight terrorism, which gave the United States domestic and international legitimacy to fight the Taliban.

The support of the international community was undoubtedly given to the US. It was only logical due to the events of 9/11 and the previous Taliban behavior toward the US. The chances that similar events will happen again were high and thus the support has not lacked. The CD actions were supported by the wide international community and still, that was not enough to make necessary leverage in this conflict for the Taliban to settle.

Undoubtedly, for CD to be successful it is of great importance to have all support that it can get from international and domestic actors. Yet, this is not the formula for success. Even when the support exists and it is huge, it is clear from this example that CD can fail. It is important to have that in mind so that CD is analyzed more accurately. Even though it exists, the success of the CD strategy should not be presumed.

An offer of incentive for compliance

An offer of carrots for compliance was absent. The message sent was in the form of an ultimatum and offered only the absence of attack for compliance. This approach was not surprising considering the events under which the conflict escalated. In addition, in light of the lack of effectiveness of threats that force will be used, it is clear that carrots would not be effective either. One reason not to use positive incentives is that goals and aims were opposite and it was hard to even consider finding a middle ground.

5.3 Concluding Remarks

The case of Afghanistan is the extreme case of the conflict in which CD was applied. It included fear of terrorism, which made the application of CD harder than usual. The chances for the CD to be successful were limited as both sides had very little motivation to cooperate; the demands were too high to comply with them. In general, it could be said that both sides wanted to either lose big or win big. This made it almost impossible to find a compromise by using positive incentives.

The international and domestic support was on a high level due to the events that happened on 9/11 and thus this criterion had a major impact on the outcomes of this strategy.

The failure of the CD strategy can be attributed to the gravity of the situation itself and extremely opposed interests that hardly could be settled anyway. The case shows that in some cases due to the gravity of the situation, it is not possible to successfully apply the CD strategy.

6. Analysis based on case studies

6.1 Conclusion Based on CD Theory and Case Study Analysis of Iraq

The case failed from a theoretical standpoint, going from the sparing use of armed force to full-scale war. When the context is considered, many actions have been conducted carelessly, and the CD strategy's execution has failed as a result of the lack of criteria that consider the full context. It is important to remember that after the Iran-Iraq War, when Iraq's economy was totally decimated, Kuwait started to apply pressure on Iraq to resolve its border issue and boosted oil production, which decreased the price of oil and lessened the likelihood of Iraq's financial recovery. Saddam likely perceived the situation as an outright attempt to remove him from power without other objectives, because he now felt threatened by the overthrow of his regime at each attempt at a diplomatic settlement (constantly enforced with threats). Although Saddam's removal may not have been intended, the action's ultimate goal, as it turned out, was to uphold international peace and eliminate threats to it. The fact that Shiite militias and Kurds immediately began rioting after the operation ended and President Bush himself urged the Iraqi people to "take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein to step up" lends credence to this allegation.³⁰⁰

The first error was that the situation did not worsen gradually after diplomatic pressure manifested in the adoption of UN resolutions and various statements by officials. Instead, the expiration of the deadline sparked a massive military campaign that largely exceeded the limited use of military force. These criteria, as well as how they should be used, will be discussed in the next chapter. Furthermore, no assurances or promises have been provided to the Iraqi leadership that no additional demands will be made or that the nation's crucial interests will not be endangered. There are other ways that this operation could have been more cost-

³⁰⁰ George H. W. Bush, Remarks to the American Association for Advancement of Science, 1991.

effective in terms of escalation and persuasion, preventing bloodshed, and still accomplishing the stated purpose. At least four strategies—threats, mobilization, a buildup of soldiers on the target's border, and the use of restrained military force—can be used to escalate with assurance. There was no time to implement strong sanctions because the situation called for an immediate response. These penalties would have undoubtedly helped Iraq's economy, but more time would be required, thus their absence for a significant amount of time cannot be seen as a mistake.

Following the fall of Iraq by coalition forces, the UNSC adopted Resolution 687 creating a commission in charge of destroying chemical and biological weapons, and tasked the Atomic Energy Agency with evaluating Iraq's nuclear capabilities (but essentially the same mandate as the previous commission). These organizations faced opposition from Iraq, and the sanctions persisted until 1995. According to CD theory, the imposition of the inspectorate after the situation has returned to the previous state is considered a subsequent request. Subsequent requests certainly undermine the coercer's credibility in potential future actions; because the next target, having learned from previous experience, cannot believe assurances that there will be no further demands. This reduces the likelihood of subsequent actions succeeding and general credibility in the international community.

The case of Iraq, in a sense, has introduced a time limit, which is decisive in the CD, into UN resolutions and is thus noteworthy from a theoretical standpoint, but the time limit, as previously stated, should have been accompanied by demonstrations of force, persuasion, and encouragement. This can be considered the first mistake, and CD theory supports this viewpoint, which will be explained in detail in the following chapter, which will also explain the success criteria and how they are implemented. Sometimes regime change is consistent with CD theory, but if the stated goal of the strategy is to establish peace and restore things, the opponent must be convinced that there are no hidden agendas. If the target believes there

are hidden agendas, particularly those that would jeopardize their vital interests, this leads to an asymmetry in motivation, which, according to the research, leads to failure if the target is correct. Even if the motivation is the same, according to the literature, this gives the target an advantage.

Persuasion may result in a relaxation of relations and the establishment of some kind of trust, which may lead to further peaceful resolution of the situation, i.e. the conflict may be halted by sanctions and the demonstration of force without its use. This would make the CD more efficient because it would lower the price and allow the parties to exit the conflict cleanly, given that the CD's goal is to defensively prevent an opponent from committing an act or force an opponent to restore the previous state. At the conclusion of this action, it was revealed that the goal of this action was not the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, but to destroy Iraqi military capabilities (achieved through physical destruction), destroy chemical and biological weapons (achieved through a combination of inspectorates and sanctions), prevent Iraq from occupying Kuwait (also achieved through military intervention), and certain statements indicate that there was an intention to change the regime if possible. Given that the CD's theoretical framework demands that the requirement be clear and that the precondition for success is a clear setting of the requirement behind which (ideally) no other intentions should exist (which would allow assurance).

All of this is significant because, from the target's perspective, the greater the value that can be obtained through war, the less likely it is to persuade the target that war is unnecessary, and vice versa. This knowledge adds significant value to the theory because asymmetry in motivation, which does not have to be based on the right situation, leads the strategy in an uncontrolled direction if there is poor communication and if the parties have different information. Because the goal of CD is to manipulate war (intimidation and coercion), the goal

is to avoid war and, even better, any use of military force should keep the situation under control as much as possible.

Given the risk of jeopardizing vital interests and the assimilation of motives on the target's side, poor communication, and a lack of persuasion and encouragement, this case was prolonged until 1995, when sanctions against Iraq remained in place long after Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait. Because regime change and territorial disputes are of vital interest, the Iraqi side saw the international community's involvement in the dispute with Kuwait as of vital interest, given Iraq's perception that Kuwait is considered its territory. The cultural, political, and personal dimensions of the conflict had to be considered because the Iraqi leadership perceived that their vital interests were threatened on two fronts. Following the conflict, a large amount of sociopolitical literature was published on the subject of Bush and Saddam's personal conflict, as well as the cultural misunderstanding between the global north and the global south, or east and west. Therefore, this is another explanation for the opposing parties' poor communication and divergent viewpoints. Iraq, for its part, misjudged the situation and expected Arab and Soviet support, which did not materialize, so the coercer should have made it clear that the target would eventually agree to obey. Making it clear that there will be no support or that it will have no effect on the outcome can significantly reduce the target's motivation and thus outweigh the positive outcome.

To summarize, both parties' signaling was sloppy, and expectations were created, which contributed to the parties' misunderstanding. On one side, a superpower that claimed the position of the sole superpower and thus pledged its credibility in the international community, so failure to defend Kuwait would cost both internally and externally, and on the other side, a bankrupt contender for Arab leadership who requires victory to realize that claim. When one considers the parties' lack of understanding and desire for understanding, it can be concluded that the clumsily implemented strategy failed.

6.2 Conclusion Based on CD Theory and Case Study Analysis of Haiti

In the case of Haiti, the CD's goal was to force the military junta to re-elect a president who represented national unity rather than previous authorities who represented the interests of the military and the financial elite. This type of CD could be defined as a demand for fundamental changes in the regime; however, given that the ousted president was democratically elected and the junta imposed its power through force, the essence of the CD can be said to be to restore things. The response was initially lukewarm, so the opportunity to instill fear of the unbearable price to be paid in the event of disobedience was missed from the start, as was the reduction of the target's motivation to resist. The CD implementation in this case, at least initially, was not intended to physically impose a solution, but rather to destroy the target's will to resist, primarily through the coercer's reputation. Because no deadline was set at the outset and no intimidation tools were used, asymmetry in motivation prevailed on the target's side, and the junta maintained its rule for an unusually long time, in the dispute where the CD is implemented because the CD is used in emergencies. Because the incentive was in the form of amnesty for junta members, there was no (at least to the extent necessary) negative incentive at the outset. Motivation should be closely linked to the belief in what can be gained or lost in a given situation, so junta members in Haiti created the image that they can only lose if they give up their current position for these reasons. In this case, it can be seen that if the target believes that what it should give or give up is greater than what is offered, the CD has a low chance of success. Conversely, if you lose less by obeying than by not obeying, the CD has a much better chance of success. Thus, this crisis was only resolved when a deadline for completion was set and the military option became certain. In this case, the sense of urgency was addressed this way. This occurred when the coercer became more motivated for his own reasons, and asymmetry of motivation prevailed on the coercer's side. The domestic public, despite the opposition of certain parts of the apparatus to intervene, was in favor of restoring

democracy in Haiti. Once again, by this example, it could be seen how a change in motivation changes the outcomes of this CD strategy.

For the strategy to work, the target must be convinced that both the coercer and the threat are credible and potent. In general, there should be no doubt that a force like the US is untrustworthy, especially when it comes to a target, which is a country that is part of the security zone or area of interest due to its proximity. The question then is why did the junta maintain power under CD pressure from 1991 to 1994? It is precisely the deadline for obedience, the ultimatum, a certain military threat, and the incentive that have only recently gained importance. The sanctions imposed on Haiti were not installed in the right way, so it can be seen that the junta profited from them, so this can also be recorded as an omission. If sanctions significantly weakened the junta, diplomacy backed by harsh sanctions would likely pay off, but as the CD had gone lukewarm and sanctions had been installed clumsily, the coercer's credibility in the junta's eyes become questionable. Finally, the withdrawal of the ship that was supposed to deliver the manpower and equipment needed to monitor the agreement was the final nail in the coffin of credibility. However, with the new administration and the negotiators' persuasion that military intervention is certain, things are changing dramatically, and this can only be explained by the target's perception because the threats existed previously but were not taken seriously.

The combination of positive and negative incentives is the most effective, as will be explained in greater detail in the following chapter, but in this case, it can be concluded that a positive incentive without a negative incentive does not work. The junta's positive incentive was offered at the outset, but the negative was set in such a way that the target did not believe the threat was credible. As a result, the positive incentive or guarantee that members of the junta would be granted amnesty gained significance only after it became clear that the alternative was imprisonment or death. As a result, the appropriate measure of positive and

negative incentives produced results, while the positive incentive itself had no effects. When it became clear that everyone was equally threatened, cohesion was established and they were in a position to comply with the coercer requirement, which they were not able to do due to reduced real cohesion before compliance. The point is that the CD tool installation was not completely missing, but it was not installed and escalated correctly. Escalation refers not only to the use of tools ranging from mild to severe but also to the intensification of escalation within a single tool. For example, while the threat of sanctions is less severe than the threat of military force, sanctions on computer imports are significant but incomparable to the situation when sanctions are imposed on imports of energy or food. Also, if the limited military force can be escalated by attacking less important targets first, and if that fails, then start attacking vital targets, but keep a limit that does not exceed the line that would mean exceeding the limited military force. The Bush regime's threats were not taken seriously because there was no deadline for compliance and there were no clear consequences for possible non-compliance. While the Clinton administration issued a clear threat or ultimatum with a clear consequence for disobedience, the result was achieved by leaving an incentive on the table.

To summarize, the success of the CD in the case of Haiti is due to a combination of ultimatums and direct talks led by former US President Jimmy Carter. Furthermore, internal public pressure in the United States and the breakdown of junta cohesion contributed to the success. What should not be overlooked is the time that has passed since the junta has come under increasing pressure. It is not good for the CD to last long because it serves to resolve emergencies, but it is important to note that as time passed, stress gradually increased and junta cohesion declined, resulting in the perception of a target that contributed to obedience. Thus, the analysis discovered that the deadline set for the diplomatic activity for which Clinton authorized Carter, was all backed up by a military threat (for which there had previously been no congressional support), and created a perception that led to asymmetry in motivation and,

ultimately, obedience. In addition, of course, as a result of public pressure in the United States caused by the humanitarian crisis caused by a large number of Haitian refugees. This may highlight the significance of threatening and diplomatic activities that employ persuasion, as well as the use of a stick and a carrot. It is also obvious that without a clear military threat and the support of the internal public, a successful outcome is unlikely. As for the motivation itself, it is clear when comparing the two regimes, that the Bush regime believes that American interests are better protected if Aristad does not return to power, unlike the Clinton administration, which had the opposite view and drastically raised the coercer motivation with its support of the public.

6.3 Conclusion Based on CD Theory and Case Study Analysis of Libya

The Libya case demonstrates that changing policy can produce results. A good adaptation of tools that were not used or were used incorrectly in the first phase can contribute to success in the second phase, so it is analytically valuable. During the first phase, Libya resisted sanctions because it was economically strong enough that the consequences of the sanctions did not disrupt unity. This unity was also important in terms of Gaddafi's domestic support, as it allowed the regime to suppress and control the opposition. At the time, the majority of Libyans believed there was an external enemy and that it was necessary to unite in the fight against it. In the first phase, there was a clear view that regime change was required, which was acceptable according to the theoretical framework, but it was also emphasized that it was one of the vital interests likely to stymie the CD's success. It can be argued that when the policy was changed rather than regime change during the second phase, it was a necessary adjustment that contributed to the CD's success. Economic sanctions paid off in the second phase, but it was the result of the long-term depletion of the country, so the result was achieved with the passage of time, as in the case of Haiti. For a long time, it has been said that it is not a good tactic because it can be coercive due to the possibility of a counter-strategy, but it worked

in this case, as it did in Haiti. The multilateral sanctions that resulted in internal pressure on the leadership are a clear indication that international support is influencing domestic support. The combination of threats of force and sanctions, as well as the country's economic exhaustion and the desire to reintegrate the country into the community of nations, i.e. the desire to end international isolation, were factors that influenced obedience, but primarily the coercer's abandonment of the regime change. The incentive provided in the form of an offer to reintegrate the country, as well as the compromise made when the neutral ground was chosen to try those accused of attacking Pan Am 103, were also effective tools for softening the target's attitudes. There was also an aggravating circumstance in the first phase that prevented the coercer from taking the military option more seriously, which was the international public's disapproval of the attack on Libya in 1986, which prevented the coercer from seriously threatening military coups. Military strikes have become an increasingly visible and certain option over time, with the multilateralization of sanctions and the increase in international support, and this has undoubtedly contributed to the target's perception that it could lose more through disobedience. The period of obedience coincided with several US military interventions against rebellious targets, such as Libya, which served as an indirect demonstration of force and increased the likelihood of military intervention. Gaddafi's motivation was clear: he wanted to stay in power, which was impossible given the country's isolation, economic weakness, and the coercer's desire to change the regime. As a result, Gaddafi became more flexible, and the coercer provided an incentive in the form of modifying the regime change policy. An incentive can also be the coercer's consent to concede in the form of an offer to bring to trial the accused on neutral ground. This was presented as a mini-victory for Gaddafi and a concession to the target, which saved the target regime's face and provided a picture of the diplomatic victory won. Even the coercer got what he wanted: the accused were tried. All of these adaptations, the most important of which is the abandonment of the regime change, have demonstrated that success

can be achieved with the proper implementation of the CD tool. Changing the policy is a good choice because, in some ways, it proves that a rouge regime can be liberalized; however, the threat that a policy of regime change will occur again remains.

The deadline for obedience was set in the first phase, but it was not met due to the perception that the threat was not credible. Previously, there was discussion about the importance of establishing a clear deadline for compliance, but this case study, like others, has shown that a clear deadline without a credible threat does not mean much. The lack of balance contributed to the failure in the first phase, which did not account for Libya's current economic vulnerability. In the second phase, Libya was economically exhausted, which contributed to compliance; however, in the first phase, Gaddafi's unbalanced approach and the political situation achieved by restraining the opposition prevented success. At the end of the first phase, some progress was made in the negotiations to settle the Pan Am 108 case, but the transition from regime change to policy change was the most deserving. The international support received by the coercer at the end of the first phase, as a result of the internationalization of the problem, contributed to the coercer's credibility, which ultimately aided the final solution. The final solution in the Lockerbie case was the result of a balanced approach to the CD that included, in addition to the threat of force, a good timing concession and the promised incentive. The Libyan authorities agreed to withdraw much more easily after the concessions and incentives because the big question is what would have happened if they still had the mindset from the beginning that they had to protect vital interests, i.e. the regime's survival. This demonstrates that both diplomacy and force should be addressed within the CD and that the case of Libya demonstrates that a threat without credibility, as well as diplomacy without force, but also force without incentives, does not help. Balancing a policy that does not interfere with vital interests while producing similar or identical results is critical and it is probably the most important conclusion that can be drawn from this case. This case study demonstrated that

policy changes in rogue states are possible, and thus there is no need to change the regime or attack vital interests, facilitating CD implementation (shown in this case what can be achieved with modification from regime change to policy change).

In the case of Libya, policy adjustments and prolonged exhaustion produced results, even if the relationship between the target and the coercer changed over time. The case also demonstrated how some of the coercer's previous actions, such as the 1986 bombing of Libya, could make it more difficult to implement the CD, at least in the form of a lack of international support. In conclusion, the case of Libya demonstrates that the establishment of any trust between the parties, which is established by the policy of incentives and threats and balancing a policy that does not offer too much or too little and does not interfere with the target's vital interests, is preferable to an unbalanced policy. Such a balanced policy can only be implemented through the use of criteria that should be applied to the situation in order to achieve the necessary balance.

6.4 Conclusion Based on CD Theory and Case Study Analysis of Afghanistan

Afghanistan is an unusual case, so the CD's outcome warrants a special explanation. Following the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan, the international community embarked on a sort of anti-Taliban CD, cutting off aid that Afghanistan coveted. Conventional methods achieved some minimal results on the Taliban's behavior, but nothing fundamentally changed, therefore *realpolitik* should have been used. The cancellation of aid was not primarily sanctioned, in the true sense, but was intended to modify behavior. These behaviors could not be achieved by severing ties with terrorist organizations, women's rights, and a representative government, even if it meant a lot to economically devastated Afghanistan. This was not

possible in a world where bombings were commonplace and justified by the Taliban's interpretation of Islam. There was no expertise or ability to run a functioning government within the regime; instead, there was fear, various religious manipulations, and corruption. As an external threat to the regime, the system thus established contributed to internal support when it came to resisting the international community. The international community has been portrayed as ill-intentioned and deceptive within Afghanistan. Following attacks on suspected US missions in 1998 and the US destroyer USS Cole in 2000, the US has been at the forefront of anti-Taliban policies and has made several attempts to coerce the Taliban into surrendering bin Laden. When it all came to a head in 2001 with the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, the US used the classic CD format to demand that Osama bin Laden be tried under the threat of military attacks and the accumulation of bombers in neighboring countries. Bin Laden's surrender was unacceptable to the Taliban because it would erode internal support, and they understood that war meant regime change. In this case, both things meant the end of the regime, and when you combine that with the strong motivation that terrorist groups usually have, based on the desire to die, the situation has already signaled the end of the CD. Because the Taliban's main priority since 1996 has been regime maintenance, and the CD theory holds that regime change is a vital interest that, when threatened, usually indicates the collapse of the CD, the subsequent course of events determined just that. Surprisingly, the pressure applied to the Taliban regime was directed at a person who did not even formally belong to the regime. However, because the Taliban's policy was based on the so-called struggle against imperialism, bin Laden as a symbol of that struggle was critical and necessary for the regime's survival. On the other hand, the world's largest military force was attacked on its soil, and the motivation was clear at the time. The US did not mention a regime change until the attack, but the goal was to destroy terrorist camps, capture bin Laden, and build a nation, but it was clear that if there is a coup, regime change will not be far behind. When military strikes began, they were

relatively limited due to the Northern Alliance's ground support. It is difficult to say whether this ground support can be considered an excessive force attack within the CD, but given that it was a force fighting for power within a state, it can be said that it was an internal power struggle, but the moment at which these attacks are carried out parallel and synchronized deserves special attention. In any case, the arrival of international forces marked the end of limited military attacks.

The Taliban certainly liked the fact that there were battles on the ground to maintain internal support, presenting the change of the regime as a foregone conclusion. Prior to the coup, the Taliban were not given any incentives in the form of much-needed financial assistance, and they were also denied the eventual diplomatic recognition and respect they required due to the international community's stance on the regime. A certain and potent threat combined with an incentive could produce results, particularly for a regime that essentially required the incentive. Due to the high level of extremism in Afghanistan, the lack of incentives provided no opportunity to maintain internal cohesion even if the request was granted. As a result, the Taliban's motivation remained strong, if not unwavering. When using a CD in situations where the motivation is the same on both sides, the target usually wins or the CD fails, so this was something that needed to be worked on with a carrot-and-stick approach. The motivation of the US was not in doubt due to the attack on their soil, and the motivation of the Taliban was due to the possibility of regime change, so it is clear that the CD has no greater chance of success at this point. Then remained a limited military force capable of achieving the goal; however, due to the inaccessible terrain and numerous hiding options available to bin Laden, it was necessary to deploy the forces on the ground, overcoming the limit of limited use of military force. First and foremost, another step has been violated, but from this perspective, it does not appear to contribute much when all of the things listed thus far are taken into account, and that is a clear deadline for fulfilling the requirements. There was a sense of

urgency, and it was clear that the deadline was approaching, but it had not been formally set. After that, it was impossible to persuade the Taliban that regime change was not the primary goal, so there was no assurance or incentive with which the Taliban could justify compliance to the internal public.

As a result, the Taliban regime sought evidence that bin Laden was responsible for the September 2001 attack, implying one of two things: either that they wanted to postpone a possible attack or that they wanted to provide some justification for possible extradition. As a result, following the request, it was necessary to try to offer an incentive while assuring that the regime was not the target. However, the incentive to extradite someone who dared to attack the largest military force on their soil was likely viewed by the US as a weakness and potential disruption of its internal public. All of this distinguishes this case study: targeting a regime because of a non-regime individual, asymmetry in motivation, and inconsistent strategy implementation. Maintaining credibility in the international community through coercion, as well as the issue of honor and extremism on the target side. Multiple coercer's goals, some publicly declared and some not, and the desire to achieve them all at once caused confusion and completely blurred the strategy. International and, to a lesser extent, domestic public support facilitated the coercer's entry into the conflict. As a rule, the targets' motivation was supposed to decrease, but the targets' motivation remained high because the Taliban believed that in both cases, they were losing the regime, which was unacceptable to them, so they attempted to find a way out in a possible military failure of the coercer.

Chapter V

1. Introduction

Following the general hypothesis of this paper and research, particularly the analysis of case studies, criteria for CD success will be offered, as well as arguments for why certain criteria would be successful and what potential problems may arise in applying these criteria. So far, the theory has done a lot (but not enough) on the theoretical definition of CD, and this strategy has been used numerous times, but as noted in the literature, analyses, and earlier in this paper, the success rate of CD is still very low. One of the reasons for this is undoubtedly the lack of clear criteria for successful CD implementation, which is one of the theoretical shortcomings that affect the strategy's practical implementation. As the topic of this paper is, it must be emphasized that the analysis revealed that certain criteria for implementing similar coercive strategies might overlap in implementation, so this could be an interesting topic for future researchers. The overlap of criteria can lead to a false clue in the analysis of the implemented strategy, so detecting overlaps would be useful so that future researchers have a clearer starting point in the analysis. Concerning the CD's success criteria, it should be noted that it is possible that they will have to adapt to some new international conditions in the future, which could be the task of some future researchers who will deal with this and similar topics. However, it is undeniably useful that the criteria based on an analysis of current theory and practice can contribute to success in the current international circumstances, which is the purpose of this paper and can be useful in the current circumstances and contribute to theoretical determination and in the future be an excellent starting point if corrections are required. During the analysis, it was also discovered that the theory is concerned with the flow of the strategy itself (which is certainly necessary) and determines success and failure too rigidly based on that flow. During the previous chapters' writing, it was suggested that the

qualification success/failure be expanded to partial success/failure and cheap and expensive success. Certainly, the most successful option would be a cheap success, but even that will be left to future researchers because it appears that escalation is sometimes more appropriate for those who use coercion. Six criteria that contribute to the oral implementation of CD were chosen based on the variables observed in the analyzed cases and relevant literature, as well as by combining certain criteria found in the literature with different names but the same or similar essence. What matters is that they are implemented in the manner described and that the problems described are avoided. It is equally important that all six criteria be applied because they are interdependent and cannot be implemented arbitrarily; however, all six criteria must be applied gradually and chronologically. This should not be interpreted as a usage guide because it is based on criteria and science, and thus on the chosen constant that is required for the decision-making process, or as a basis for comparing variables in the decision-making process. They served as a basis for the detection of criteria, i.e. determining what should be done based on these deviations, in the analysis of case studies of variable deviations from the constant in the dynamics of CD. Because the CD is implemented in a specific time interval, it must be considered that the criteria cannot always be applied explicitly, so certain criteria are sometimes implicit in some phases of implementation because they arise from the behavior of the other party. Some corrections have already been made in the section of the paper where several criteria are defined, merged, and reduced to six criteria, but this chapter deepens and argues the analysis not only on theory but also on practice. By combining the criteria, an attempt was made to refine one common point of view, as well as an argumentation explaining what could and would not work to achieve the ultimate goal of this paper. The crystallization of the criteria not only improves the theoretical framework of the CD but also influences the art of diplomacy because the CD is the diplomatic strategy.

Before explaining what will work, when it will work, and why, it will be written which factors in the CD's implementation contributed to the outcome. First and foremost, the position of this paper is based on Alexander L. George's original definition of CD. Other perspectives and relevant authors dealing with this topic were certainly considered, but George provided the main direction, in the sense that the CD, even if hybrid, is primarily a diplomatic strategy. Furthermore, the CD serves to realize interests, but more importantly, it represents a viable alternative to war in resolving the conflict.

It has already been stated that the point of view on which this paper is based is the third described current, i.e. theoreticians who believe in the threat and use of force, but that force should be avoided as much as possible but must be used for credibility if necessary. According to the conclusions reached thus far, it is necessary to use tools proportionately and gradually escalate the situation in order to further establish the issue of credibility. In the use of limited military force, which remains the most difficult theoretical problem, it should be used only to the extent that it serves a purpose; anything beyond that can no longer be considered limited, even if the number of weapons is limited. In addition, because the parties must trust each other as much as possible, and trust is unrealistic to expect in a coercion case, this issue has significantly contributed to the final definition of the CD's success criteria. When it was explained what the guideline for the selection of criteria was, and before the criteria and problems were described, it should be explained what the problems that arose in the analysis and contributed to the selection of criteria were. This will be done in the following section.

2. Prediction of CD flow

The inability to predict the strategy's course was the first issue that arose as a result of the analysis. Once the CD is implemented, current practice demonstrates that neither the implementer nor the target knows how the situation will develop, but instead reacts to both

parties' reactions based on current interests (and possibilities, of course). This is due to poor communication between the conflict parties, actions during strategy implementation, and mistrust between the parties. As a result, an attempt was made to determine the criteria following the theoretical framework and analysis of practical implementation in such a way that they depend as much as possible on the one who implements them and are under his control as much as possible.

Of course, it is not possible to be completely under the control of the coercer because so much depends on the target's response, but the responses of the target that could follow and the possible response of the coercer to that are taken into account, and communication is essential for all of that. Communication, the most important component of diplomacy and coercive diplomacy, consists of both verbal and nonverbal components and cannot be a one-sided act, but must flow in as many directions as there are participants. Communication aims to convey an understandable message to the recipient, in this case, the request, so understanding should be prioritized. Communication occurs constantly in everyday life and is frequently unconscious, so caution is advised here as well. CD communication is unique because ordinary communication implies an exchange in which no one loses anything, unlike, for example, material exchange, and CD communication implies some kind of loss or gain, so it must be adapted to it. Adaptation is one of the main elements in diplomatic communication between the parties, but there is a problem because in this communication one side appears as a coercer and imposes its will, so the space for adaptation is diminished and the other side's interests are threatened (sometimes vital), so adaptation is only possible to some extent and is often not the first option to be considered.

3. Intelligence work

In terms of intelligence work, it is certainly lacking, and little has been written about it in the CD literature. The strategy is primarily concerned with sending a message to the opposing party, potential moves in international organizations, and assessments of the opponent's military power. Even if the coercer accurately assesses the initial situation, this does not guarantee that this assessment will be useful when the crisis emerges later on. Thus, operational intelligence work that objectively assesses the target's absolute and relative strength in terms of economic and military strength, population support, and, most importantly, the target's will and determination to oppose and persist would be invaluable. Although intelligence and diplomacy are inextricably linked, this connection is rarely discussed in CD-related literature. Decision-makers could gain a decisive advantage in the conflict if timely and accurate information was available. For the data to be as accurate as possible, the people who collect, analyze, and transmit it must be familiar with the circumstances. Good intelligence work would thus, among other things, aid diplomacy, both in general and in the context of this paper. This assistance includes a variety of intimidation, confidence-building, and covert political and military actions, but the most relevant to this topic are coercion strategies. All of these factors have an impact on the course of events in the international community. This should not be a problem when it comes to measurable elements like the economy and military capacity, but when it comes to the decision-makers, effective intelligence work would be very useful in an assessment of the extent to which the target, i.e. those who decide on resistance, are ready to offer resistance.

4. (Dis) trust between the parties

Mistrust between the parties has already been mentioned, but now is a good time to elaborate. Mistrust between the parties is expected and normal, but if there is credibility and if

both sides stick to what was agreed in the early stages of the CD, trust could be established in some way and a solution could be reached that would satisfy the coercer and make it known to the target that after the establishment of the agreement and compliance, there will be no new requests and that there are no hidden agendas behind the requests. Mistrust between the parties was said to be expected because trust meant believing in one's own consistency and goodwill. Consistency can be trusted, but expecting someone's goodwill to be trusted in international relations is unrealistic, especially when the relationship is further burdened by coercion. However, even if the relationship is conflicting, some level of trust is required for it to stabilize and free the parties from the fear of being duped.

5. Credibility

The next issue discovered builds on the previous one, and that is the issue of credibility. In this context, credibility refers to a positive reputation earned by the party through previous actions or through what has been accomplished. The party that imposes the will loses credibility if it abandons the goal, and the party that imposes it loses credibility if it agrees to everything right away. As a result, it aggravates the situation and has the potential to exacerbate the conflict. The reason for the escalation is that neither side wants to lose credibility. After all, it is crucial for the future. However, since credibility is the impression that others have of someone, i.e. the feeling of respect one has for others as a result of their behavior and actions, it follows that it is critical to maintain the impression in others that the actions that can be taken are credible and correct. So far, it has been demonstrated that military superiority has little to do with the CD's success, but it is always the case with the CD that a significantly stronger side imposes its will on a significantly weaker one. When a great power imposes its will on the weaker and does not persevere, it loses credibility with the target and the international community in general, so military power does not mean much if it is not used and credibility

is lost. On the other hand, if the target agrees to all conditions without resistance, it informs the coercer and the whole international community that it is an 'easy target', so the question is why there would be no subsequent demands and why some other force would not decide to try to achieve imposing their interests by imposing their will. That is why incentive is a very important criterion, which will be discussed in more detail later because it greenlights compromise to the strategy. When there is an incentive, it allows the target to present the situation in such a way that the incentive is something that the target has achieved and allows the coercer to achieve the goal and have his request met, preserving both parties' credibility. Furthermore, the demands should be carefully chosen so that they are feasible to impose and to exit the strategy as a credible party that manages to impose its will while avoiding war. Finally, good credibility is accompanied by a good reputation, which can significantly facilitate the fulfillment of some future requirements that the coercer may have. In addition, the resistance that the target offers gives it a reputation that it is not an easy target, so it can dissuade some other subjects who have possible pretensions.

THE MILITARY FORCE WITHIN THE CD

The complexity of the military force used within the CD is the next issue. The CD's limited use of military force has already been discussed, but there has been no discussion of how to use that military force effectively, assuming that it is undeniably limited. As a result, military force was frequently used in practice as a punishment that resembled a typical military force rather than a combined strategy. Moreover, the purpose of military force in the CD is to demonstrate and escalate, not to annihilate. In other words, military force is used to demonstrate resolve to achieve compliance and to demonstrate to the target that escalating conflict in the event of disobedience is a viable option. Force demonstration is both a threatening action and a demonstration of readiness for conflict. Of course, in military doctrine, force is sometimes used to compel the adversary to reveal his strengths and weaknesses or to divert attention from

another action, which is somewhat acceptable for the CD's theoretical framework. The use of military force implies an increase in the level of hostility and violence in the conflict. As a result, an escalation in international relations is a situation in which the conflict between the subjects is moving towards armed conflict, and the limited use of military force could be defined as the final step before the armed conflict. Of course, escalation makes sense only if the opposing party does not want a war, is not prepared for it, or cannot defend itself. It can also be dangerous if used without intelligence because it can lead to an unanticipated war.

6. Criteria for CD success

The following section of the paper will describe the criteria that work and what does not work within them, as well as the conditions for their success and how they are used. Because the case study method is the primary method in this study, the conclusions will be based on carefully selected cases conducted under different conditions with different outcomes. The case studies examined differ in terms of implementation, location, and outcome, but they are all linked by the fact that the same strategy was used in all of them. However, regardless of the outcomes of these cases, a strong link was established between the practical implementation and the CD's theoretical framework, and different outcomes provided variables from which it was possible to conclude which criteria give results under which conditions. Based on the relevant literature and research, an attempt was made to create a more complete and relevant reconstruction of the events, from which further analysis detected the variables that led to the conclusions. The goal of it all was to get closer to the perfect description and discover the perfect truth about specific cases. This has provided a very broad exploratory and methodological framework that connects various social, psychological, and other techniques to detect disorders during the strategy and these disorders are our variables.

Due to the contradictory requirements set by the CD strategy, it is difficult to implement. The CD on the one hand coerces, intimidates, and uses invasive methods and on the other hand, encourages calm and avoids war, which leads to a psychosocial context that requires analysis and must have rules to maintain control. Perception can be completely wrong as a result of mixed signals, and it appears illogical that this can lead to a miscalculation in terms of answers. If there is a danger of high levels of violence on one side and offers of incentives on the other, it is expected that the signals will be difficult to interpret. As a result, in the future, when analyzing the CD phenomenon, it will be necessary to interpret psychological criteria as well as intelligence work, as previously mentioned. This is related in some ways because intelligence would provide insight into decision-makers' capacities as well as their weaknesses. The psychological assessments could predict how decision-makers will behave and respond to certain pressures, as well as how the personal weaknesses of those in power can serve to put pressure in the right place at the right time. Certain factors identified in CD theory and those proven to contribute to success, such as credibility, balance in motivation, perception of the target of urgency, international or support of the international community, fear of the target in case of disobedience, and setting unambiguous requirements that the target should meet, were extremely helpful in the separation of the criteria. Given that the CD is not a strategy aimed at cultivating opponents, blackmail, or extortion, but rather the pursuit of interests that may or may not be realized, both sides save face.

6.1 Criterion 1: Asymmetry of Motivation

There are various asymmetries between the opposing sides when it comes to CD. Because coercion is usually used by a much stronger force against a weaker one, there are asymmetries in resources, interests, and relative and absolute strength. The appropriate proportion should not be sought in international relations, but in the case of CD, it is frequently, if not always, significant. A strength that reflects the size of the army did not always play a

significant role in the implementation of the CD, but asymmetry in motivation was identified as a significant factor contributing significantly to the CD's success or failure. Motivation, like in everyday life, reflects an individual's or group's performance in a specific context. It serves as a theoretical construct to explain certain behaviors, so the behavior is the foundation of motivation research. The target's motivation should be analyzed using previous procedures related to disputes and categorized in terms of how the target sees the problem and how he psychologically experiences the problem. Because motivation is the driving force, but it is imposed by the other party in this case, it must be controlled by that party, and this must be done carefully because motivation is driven by emotions, which leads to certain behaviors, which should lead to a goal. Therefore, it is important to emphasize here that the most important thing is to understand the emotions of the party to which the motivation is imposed in order to determine the right amount of demands that will provoke the right amount of emotions and thus lead to the desired goal. The asymmetry in question suggests that if the weaker side of the target is more committed to the goal than the stronger side, the weaker side can win the competition within the CD. When there is more commitment or motivation, there is also a willingness to pay a higher price, especially when the target's vital interests are at stake. The case studies examined in this paper demonstrated that if the motivation is on the target side, the CD will undoubtedly fail, but it is even more interesting to note that if the motivation is equal, the target will once again prevail. To succeed, the coercer's motivation must be on his or her side, because otherwise, success is unlikely, if not impossible.

This criterion has been demonstrated as necessary in all case studies. What is also advantageous for the strategy implementer is that control by the coercer is possible in the implementation of this criterion, which is not the case in other segments of strategy implementation. Case studies have revealed that demand and motivation are inextricably linked. The coercer can control this criterion because the request can be adjusted so that it does

not jeopardize the vital interests of the other party, resulting in success. In the case of Iraq, it has been observed that when the target's vital interests are jeopardized, the motivation is on the target's side, resulting in the failure of the CD. Of course, understanding how the target perceives interest is critical because perception is everything. This is the case in Iraq (but also in some other cases) because, in addition to the principles of international relations and international law, decision-makers' cultural, political, and personal dimensions must be considered. There is a fair amount of literature in the field of international relations that deals specifically with Saddam Hussein (and other leaders) as a specific figure on which other international actors made assessments, such as the Bush administration did during the Iraq conflict.³⁰¹ Even though the US, through direct contacts, and the UN signaled what would happen if Iraq disobeyed, and even if it is assumed that Iraq perceived the threat as credible, the motivation, as demonstrated, was on Iraq's side. Not only because of so-called vital interests (regime change and territorial issues) but also because of the belief that the US would lose domestic support, making it unable to intervene, and the USSR would regain the international balance, which was lost when the US began the intervention, and its position on the 'chessboard'. Given that the threat was credible and clear, and Iraq had been defeated, the reason for Iraq's strong motivation was most likely a miscalculation. Furthermore, Iraq at the time sought to establish itself as the Arab world's leader and saw itself as the unifier of Arabs, from whom support was also expected, which influenced motivation. Vital interests, combined with the image of a leader of all Arabs retreating without a fight, have certainly tipped the scales in Saddam's favor, but he has underestimated the international community's willingness to defend Kuwait from invasion. As previously stated, when it comes to regime change and when the target's territory is in question (it does not matter whether the territory *de jure* belongs to the target, but what is the target's perception of territory), this usually reflects vital interest.

³⁰¹ For example: Hybel & Kaufman (2013).

Of course, the intelligence mentioned earlier is required to determine the limit to the endangerment of interests and the one that exceeds it. Intelligence could provide insight into the target's perception of the goal. In the most basic sense, this criterion is under the control of the one who imposes the will. The coercer then has in his hands the decision on how far the request will go and how it will be sent, giving him control. When the picture of the system's vital interests, relationships within the system, and decision-makers personal attitudes and interests are clear, shifting the focus of motivation to the coercer's side becomes much simpler. Motivation, in addition to being psychological, reflects how much both parties care about a particular issue through their behavior and reveals what the stakes are. Contrary, if the coercing power pursues ambitious goals that do not reflect its vital interests or makes demands that infringe on the adversary's vital or very important interests, the asymmetry of interests and the balance of motivation are likely to favor the adversary.³⁰² The CD is a 'psychological game' that is heavily influenced by the decision-makers' mindset, but both the domestic public and system pressure play a role in determining the final decision (since decisions in the entities over which the CD is implemented are not made in one place). Thus, in the case of Haiti, under the Bush administration, motivation was initially on the target side due to a general lack of motivation and interest in the case by US authorities. There was no agreement in the United States on what should be done or to what extent something should be done. When the domestic public began to exert pressure within the US, and a new administration arrived with a different mindset and general attitude toward the establishment of democracy in Haiti, the motivation began to shift to the coercive side. The sanctions were significantly strengthened at the start of the Clinton administration, but they were not implemented correctly, so the junta benefited financially from the illegal trade, but it still sent a signal that the situation was escalating. Therefore, in this case, the motivation of the junta was weakened only when it was clear that

³⁰² George (1991): 13.

American soldiers were ready to march on Haiti. Only in this way is the target convinced that the consequences that follow will be much worse than the demand that has been set. In addition, the motivation of the US has strengthened only after, in addition to democracy being violated and human rights being violated, Haiti attracted worldwide attention after the large number of refugees who left Haiti. “Eventually more than 30,000 Haitians were detained in legal limbo at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”³⁰³

That is why the importance of intelligence gathering prior to making a request was previously discussed. Intelligence work should determine what the target's ‘red lines’ are and what the target's vital interests are, and then adjust the request accordingly in a way that is acceptable to the target while also achieving (or partially achieving) the coercer interest. In the case of Haiti, no results were obtained without significant intelligence, but this was due to a good assessment and available data, given that regime change was the goal and regime change was of critical importance. However, because this was not a true regime change, but rather the restoration of the legitimate one, it cannot be classified as a threat to vital interests. It should also be noted that motivation is not always black and white and can be influenced by seemingly unrelated events. For example, in the case of Haiti, the lack of motivation in the US was due to the bloodshed of US troops in Somalia, and in the case of Libya, when the 1986 attack was condemned by the international community, there was a fear that new pressure on Libya would be met with unfavorable results. In the case of Libya, however, there were hints that the ultimate goal could be regime change, so there was great caution and mistrust during the communication. The Libya case turned in the coercer's favor in the second phase when the target leadership took fright of other examples of the coercer's CD, which happened to be a demonstration of force, with the incentive offered to Libya turning the motivation in the coercer's favor. Therefore, encouragement without encroachment on vital interests, as well as

³⁰³ Clinton Presidential Library, Haiti: Restoring a Democracy

demonstrations of force, produced results. Gaddafi's motivation was clear: he wanted to stay in power, and when that was factored into the equation, the target's attitude shifted dramatically. Internal pressures, that forced Gaddafi to reintegrate isolated Libya back into the international community, must not be overlooked. This integration served as an inducement, outweighing the balance of motivation on the coercer side.

The case of Afghanistan has demonstrated in principle that the target's motivation can be strong even when (declaratively) vital interests are not jeopardized. In this case, the result was fear of future demands, extremism, and a lack of good communication. In the case of Afghanistan, however, it was eventually revealed that the Taliban regime had been deposed and an anti-Taliban interim government (the Northern Alliance) had been installed. So, the possibility can be considered that the Taliban government estimated that there would be new demands that could jeopardize vital interests (which happened), so it was more motivated at the start. When the situation is analyzed more deeply, it comes down to the asymmetry in motivation that should be under the control of the coercer and should be imposed by a moderate request with the assurance (or guarantee) that new demands will not occur. Regardless of the outcome of the CD (the CD failed due to the strategy's transition to full-scale war), it can be seen that when the attack on US soil occurred, the coercer's motivation increased dramatically to the level leading to war and occupation, so it is interesting to note that within the CD, the coercer's vital interests (attacking the soil of some of the key states in the international system can be interpreted as an attack on vital interests) may be implemented.

In cases where the opponent's motivation was ignored, the CD failed unmistakably, so balancing motivation is all about risk assessment. According to George and Smoke, "perceptions of risk calculability and controllability" are important in risk assessment. This is consistent with the preceding because perception is dependent on both subjective (without prior knowledge) and objective (in this case intelligence components) perception. Calculability

should be determined by the data obtained, which will be considered and used to make the calculation. This calculation should be related not only to the careful selection of requirements but also to a method of ensuring that there will be no new requirements that are effective.

Requirements that jeopardize vital interests should not be imposed within the CD, because the CD is, by definition, a limited strategy with limited objectives, and limited objectives should not be vital. The stronger side or the coercer frequently fails to mobilize public support, resources, and political will and is frequently unable to go to war due to international and conventional norms, so the target has a good chance of preserving interests if a stronger force does not go to war. It should be noted that, as stated, this criterion is closely related to the level of requirements and the threat to the target's vital interests. As previously stated, vital interests are related to territory and regime change, according to the conclusions that can be drawn from the literature (and the specificity detected in the case of Afghanistan by attacking key players). Creating asymmetry in motivation is a branch of political psychology in international relations, and it is one of the potential issues that can arise if the decision is made by people who are not qualified to assess the situation using the appropriate methodology. In the case of Afghanistan, it is a situation that was unquestionably unique and added a new dimension to the study of CD because the target and the person to whom the request was addressed were two distinct subjects. Therefore, the assessment, in that case, was more complicated, but the principle of pressure on decision-makers is certainly based on the CD framework that exists regardless of the goal. So at one point the regime itself was not a target and there were no territorial disputes but the Taliban's motivation was strong enough to resist. This showed, in the first place, that creating asymmetry in motivation was not an easy task until the attack was carried out on US territory and this shifted the balance of motivation leading to war and occupation and it cost the Taliban the regime. Then the ultimate goal became the overthrow of the Taliban regime and justified the Taliban's caution but also explained why their

motivation was so strong. So it can be said that if the motivation is strong on both sides, as in the case study of Afghanistan where the Taliban regime was threatened and the US, as one of the key players on the international scene, was attacked on its soil, it leads to the collapse of the CD. If there were poor motivation on both sides, the CD probably would not go beyond the requirements. So balancing the interests that have already been mentioned is what is necessary because if the motivation is equal, paradoxically, the target always prevails and is victorious. The target's motivation is frequently underestimated because it is common for the CD that force is applied to the weaker side by a much stronger force, so the imbalance is frequently the result of poor assessment by the coercer. An attitude that reflects an overestimation of its reputation has frequently cost or could cost the coercer dearly. Because reputation is not a constant, and it is not always true. A good or bad reputation is frequently based on the perception of the other party because reputation refers to the trustworthiness that someone has with the other party. Furthermore, as previously stated, the selection of requirements has a significant impact on the target's motivation. Internal support may make balancing motivation difficult, as seen in the case of Haiti, where the Pentagon was not particularly interested in restoring democracy, and the public was strongly opposed to any use of force. Since Colin Powell's anti-interventionist 'doctrine' was laid out in 1992, the Pentagon has been wary of becoming entangled in peacekeeping operations like the one in Haiti.³⁰⁴ When the target has such data that can be obtained from public sources, it certainly increases the target's motivation. As can be seen, when the Haitian refugees began to arrive, the public began to view the situation differently, giving the Democrats the confidence to threaten with force, which ultimately paid off. As a result, in addition to motivation, the target must be convinced that the punishment for disobedience is credible and unbearable. Because the coercer is acting and must keep the situation under control, it must determine what is at stake for both parties and how important

³⁰⁴ Clinton Presidential Library, Haiti: Restoring a Democracy.

it is for both parties. This is critical to avoid assessment gaps, as case studies have confirmed the importance of assessing motivation. Moreover, the key is to keep the situation under control by limiting the requirements to what is not in the coercer's vital interest.

6.2 Criterion 2: Sense of Urgency

A sense of urgency is implanted primarily because urgency itself has a negative impact on attention, which in turn has a negative impact on the ability to make rational decisions. Making decisions under stressful and time-sensitive conditions leads to errors, which is why instilling urgency is important. If the opponent is given enough time, he or she may be able to devise a counter-strategy that prevents or hinders the coercer from acting. The goal is to prevent the target from making the best decision possible, so a time limit is essential to prevent the opponent from consolidating. When there is a sense of urgency, the goal is lost, and instead of controlling the process, the process controls you. This sensation is comparable to the feeling of narrowed consciousness caused by intoxication, in which a person makes decisions that he would not make in a rational state. Therefore, the bottom line is intimidating the opponent and instilling a sense of urgency that builds on motivation by motivating the opponent to accept the threat and obey within the time limit. A sense of urgency can be instilled in a variety of ways, but the most effective is a clear deadline for compiling the requirements, taking into account how realistic the deadline to meet is. If an unrealistically short deadline is set, the target subject may suspect that it is a case of deceit and that there is an intention, in the background of the request, that the request not be fulfilled (because it cannot be fulfilled) to give legitimacy for a possible attack. Of course, the deadline should not be too long or too flexible, as this would allow time for target consolidation or eventual mobilization of the public and international community actors in the protection of their interests. Political, economic, and military pressures all create pressure, but a sense of urgency is ineffective without a deadline and a clear threat of what will happen after that deadline. Pressures such as various signals should be used in

conjunction with the deadline (freezing of financial resources, resolutions in international organizations, accumulation of the army at the border...). If the deadline is set and nothing happens after that, the coercer's credibility for future actions may suffer. This criterion must be accompanied by other criteria and persuasion, because it was quite clearly set in the case of Iraq, for example, but the Iraqi side did not understand it in the way that was expected. In the case of Iraq, the omission was made because there was no gradual escalation, but rather a deadline, after which massive force was used. In addition to the deadline, the situation should be escalated through political, economic, and military means to demonstrate to the target that time is running out. Here it should be returned and reflected again to the assessment and intelligence work that could provide the coercer with information on whether or not the deadline will be met. If the information does not exist, as it did in the case of Iraq, from the misconceptions that Saddam had about the support that should come from the Arab world and the USSR, and the lack of understanding of the international moment. Then something could be done about convincing e.g. to make it clear that failure to meet the deadline will be punished. So if there was reliable information that Saddam does not intend to fulfill the request, it could have escalated the situation by the deadline and encouraged to strengthen the CD, as well as other means to show the situation clearly to meet the request. Due to the lack of a clear deadline for compliance, it took three years for Haiti's legitimately elected president to return to power. Of course, this is not the only reason for the unusually long period of CD implementation, but it is certainly one of them. This is supported by the fact that when Clinton issued an ultimatum and a deadline was set, an agreement was reached and a solution was found. In the case of Libya, there was a time limit, but no credible threat, so in the second phase, after the country had been exhausted by harsh sanctions and isolation, the internal pressure was applied to the leadership, which, when combined with other elements of coercion, forced Libya to obey. In addition, the case of Afghanistan is unique in this regard because there is an implicit imposition

of urgency, but no specific time limit has been set. Such tactics are not ideal because they can devolve into an endless cat-and-mouse game in which the coercer demonstrates force and the target avoids or ignores the coercer's actions by delaying the conflict in order to better prepare for a counter-attack or provide support internally and externally. In the case of Afghanistan, something similar would have most likely occurred if the Twin Towers had not been attacked, providing the coercer with a cause, legitimacy, and motivation. Without such an event, it was extremely difficult to anticipate adequate internal and external support for a potential attack. As a result, the most important aspect of this criterion is to create a sense of urgency because it must be established in such a way that the situation is taken seriously and urgently, and to reduce the possibility of the target making a good decision, but it must not lead to such a level of agitation and coercer response that the escalation would result in CD failure. In this case, urgency should make it clear that there will be unacceptably harsh consequences, i.e. that obedience pays more than the consequences. This means that the request should be defined in such a way that it does not interfere with vital interests, gives the appearance of justice and legitimacy, and, on the other hand, carries a consequence that is credible and worse than meeting the request. It should be decided whether to start with gradual coercive pressure or immediately threaten large-scale violence based on the available data and the other party's behavior, but because each case is different, the other party's reactions and necessary intelligence should be used as guidance. The most obvious way to create a sense of urgency would be to say, "Withdraw your troops from a certain territory by a certain date or we will attack you militarily," but this approach puts the coercer in jeopardy because if there is no obedience, he must respond militarily or lose credibility and reputation. If he does not respond, it will be obvious that the threat was a bluff, and any subsequent action he takes will almost certainly be regarded as a bluff. Unlike the previous criterion, this one is not solely (or to the greatest extent) in the hands of the coercer, but is equally dependent on both sides, with the

coercer having some control over the requirements. Both sides have a problem of preserving credibility because the target also has a problem of credibility in the sense that if it immediately agrees to all conditions without resistance it can gain the reputation of an easy target, and the coercer in case of non-fulfillment of the threat, as someone who bluffs and does not fulfill threats. Finally, it should be borne in mind that urgency is not anxiety, that is, the goal is to create urgency and not panic. Therefore, the essence is, that target does what is required immediately, without delay, and without additional questions to create change without panicking to avoid completely unforeseen reactions and responses.

Time pressure, as previously stated, can lead to hasty and reckless moves that can knock the strategy implementer on the head because, due to the target's panic, it (the target) can make a move that must be responded to, bringing it to a stage that does not suit the coercer. Although the goal is to create urgency in the target, that urgency must be controlled and maintained at a level that prevents reckless moves or panic while also being strong enough to prevent consolidation. Incomplete or poor communication can result in erroneous signaling and displaying a sense of urgency as insufficient or excessive pressure, leading to a loss of control over the situation. It is not always necessary to threaten military force. Some situations, such as Libya, require far fewer threats, such as sanctions or political isolation. An insufficient sense of urgency in which the target is relaxed allows the target time and space to maneuver, and too much pressure, as stated, brings the danger of a reckless move to which the coercer would have to respond, which leads to further escalation and loss of control. It should be made as clear as possible at both levels of communication that occur within the CD (verbal and nonverbal) that the situation is urgent and how urgent it is. This is established by stating clearly, what is expected and by what deadline. Only to be omitted if the coercer has a flexible goal and does not want to make it clear how urgent the situation is so that demands can be reduced during communication. This is a problem that can arise when combining a sense of urgency with long-

term goals. This variant is risky and ineffective, but it is consistent with the theoretical framework. The time frame for compliance should not be too short, i.e. the realistic deadline for fulfilling the request should be considered (if the deadline is unrealistically tight, it may cause the target to act preemptively), nor too long, because in that case the threat will not be taken seriously, and the requirements will most likely not be met. As a result, a request without a clear deadline cannot be considered credible, and a time limit without a clear request cannot be met in the manner desired by the applicant. Timing is critical in creating a sense of urgency, and its absence is frequently interpreted as a sign of weakness. Reading signals is also important, but it necessitates good communication because feelings can be hidden but behavior cannot, so it is critical to maintain constant communication with the other party to detect behavior and avoid misinterpretations.

6.3 Criterion 3: Fear of Unacceptable Escalation

Fear of unacceptable escalation stems from the target's belief that the coercer can escalate the situation to the point where it is too expensive or unbearable to the target. The situation must be presented in such a way that escalation is possible to war and occupation, but this must be determined in advance by the coercer to avoid an unexpected outcome. It would be ideal to impose oneself gradually and at a pace that instills in the target a sense that there will be consequences that he will not be able to bear and that obeying is a better solution than suffering the consequences that follow. The escalation of the situation leads to the escalation of emotions, most notably fear, so the situation must be escalated gradually. Gradual implementation is required because few options could be used without causing war or "loss of face" if you start with more severe forms of coercion. As a result, a gradual escalation with a quick cut-off initial reaction should produce the best results. For everyone in their field to implement this component of the strategy in a coordinated manner, political and military leaders must understand the principle of gradualness and speed in the first reaction. This

strategy also relies on and is dependent on the target's motivation, because the degree of escalation required to achieve the goal can be precisely determined. This criterion accurately reflects the CD strategy because military leaders typically perceive conflict as either war or peace, and gradual escalation falls somewhere in the middle, implying neither war nor peace. It is also necessary to understand which goals should be used to escalate the conflict, as the same component cannot be shared by all subjects. Some entities value roads, bridges, oil fields, and so on. Thus, for some, economic or political escalation is sufficient to compel compliance, whereas, for others, military intervention is required. If military force is used, the strikes must be carried out in such a way that they do not exceed the limited use of military force while inflicting enough economic, political, and military damage to force the target to reconsider the cost-effectiveness of resistance. The target's counter-strategy should also be considered, and there should be a plan in place to override or, better yet, prevent any move by the target. Moreover, it is not just about raw military and economic superiority; it is also about will and determination, as well as tactics and strategy. And, if it is not permitted to use ground forces within the CD, as stated, a significant number of ground forces are required because only in this way can the target be made aware that escalation to the extent of occupation is possible, even if it is not the coercer's intention. In the broadest sense, escalation means an increase in the level of hostility, but in this case, it also means increased intimidation by a possible increase in brutality. As a result, escalation takes time, but the goal of this criterion is to instill fear of unacceptable escalation. This means that whether an escalation occurs or not is unimportant, as long as the opposing party believes it is certain and creates a fear of escalation that cannot be tolerated. This fear is still easily manipulated; if such fear arises, the likelihood of obedience increases in proportion to the fear of escalation. If the threatening force is credible and powerful, it should be respected; however, there are some situations in which even such a threat is not taken seriously. In the case of Haiti, obedience came after years of CD implementation.

What prompted the junta to refuse to obey between 1991 and 1994? And what made the 1994 ultimatum different from the others? This is where the answers to the question of how to handle escalation can be found. In particular, the escalation must be done gradually, which is exactly what happened (unintentionally) in Haiti. Therefore, a request was made, and then came political pressure, economic sanctions, and the first show of force in 1993 when the junta refused to allow US troops into its territory. Even if the landing of American soldiers was blocked, the junta understood that it was a drop in the bucket and that the US could not afford another humiliation and it was clear that if the next confrontation occurred, the US would not be the one to withdraw. So, in essence, the ideal escalation occurred unintentionally, which resulted in a positive outcome for the coercer without the use of force with the 1994 ultimatum. In the case of Iraq, a request was made and then a massive military campaign was launched, which was a completely different situation. Several resolutions were passed, but other tools to gradually escalate the situation, such as the demonstration of force before use and, finally, the demonstration of force itself, were missing. When the ability to cause harm is kept in reserve, it is most effective. The threat of damage, or more damage to come, can cause someone to yield or comply.³⁰⁵ The case of Afghanistan demonstrated the absence of a gradual increase in costs in the event of disobedience because it devolved into a brutal force, resulting in the CD's collapse. Brutal force results in the demand of a target incapable of defending or negotiating, so it is no longer about diplomacy, but about the raw imposition of will by force. Coercion, on the other hand, seeks to change the behavior of the target in order to consolidate military force in the strategy's implementation. As a result, implementing the CD should accomplish the same thing as using military force, but at a lower cost. As a result, a gradual escalation of the situation is required to achieve the same results as brutal force, but at a much lower cost. Finally, the political goals are extremely difficult to achieve through destruction and rebuilding, as the

³⁰⁵ Schelling (2008): 3.

Taliban discovered in 2021 when they retook control of Afghanistan. Coercive tools such as gradual escalation still allow for diplomacy and a solution without armed conflict (or with limited military resources), avoiding the possibility that it is easier to start a war than it is to end it. The escalation should be planned ahead of time by counteracting every possible target response, and the final procedure can be a military force, but within the use of military force, the situation should be gradually escalated in the sense of starting with smaller strikes and later intensifying strikes. As a result, success was achieved numerous times without entering the war and employing infantry.

Possible problem and counter-arguments of Criterion 3

A potentially dangerous situation occurs when the coercer does not first determine how far they are willing to escalate the situation and instead reacts solely to the target's actions. This can result in rash reactions and a loss of control of the situation, leading to war. If the situation does not deteriorate gradually, there is a risk of implementing all of the measures at once, leaving no room for maneuvering or tools for further CD implementation. In other words, if political, economic, and military pressures are applied immediately, and the military pressures are massive, the only option for increasing pressure on the target is war, which is an unfavorable outcome. Further uncoordinated action between the actors (military and political) as well as hasty solutions would very likely affirm the coercer in the sense that it would lead to the failure of CD (either by escalating into war or by the coercer giving up on further actions). Political and military views are often different because military officials see military conflict in black and white as war or peace, and the CD is a political-diplomatic strategy that sometimes "borrows" military funds to achieve its goals but they are adapted to a non-military strategy. As stated in the gradual escalation, there are options ranging from mild to severe; therefore, if they are used to skip the mild ones and begin amassing troops at the border, the only escalation after this may be limited use of military force, followed by war. This does not allow the

opponent to be exhausted (economically or politically), but rather to demonstrate to him that he has nothing to lose and to instill resistance in him. A situation in international relations in which the subject has nothing to lose and no way out of the conflict as 'honorably' as possible almost always leads to war. In international relations, escalation is certainly recognized as a form of bargaining, so if the necessary levels of bargaining and negotiation are exceeded, there is no agreement but an imposed price that is usually rejected.

When considering aggravating circumstances, consider counter-escalation as well. This is a situation in which the target, as a result of the coercer's escalation of the situation, begins to escalate the behavior that the coercer wishes to prevent. In such a case, the coercer would be forced to increase the pressure to avoid being embarrassed, and the situation would most likely spiral out of control. Both parties have a common interest in not being embarrassed, which can be both a mitigating and aggravating factor. It is reassuring that both parties should be motivated to reach an agreement, but it is frustrating that the bargaining cannot continue indefinitely because there is a price at the outset that neither side is likely to pay. The bargaining formula for escalation would then be that bargaining costs reduce the value of disagreement between the parties. This brings us to the connection of this criterion with motivation, specifically the motivation to communicate between the parties. Where motivation for a solution exists on both sides, the strength of motivation is determined by interests. This criterion can be rendered meaningless if the opponent's motivation is unknown. Because if at the start there is at least a rough knowledge of the extent to which the opponent is ready to go, then it is not a strategy but a mere 'groping in the dark'.

6.4 Criterion 4: Clarity of the Settlement Terms

The clarity in the settlement terms implies clarity in the purpose and requirements. This criterion is primarily required to ensure that the target understands what is expected of it. In

addition to meeting the requirements for an initial CD, they must persuade the target of three things: 1. there will be no new requirements; 2. there will be no hidden agendas behind the request; and 3. He will receive the ‘carrot’ offered. These three factors should help persuade the coercion targets how to behave in order to avoid punishment. Of course, the clarity of the request lends both domestic and international legitimacy to the action, so this is a significant factor in establishing this criterion. Of course, because the CD is not a war and there are no strict surrender conditions, the strategy conditions can be adjusted during the conflict due to the bargaining process. The target's request to be reassured that the revised agreement's terms will be met will reappear. As can be seen, the CD strategy is very much alive and has some wiggle room because it falls into the gray zone, assuming that war is a black zone and diplomacy is a white zone. However, regardless of the flexibility, certain constants exist, one of which is that the requirements and conditions must be clearly defined. The target can be convinced of the three things listed at the start by clarifying the requirements and providing some sort of guarantee. They are also important because no conflict lasts forever, and the logical thing to do after every conflict is to sign a settlement agreement in good faith. If the target is convinced that the agreement will be fulfilled, it contributes significantly to the success of the CD by avoiding misunderstandings between the parties and the risk of misunderstanding the intention. To avoid deception, clarity is important not only because the target knows what is expected of him, but also in what way and what will not be tolerated during the process. “Clarity with respect to what is to be achieved is important because it helps persuade the opponent of the coercing power's strength and purpose, as well as clarify its specific expectations.”³⁰⁶ The promise must be kept so that there is no mistrust in future CD applications based on past events and behaviors. Through the use of CD, it has happened in some cases that a certain request hides a secret agenda, such as a regime change, which if proven true in

³⁰⁶ George (1994): 280.

subsequent coercion the target has a justified fear that the request hides another agenda. This criterion's sole purpose should be to articulate specific criteria for ending the crisis. It cannot be overstated that if there is trust and clarity in the requirements, the chance of a peaceful solution or cheap success of the CD increase significantly. Good communication, in which intentions are clearly expressed and clear signaling indicates the goal and role, is a necessary precondition for requirement clarity. The only essentially clear request made in the cases studied was in the case of Haiti, and it resulted in cheap success. In the other three cases, there was fear of new demands and regime changes, so clarity in setting demands and good communication were not met. It does not imply that the (declared) request was not made clear, but communication was poor during the crisis, and there were concerns that additional demands would be made. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, assurance was lacking, so the two cases failed, whereas, in the case of Libya, assurance was present, so this case, along with other criteria, was successful in the second phase. This criterion is also dependent on others, as are the majority of the criteria established here. To achieve obedience or compromise, as a result of coercion, the coercer must be determined to protect the status quo, there must be a history of respect for previous agreements and clarity in requirements (credibility), and the goal should be limited (consistent with the theory) so that the target has the impression of legitimacy rather than a sense of punishment. This is significant because there is a compulsion to behave within the CD, but there should be no absolute imposition of will as in military defeat, so the outcome should still be the result of mutual agreement. The mutual agreement should include, in addition to clarity in the request and conditions, the offer that the coercer undertakes to fulfill (e.g., cessation of hostilities and coercion), acceptance of the conditions by the target, some kind of goodwill that the conditions will be met, and mutual consent. In order for the parties to agree and accept the conditions, it is somehow imposed that the conditions be clear and without hidden agendas, or what is colloquially referred to as 'fine print' in the contracts. These

agreements are not legal agreements because they rely more on credibility and reputation than on the legal framework.

While the legal framework can sometimes be used to formalize agreements between actors in international relations, most CD agreements are made behind the scenes and based on political principles. This is not to say that these principles are without legality, but they lack a solid form of the legal framework (which does not mean that they should not have clarity). Even if the result is a legally binding act, that agreement was likely reached behind the scenes as a result of various insistences and escalations to take such a form. However, in order to get in form at all, it must be established from the start. As a result of the later exchange of views whose points of interest differ, essential clarity in the acts is required. However, informative communication and presentation must be clear, with no ambiguity. There should be no illusions that everything in diplomacy should be clear because that is not the purpose of diplomacy, but even when a diplomatic maneuver or bluff is used (which is permissible under the CD strategy), it should be convincing. This is not about whether something is a bluff or not, because clarity is primarily concerned with the intended consequences.

As a result, the approach within the CD should be based on clear communication about the situation's goals and limitations, which means that misconceptions should be exposed and whether an agreement can be reached or not. It follows from the preceding that clarity in defining requirements, as well as good communication and ensuring that no new requirements emerge, contribute to the CD's success.

The clarity of the conditions is important primarily for the target's assurance that there will be no new requirements after the completion of the one set, and the conditions should provide that assurance. If there are new demands after the original request is made, it logically arouses distrust in the target and instills suspicion that even after the request is fulfilled, there

will be new demands and so on indefinitely, so for the target it pays to go to war in that situation. As much as the coercer's intention in a particular situation is to stick to the given conditions, the credibility from previous similar situations can arouse distrust in the target. This means that when implementing the coercive strategy, the requirements and conditions should always be clearly defined so that deception committed in one case does not cost the coercer in the implementation of another. If it is necessary to give up some higher values due to the request of a coercer without knowing to what extent this will be required, then war is a good option because there is at least some chance of saving something in case of war and in case of unconditional consent is certain and costly as if there was a war. An important consideration in terms of the political price that the target pays is that it carries one political weight when something is given and another when something is lost in war. That is, if something is given, decision-makers may be accused of treason or capitulation by the internal public, and if it is lost in the war, they may emerge as heroes who refused to give up national values without a fight. It is sometimes argued that clarity is undesirable in order to keep the requirement flexible and that it is possible to adjust if it is discovered that maximalist requirements cannot be met. This is consistent with CD theory because the parties bargain and adjustments may occur during the strategy. However, this should not affect the clarity of the requirements and conditions because a core set of requirements can be established, which is not abandoned so that the strategy is not rendered meaningless, and deviations regarding side requirements are possible. In the case of Libya, for example, those accused of the bombing were asked to stand trial, but it was later agreed that it would take place in a neutral country. Therefore, while the core of the demand that the accused be extradited for trial has not been abandoned, a compromise has been reached in a country other than the ones accusing them. To avoid 'losing face', it is possible (and perhaps even desirable) to adjust the claim and emerge from the conflict as the victor while giving the impression that the goal was met even if the original

maximum claim was not met. However, if the request is not offered in the right way or not adjusted in the right way, it leads to misunderstandings and mistrust, so the target is much more likely to suspect that there is a possibility of imposing new demands if he fulfills the ones that have been set, i.e. that there is a hidden agenda lurking behind the original demands. It is critical to strike a balance when it comes to setting demands and interests, in the sense that the request should not be too small and appear to be a request because the request must be made with the intention of intimidating. Because it is difficult to establish the logic that one should not ask for too much or too little and prepare a response to the reaction, the balance between the realization of interests and demands is frequently not established. Personal rage on both sides over the request's clarity or ambiguity is common, but it is counterproductive in negotiations when neither side shows understanding and respect for the other party's position. Regardless of the request's clarity and moderation, each side believes its position is correct.

A request without clarity and clear argumentation is usually counterproductive in any negotiation process, so it is necessary to provide arguments for fulfilling the request in this one as well, regardless of what is required (usually legal but also moral and generally acceptable). To save time and money, which is the purpose of the CD, it is necessary to define clear requirements so that time is not wasted interpreting the signal and costs are not increased due to a poor assessment on either side. Vague requests can result in a lack of context, giving the receiving party a completely different (and potentially much worse) picture of what is being asked of it and its responsibilities, in relation to the request. Due to the misunderstanding that initially arose, the lack of context creates additional communication problems, and the parties may remain confused and frustrated as a result. When things are unclear, the next issue that arises is making assumptions that distract from problems in the opposite direction and distance parties from direct and immediate problem solving, based on the assumption that the other side is making decisions and moves. Another issue with vague requests is the ambiguity or

vagueness that occurs most often when a coercer intentionally omits the most important information. When information is sent incompletely, it may be overlooked or accentuated, resulting in either recipient ignorance or overreaction. Finally, in order to avoid figurative speech and any kind of exaggerated description and analogy, humor, or sarcasm, it is necessary to avoid them all. Expression in writing or orally should be unambiguous, free of superfluous details, and delivered through the appropriate channels. The message must be sent through the proper channels so that you can be certain that the recipient will receive it.

6.5 Criterion 5: Adequate Domestic and International Support

Adequate domestic and international support is a criterion without which it is very difficult to implement a CD and that support applies (i.e. they must strive to have) to both sides of the conflict. Given that at the heart of this criterion is the creation of an impression of legitimacy among the domestic and international public (for coercion or defense against it), with the opposition within the system (states³⁰⁷, for example) and the international public, one should keep in mind political interests that may be related to the situation. It can be difficult to explain how intervening to overthrow the regime can establish legitimate intervention, but using the Republic of South Africa as an example during apartheid would probably soften that stance. The international community's and the internal public's positions are rarely monolithic, so expecting absolute support for one side is difficult, but it is critical to mobilize the majority support of the internal public and the so-called key players in the international community. So it does not imply the entire international community's support, but it is a significant or relevant part. In other words, a corpus within the system and in the international environment that has the same view of the situation as decision-makers is required. If states and international institutions provide some form of support, it must be ensured that these states and international

³⁰⁷ Since the CD can be implemented over other entities and groups beside states.

institutions are relevant and that there is no possibility that other states and international organizations representing the opposing party will prevail. All of the resolutions discussed in this paper were approved by the UN Security Council, indicating that this element was well implemented and was most likely the subject of persuasion and concessions. Domestic support, on the other hand, has managed to profile the behavior of the parties, particularly in the case of Haiti, where public internal pressure, i.e. support for action due to a large number of refugees, has contributed to the case's successful completion. Domestic support varies, of course, depending on whether the party in conflict is a democracy or not, because international and domestic public support has a greater influence on democratic regimes, but this does not mean that there is no influence in non-democracies. The difference is most noticeable on the domestic scene, where authoritarian regimes tend to mobilize sympathizers as supporters while opponents, who usually constitute the majority, remain silent and stifle any expression of dissent. On the other hand, international support is necessary to give legitimacy to the action and increase pressure on the target; on the other hand, international legitimacy increases the likelihood that the domestic public will accept the CD's implementation more easily. The most common reason is that if decision-makers decide that an action is worth the risks and costs, the majority of those who support them regard that decision as credible and deserving of respect. However, if the leaders are divided along ideological lines, public opinion is likely to be divided along those lines as well. However, because support is a dynamic process, support for action is heavily dependent on the course of action, as is the perspective of gains and potential subsequent support from leaders or the international community. Essentially, political elites rely on domestic support; however, when international actions are carried out, it is natural for this support to be transferred to the international level. Attitudes are frequently stimulated and shaped by external influences, such as journalistic reports and reports from various agencies, both at the domestic and international levels. On the one hand, the public can be supportive of

a specific policy and lend legitimacy to the implementation of political decisions; on the other hand, it can be useful to check the authority of the government and the support for specific policies. It can be argued that public opinion is a dangerous force that can cost decision-makers their jobs, so decision-makers must maintain public support regardless of their CD strategy. If regional and international organizations support the action, the political opposition will find it difficult to exert pressure and obstruct the system.

Support may be limited, which means that there may be support within the international organization for imposing sanctions but not for the use of force. Such support can also be beneficial because it helps to justify measures against the target, but it can also irritate the internal public and provide ammunition for the opposition. The UN system, as the most comprehensive and influential organization in this regard, can be a big wind at the back of the parties in the conflict, but due to the specific way of decision-making (veto instituted in the Security Council), it can lead to a blockade of action, greatly complicating its realization. There are numerous examples of attacks carried out despite internal public opposition, but the high political cost was almost always paid after the campaign ended. However, very few cases have been conducted without the support of international organizations for action because the action becomes contentious and the subject of debate, with the main argument being the lack of that support. International support is frequently equated with legitimacy, which may or may not be true, so this fact should be used as a success criterion. If the CD is to be implemented by a coalition, there must be support. Disagreement within the coalition would always result in the CD's demise, so coalition partners' motivation can also be viewed as a form of international support. When a coalition implements a CD, one member or smaller group of coalition members is always more motivated than the rest of the coalition; therefore, it is up to that member or smaller group to motivate the rest of the coalition in order to maintain legitimacy and support. Coalitions in the implementation of actions such as CD are typically temporary

in nature, serving to achieve a specific goal or common interest. Naturally, each member has an idea of how this goal should be implemented in order to achieve these goals. In this sense, a coalition is formed to combat a common threat to achieving the goals more easily, and this is the reason for its formation; however, how these goals will be achieved is always the subject of differing opinions at the outset and during implementation. Previously, there was frequent disagreement about the intensity of the force to be used. As a result, the coalition's dynamics are determined by their disagreements about how to achieve the goal. Because military coalitions frequently unite around a single major power, the interests of that force generally take precedence, but the support of other members is important because the coalition's dissolution would give the impression of illegitimacy. A good example of a coalition formed to implement the CD is the coalition formed in Iraq in 1991, which consisted of 39 members who were not affiliated with an alliance such as NATO and were formed ad hoc or for the sole purpose of preventing the invasion of Kuwait. Given that US troops made up 73% of the infantry and one of the 39 members, it is reasonable to conclude that it was of the utmost importance and that the other members were mobilized more for support and a broad front than for concrete military aid. The formation of a coalition already generates some international support because it implies that support comes from coalition members, so this is a positive aspect of forming a coalition, while possible differences among members are a negative aspect, but it is certainly preferable to make compromises within the coalition and have support than not have it at all. Public or international opinion does not always shape the policy pursued by decision-makers, but a lack of support is a major risk for them, and because the CD is already a rather unstable strategy in terms of success, failure can occur due to external pressures and internal obstacles.

Support for interfering in other countries' policies is difficult to obtain, so if the case of imbalance in international relations is not entirely illegitimate, a significant effort is required

to justify coercion to the public. Even when currently justified, support cannot be sustained indefinitely, putting additional pressure on the coercer to maintain support during CD implementation if the target resists. It is difficult to maintain and balance domestic and international support when there is no international support or vice versa. It is impossible to say with certainty, which support is more important, but in most cases, domestic support comes first, followed by international, but there have been cases where this has not occurred, so achieving such goals can cost the government internally. Sanctions and other measures frequently harm the innocent, so the domestic public in the coercive country may view such government moves negatively. In addition, if the goal is to put pressure on the entity's decision-makers, the measures most often target the innocent because it is the simplest way to apply pressure on the government. Such moves typically elicit outrage from the international community and the domestic public of CD-implementing states; however, the domestic public may be upset because nothing is being done, so pressure may shift in the opposite direction and force decision-makers to act even if no such action was intended. Sanctions against autocratic regimes can have disastrous consequences because autocratic regimes rely on a small group of supporters and can shift the weight of sanctions to a larger group that is not usually the target of pressure, but vice versa. The public's support frequently shifts depending on the media image, which is extremely difficult to manage. Different images and attitudes are promoted based on their interests, and public opinion is formed accordingly. Depending on this, the system's opposition, which by definition is the internal public, may turn its sympathizers against the ruling elite's interests. This can happen in both the coercer and target countries because the opposition in the coercer country would argue that an aggressive policy is being pursued, while the opposition in the target country would argue that the policy being pursued is irresponsible and has posed a danger to society. Other countries may not want to get involved in conflicts if they are not affected, so they may remain restrained in following their interests

unless something is offered to them as compensation, which may increase the cost of the CD. When analyzing domestic and international levels of support, they are not too similar but equally important because, in the analysis of domestic support, the character of the specific state system must be discerned, as well as the strength of institutions and individuals, as well as their interests, whereas, in the analysis of international support, the 'block' to whom the sides belong must be unique and supported from one unit of an international system, or international institution, to another. As a result, support lends credibility to a specific community for a campaign of certain changes or the fight against change on both an internal and external level, so the more support gathered, the better the chances of policy implementation success. The goal is not for the public to fully comprehend what is being discussed, but for the public to respond positively to what you intend to do. To accomplish this, it must first ensure that the public is informed about the topic, and then present your viewpoints and persuade them of the topic's importance. First and foremost, it must be worked on to convey the significance of implementing a specific policy so that the international and domestic public understands that they have a responsibility to decide. When the public recognizes their responsibility, there is a better chance that they will support the views and provide the necessary support. To gain support, you must first understand the public's point of view. The better you understand the policies you are pursuing and the public you are addressing, the easier it will be to target people and organizations that can help you. If policymakers are assumed to want to solve a problem, even if they claim to only want to achieve political goals, certain political measures are required. These measures elicit a variety of reactions, and the goal is to avoid negative reactions. In terms of the domestic public, various measures, such as public opinion polling on representative samples, can be used to avoid these reactions. However, when it comes to the international community, it is necessary to anticipate key players' and possibly their public's interests, which could put pressure on the leadership to adhere to a specific policy

in order to avoid paying an internal price. As a result, the presentation is far more important than the factual situation because the formation of a particular attitude is only possible based on available information, i.e. providing the same information differently can elicit completely different attitudes in the same person. It is also important how this information is delivered, so quantitative data is far more effective than qualitative data, for example. The information that economic sanctions have been strengthened by 10% does not provide a clear picture of how much economic damage has been done, but it is far more effective than information that explains in detail what measures have been taken. As a result, public support can be best increased or decreased by presenting a specific situation and evidence in a way that gives purpose and legitimacy to the policy being pursued, as well as by animating the international public regarding their interests.

6.6 Criterion 6: Positive Incentives

An offer of carrots for compliance with this criterion has often been described in the literature as ancillary, but through case studies and other descriptions in the literature, it has proven to be a necessary criterion for CD success. The incentive has been rather neglected in CD research, however, and case studies have shown that it can have a major impact in facilitating the implementation of a strategy that is ultimately based on hard and soft power. Both powers can be smart or installed strategically, but soft power must be well installed to give results, so a positive incentive is this component. "Of course, hard and soft power, are related and can reinforce each other. Both are aspects of the ability to achieve our purposes by affecting the behavior of others. Sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire spectrum of behavior from coercion to attraction."³⁰⁸ The use of punishment and reward in combination is a well-known tactic in the realistic concept of political science, and it is based

³⁰⁸ Nye (2002): 9-10.

on the use of reward and punishment to induce desired behavior (carrot and stick politics). In this case, the incentives would be various assistance in the form of material goods or political concessions, with the threat based on all CD tools. The threat is certainly within the CD (if the intention is to be successful and follow the theory), but based on previous experience, it is much easier with encouragement. The incentive and target consent are related in the sense that the target is always more likely to agree to the request if there is an illusion of reciprocity. If the target is allowed to show his public that he has gained something, he can present himself as a winner in the conflict, which is irrelevant to the coercer if he has achieved his goal. In this case, the coercer portrays the achievement of the goal to his audience as a victory, while minimizing the possibility of criticism for the incentive provided to the target. Furthermore, it is easier for the targets and the opposition's internal public to justify concessions made if they receive something in return. Authors who oppose this criterion frequently argue that consent must come from fear, not encouragement because otherwise it is bribery, not coercion. However, if the CD is conducted according to established rules and offers an incentive, it does not imply that the target has been bribed or that there is no fear, but rather an incentive to make it easier for both sides to exit the conflict, such as an expensive variant of CD or war. As a result, the incentive serves only to increase the target's motivation to obey rather than to bribe it. That is, the target should obey primarily out of fear, and the incentive serves to expedite and facilitate implementation. The stick is a sanction that is prohibited by law in domestic law for some undesirable behavior, and it is set a little differently in international relations. Specifically, because states are sovereign and it is difficult to impose a sanction for certain behavior that will always be enforced, it is still not possible to regulate the behavior of subjects of international law in this manner. Some regulations in international relations are contained in international law, international organizations, and even international courts that seek to enforce these regulations, but ineffectively. So, for the time being, state intervention over a state or

group of states, or group of states over a state or group, is the only option. In international relations, the policy of incentives and penalties can be implemented in two ways. They can be implemented simultaneously or one after the other. The influence or change in an entity's behavior remains regardless of how it is implemented. In the case of Haiti, the incentive was in the form of a guarantee that the junta would not be prosecuted, i.e. an amnesty for the removal of a legally elected president, whereas in Libya, it was an offer to successfully reintegrate into the international community. Unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan, where no incentives were offered and the cases failed. The incentive should be carefully chosen in conjunction with the accompanying stick, and these two components must be carefully balanced to produce a result. Incentives can range from small concessions to large payments; the size of the incentive, of course, depends on what is required of the target, which is not fully comparable and measurable but can help determine which incentive is required for the target and its consent to pass with the least amount of humiliation. Because the goal of the CD is not conquering in nature, and the goal is not to subdue or humiliate the opponent, providing an incentive to achieve the goal is acceptable. Given that the incentive costs the coercer, it provides some assurance to the target that there will be no new demands because if the concession is significant, it is unrealistic to expect the coercer to constantly make demands and make large concessions. When the request is made, the threat of a stick and the offer of carrots should be calculated and compared to how much damage there is from obedience, how much benefit there is from incentives, and, most importantly, whether it pays to reject the request. Certain calculations can be drawn from the preceding sentence, such as the fact that if the penalty and the incentive are used together, in the event of rejection of the offer, the target's cost is greater than if only the penalty is used, because it may be forced to give what is required and remain without incentives. This is yet another indication that an incentive is required in the use of coercive strategy, and it is also quite clear that both the carrot and the stick have their

range or limitations in use when used individually and in the case of combined use, and compensate for these shortcomings. For example, using punishment alone usually results in excessive hostility and thus excessive resistance, whereas using incentives alleviates hostility, de-escalates the situation, and thus reduces resistance. Based on the case studies and approach analysis, it is possible to conclude that this criterion is required for the CD's success and that the approach that does not use the incentive is ineffective and has a significantly lower chance of success.

When using this criterion, a number of issues may arise. One of them is that the offer of incentives may be perceived as a weakness of the coercer, causing the target to become more rigid in their attitudes as a result. This could be resolved by clearly stating that the coercer is prepared to use force at any time. Therefore, regardless of the incentive offer, the coercer should stick to the threat and state unequivocally that they intend to use the greatest amount of force. A further unbalanced relationship between the stick and the carrot may result in failure because the stick is the alternative to the carrot. The offer should therefore be weighed and offer something that can compensate for the loss of what the target is giving up while not appearing to reward the target for their bad behavior. As a result, the next issue was raised, which is that the incentive given can appear to be a reward for bad behavior, giving other subjects the impression that bad behavior will be rewarded. In other words, other entities may disrupt the status quo in order to obtain what is given to the target in a specific case. The next issue is that in some cases, the assumed incentive may appear expensive to the coercer, leading to the use of only a negative incentive. If the coercer believes that the incentive that could be compensation will not pay off, he may not consider it at all. Although imposing sanctions appears to be less expensive than providing financial resources, sanctions, as seen in the case of Haiti, can strengthen the target by encouraging illegal trade, making a negative incentive more expensive in the end. Further encouragement may be perceived as humiliating by the

target, leading to increased hostility and resistance. What the coercer offers can be humiliating to the target and have an impact on domestic and international credibility, so the offer can be interpreted as a provocation. Something may be offered that would satisfy the quantitative target, but it is offered too late, resulting in inefficiency. This means that, in addition to measuring the incentive, it should be provided promptly, i.e. in good time. If the offer is good at one point but loses its purpose over time, its value may increase over time, so that it loses value at the time it is offered. The use of CD already indicates that the parties are realizing their interest, but it is very likely that when the target goal is offered, they will abandon their goal in exchange for the avoidance of punishment and the realization of less interest in the form of incentives.

6.7 Overview of the Criteria Analysis

Such a structured model of criteria, which takes into account both the individual views of decision-makers and the objectives of national policy, eliminates any uncertainty caused by any of the decision-makers' personal views. Such strategies frequently focus on the response of the state apparatus, which is not entirely incorrect because this is most of the time the case; however, in some cases, this decision is influenced by the excessive influence that leaders have on the apparatus (usually in authoritarian regimes), 'specific social impact', which, if it occurs on both sides, can cause decisions to be made bitterly and in vain. In other words, an individual's or a few individuals' personal attitudes and environment influence the decisions of the entire apparatus, which has been considered and attempted to overcome using the stated criteria. Intelligence work is an important component that has been unfairly overlooked in the CD literature. Intelligence plays an important role in state decision-making, particularly diplomacy, so, naturally, intelligence work is used in decision-making related to CD implementation steps. Intelligence work, like other segments, should provide usable, relevant, and timely data, with the exception that in the case of CD data is collected under difficult

circumstances and there is not much time to collect and report because things happen quickly and any lack of relevant data can cause conflict. Good and timely data, on the other hand, aid in being aware of the situation and making the best decision to achieve the goal. Misperception and potential communication issues would also be avoided, as will gaps in possible situational ignorance. Objective intelligence, on the other hand, prevents decisions based on personal views because of the scrutiny in the apparatus and the public. Moreover, all of the preceding contribute to the defined criteria raising the tactical, operational, and strategic level of the decision to achieve the best possible result. Based on case studies that have been processed in the paper and chosen because they have different outcomes and actors and contain flaws that have been corrected in the defined criteria regarding the analytical framework that is the purpose of this paper. An analytical framework that, while relating to research issues, also discusses how and when it is appropriate to use diplomacy, economic sanctions, embargoes, and military force as tools, as well as under what conditions some of these tools will work. In all cases, both proactive and reactive measures were implemented in which some historical, cultural, and political contexts were considered, but in some cases, some or all of these contexts were ignored. Furthermore, intelligence, which was undoubtedly present in all cases, was not taken into account during the theoretical analysis. The negotiation process, which was used to determine success or failure, was heavily considered. The analysis in this paper takes into account CD's instruments, the temporal and spatial context, cultural and political context, as well as theoretical considerations. It has also been demonstrated that coercive measures are most effective when used in a controlled manner to influence the target while expanding the area of potential agreement. However, in addition to being fully informed about the circumstances and, in particular, the target's attitude toward risk, governments must also consider the target's interest and exercise restraint in communication. The defined criteria provide alternatives in the negotiation process as well as the coercive perspective required for

the successful implementation of a CD. The criteria are set so that even if the target makes irrational and irresponsible decisions, the responses are adjusting the requirements that would lead to success while avoiding humiliating the opponent and achieving the coercer's goals. Overall, in the analyses thus far, too much emphasis has been placed on the side that imposes the CD and too little on the target, which is not a winning strategy. When the target's interests are considered, coercion is not weak; rather, it is used rationally to bring success because it allows the coercer to adapt its request and other CD tools to the situation, and the result is a success.

7. Conclusion

7.1 Overview of the Thesis

War is one of the greatest diseases of society and the way to stop it has been sought for a long time. The need to minimize the negative effects of conflicts and to prevent potential escalation of the conflict is fundamental for all nations. Still, the awareness of the negative sides of the war is not enough to provide needed results and to encourage the sides to resolve conflicts without the use of force.

Conflicts have existed for as long as there have been people on the planet, and negotiations are just as old. The sides in a fight have logically always sought a resolution that involved compromise, giving up something in order to obtain something else, and emerging from the conflict both wounded and successful. This was done in different manners depending on the concrete historical moment and the circumstances related to the conflict itself. Despite all diversity among solutions and the nature of the conflict, it is clear that idea of some way to resolve conflict differently than war always existed. Just none of them was a desirable solution for the involved parties and thus many conflicts led to casualties and had a great impact on the development and progress of societies all across the globe. In recent decades, after the Cold War, more attention was paid to the strategy called coercive diplomacy. The importance of finding alternatives to war became a priority and thus both theory and practice searched for solutions that can be both effective and more peaceful than war. Therefore, it can be concluded that the CD strategy is a result of the need to avoid war and minimize the negative consequences of conflicts. To do so, it is important to have in mind that the strategy should be able to maintain the balance between two opposite goals. Because of that, the first task of the thesis was to better explain the term.

The importance of the topic and its justification lies in the nature of the CD. CD strategy is considered as an alternative to a war where both parties typically come out on top (or at least present themselves that way) from the fight. It focuses on using different tools for achieving the goal and end the war before it starts. This represents a huge challenge and needs more theoretical analysis and attention to achieve better results in practice. It was started with the idea that the potential of the CD is huge but that factors that influence its effectiveness were still very little researched. For understanding how useful and reliable CD could be, it was useful to determine which factors influence the success of the CD. This way it could be understood what are the most important aspects and how these aspects can interact and cause different results in each of the cases. In addition, the potential errors that have been made could be determined in the analysis of previous practices, which can show what aspects can limit the application of CD and its effectiveness.

Hence, this research was done in the hopes that it would theoretically enhance this approach and that it would also make a contribution so that application of this strategy becomes empirically more effective. To do so, theoretical approaches and case studies are both covered and analyzed in this study. Current theoretical findings provided a good basis for applying this concept to real examples of conflicts that were attempted to be resolved by the application of the CD strategy.

While analyzing the theoretical background, the nature and the aim of the coercive diplomacy strategy, same as the rationale for its introduction were covered. The need to create a balance between effectiveness and peace was manifested by introducing this strategy. At the beginning of the thesis, it is stated that CD uses minimal force or threat that force will be used to achieve desired results. Although CD is more aggressive in its approach, compared to diplomacy, due to its higher effectiveness international community tolerates some similarities to war activities as it in some cases eliminates chances for war. Before the term was discussed

in detail, the nature of CD had been explained as a response to more complex international relationships and different requests regarding resolutions of conflicts. The shift in priorities of the international community caused a change in the approaches, which resulted in the CD strategy as a potential solution.

At the very beginning of the thesis, it was already stated that the value of the CD is not in some amazing results that were achieved so far by its application but in the change of the mindset that this strategy represents. The nature of the CD, it can be concluded, fits well with the needs of the current events in international relationships. Applications of the strategy done so far can testify that CD was accepted as a solid approach in practice but that many questions about the usage of this strategy remained unresolved. The main conclusion was that more research in the field was needed.

The main objective of this thesis is to define precise standards for CD effectiveness and success. According to this objective, the research identified the factors that could improve CD's efficiency and effectiveness based on instances, theories, and practices linked to CD that were reviewed. The thesis's findings include the criteria that have been chosen as well as an explanation of how they are used and how they relate to one another. The order, manner, and optimal time to use each tool that the CD approach provides, as well as their phases and intensities, are all defined based on theory and practice.

Research conducted for this purpose was based on the case studies selected in the way to represent different situations when CD was applied. It means that case studies were selected with the aim to be as diverse as possible. Very useful for the analysis of CD and its criteria was to see how different ways in which external factors can influence the CD application and its success. Many different aspects were included from different reasons why the conflict happened in the first place, cultural differences, and economic position to the seriousness of

the situation. All these factors that characterize the case studies help to explain the wide application of CD. It is of great importance to have in mind that CD cases in general cannot be put into a box and that the only thing that they have in common is that they could escalate to war if the conflict is not resolved before that. All other elements could vary by nature or extent.

As it is impossible to predict, given that each case should be considered separately, the goal of this study was not to provide guidelines for the use of the strategy. Instead, it attempted to take into account as many variables as possible to prevent failure based on a common theme that runs through the cases in which CD was used. The conclusions made by the end of the thesis show which factors influenced the success or the failure of the CD strategy applications and criteria distinguished based upon the theoretical part were discussed in the light of these cases.

The general hypothesis was that:

The effectiveness of CD strategies can be estimated using the list of criteria presented in this thesis.

While special hypotheses are the following:

- 1 For CD to be successful the asymmetry of motivation needs to be fulfilled.
- 2 For CD to be successful time urgency needs to be fulfilled.
- 3 For CD to be successful fear of unacceptable escalation needs to be fulfilled.
- 4 For CD to be successful clarity of the settlement terms needs to be fulfilled.
- 5 For CD to be successful adequate domestic and international support needs to be fulfilled.

6 For CD to be successful an offer of incentive for compliance needs to be fulfilled.

Each of the special hypotheses is based upon one of the criteria that are distinguished and further analyzed in the thesis.

When discussing the nature of CD, it is explained in the thesis that it is primarily a non-military strategy that uses force to a limited extent just as a final tool to avoid escalation of the conflict and that it is a defensive strategy. The CD is thus used just as a way to react to the action of other actors in the international environment, not a way to try to achieve its own goals.

To respond to the set goals of the thesis it was of great importance to define CD and to analyze the subject of research in more detail. To summarize the discussion about the definition of CD it is important to state that the term is not clearly defined. It is narrowed down by explaining its relation to the terms pressure, fear, and costs. Adequate pressure needs to be put on the opponent to create real fear of the consequences that the opponent will need to pay the costs of disobedience that are too high to accept. This means that costs need to be high but still lower than potential war costs. Therefore, obedience is considered a better option than war from the perspective of war.

One of the useful ways to explain closer the term CD for the purpose of this thesis is to compare this strategy with other similar strategies. The first strategy that should be distinguished from the CD is compellence. Compellence differs from the CD by intent. The CD intends to respond to the actions of the other side, while compellence intends to get something by threatening to punish the other side if it does not comply. Because of that, compellence is described as a blackmail strategy.

Deterrence is another strategy that can be compared to CD. Deterrence does not require any action to be undertaken, just the threat that the action will be undertaken if the opponent

does not comply. It is a passive approach. Sometimes CD also includes a threat but is also can use military force, economic sanctions, or other ways to achieve its goals. Explaining CD by comparing it to other similar strategies additionally helped in understanding the nature of the strategy.

A large piece of the theoretical part of the thesis is about the way strategy is implemented and the most important aspects that have already been recognized and discussed in the academic context. The first important issue is that the request is legitimate and is backed up with arguments. The importance of this condition is clearly connected to the support of international actors. If the argumentation is not there and if the request is not legitimate, the action cannot fit into the frame of CD. As CD is a defensive strategy, with the main aim to restore the status quo the coercer needs to form a request that is in accordance with this purpose. Furthermore, the request needs to be serious enough to justify the potential usage of force. If the request is not legitimate, the application of any force or even threat should not happen. It changes the way the actions would be understood and the justification for them may lack.

Sense of urgency is the next important aspect defined by authors so far. The need to set a time limit for the opponent to comply is in accordance with the previously mentioned purpose of CD. If it is stated that all it is done to resolve some serious issue that represents a problem for international law and values, it is needed to act as soon as possible. In addition, a sense of urgency is important for getting credibility. Credibility is the next important issue acknowledged in the literature. The threat must be realistic to be effective. The way threat is perceived can influence to a great extent the chances for success of CD strategy.

Already, it was clear while reviewing these observations made in the theoretical part that the application of this strategy is very complex and demanding. However, there is more to it; proportionality is also distinguished as an important factor when it comes to the CD. It is

very important to fulfill this task as in many cases international support depends on it. Proportionality is also connected to legitimacy and the request itself. It refers to the need to threaten with the punishment, which is proportioned to the gravity of the offense committed. It is almost impossible to create any guidelines to achieve this principle but to challenge every decision against the criterion of proportionality.

One more important theoretical finding is that positive incentives can contribute to the desired goal that will lead to better solutions when applying the CD strategy. It is interesting to see how this strategy approach is further applied to concrete cases so far.

Robert Pape, Alexander George, and Piter Viggo Jakobsen provide their perspectives about how the criteria could be understood and what is the most significant for the success of the CD strategy. Pape defines them as conditions for success or failure. He focuses on the way territory is understood and the aspects related to it that can lead to a need to apply CD, the willingness of the state to tolerate costs, the vulnerability of the state, the role of domestic problems, etc.

While George focuses on the asymmetry of motivation, sense of urgency, fear of unacceptable escalation, clarity of settlement terms, and international and domestic support. The criteria overlap and should be evaluated together. Jakobsen modernized strategy and this is his main contribution to understanding CD compared to the work of George. He underlines the credible threat of force, the deadline for compliance, and assurance to the adversary that compliance will not lead to more demands. For Jakobsen, positive incentives, so-called 'carrots for compliance' are the most important part, while for George they are understood as supplementary. Although some differences exist among authors, the basic approach is similar for all of them. Similarly, they all face challenges to define limited force. Therefore, it can be said that certain limitations are met by all of the researchers in this field. Proportionality when

using CD tools can also be named one of the main aspects of theoretical problems. It is hard to determine what is the exact amount of threat, sanction, or force that is needed to achieve the desired goal, avoid contra effect, and act fairly in international relationships. Similarly, it is problematic to determine what is the minimum level of force that could lead to desired goals and remain in the framework of CD.

Some problems in understanding this term are also presented. Some of the theoretical and empirical problems that arise together within the concept of CD. There is a certain illogicality between the concept of CD and the concept of diplomacy. Diplomacy and force, no matter how limited they are, are two opposite concepts. The task of research in this field is to explain how the balance of these two opposites can be achieved and how this way effectiveness can be achieved. The usage of CD tools also is one of the burning questions. For example, the order in which tools should be used is one of the problems that need to be addressed. One of the most important aspects is to determine if more drastic measures could be applied. It represents one of the main questions that could influence further the credibility and support.

In addition to these problems, an important question is to determine if this strategy is military or diplomatic. It could be concluded that it is mainly diplomatic because it is used even when it is applied with force with the aim to achieve diplomatic goals. But this is still open for discussion. As a theoretical concern, the similarity with other strategies should also be mentioned.

Theoretical problems are not the ones that characterize CD; empirical problems are also of great significance. Trust between parties is one of them. For example, it is important that the coerced knows that if he complies with the requests the coercer would not extend demands. The choice of the tool that would best fit the current situation when CD needs to be applied is also one of the most important empirical problems. It is important to find a solution that in

practice would lead to an effective and rapid solution. The most important part in practice is to avoid escalation that could lead to war. The motivation of both sides is also something that needs to be taken into account when analyzing empirical perspectives.

How success and failure are perceived in the political context is of great importance and political, military, and economic pressures are also significant parts of the application of CD strategy.

Taking into account the theoretical framework, the definition of the term, its purpose, problems with criteria (both theoretical and empirical), and the need to respond to the needs of contemporary society and provide some adequate solution, this thesis provides criteria for assessing the success or failure of the strategy. These criteria demonstrate the thesis's practical contribution to understanding CD. The initial idea is to develop a framework for rethinking existing CD strategies in order to determine what factors influence CD strategy outcomes in practice. The first one is the asymmetry of information. Motivation is critical because it determines readiness to act and/or readiness to obey. If the opponent is more motivated than the coercer is, the reaction to the coercer's actions will be negative, i.e. resistance will be higher. The resistance would make the coercer's mission more difficult to complete. It means that if the coerced is more motivated not to obey demands than the one imposing the demands, CD is highly likely to fail or be less successful. The level of motivation is important because it influences the actions and decisions that both sides will make and how they will react to the actions made by the other side. Motivation directly influences how one side will respond to a threat and thus indirectly how much threat or force (within the CD term) the coercer would need to implement to get the desired outcome. It is important to state that the motivation of both sides matters and that it differently influences the final outcome of the strategy application. Aside from the great effect that motivation of both sides has, it is important to focus on which of the two sides has higher motivation i.e. the relation between these two motivations. This

dynamic can significantly influence the final outcome of the strategy and determine the time and effort for achieving the goal.

The following criterion is a sense of urgency. Several reasons are addressed to explain why a sense of urgency is important. First, when under pressure, it is more likely to make a less calculated decision motivated by fear of the threat's effects. If the coerced has a limited time to comply, other options that can contribute to the overall goal of achieving the set goal and restoring the status quo will be less researched. More time means more opportunities to research alternatives, and if the coerced believes it must act by a specific deadline, the chances are greater than if there is no sense of urgency.

The next reason is that a sense of urgency lends legitimacy to any type of action. Other people get the message that the situation is serious and that action is required.

The following issue that needs to be mentioned is the fear of unacceptable escalation. Fear of unacceptable escalation is also understood as a critical component of CD. Fear of unacceptable escalation serves to psychologically act on the opponent and cause fear of escalation, which represents an unacceptable price in comparison to what is expected of him. If the coerced fears that conflict may escalate more and that will lead to some costs and losses that the coerced is not ready to pay, it is highly likely that the coerced would comply easier and earlier.

Forth criterion is clarity of the settlement terms. The clarity of the settlement terms guarantees that when complied with the request, nothing more will be requested. It is additionally facilitated this way to understand what the coercer wants to achieve and sets a better framework for making settlements. If the conditions of the settlement are not clearly defined, a lot of space is left for misunderstandings. The example used in this thesis to explain this criterion is the following. The coerced may agree to conditions in a way he understood it,

but if the clarity lacks the coerced might expect different action or different extent of the action that was undertaken. The same could happen with the process of lifting sanctions if the coerced complies. The coercer may lift some sanctions but not all that were expected by the coercer. If two sides do not get to understand each other about settlement terms, the whole process is jeopardized. When taking into account that peace is at stake, the importance of settlement terms is much clearer. Support is also identified as an important factor. Support is critical to the success of the CD. CD lacks legitimacy without support, and the coercer's actions could be interpreted as an act of violence. As a result, legitimate international and domestic support for CD action is critical. It is difficult to justify an action if there is no support. It is also important to note that both parties require support. With the support of international actors, it is much easier to resist coercive pressure. The chances of success vary depending on the distribution of support.

And the sixth criterion represents positive engagements that are also called positive incentives. They may aid in the decision-making process by making an option that is offered more acceptable to the coerced. If the option offered has some benefits for the coerced, it is much easier to accept it and comply with demands. Also, this way the coerced can keep dignity or frame the situation so that something is gained and nothing is lost. However, sometimes this aspect of the strategy shifts more towards diplomacy and influences it towards compromise more than force application.

Focus on the criteria and their nature showed that they could not be analyzed alone, without context, and without taking into account the influence of other factors. Therefore, all criteria are interconnected and should be analyzed holistically. This approach was applied in the analysis of four selected case studies for this thesis: Iraq, Haiti, Libya, and Afghanistan. Iraq is one of the conflicts that marked the recent history of international relationships. It resulted in great losses and costs for all involved sides. The consequences of this conflict are

still present. In the chapter dedicated to Iraq, the background of the conflict and the path to escalation were explained. The application of CD was also presented in this and all following case studies. As CD failed and the war started in 2003, from the analysis, the reasons for the lack of success are discussed. The results indicate that the following reasons are the main ones for the inefficiency of the CD strategy in the example of Iraq. The first problematic decision was shifting from the goal of liberating Kuwait to regime change. This observation leads to the conclusion that a successful CD strategy necessitates consistency in its goals as well as clearly defined and elaborated reasons why such actions are required. The second important lesson is that the opposing side should never be left without something to lose. It is critical to keep this in mind when using a concrete example to which all theoretical concepts can be applied. The error was that not only were the demands too selective, but positive incentives were also lacking. With all of the criteria covered, it is clear that this CD strategy was destined to fail. Taking into account negative examples and mistakes made, and especially consequences that happened, a lot about the CD can be learned. First, related to its importance and need in contemporary society. Second, about mistakes that happen in the CD strategy application. This example provided good insight into reasons why in some cases CD does not provide results. It is of great importance to include failure as part of the analysis of the CD strategy.

The following case was in Libya, and it was divided into two phases. Each of the phases was presented in separate subchapters and the change of strategy in these two phases was underlined. The change of strategy, in the end, led to the success of CD, and the power of economic sanctions as a replacement for force usage was stated. The situation in Libya was quite different during the first phase. Not only Libya was stronger in an economic context and could resist the sanctions, but domestic support for resistance was significantly higher. The factors that changed between phases 1 and 2 were the desire to end international isolation as a result of a long period of sanctions. The positive incentives criterion was also applied in the

case of Libya as help was offered to reintegrate the country. This case shows how when international support lacks for the usage of any military force, other tools can be used. The only problem with the usage of economic tools, in this case, is the long period of time that was needed for goal achievement. Aside from the need to end economic sanctions, the motivation of both sides was in the right place for ending the conflict, which is also of fundamental importance for explaining the success of the CD strategy.

In the case of Haiti, the aim was to restore the previous state, which in this situation was manifested as a regime change. In this case, at least initially, the CD implementation was not intended to physically impose a solution, but rather to destroy the target's will to resist, primarily through the coercer's reputation. It shows how motivation sometimes is included in the planning of CD strategy. Depending on motivation, the success of other criteria can be discussed. Asymmetry in motivation prevailed on the target's side because no deadline was set at the outset and no intimidation tools were used, and the junta maintained its rule for an unusually long time in the dispute where the CD is implemented because the CD is used in emergencies. Opposite to the sense of urgency, in some cases like Haiti, time led to a change of circumstances and the success of CD. From this, it can be remarked that each criterion needs to be held against the concrete circumstances that led to the success of the strategy.

When it comes to Afghanistan, it is an extreme example of a conflict mainly due to the involvement of terrorism. Due to that, chances were low that the CD strategy would be effective. Still, trying to provide any solution other than war was the right approach, as the intention was to avoid scenarios that led to more casualties and higher losses. Both sides had little incentive to collaborate and the demands were too high to meet. In general, it could be said that both sides desired to lose or win big. This made finding a compromise through the use of positive incentives nearly impossible. From the perspective of each of the criteria, it was

almost impossible for CD to succeed. The case of Afghanistan shows how in some cases CD criteria may show that failure is almost assured.

The cases are analyzed in detail presenting circumstances that shaped the context and aspects that influenced the success of the CD. It was very important to have in mind that all of these aspects lead to different impacts by all criteria. Having background knowledge helped the analysis and determination of the criteria' influence on the success of the CD. Any of these cases led to specific, even in some cases opposite conclusions about CD. It became clear that some rules about CD application cannot be made and that each case is different. Nevertheless, to respond to why analyzing criteria is then important, a better understanding should be emphasized. Analysis of previous cases leads to the understanding of many factors that should be taken into account when applying CD.

It is interesting to see how criteria are shown in practice. For example, the asymmetry of motivation in the case of Iraq is a case in which motivation was one-sided. When the target's essential interests are threatened, it has been seen that the motive is on the target's side, leading to the failure of the CD in the case of Iraq. Of course, since perception is everything, it is essential to comprehend how the target interprets interest. This was an important conclusion as it showed that everything that could be planned needs to be perceived through the lenses of concrete circumstances. If time is essential for acting in a concrete situation due to specific circumstances it is more useful to evaluate if in the concrete case, CD could achieve success. One of the first parameters that should be taken into account is motivation. Even if it were not enough to base the decision about the application of the CD on that, it would provide the framework for analysis of other aspects.

The way criteria behave differently depending on the circumstances shows the complexity of situations when this strategy is used. For example, positive incentives can in

some cases, like in the conflict in Libya, be very significant and completely irrelevant in some cases like in Afghanistan. In theory, the case of Afghanistan has shown that the motivation of the target can be strong even when vital interests are not in danger. In this instance, the outcome was fanaticism, poor communication, and anxiety about upcoming demands. The strength of the state, the duration of the conflict, and the reasons why conflicts happen are only some of the important factors that influence the power of positive incentives.

What is learned from the analysis of the case studies is also how relying on the most fitting criteria can help the success of the CD. This way, when observing the case of Libya – providing some promise of support if it complies makes it easier for the state to accept the requests and actually comply.

What all of these cases have in common is that they try to avoid more severe consequences. In some cases, this goal was not achieved. When CD fails, like for example in the cases of Haiti and Afghanistan, the costs and consequences are much more severe than anything that can happen while applying the CD strategy. And in this lies the importance of the strategy and its value. By comparing these costs, the CD would be in a great majority of cases better solution even though the success is not assured. Because of that, it is of great importance to take that into account when evaluating the strategy. Even when the chances for success are low, the possibility of success is valuable as it represents the way to avoid war.

When all the cases and theoretical claims made so far are discussed and analyzed in the context of society's needs and values that now are labeled as important, it could be said that this strategy shows that change from completely diplomatic actions to military actions could be in phases and not all at once. This means that the change could happen by implementing a solution such as CD. The CD uses the possibility of war as a tool to prevent it and that represents a great way to achieve goals and use limited force.

It is logical to assume that conflicts will continue to be one of the central themes of human society given their importance for human security and existence in the current day. Conflict resolution will logically continue to be a popular research subject. There is hope that the contribution made by this research to science will provide a strong basis for further research and advancement of CD as an alternative to war.

7.2 Final Remarks

To sum up, based on the conducted research and analyzed case studies following conclusions should be major takeaways from this research. First, CD is a promising tool for resolving conflicts. More research and efforts to facilitate understanding of the CD and factors that influence its success still need to be done to achieve desired results in this field. Application of this strategy could have major benefits and reduce the use of force if the criteria explained in the thesis are fulfilled. Theoretical explanation of this theory shows its importance and significance and provides a good basis for further practical analysis.

Furthermore, the theoretical development of the term has shown that this term was in a similar manner understood by the researchers that paid interest to this topic. Major changes in the way this term was understood were related to the changed nature of international relationships and the different needs to which CD had to respond. It shows that this term still develops and that is suitable for changing to better fit the moment and that term develops in a similar line of thinking. It provides a good perspective for future work on this strategy and developing proposals and potential redefinitions of the strategy. If the CD theory can be improved and if the basis is considered good, it is clear that future improvements of the strategy are possible.

The fact that many similar strategies are not accepted with the same positive attitude as the CD it is clear that the main characteristic of the CD that is of major importance is that it aims to find a balance and not to prevail to one or other side during the negotiations and process of making a solution. It is a valuable perspective as it explains which sides of this strategy should be built in the future and in which direction progress should be led. Inclusion of criteria such as positive incentives and the fact that usage of force is the ultimate tool shows how CD is not just about winning and losing but also about finding solutions and overcoming barriers that can cause both sides a lot – both in lives and in resources.

The criteria that were defined based on the research are:

- Asymmetry of information
- Sense of urgency
- Fear of unacceptable escalation
- Clarity of settlement terms
- Positive incentives.

Each of these criteria is explained in detail and its application was researched using case studies, but what should be stated once more in the concluding part of the thesis is that these criteria cannot be comprehended alone. They represent integral parts of one strategy and thus they must be understood in that way and it should be acknowledged that one influences the other in many cases. Stressing that is of immense importance, as some criteria could be understood as items on a list that needs to be checked. But in this case, each of the criteria first should be analyzed separately and then its interactions with other criteria could be taken into account. In each case, the criteria would distribute differently, and thus as a consequence of it, the outcome would be different. For example, no matter how good and tempting the positive

incentives are if the motivation were higher on the other side these criteria would not be effective.

This was shown by analysis of the case studies that by their nature were completely opposite to one another. Analysis of existing cases shows not only how criteria have manifested differently in each of the cases but also how during the time criteria changed and how the overall situation perceived by these criteria indicated first failure and then success. The possibility that changed circumstances can change the result of the analyzed criteria show that CD strategy application needs to be addressed from the perspective of current information and not just theoretically.

The following issue that needs to be addressed is that impressions about CD success can be interpreted differently depending on which criteria are emphasized. This is important to say to explain that estimation of the success cannot be 100% reliable and no state or other actor in international relationships can count on the definitive success. CD can provide guidelines and better insight if this strategy can provide results or is just a waste of time that could be used for some different strategy. The second reason is that based on the criteria better selection of tools can be made. This means that in some cases a sense of urgency could resolve rapidly and successfully, and in other cases, it could just cause an opposite effect and make parties more determined to go to war if the intent to apply CD by creating a sense of urgency fails. Alternatively, if distrust between the parties exists, clarity of settlement terms could be much more important. Aspects like this one can be of fundamental importance when making a strategy and assessing its potential success. For example, a lack of international support can completely shift the chances for success. Without support, using any force can backlash in the international framework and lead to an even worse situation than initially. Thus, it can be concluded that the complexity of CD demands a detailed analysis of the aspects included in the

international perspective of the situation and a potential lack of support can influence significantly the chances for the application of the strategy or its success.

It is impossible to determine one aspect that has prevailing importance and that leads to the failure or success of the CD strategy. It can only be said that depending on the concrete situation it may vary which has more power over others. It was analyzed for all case studies and it was seen how different criteria get to have the most important role in the analysis of the CD application. In the future, it would be good if actors in international relationships had determined that criterion before the application of CD, this way strategy could be better applied and the change in the status quo that needs to be addressed would be resolved sooner.

However, no matter how low the chances for success are, adding one step more between society and war is definitely a good way to act in international relationships. If there is any chance that the negative aspects of the conflict would be minimized, the application of the strategy is a good way to progress and to act when there is a need. What could be beneficial is to limit the usage of force to the necessary minimum and rely more on other tools that can have the same effect but are more distinctive to war. The predominance of democratic elements over the usage of force could make this strategy stronger and gain more international support. In addition, it would facilitate the hard-defining calculation of the amount of force that can be used.

Thus, after all the analysis and discussion about CD, it could be said that so far this strategy has assured its place in international relationships and that it has achieved enough results to be considered a promising way to address conflict in contemporary society. CD achieved some results so far that could be addressed as success. Still, a lot more room is left for the progress and development of CD. Based upon the criteria set in this thesis, previous applications of CD could be assessed, and the areas for improvements identified. The problems

that may be found in practice are the following. In some cases, there is no time for deep analysis and consultation with the previous cases. The action is required as soon as possible and the preparations cannot be so extensive. Because of that, it is of great importance to make a good and detailed theoretical background that could be easily and rapidly analyzed in the case of need.

The second problem that could be faced in practice is that each case, as it was mentioned before, is specific and different from others. No matter how much the two cases look alike, the motivation will differ, one side will get more international support, the economic situation would be different in the concrete state, and the change in the status quo that happened would have a different impact on people in that country, etc. All of these reasons make it very hard to have a prepared solution for times of crisis.

As a suggestion of how this may be addressed, the focus is put on the further development of the presented criteria. It would be useful to make the application of these criteria to the concrete case simpler and to provide some shortcuts for states to, not in a time-consuming manner, evaluate the future success of CD application.

Definitely, criteria can't be the only thing on which actors who consider the application of CD rely but should be a starting point for evaluating the success or failure of future CD applications and the helpful means to choose the best approach depending on the aspects that are underlined in the concrete case.

7.3 Future Research

Further research should be focused on the ways in which criteria could be assessed before the application of the strategy so that mistakes could be avoided and better results achieved. As an addition, it is of the ultimate importance to increase awareness about this strategy and to support its development as a path to reduce general usage of force in the world.

The power of CD to reduce the costs of conflicts is also an area that needs to receive more attention. The CD is also a strategy that could be used to stop some parties from acting inappropriately, boost international cooperation, and to start justification debates that can later be used as proof to support additional acts. Therefore, in addition to serving its core goal, the CD can be said to generate long-term evaluations of foreign policy and attitudes that have the potential to affect international relations by using a specific example over an extended period of time. The discipline of international relations studies may be affected if the CD, as it is prone to doing, evolves into a substantial tool for changing enemy behavior. As it advances academically, it may become one of the most important strategic tools for resolving conflicts. This is still another incentive to keep developing this strategy, which has over time shown to hold great potential for preventing both the escalation and the actual violence.

The conditions for CD success have not yet been sufficiently thoroughly researched in academic studies. Up until now, there have been talks on the criteria, but these discussions have not taken into account compromise, the target's interests, the target's perspective on the situation, national norms, cultural identity, etc. Finding a solution was therefore seen differently and did not necessitate the kind of sacrifice necessary for the CD to be successfully deployed. These elements can improve the communication that is necessary while using a CD.

7.4 Limitations of the Study

At the very end of the thesis, the limitations of the research are underlined. The first limitation refers to the complexity of the cases that were analyzed. The conflicts on which the CD strategy was applied can be long and many aspects influence the final outcome. It is impossible to include all details that could have had an impact on the examination of the concrete criteria, no matter how deep and detailed the investigation was on the background of the cases. To further elaborate, not all information about the cases that could have had an impact

is public and available for evaluation. Thus, it should be noted that conclusions are drawn based on the information known about the cases, and it is not ruled out that each case has more to it. This is one more reason why it is stressed that no actor in international relationships can rely 100% on the criteria and previous experiences. In addition, a potential lack of information means that some of the information could have led the induction in the wrong direction. If the conclusions made are based on partial information, their value is limited and this represents a major limitation of the conducted research.

Another limitation refers to the number of included studies; it is possible that some other aspects would be distinguished as important if different cases were selected for this purpose. As was already mentioned, this limitation was partially addressed by selecting different cases by nature and by trying to cover in that way a diverse range of aspects that influence the success of CD strategy, to a certain extent, this limitation remains.

When it comes to the analysis of international relationships, it usually is hard to evaluate data as completely truthful as both sides have their version of events. This means that some conclusions are made on the accepted ideas by the international community. It usually refers to the questions such as if the force used for this purpose was necessary and limited, if the action had legitimacy, and whether the goals were clearly set. The same stands for all the cases and all the criteria, as the opposing sides have completely different perceptions about events even when the CD was successful. Therefore, it creates a lot of trouble for researchers to find an objective voice to write about this matter and to present actual facts and not just a more advertised narrative.

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